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Pseudonymity and its consequences

Part III: Technical Topics

16.1 The difficulty of accountability

16.1.5 Pseudonymity and its consequences

Many, if not most, of the services on the Internet today do not deal directly with legal identities.

Instead, web sites and chat rooms ask their users to create a handle or pseudonym by which they are known while using that system. These systems should be distinguished from those that are fully anonymous; in a fully anonymous system, there is no way to refer to the other members of the system.

16.1.5.1 Problems with pseudospoofing and possible defenses

The most important difficulty caused by pseudonymity is pseudospoofing . A term first coined by L.

Detweiler on the Cypherpunks mailing list, pseudospoofing means that one person creates and controls many phony identities at once. This is a particularly bad loophole in reputation systems that blithely accept input from just any user, like current web auction sites. An untrustworthy person can pseudospoof to return to the system after earning a bad reputation, and he can even create an entire tribe of accounts that pat each other on the back. Pseudospoofing is a major problem inherent in pseudonymous systems.

Lots of systems fail in the presence of pseudospoofing. Web polls are one example; even if a web site requires registration, it's easy for someone to simply register and then vote 10, 15, or 1,500 times.

Another example is a free web hosting site, such as GeoCities, which must take care to avoid someone registering under six or seven different names to obtain extra web space.

Pseudospoofing is hard in the real world, so most of us don't think about it. After all, in the real world, changing one's appearance and obtaining new identities is relatively rare, spy movies to the contrary.

When we come online, we bring with us the assumptions built up over a lifetime of dealing with people who can be counted on to be the "same person" next time we meet them. Pseudospoofing works, and works so well, because these assumptions are completely unjustified online. As shown by the research of psychologist Sherry Turkle and others, multiple identities are common in online communities.

So what can we do about pseudospoofing? Several possibilities present themselves:

• Abandon pseudonymous systems entirely. Require participants in a peer-to-peer system to prove conclusively who they are. This is the direction taken by most work on Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), which try to tie each online users to some legal identity. Indeed, VeriSign used to refer to its digital certificates as "driver's licenses for the information superhighway."

This approach has a strong appeal. After all, why should people be allowed to "hide" behind a pseudonym? And how can we possibly have accountability without someone's real identity?

Unfortunately, this approach is unnecessary, unworkable, and in some cases undesirable. It's unnecessary for at least three reasons:

o Identity does not imply accountability. For example, if a misbehaving user is in a completely different jurisdiction, other users may know exactly who he or she is and yet be unable to do anything about it. Even if they are in the same jurisdiction, the behavior may be perfectly legal, just not very nice.

o Accountability is possible even in pseudonymous systems. This point will be developed at length in the rest of this chapter.

o The problem with pseudospoofing is not that someone acts under a "fake" name, but that someone acts under more than one name. If we could somehow build a system that ensured that every pseudonym was controlled by a distinct person, a reputation system could handle the problem.

Furthermore, absolute authentication is unworkable because it requires verifying the legal identities of all participants. On today's Internet, this is a daunting proposition. VeriSign and other PKI companies are making progress in issuing their "digital driver's licenses," but we are a far cry from that end. In addition, one then has to trust that the legal identities have not themselves been fabricated. Verification can be expensive and leaves a system that relies on it open to attack if it fails.

Finally, this proposed solution is undesirable because it excludes users who either cannot or will not participate. International users of a system may not have the same ways of verifying

• Allow pseudonyms, but ensure that all participants are distinct entities. This is all that is strictly necessary to prevent pseudospoofing. Unfortunately, it tends to be not much easier than asking for everyone's legal identity.

• Monitor user behavior for evidence of pseudospoofing. Remove or "expose" accounts that seem to be controlled by the same person. The effectiveness of this approach varies widely with the application. It also raises privacy concerns for users.

• Make pseudospoofing unprofitable. Give new accounts in a system little or no resources until they can prove themselves by doing something for the system. Make it so expensive for an adversary to prove itself multiple times that it has no inclination to pseudospoof. This is the approach taken by the Free Haven project, which deals with new servers by asking them to donate resources to the good of the system as a whole.

All of these alternatives are just rules of thumb. Each of them might help us combat the problems of pseudospoofing, but it's hard to reach a conclusive solution. We'll return to possible technical solutions later in this chapter when we describe the Advogato system.

16.1.5.2 Reputation for sale - SOLD!

Pseudonymous systems are based on the assumption that each pseudonym is controlled by the same entity for the duration of the system. That is, the adversary's pseudonyms stay controlled by the adversary, and the good guys' pseudonyms stay controlled by the good guys.

What happens if the adversary takes control of someone who already has a huge amount of trust or resources in the system? Allowing accounts to change hands can lead to some surprising situations.

The most prevalent example of this phenomenon comes in online multiplayer games. One of the best-known such games is Ultima Online. Players gallivant around the world of Brittania, completing quests, fighting foes, and traipsing around dungeons, in the process accumulating massive quantities of loot. Over the course of many, many hours, a player can go from a nobody to the lord and master of his own castle. Then he can sell it all to someone else.

Simply by giving up his username and password, an Ultima Online player can transfer ownership of his account to someone else. The new owner obtains all the land and loot that belonged to the old player. More importantly, she obtains the reputation built up by the old player. The transfer can be carried out independently of the game; no one need ever know that it happened. As far as anyone else knows, the game personality is the same person. Until the new owner does something "out of character," or until the news spreads somehow, there is no way to tell that a transfer has occurred.

This has led to a sort of cottage industry in trading game identities for cash online. Ultima Online game identities, or " avatars," can be found on auction at eBay. Other multiplayer online games admit the occurrence of similar transactions. Game administrators can try to forbid selling avatars, but as long as it's just a matter of giving up a username and password, it will be an uphill battle.

The point of this example is that reputations and identities do not bind as tightly to people online as they do in the physical world. Reputations can be sold or stolen with a single password. While people can be coerced or "turned" in the physical world, it's much harder. Once again, the assumptions formed in the physical world turn out to be misleading online.

One way of dealing with this problem is to embed an important piece of information, such as a credit card number, into the password for an account. Then revealing the password reveals the original user's credit card number as well, creating a powerful incentive not to trade away the password. The problem is that if the password is ever accidentally compromised, the user now loses not just the use of his or her account, but the use of a credit card as well.

Another response is to make each password valid only for a certain number of logins; to get a new password, the user must prove that he is the same person who applied for the previous password. This does not stop trading passwords, however - it just means the "original" user must hang around to renew the password each time it expires.