Projecting nuclear power development in the medium and long term is a difficult exercise, because a large number of driving factors cannot be assessed with any high degree of certainty. The scenarios developed by the IAEA are not meant to be a prediction of the likely evolution of nuclear power generation but rather are intended only to illustrate some plausible future possibilities. The medium term scenarios, up to 2030, are derived from a bottom-up approach based upon a review of nuclear power programmes and plans in Member States of the IAEA. The low and high estimates of nuclear
capacity (Table 3) correspond to a set of contrasting but not extreme assumptions with regard to the parameters which will influence the implemen-tation of nuclear programmes.
The low estimates are based on assumptions that reflect a continuation of present trends: public opposition in some countries, low economic growth in industrialized countries, institutional and sociopolitical uncertainties in economies in transition and lack of funding in developing countries. In this case, the nuclear units under construction will be completed but only those countries where nuclear programmes are already firmly committed to will continue to order new units. In some countries, nuclear units will not be replaced at the end of their lifetimes and the total installed nuclear capacity in these countries will decrease before 2030. The projected nuclear capacity worldwide, in the low case, would be about 418 GW(e) in 2030, and the share of nuclear power in electricity generation worldwide would be 13%.
The high estimates assume a moderate revival of nuclear power development that could occur in the light of a more comprehensive assessment of the macroeconomic and environmental aspects of the different options available for electricity generation. This revival is assumed to occur mainly in Western Europe and to a lesser extent in North America. In Eastern Europe, nuclear power programmes are assumed to be implemented according to the present plans. In the Far East, nuclear power is assumed to be developed in line with rapid growth of electricity demand. In the high case, total nuclear capacity is projected to reach about 640 GW(e) in 2030, which will allow the share of nuclear power in electricity generation to be just about 12% [2].
In both sets of projections, nuclear growth starts to lag behind global electricity growth. Therefore, nuclear power’s share of global electricity decreases. In the latest low projection it drops from the current 16% to 13% in 2030. In the high projection it drops further, to 12%. That may seem counter-intuitive. What is happening is that, in the high projection, not only is nuclear electricity growing faster than in the low projection but so also is overall electricity use. In fact, overall electricity use is growing sufficiently fast that the differential between it and nuclear power is growing more than in the low projection, and thus the nuclear share drops more.
Assuming a nuclear revival is not unrealistic; 2004 already showed several promising developments, including upward revisions in specific expansion plans and actions in a number of countries, consequently higher medium term nuclear projections, increased media attention to the potential benefits of nuclear power including its very low GHG emissions, and more favourable ratings for nuclear power in a number of public opinion polls. It should be noted, however, that while the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol could be
TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF TOTAL ELECTRICITY CAPACITY AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR POWER (Source: IAEA [2]) Country group 20042010a2020a2030a Total elect. GW(e)
Nuclear Total elect. GW(e) Nuclear Total elect. GW(e) Nuclear Total elect. GW(e)
Nuclear GW(e)%GW(e)%GW(e)%GW(e)% North America1055111.310.61099 1155116 11711 101194 1279118 12810 101318 1422115 145 8.7 10 Latin America2644.11.6303 3504.1 4.11.4 1.2383 5436.1 6.11.6 1.1483 8285.8 15 1.2 1.8 Western Europe724125.117.3762 816119 12516 15842 95197 13011 14940 111879 145 8.5 13 Eastern Europe46649.410.6469 49648 5110 10505 60564 7813 13543 73666 9712 13 Africa1051.81.7115 1351.8 1.81.6 1.3143 2072.1 4.11.5 2.0181 3162.1 9.3 1.2 3.0 Middle East and South Asia2843.01.0331 3709 102.8 2.8430 55515 273.6 4.9556 81118 43 3.2 5.3 South East Asia and the Pacific143169 184213 2700.9 0.90.4 0.3264 3910.9 3.0 0.3 0.8 Far East65172.811.2685 84082 8512 10804 1167113 14214 12937 1589131 18314 11 World totalLow estimate High estimate3693367.510.03934 4347380 39510 9.14515 5576416 5169.2 9.35223 7210418 640 8.0 8.9 a Nuclear capacity estimates take into account the scheduled decommissioning of the older units at the end of their lives.
important for the future development of nuclear power, its immediate impacts on nuclear power are indirect, and significant impacts are uncertain and long term.
Most straightforward were the upward revisions in new near-term nuclear projections released in 2005 by the IAEA [1]. The low projection was adjusted upwards for the fourth year in a row, reflecting an increasingly optimistic outlook for nuclear. It now projects 416 GW(e) of nuclear capacity in 2020, the equivalent of 116 more 1000 MW(e) nuclear plants than projected just four years earlier. In the high projection there has been less change, and a less consistent pattern of change, from year to year. However, the overall pattern is consistent with an industry with good prospects. The list of reasonable medium term projects at the high end is fairly stable, and each year more of them are promoted from promising prospects to actual projects being developed.
