Early in December 1954 the British Embassy in Washington presented to the American Government a draft statute for the proposed Agency.25 The United States responded with a considerably revised draft of its own, which after ample discussions and redrafting was circulated (still lacking provisions as to the voting formula in the Board and as to finances) on 19 April 1955 to the representatives of the five other States that had co-sponsored the Resolution adopted by the 9th General Assembly, plus to that of Portugal (then not yet a UN member).2 6 Thus commenced an ad hoc, in-formal series of consultations in Washington, which came to be known as the [8-Nation] Negotiating Group.2<7 Starting with the British/American draft, the Group during the next three months evolved a proposed instru-ment, which in structure and in many points of detail closely approximated the final text of the IAEA Statute. There can be little doubt that the com-plete secrecy of the proceeding, which was later much resented by the General Assembly but was wisely emulated by the subsequent Working Level Meeting, contributed greatly to the swift conclusion of the task faced by the representatives of States with widely diverging interests that could probably not have been reconciled except through private diplomacy.
In this early text the size of the Board of Governors was still consider-ably smaller and its powers were considerconsider-ably greater; the functions of the General Conference were more restricted; safeguards were stricter; and the financial provisions were more rudimentary. However, in relation to the receipt and distribution of nuclear materials the final pattern had e s -sentially been attained: the original Eisenhower concept, that a principal function of the Agency would be the siphoning off from Member States of significant quantities of nuclear materials, which in weakened form had still been maintained in the first US Sketch of the Statute, was virtually abandoned;
contributions of materials were to be entirely voluntary and related princi-pally to the needs of the Agency and its Member States rather than to an effort to neutralize militarily significant nuclear materials. Moreover,
though both options continued to remain open, the Agency was to act more as a "broker" than as a "banker" of nuclear m a t e r i a l s , i . e . , it would not necessarily receive and hold material itself for possible leasing, but it might merely arrange for the States that had undertaken to supply material to de-liver it directly to other States conducting nuclear energy projects approved by the Agency. Finally a number of ancillary functions were added to the Agency's proposed repertoire.
On 29 July 1955 this draft was communicated to the Soviet Union, which had previously been informed of it but had evidently shown no interest in participating in the work of the Group.28 On 22 August2^ a slightly altered final version was transmitted to all 84 States that were then m e m b e r s of the United Nations or of any specialized agency, and comments were s o -licited from all.3 0
2 . 5 . MEETING OF 6 GOVERNMENTS
On the basis of further correspondence between the United States and the Soviet Union in its second phase,31 and after tentatively exploring the possi-bility of bilateral meetings, the two Governments jointly convened, during the closing days of the F i r s t Geneva Conference, a "Meeting of 6 Govern-ments [on the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency]".3 2 From 22 to 27 August 1955 representatives of Canada., Czechoslovakia, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States (respectively, Messrs.
Lewis, Simane, P e r r i n , Skobeltzin, Cockroft and Rabi) participated in a series of five confidential meetings (the cost of which the Governments shared and reimbursed to the host of the Conference, the United Nations).33
The agenda was limited to: "safeguarding peaceful uses of atomic energy". The discussions were intentionally kept on a purely technical level and reflected, though were not directly oriented toward, the safeguards pro-visions contained in the draft IAEA Statute that the Negotiating Group had just disseminated. Of an extensive list of topics proposed by the United States, most attention was paid to the possibility of controlling nuclear ma-terials by the addition of isotopic tracers — a suggestion received with con-siderable (and evidently justified) skepticism by the Soviet representative.
No definite conclusions were reached and recorded, and each delegate merely reported to his own Government.
From the point of view of the future work of the IAEA, no substantial progress was made, and none of the proposals discussed in these meetings were later incorporated into the Agency's safeguards system. But a positive purpose was served, as for the first time since the early days of UNAEC the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in serious discussion on safe-guards in a multi-national forum, and they did so for once on a scientific rather than on a political level.
2 . 6 . THE 10th SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
At its 10th Session the General Assembly considered an agenda item entitled:
"18—Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: (b) P r o g r e s s in developing
inter-national co-operation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy: reports of Governments".
This consideration followed hard on the heels of the First Geneva Conference which had kindled great and widespread enthusiasm for atomic energy and correspondingly increased the impatience for the establishment of the Agency. In addition, the Negotiating Group's draft had been distri-buted to all States a few weeks earlier and the debates reflected the concern of many States with some of the concepts that had been developed by that small clique. However, it is significant that the draft Statute was not sub-mitted to or formally debated by the Assembly.
