Theoretical framework

Having summarised the current formulations and use of the concept of solidarity in the social science literature, I will now delineate how this concept is used in this dissertation as it relates to the theoretical framework guiding this research.

Solidarity

As identified above, solidarity can be examined through various lenses, but key conceptual elements concern social configurations that link individuals and groups and favour prosocial practices and attitudes due to common obligations.

Traditional concepts of solidarity also indicate that solidarity comprises three social roles – normative, functional and structural. In this sense, solidarity has been described as a measure of social cohesion. Durkheim (1993 [1893]) defines solidarity as a source of social order (i.e., fulfilling a normative role), based on a sense of mutual awareness and a set of collective obligations. Hence, solidarity also entails compliance to social norms, which favours social cohesion (a functional role).

Researchers have also elicited structural aspects of solidarity. Solidarity by virtue of social relations concerns social groups and people sharing common interests and characteristics. This structural role of solidarity favours normative compliance and requires functional interdependence between individuals with limited rationality (Hechter 2015; 1987; Coleman 1990).

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These three roles define the groupness or membership function of solidarity, which has been described as mechanical solidarity if based on interpersonal ties, and as organic solidarity when based on the interdependence between highly differentiated social arrangements (Durkheim 1993 [1893]; Hechter 1987). The literature also concludes that solidarity can be project-driven, as people are not only oriented towards the concrete aspects of everyday social life, but also towards collective everlasting projects (Alexander 2006; Rippe 1998).

The groupness or membership function of solidarity supposes a motivational source to cooperative and reciprocal practices and attitudes (Gerhards et al. 2019; Bating and Kymlicka 2017). Solidarity favours collective endeavours due to its groupness function where the actors enacting solidarity can benefit directly or indirectly (Lahusen et al. 2020). These elements of the concept of solidarity indicate its hybrid nature (Gerhards et al. 2019; Scholz 2008). As a result, solidarity denotes a functional, structural and normative role (i.e., groupness or membership function) in addition to observable practices and attitudes (i.e., outputs).

Therefore, solidarity involves first a range of social relations connecting either individuals and groups, actors and beneficiaries, or actors and projects. Second, it builds on common normative grounds. Third, it provides motives for action, and lastly, it translates into practices (behaviours) and attitudes.

Hereafter this dissertation centres on an understanding of solidarity, which denotes relations of care and support, held and carried out by individuals or collective actors, in favour of others and enacted by virtue of shared norms and obligations to common membership to groups. Indeed, these relations are employed to describe the solidarity outputs, i.e., the practices carried out by actors to support, or at the very least, to describe their disposition to care and help others (Lahusen et al.

2020; Bayertz 1999). Thus, solidarity is defined as:

Attitudes (preparedness) and practices of care and support for the rights, interests and welfare of others, through personal or collective contributions within non-institutional or institutional settings, shaped by norms and obligations to common memberships (group orientations).

In this sense, solidarity is distinguishable from other associated concepts i.e., 'altruism', 'philanthropy', 'care' and 'prosocial'. First, solidarity relates and differs from altruism and philanthropy because it is grounded in reciprocal expectations (indirect or direct), sustained by membership to groups or projects (Lahusen et al. 2020). Moreover, solidarity goes beyond a supererogatory action of altruism (Ferrera 2014; Habermas 1991, 1990), i.e., a good Samaritan action, because it is bounded to shared obligations to others and expectations from others

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(Gerhards et al. 2019). Solidarity is distinguished from philanthropy and altruism because, “the person who pledges solidarity to the cause, even if she has not been affected, nevertheless also sees herself as having a stake in the cause” (Polletta 2020:22).

Likewise, solidarity is often used as synonym for prosocial practices and attitudes (Lindenberg et al. 2006). Conceptually, solidarity also accounts for motives. Hence, the hybrid nature of solidarity denotes two major characteristics, a function and an output, yet the prosocial concept only accounts for the output. Lastly, “care” suggests a sensibility toward others’ needs (reciprocal or not) and refers to an empathic concern (Nadler 2012; Dovidio et al. 2006). Thus, solidarity relates to care when care is an expressive form of concern due to a sense of belonging among people but not when it is the source of empathic concerns and emotional arousal.

Studying solidarity

Solidarity takes place between individuals and groups, actors and beneficiaries, and actors and projects. Therefore, solidarity describes target-oriented practices and attitudes, conditioned by one’s membership. Concretely, this illustrates that solidarity requires having or taking an interest in and for others.