Figures 10 and 11 show historical nuclear capacity growth together with the evolution of the IAEA projections in the last four years. The IAEA’s latest high projection shows an 82% increase in nuclear electricity production between 2004 and 2030.
For a regional breakdown of the low projection until 2030, the two most distinctive features are the contraction of nuclear capacity in Western Europe and the expansion in the Far East (Fig. 12). The capacity in the Middle East and
FIG. 10. Historical growth in world nuclear capacity and the IAEA’s low projections for the years 2000–2005.
FIG. 11. Historical growth in world nuclear capacity and the IAEA’s high projections for the years 2000–2005.
FIG. 12. Regional distribution of world nuclear capacity in the IAEA’s low projection until 2030 when extended to 2050 using approximately one third of the median nuclear expansion rates of the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovern-mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (NA: North America; LA: Latin America; WE:
Western Europe; EE: Eastern Europe; ME/SA: Middle East and South Asia; SEA/Pac:
South East Asia and Pacific).
South Asia region actually grows by a factor of six in this case, although from a small base. There is some small net growth in Eastern Europe and basically no change in North America.
In the high projection until 2030 (Fig. 13), there is capacity growth in all regions, but the Far East still leads with 100 GW(e) of net new capacity by 2030 (by ‘net’ we mean capacity additions beyond any construction to replace retiring nuclear plants with new nuclear plants). By 2030, 45% of the world’s additional capacity will be in the Far East. While the Far East leads in net capacity additions, the Middle East and South Asia region has the most impressive growth rate, adding 31 GW(e) to increase capacity by a factor of ten, equal to average growth of 9% per year. Eastern Europe adds 40 GW(e) net. More salient national developments are summarized below.
The Chinese Government has authorized 7 GW(e) of new capacity, including the construction of four more units, bringing the total number of authorized units up to nine, with two additional units already under construction. The Government plans to raise total installed nuclear electricity generating capacity from the current 6587 MW(e) to between 32 000 and 40 000 MW(e) by 2020.
FIG. 13. Regional distribution of world nuclear capacity in the IAEA’s high projection until 2030 when extended to 2050 using approximately one third of the median nuclear expansion rates of the IPCC’s SRES (NA: North America; LA: Latin America; WE:
Western Europe; EE: Eastern Europe; ME/SA: Middle East and South Asia; SEA/PAC:
South East Asia and Pacific).
India, which has the most new nuclear construction of any country in the world (nine plants), plans a 100-fold increase in nuclear capacity by mid-century, and an increase from 3% of electricity generation to more than 25%.
A 100-fold increase seems enormous, but works out at an average of 9.2% per year. This is well below the pace of global nuclear capacity growth in the 1970s of 21%, but above the average in the 1980s of 8.7%. It is comparable to the 33 year global average growth rate from 1970 to 2003 of 9.4%.
The prospects for expansion of nuclear power also appear to be gaining momentum in other parts of the world, although less dramatically than in China and India. The Russian Federation has two more plants under construction and plans to more than double capacity from the current 22 GW(e) to 53 GW(e) in 2020. The new European Union accession countries and other Eastern European countries with nuclear power have shown a clear determination to retain and expand the nuclear option. Even in Poland, where nuclear development was halted by a parliamentary decision in 1990, the Council of Ministers approved a draft energy policy in early 2005 that explicitly includes nuclear power.
In Western Europe excavation work began in 2004 for Olkiluoto 3 in Finland, a European pressurized water reactor (EPR) that will be the first construction start in the region since 1991. In France, Electricité de France selected a site for a demonstration EPR, with construction expected to begin in 2007.
In the United States of America (USA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved seven more licence extensions of 20 years each (for a total licensed life of 60 years for each plant), bringing the total number of approved licence extensions to 30 by the end of 2004. Some three quarters of the 104 US NPPs have either received, applied for or stated their intention to apply for such licence extensions. The possibility of new construction was further enhanced when the US Department of Energy (USDOE) approved financial assistance to two industrial consortia for NPP licensing demonstration projects, taking advantage of the NRC’s new combined construction and operating licence procedure.
