Validity of economic rationale behind PBF is limited
Principal-agent theory does not hold in complex systems such as health:
Multitasking problem multiplicity of outputs
Outputs are not observable at no cost, without noise difficulty and cost of correctly measuring performance
Some outputs are not dependent on agents’ efforts
Agents are not risk-neutral unfairness of transferring risk to healthcare providers
Complexity of health workers’ remuneration schemes incoherence of incentive scheme
Health workers are not pure homo oeconomicus
Elusion of ancillary components beyond financial premiums Does not take context into consideration
Little empirical endorsement of the P-A theory (Prendergast 1999)
Growing consensus on the fact that the principal-agent theory is not appropriate to justify PBF (Barnes et al. 2015, ToC working group 2017, Paul and Renmans 2018) Review of experiences: “all [PBF] programmes had weak theories of change at start-up” (Norad 2015b)
The theories used to justify PBF to date are few and insufficiently credible
Studies aimed at uncovering the ToC of PBF are recent and unfinished
Most existing PBF ToCs are not theory-based
Actors need to make the theories underlying their interventions more explicit, disentangling the PBF package Performance premiums conditioned on
reaching a number of predetermined
performance criteria may not be justified If PBF is justified neither by strong
theoretical arguments, nor by generalizable evidence, it is definitely marked by a neoliberal ideology, and the promotion of lack of trust and competition over cooperation between actors in the health system
Taboo: Is the debate over PBF definition a way to conceal the debate over PBF ideology ?
• Theory-based evaluation has progressively imposed itself as more appropriate approach to study complex issues
• There are few theory-based evaluations and partial attempts to “open the black box” of PBF and identify its ToC / programme theory / causal pathways / mechanisms / transmission of effects…:
• World Bank’s RBF evaluation toolkit (Vermeersch et al. 2012): outlines some possible ToCs
• Perakis and Savedoff (2015): 4 kinds of channels through which results-based approaches
could produce results: (1) financial incentive; (2) results indicators; (3) accountability; (4) autonomy
• Nimpagaritse et al. (2016): tracks for transmission of effects for health facility performance:
1) income; 2) cash; 3) incentive; 4) information; 5) supervision & enforcement; 6) culture at provider level; 7) health system
• Lohmann et al. (2017): six categories of motivational mechanisms: (1) periodic wake-up call
to deficiencies in day-to-day practice; (2) direction and goals to work towards; (3) strengthening perceived ability to perform successfully at work and triggering a sense of accomplishment; (4) instilling feelings of recognition; (5) altering social dynamics, improving team work towards a common goal, social pressure; (6) offering a ‘nice to have’ opportunity to earn extra income
• More elaborate intents of ToC found in literature include for instance: • Fragmentation of the literature and abundance of (often overlapping)
theories that explain the rationale and functioning of results-based financing approaches (Jahn et al. 2013, Selviaridis & Wynstra 2015, Paul & Renmans 2018)
• Sina Health (2017) PBF course identifies a number of so-called “theories
underlying PBF”: Systems analysis; Public choice; Contract theory; Microeconomics and free market principles; Health economics & public health; Decentralisation; Good governance
• Most commonly used theory to justify PBF = the principal-agent theory:
• Objective: to better align healthcare providers’ incentives with populations’ interests
• Rests on very restrictive assumptions (see below)
• Other currents referred to justify PBF belong to the broad New institutional economics – Property rights theory (Meessen 2009), Transaction
cost economics (Selviaridis & Wynstra 2015) – as well as: Behavioural
economics (Eichler 2006, Chowdhury et al. 2013), Political economy theories (Norad 2015a)
• Few non-economic approaches: Management control theory (Selviaridis & Wynstra 2015), Operations and supply management (Selviaridis & Wynstra 2015),
Contingency theory (Barnes et al. 2015)
To explore (i) the theoretical justification of PBF and (ii)
the theory of change (ToC) in the health sector in LMICs
Performance-based financing (PBF) is expanding in LMICs, despite it has been criticised for potential perverse effects (Paul et al. 2018); unintended effects are demonstrated (Turcotte-Tremblay et al.
2017). Attributing results to PBF as such is difficult because (i) health systems inherently
comprise “structural” incentives and are subject to various reforms; and (ii) there are misunderstandings and controversies about the mere definition and the theory behind PBF.
PBF schemes encompass different components (e.g. financial premiums conditioned on reaching pre-agreed results, focus and feedback on key performance indicators, coaching, additional resources at facility level, …) and their designs may infinitely vary. Yet, we still do not have a clear and consistent explanation of why and how PBF is supposed to produce results.
Much of the current cross-disciplinary PBF research lacks a sound theoretical basis (Selviaridis & Wynstra 2015)
W
hat is the theory of
change,
actually ?
Source: Renmans D, Holvoet N, Criel B, Meessen B. Performance-based financing: the same is
different. Health Policy and Planning, 2017, 1–9
Source: Borghi J, Singh NS, Brown G, Anselmi L, Kristensen S. Understanding for whom, why and in what circumstances payment for performance works in low and middle income countries: protocol for a realist review. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000695
1 Université de Liège, Faculty of Social Sciences*, Liège, Belgium; Email: [email protected] ; [email protected] 2 Université Libre de Bruxelles, School of Public Health, Brussels, Belgium 3 Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, CEPED (IRD-Université Paris Descartes), Universités Paris Sorbonne Cités,
ERL INSERM SAGESUD, Paris, France; Email: [email protected]