Interest-oriented actions and attitudes, and its mirror image altruism, are key concepts in social science research. They have been studied as being primarily motivated by the actors' self-interest (rational choice) and/or in an obliged situational interdependence with others (exchange theory) and/or context (cultural theory) (Hechter 2015; Simpson and Willer 2015; Spillman and Strand 2013). Previous arguments situate practices and attitudes of solidarity as oriented towards the actor’s self-interest, but limited by the interdependence with other actors that indirectly favours the interests of other beneficiaries than the actor. However, there is no reason why interest-oriented actions should not favour others, based on a commonality of interests or by virtue of empathic concern (Schroeder and Graziano 2015; Spillman and Strand 2013; Batson 2011).

In this respect, on the one hand, actors can be beneficiaries of a solidarity practice because they are part of the beneficiary group or because it leads to an indirect self-gain. On the other hand, actors and beneficiaries do not need to overlap, meaning actors can enact solidarity to support or help other beneficiaries (individuals and groups). The former account concerns direct reciprocity based on mutual help and obligations or imagined expectations, i.e., I help you because you help me or eventually you might help me (Lahusen et al. 2021; Simpson and Willer 2015; Ferrera 2014). In contrast, the latter account concerns indirect reciprocity based on a third-party engagement, i.e. I help you because you helped her (Simpson and Willer 2015; Spillman and Strand 2013).

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Yet, in this dissertation, more than examining the motivational source behind solidarity practices and attitudes (outputs), I investigate to which beneficiaries solidarity outputs are orientated. Since solidarity can take place between individuals and groups, actors and beneficiaries, or actors and projects, it is the groupness or memberships function that defines the orientation of the solidarity attitudes and practices – outputs (Lahusen et al. 2020; Schroeder and Graziano 2015; Tilly 2005).

Accordingly, solidarity practices and attitudes are characterised by the actors enacting these outputs, the beneficiaries of the outputs, and the group orientations of care and support (membership function).

Therefore, solidarity is an “attribute of groups” (Hechter 2015), meaning an internal “degree of fusion” or unity with a commonality of purpose (Ferrara and Burrelli 2019). It concerns the readiness to care and support, “specific groups of people” (Lahusen et al. 2020). In this sense, solidarity is attached to specific reference groups. The outputs of solidarity are conditional to the memberships orienting attitudes and practices of solidarity within groups, as well as between groups. Thereby, solidarity can be limited to specific groups (particular), but also to imagined or universal groups (e.g., humanity). Thus, memberships inform how people accommodate competing solidarities across groups, uncovering internal group dynamics but also intergroup ones.

Defining the political dimension of solidarity

The previous conceptual overview presents a general understanding of solidarity, integrating a rich variation of social relations, memberships, attitudes and practices. Now these features are centred in relation to its political dimension. First, I define the political dimension of solidarity, illustrating how solidarity features can encounter a political dimension. Second, I discuss how memberships (group orientations), practices and attitudes of solidarity can be considered political. Lastly, I elaborate the conceptual operationalisation of political solidarity used in the four papers of this dissertation.

One of the main characteristics of solidarity is related to shared obligations and strains of commitments between individuals and groups – its groupness function. Solidarity preludes normative-led practices and attitudes to build and maintain collective endeavours as well as just societies (Gerhards et al. 2020; Gerhards et al. 2019; Bating and Kymlicka 2017; Bayertz 1999).

Accordingly, solidarity concerns shared projects to build and sustain collective endeavours. These projects fuel solidarity practices and attitudes in modern societies inspired by feelings of loyalty and civic virtues that go beyond old communitarian perspectives (Alexander 2006; Rippe 1998). The projects constitute the boundaries of the social configuration (membership) and therefore of the solidarity relations (Polletta 2020; Alexander 2006; Rippe 1998). In this sense, I maintain that the

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political dimension of solidarity is grounded in shared political projects, entailing common obligations and moral commitments between individuals and groups.

Aside from the function, the conceptualisation of solidarity also includes group memberships orientating attitudes and behaviours of care and support (outputs). Hence, the political dimension of solidarity supposes active agency of the actor and attitudes of preparedness to engage politically to help and support others. Stjerno (2005: 308) defines solidarity as, “the preparedness to share resources with others, through personal contributions to those who are struggling and through taxation and redistribution organised by the state.” Accordingly, one could describe political solidarity as standing beside the ones in need in order to favour their civic and political inclusion. In this sense, the political dimension of solidarity denotes political attitudes and practices of support and care within institutionalised settings. This previous aspect is key to describing political solidarity within institutional practices and obligations to protect all members of the community, guaranteeing their basic needs and rights to participate fully in society (Scholz 2008).