Public opinion polls in 2004 also appear to have shifted positively for nuclear power, although details are different in different countries. In Finland, the only Western European country with new nuclear construction, a November 2004 poll showed 46% supporting the use of nuclear energy, compared with only 36% in 2002. Twenty-five per cent of respondents had a negative opinion and 29% were neutral. In Sweden, which is phasing out nuclear power and will close its second reactor in accordance with that policy in 2005, an October 2004 poll showed support for nuclear power at 82%, up slightly from previous years. The proportion of respondents supporting an
expansion of nuclear power, not just the replacement of existing reactors, increased markedly to 21%. An October 2004 poll in the USA found a new record high of 67% of Americans in favour of the use of nuclear energy, compared with 26% of respondents who opposed the use of nuclear energy and 7% who had no opinion. The percentage of respondents who thought the USA should ‘definitely’ build new nuclear plants in the future increased to 60%, compared with 54% in the most recent poll earlier in 2004.
Most long term studies of global energy demand and supply consistently project an increasing share of nuclear energy, especially for the period after 2030, irrespective of the presence of policies targeted at climate protection.
Short term energy outlooks usually show a much lower share of nuclear electricity. With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, short term projections have already been revised upwards.
However, even with upward revisions in short and medium term projec-tions, the gap between short and long term projections still remains. Figure 14 offers one illustration, comparing the IAEA’s latest low and high projections (the blue and red bars, respectively) and the projections of the OECD/IEA (grey bars) [6] with the median value of nuclear expansion (the green line) in the scenarios in IPCC’s SRES [7].
FIG. 14. Nuclear capacity projection: (red bars: IAEA high projection; blue bars: IAEA low projection; grey bars: OECD/IEA projection; olive green line: median values for the SRES scenarios).
The SRES long term scenarios have a planning horizon up to 2100. There will be significant depletion of low cost fossil resources (and low cost uranium) over such a long time horizon, and a resulting continual increase in fossil fuel costs. The anticipation of higher fossil fuel costs translates into larger shares for nuclear power. The effect is evident even early in the scenarios as the optimi-zation models used for SRES, taking into account the fact that sharp increases in nuclear capacity cannot take place quickly, include early investments in nuclear power so that industry is ready when needed to provide the required capacity.
The medium term projections are based largely on current designs at current costs, while the long term scenarios assume continuing technological innovation to both raise performance and lower cost. The SRES scenarios include, of course, innovations as well as performance and cost improvements for all technologies, not just nuclear power. Thus, it is not clear how much of the projection gap may be due to innovations. However, even if the contribution is small, the importance of innovation must not be overlooked.
Moreover, in the models used to create the SRES scenarios, investments are essentially risk-free. They benefit from the model’s ‘perfect foresight’. In the real world, there are many risks that potential investors need to factor into their investment choices. These risks will not be the determining factor in every decision but they will move some decisions away from nuclear power, and thus lead to fewer investments in nuclear power than calculated in risk-free scenarios. These risks are mainly the risk of regulatory delays that raise costs at the front end of a plant’s life cycle, and the risk of longer term low demand or low prices that reduce the revenue stream in the out-years. Reducing such risks, through mechanisms such as the partial regulatory insurance provided in the new US Energy Policy Act, would reduce the projection gap.
Figures 12 and 13 depict nuclear capacity projections by region until 2050.
For the period to 2030 these projections correspond to the IAEA’s global low and high projections, shown in Figs 12 and 13, respectively. These projections were extended using the median nuclear expansion rates of the IPCC SRES cases.
In the extended low projection, global nuclear generating capacity reaches 563 GW(e) by 2050. The growth rate of only 1% per year from the present to the middle of the twenty-first century implies a continuous decline of the nuclear share in the electricity mix. Even in the extended high scenario, where total installed nuclear generating capacity amounts to 1454 GW(e) by 2050 or a 3.9-fold increase over current capacity, the annual growth rate of 3.03% per year means that the nuclear share will barely be able to remain at the present value of 16%.
4. CONCLUSIONS
If the challenges of economic competitiveness, public acceptance and appropriate safety requirements can be met, nuclear energy can play a more important role in the future than it does at present in supplying the world population with energy. The desire to diversify from the present reliance on fossil fuels, the commitment to reduce CO2 emissions and the limited prospects of large scale use of renewable sources tend to emphasize the potential contri-bution of nuclear power.
These points suggest several policy directions for governments that would like to encourage nuclear expansion. First, to the extent that policies can accelerate technological advances in the nuclear field, with associated cost reductions, they would encourage nuclear expansion. Second, to the extent that they can reduce political opposition to nuclear power in some countries and allow decisions more on the basis of economics, they will benefit nuclear power. And, third, to the extent they can reduce the financial and regulatory risks associated with large nuclear investments, they will also encourage nuclear expansion.
The incentives for the use of nuclear power are strong, especially in countries with growing populations, aspirations for economic development and improved quality of life, or concerns about environmental protection. If the objectives of advanced nuclear power development programmes are met, nuclear power could provide a long term, safe and economical energy supply as an integral part of the future energy system.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The assistance of A. Grtisevski in the preparation of this paper is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
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