By and large the issues raised in the 10th Assembly were substantially the same as those discussed a year earlier, though by now the debates and proposals had become more complex and many-sided as more States had become educated in the intricacies of nuclear politics and saw their interests more directly involved. The principal issues were:
(a) The method by which the majority of States could impress their views on the small group that was negotiating the Statute — an issue that had now gained in sharpness due to the provisions of the Negotiating Group draft assigning almost all powers in the proposed organization to the Board of Governors and little to the General Conference. As a conse-quence of this pressure the members of the Group announced their in-tention of inviting Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the Soviet Union to join them in the further consideration of the draft Statute, and that later all these Governments would convene a general international conference to establish the final text.3 4 In addition, the Assembly's resolution (the final draft of which was co-sponsored by 18 States, in-cluding all but two members of the Negotiating Group)35 recommended that: "the Governments concerned take into account the views expressed on the Agency during the present session of the General Assembly, as well as the comments transmitted directly by Governments.. . "3 6 How-ever, proposals to the effect that the Negotiating Group be further ex-panded by including some underdeveloped countries without atomic ma-terials or technology ( i . e . . States that would purely be recipient of Agency assistance) were discouraged and withdrawn.37
(b) The status of the Agency in relation to the United Nations was once again extensively debated, and the UN Secretary-General was charged with preparing, in consultation with UNSAC, a study on the question of that relationship.38 A Soviet proposal to specify "that this agency will be established within the framework of the United Nations" was rejected in the First Committee.39
(c) Universality was again raised, implicitly in connection with the member-ship of IAEA but explicitly in connection with the conference to be con-vened to consider the final text of the Statute. The First Committee rejected a proposal that all States be invited to that Conference,40 and the final resolution merely welcomed the intention announced by the sponsoring Governments to invite "all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies".
(d) Though the sponsoring Governments resisted the inclusion in the Assembly's resolution of substantive proposals relating to the Statute or
to the proposed activities of the Agency, one was accepted. This sug-gested that the Agency, when established, "consider the desirability of arranging for an international periodical devoted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy" .4 1
Under subitem (a) of the same agenda item, the Assembly also r e -viewed the results of the First Geneva Conference and recommended that a second be convened in two to three years. It also continued the Advisory Committee (UNSAC), which had originally been established merely to advise on the Conference, and for the first time assigned its functions in r e -lation to the IAEA (see paragraph (b), above).42
2.7. THE WORKING LEVEL MEETING
As announced at the 10th Session of the General Assembly, the original Negotiating Group was now augmented by the addition of four new members.43
In expanding, it also changed its name and character. The so-called
"Working Level Meeting [on the draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency]II44 wasamore formally structured organ than its predecessor (among whose members the community of interests had no doubt been greater).
Its work was accomplished in three phases: in the first it formulated its rules of procedure; in the second it revised the draft Statute; and in the third it prepared for the Conference on the Statute.45
2 . 7 . 1 . First phase: Agreement on procedure
The first phase started with a single preparatory meeting on 14 November 1955, of which no formal record was kept. Apparently the only business ac-complished was the formulation of a draft of the rules of procedure to be followed. These were then adopted, with only a single change, by the
"Meeting" (as the organ was called in its own rules of procedure; con-fusingly therefore each meeting was called a "session") at its first formal session on 27 February 1956. Their principal provisions were:46
(a) The chairmanship of the Meeting would rotate alphabetically from State to State.
(b) The quorum was a majority of the Meeting. All decisions required a similar majority (i.e. ,7 votes).
(c) Committees and sub-committees might be established.
(d) Sessions were to be private and their records confidential. These records were to consist principally of the texts of written proposals and other documents, together with the decisions taken thereon. No provision was made for recording debates, but delegates could request that the substance of particular statements be included in the record of the session (in practice, the verbatim texts of such statements were attached to the record).