Similarly, solidarity brings about collective action when standing together as a group of people in common socio-political situation, or as standing together with those in need. Linking solidarity to collective action, Stjerno (2005) complements his definition of solidarity with the idea of, “readiness for collective action and its institutionalisation through the establishment of rights and citizenship,”

(Stjerno 2005: 308). This political account of solidarity appeals to the institutionalisation of rights based on the idea of sameness and togetherness. It refers to standing together as a group, denoting moral commitments and binding obligations to a common political membership. Additionally, Scholz (2015: 732) defines political solidarity based on, “a moral relation formed when individuals or groups unite around some mutually recognised political need or goal in order to bring about social change.” This account of political solidarity focuses on the interest, rights and claims on behalf others. The actors engage politically in favour of the rights of other people or groups, as standing together with those in need.

Therefore, on the one side, the political dimension of solidarity involves rights and obligations based on common political memberships, (foreseeing group's orientations of care and support), configured through political projects. On the other side, the political dimension of solidarity entails attitudes (preparedness) and practices (engagement in political actions) on behalf of groups and the wellbeing, interests and rights of others. Overall, the political dimension of solidarity informs us of its contentious nature, bounded to claims of rights aiming at improving the situation of groups or individuals (Lahusen et al. 2020). People enact political solidarity through attitudes and practices aimed at challenging or supporting policies, contesting political membership (orientations of groups and to groups), and/or bringing about broader social change.

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Given the above, to examine political solidarity this dissertation analyses three key elements that account for care and support of the rights, wellbeing and interests of others: 1) memberships (as group orientations), 2) practices (namely actions and behaviours), and 3) attitudes (as preparedness and dispositions).

These three elements can be examined as social or political. When self-help groups engage in practices of emotional support to their members, they enact solidarity based on particular membership orientations and related practices. Similarly, when people display attitudes of concerns and interest about the welfare of others in their community, these comprise attitudes of solidarity.

However, not all group orientations, practices and attitudes of care and support bounded by shared obligation and commitments can be described as political.

To address the political nature of social phenomena, scholars have used a variety of conceptualisations (Bartolini 2018). With respect to the political dimension of solidarity, this dissertation builds on a comprehensive definition of political based on Tilly's and Tarrow's (2015) definition of contentions politics:

"Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on other actors' interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interest or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015:7)."

This definition comprises three decisive features: contention based on claims, actions based on shared programs and interests, and direct or indirect interaction among actors within the realms of politics. First, the claims are made in the interests of others. An actor enters in contention with another actor about a claim. Second, actors engage in coordinated actions to express the claim.

Lastly, actors interact with institutional actors directly or indirectly through activities addressing institutional rights, policy regulations and/or interests (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 8). For instance, associations that sign a petition claiming active working programs to municipalities for the social inclusion of unemployed young people, engage in contentious politics such as political solidarity.

They bear claims of welfare and support towards the social rights of others to institutional actors.

That said, Tilly and Tarrow's (2015) definition of contentions politics does not capture political attitudes. Their definition centres on political actions, political actors and the presence of conflicts structured through political memberships (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 109). Yet, the approach I adopt considers and examines attitudes of solidarity as political within the broader framework of contention politics. These are political when the individual solidarity attitudes address indirectly the

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governmental actors, supporting or contesting the policies concerning rights allocation to others.

Thus, I define political solidarity as follows:

Political solidarity describes practices and attitudes (preparedness) of care and support to others, by claiming interests and rights on behalf groups and people, addressed to institutional actors directly or indirectly, and aiming at improving the situation of the beneficiaries of the claims by challenging or supporting policies, contesting political memberships and/or by bringing about social change, through individual or collective means.

Moreover, to examine solidarity and its political dimension, this dissertation posits a multi-dimensional analysis of solidarity studying attitudes, practices and memberships across various level of analysis, actors and settings. As part of this dissertation’s primary objective, I seeks to unveil relevant factors that characterise, prompt, and describe individual and collective outputs of solidarity.

