4.2.1. Environmental targeting and re-targeting in PES
As noted above, environmental targeting (ET) refers to the practice of selecting eligible PES participants based on some pre-defined considerations with the purpose of increasing additionality in conservation outcomes, i.e., what would have happened in the absence of PES (Engel, 2016). The logic of ET resides in the fact that not all areas matter equally for conservation, i.e., there is variability in environmental benefits or risks, and budget constraints impede enrolling all potential ES suppliers. Hence, ET is expected to enhance additionality in areas that exhibit large variability in potential environmental benefits, opportunity costs or risk of non-compliance (Börner et al., 2017). The most common ET approach is based on selecting areas with high ES provision and low ES provision costs, or areas with high threat of degradation or deforestation (Engel, 2016; S Wunder, Brouwer, Engel, Muradian, et al., 2018). Once geographical areas are prioritized in terms of the above-mentioned criteria, landowners or tenants are invited to participate. At this stage, who gets eligible to participate is not neutral to PES objectives and conceptualizations (van Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Huybrechs, 2015). PES discourses reflect shared conceptions on what drives changes in ecosystem services and the potential role payments can have in preserving or enhancing their provision (Adger et al., 2001;
Dryzek, 2005; McAfee & Shapiro, 2010).
For example, if environmental additionality is conceptualized as the main PES objective and cost-efficiency is a priority, then, in principle, participants who are likely to conserve for intrinsic reasons should be excluded from the programme (Alpízar, Nordén, Pfaff, &
Robalino, 2017b). In contrast, if income generation, recognition of forest stewardship, and compensation of opportunity costs for land-use restrictions are regarded as PES objectives, then any participant residing in an area of ecological importance should become eligible regardless of potential deforestation threats or pre-existing motivations to preserve ES (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015; Moros, Corbera, Vélez, &
Flechas, 2019).
In this article, we focus on re-targeting defined as the changes in the selection criteria of old and new participants. Re-targeting is a quite common practice in social and environmental public policies and interventions and it is usually the result of different drivers including: pressures from specific interest groups including donors and the general public (Sabatier, 1988), learning derived from programme evaluations or technical innovations (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), the involvement of new stakeholders in programme design and implementation (Gunderson, 2008), or changes in the environmental context or environmental regulations.
Re-targeting implies changes in the rules governing PES schemes and as such, it affects both performance and outcomes (Corbera et al., 2008). Several PES schemes in Latin America have gone through re-targeting processes for different reasons. For example, a partial evaluation of the Costa Rica national PES scheme showed that adverse self-selection led to the enrolment of participants with no threat of deforestation and low conservation opportunity costs (Robalino & Pfaff, 2013). Consequently, a large fraction
of payments went to those who would conserve forest regardless of payments; a feature that was later adjusted (Porras et al., 2013; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). The Mexican PES programme was also subject to a re-targeting process. The programme was criticized by rural social movements for not including enough areas at high risk of deforestation and not reaching the most vulnerable communities (McAfee & Shapiro, 2010; Sims et al., 2014). In response, applications from smaller landowners were allowed and two ecological criteria were included in 2009 to increase environmental additionality: areas that had low rate of anthropogenic soil degradation and areas that contain high biomass density (Sims et al., 2014). The Socio-Páramo programme in Ecuador also shifted its area selection criteria from solely environmental criteria to explicitly incorporating poverty levels to define priority areas and taking into account land size to reduce strategic rent-seeking behaviour from large landholders (Bremer, Farley, & Lopez-Carr, 2014).
4.2.2. Equity in PES
Equity has been identified as a key element to incorporate in PES design and implementation, particularly when vulnerable participants or communities are involved in such schemes (Corbera et al., 2007; Pascual et al., 2014). In the context of PES, equity can comprise three elements: equity in access, equity in decision-making, and equity in outcome (Calvet-Mir et al., 2015; Corbera et al., 2007; Pascual et al., 2010). Equity in access refers to the extent to which disadvantaged farmers are able to participate in the schemes. Equity in decision-making is related to the extent to which disadvantaged groups are recognized and included in PES strategic management decisions. Finally, equity in outcomes refers to the distribution of project outcome across participants (Corbera et al., 2007).
PES can vary on the emphasis and relative importance given to these different dimensions of equity. For example, schemes that focus exclusively on environmental efficiency and overlook equity in access (e.g., enrolling only de jure landowners) carry the risk of being perceived as illegitimate or not credible among both enrolled participants and non-participants; two main aspects that have been identified as key predictors of PES success (Börner et al., 2017; Gross-Camp et al., 2012). Further, overlooking equity in outcomes (for example, if a flat-rate payment is given disregarding heterogeneous conservation opportunity costs or land size) can also result in reinforcing pre-existent inequalities among participating communities and landowners (Muradian et al. 2010; Pascual et al.
2010; Sommerville et al. 2010). Ignoring equity in decision making by excluding groups without economic or political power also risks reinforcing control over natural resources by the most powerful actors and rural communities’ elites (J. C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco
& Budds, 2015).
Additionality gains from targeting can also imply trade-offs with equity and well-being (Börner et al., 2017). Empirical evidence on the potential trade-offs between environmental additionality and equity is still scant. A review study of 29 biodiversity conservation schemes in the tropics and subtropics found that positive impacts on environmental effectiveness are generally more often reported than those associated to positive equity outcomes, and that trade-offs between equity and efficiency are rarely explored in a quantitative manner (Calvet-Mir et al. 2015). However, other evidence suggests that equity and effectiveness can be reconciled, for example through the implementation of redistributive PES (i.e. higher payments to poorer landholders)
without compromising environmental effectiveness (Vorlaufer, Ibanez, Juanda, &
Wollni, 2017).
4.2.3. Motivation crowding in the context of PES
Although environmental targeting and re-targeting are a necessary step towards the improvement of PES implementation in terms of additionality and efficiency, adjusting selection criteria, or changing the rules governing PES schemes, also entails the risk of excluding early participants. This situation potentially raises motivation crowding concerns, which implies the alteration of existent motivations due to the introduction or removal of an incentive (R. Ryan & Deci, 2000). Motivation crowding is a common preoccupation in PES practice and scholarship (Moros, Vélez, et al., 2019; Sommerville et al., 2010; a Vatn, 2010; Vollan, 2008) and recent theoretical advances in the context of PES state that crowding out of intrinsic motivations is more likely to happen when payments are perceived as controlling or imposing; when they are designed in a non-participatory manner; when they do not recognize people’s skills; or do not take into account the equity, and social or environmental preferences of participants. The opposite situation is expected to lead to crowding in (Ezzine-de-blas et al., 2019). Research on PES motivation crowding is increasing over time and to date the majority of studies in the context of PES report no evidence of motivation crowding out (Handberg & Angelsen, 2016; Kaczan, Swallow, & Adamowicz, 2016; Vollan, 2008). However, this evidence is not conclusive yet perhaps due to the difficulties in comparing dissimilar case-studies that are embedded in different institutional dynamics and contexts. In the context of this research, motivation crowding out might occur as a result of re-targeting if excluded participants feel frustrated or if they perceive exclusion as an unfair outcome.