Figure 1 presents how the different dimensions are related and factor into my theoretical framework. For this matter, I empirically described and analysed the interplay between factors among macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. The figure displays the interconnections between the three levels of analysis, with the dotted lines due to and reflecting data limitations related to the interconnections between contextual factors and meso organisational factors because they were not directly tested. With regards to the interplayed between organisational factors and individual factors, these were indirectly tested using social capital proxies.

Macro-level factors, (country level determinants), are expected to influence the political solidarity outputs. Through the analysis of the institutional context, I seek to identify the differential effect of policy regimes shaping individual political attitudes of institutional solidarity toward vulnerable groups (e.g., migrants). At the meso-level, I focus on the organisational features underlying citizen cooperation networks and initiatives. The analysis illustrates how solidarity is organised in terms of organisational forms and outputs of collective action (social and political). Lastly, at the individual level, I describe and examine individual practices and attitudes configuring the political dimension of solidarity, while studying the factors substantiating these individual outputs of political solidarity.

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Figure 1. Theoretical framework of multi-dimensional analysis of individual and collective forms of political solidarity practices and attitudes (outputs)

Operationalisation of political solidarity in the forgoing chapters

As previously discussed, empirically, solidarity translates into outputs consisting of attitudes (preparedness) and practices of care and support for the rights, interests and welfare of others through personal or collective contributions within non-institutional or institutional settings, by virtue to common memberships.

Therefore, solidarity is a hybrid concept, which denotes a groupness or membership function, while entailing practices and attitudes (outputs). These two characteristics of solidarity, namely the function and the outputs, suppose a relevant conundrum to its operationalisation. Therefore, due to the empirical inquiry of this dissertation and for operationalisation purposes, I distinguish between the outputs of solidarity, namely attitudes and practices, and the groupness or membership function.

Successively, to study the political dimension of solidarity the four empirical chapters of this dissertation centre on the outputs of the solidarity (dependent variables). Yet, the empirical outputs of solidarity are political only when claiming interests and rights on behalf groups and people.

These claims imply an interaction with institutional actors directly or indirectly to improve the situation of the solidarity beneficiaries by challenging or supporting policies, contesting political memberships and/or by bringing about social change.

Starting from Chapter 2, a proxy is used to measure forms of solidarity relations structuring the interactions between actors and beneficiaries at the organisational level. Four forms of interactions are operationalised, divided into two major categories: 1) vertical – unilateral support between actors and beneficiaries, and 2) horizontal – relations of mutual support between equivalent actors and beneficiaries. This chapter demonstrates how practices of solidarity can be social or political,

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and the chapter serves as a first step to distinguish outputs of solidarity (tout court) from political solidarity ones. It also illustrates how some forms of interactions privilege actions of protesting, demonstrating, and lobbying for policy reform or social change, while others privilege actions to respond to urgent needs and socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable groups. Concerning the membership function of solidarity, Chapter 2 addresses this indirectly through a discussion about organisational forms and the norms of reciprocity holding together various collective enterprises.

Thereafter, the remaining three empirical chapters centre the empirical analysis of attitudes and practices of solidarity (outputs as dependent variables) at the individual level, focusing on the political dimension of solidarity.

Chapter 3 measures different forms of reported solidarity practices to support the rights of groups, e.g. donating time or money, passive and active membership in organisations, buying (or refusing to buy) products, and protest participation. These solidarity outputs are labelled through the chapter as solidarity actions in support of the rights of outgroups (refugees) and in support of the rights of in-groups (people with disabilities or unemployed people).

Concerning the political dimension of these solidarity actions, applying a political criterion based on a taxonomy of activities, several of these actions cannot be described as political but civic.

Likewise, using a political criterion based on location, none of these actions take place at the institutional locus, therefore described as non-political. However, in line with the definition of contentious politics and relative to the concepts of rights and indirect claims to institutional actors, these actions are all political.

In other words, these solidarity outputs can be understood as political because they bear claims about the rights of others. They are structured in a conflict of the allocation of rights that indirectly addresses institutional power. Nevertheless, one may argue that some of these actions (e.g.

donating money or time) are not political but passive forms of civic engagement; however, passive or not, these actions are means to coordinated efforts to voice claims on behalf the rights of others.

For instance, when an individual donates money to an organisation for the rights of refugees, they are transferring private means to collective means, spurring collective action to improve the situation of the beneficiaries while indirectly challenging their current rights situation.

Chapters 4 and Chapter 5 continue the analysis of political solidarity at the individual level, yet

Chapters 4 and Chapter 5 continue the analysis of political solidarity at the individual level, yet