(e) The Secretariat was to be organized and largely provided by the Govern-ment of the United States, which acted as host of the Meeting.47
2 . 7 . 2 . Second phase: Revising the draft Statute
From its 2nd to its 18th sessions (28 February to 18 April 1956) the Working Level Meeting considered the draft text of the Statute that had been prepared by the Negotiating Group.4 8 This review was conducted in the light of:
(i) The views advanced in the 10th General Assembly — but since no system-atic compilation had been made of these and since all States really inter-ested had subsequently communicated their views in writing, at most lip service was paid to this recommendation contained in the Assembly's resolution;
(ii) The written comments that had been submitted to the United States by 39 Governments — though these were published for the information of the Committee,4® no synoptic document relating them to the various articles was prepared and thus these too were for the most part con-sidered only as reflected in the amendments formally proposed by members of the Meeting;
(iii) The proposals formally presented by members of the Working Level Meeting:50 altogether 99 amendments (including revisions of and sub-amendments to other sub-amendments) were submitted, of which some called for the revision of entire articles while others related only to points of drafting; in addition numerous oral amendments were considered and acted on at each reading.
The procedure was designed to give a maximum opportunity for reaching agreement or at least as great a consensus as possible on. every point. To accomplish this, the sequential consideration of articles was frequently inter-rupted to postpone temporarily certain portions on which disagreement per-sisted. In all, three complete readings of the entire text were conducted:
the first took place at the 2nd and 3rd sessions, the second and most important at the 4th to 12* t and the final one at the 13th to 18th .
Several committees were established:
(A) A scientific sub-committee, consisting of one member (if possible a scientist) from each delegation wishing to be represented, prepared recommendations for the definitions included in Article XX of the Statute.5 1
(B) A drafting committee, appointed at the end of the second reading, con-sisting of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, prepared a text reflecting the changes made up to then.5 2 (Some drafting, however, was left to the Secretariat.) (C) Numerous ad hoc assignments were given to the representatives of one
o r more members to draft or to negotiate improved language for par-t i c u l a r provisions in par-the lighpar-t of previous proposals and d e b a par-t e s .5 3 The Working Level Meeting made no structural or conceptual alterations in the Negotiating Group draft, in particular in relation to the Agency's functions as a receiver, distributor o r broker of nuclear m a t e r i a l s . But it did thoroughly overhaul the earlier text and introduced a number of sub-stantial changes,54 of which the most important were:
(a) The "protective" clauses now appearing in Articles III.C and D andIV. C were introduced.
(b) The reports to be submitted to various United Nations organs were specified.65
(c) The powers of the General Conference were expanded slightly by author-izing it: to approve rules regulating certain Board activities; to ap-prove general rules for the Staff Regulations; to participate in amending the Statute; and to propose m a t t e r s for consideration by the Board.56 (d) The composition of the Board was changed, from a group of 16 of whom only 6 would be elected by the General Conference, to 23 of whom 10 would be elected. In addition geographic distribution was to be empha-sized, with a corresponding relative de-emphasis on ability to supply source materials.5 7
(e) The powers of the Board were slightly reduced by making the exercise of some of them subject to rules approved by the General Conference.
The explicit statement that the Board was to "determine the policies of the Agency" was deleted, but a proposal to assign this power to the Conference was defeated.58
(f) The powers of the Director General were not enhanced, but the origi-nally proposed title of "General Manager" was changed.59
(g) The broad sweep of some of the safeguards provisions was clarified;
it was specified that projects and other safeguarded arrangements would not automatically become subject to the full range of the control measures foreseen in the Statute, but that only such measures as were relevant and included in an agreement with the Agency would be applied in each case.6 0
(h) The financial provisions were thoroughly changed. In particular, the
"2-budget system" and the distinctions relating thereto were introduced.
Explicit provisions were added regarding voluntary contributions and for the incurring of loans.6 1
At its 18* session the Working Level Meeting unanimously approved the new draft Statute. This approval was given ad referendum, and it was also agreed that the Governments that had participated in the Meeting would not be precluded from speaking freely on the draft at the Conference on the Statute — though in the event this freedom was exercised with considerable restraint. In addition Australia, Czechoslovakia, India and the Soviet Union formally reserved their positions on certain parts of the text.62
2 . 7 . 3 . Third phase: Convening the Conference on the Statute
On concluding its work on the text of the Statute, the Working Level Meeting decided that a Conference on the Statute (promised at the 10* General Assembly) should be convened at UN Headquarters in the l a t t e r part of September 1956, though various offers had been received to host the Conference elsewhere. It then established a Committee of the Whole (some-times called the Interim Committee or the Advisory Level Group) charged with proposing the formal arrangements for the Conference.63 After several sessions of this group, the Working Level Meeting had to be reconvened for its 19th to 21st sessions to resolve certain points on which d i s a g r e e -ment in the Committee had persisted.
The Provisional Rules of Procedure for the Conference were adopted without great controversy. As demonstrated in Section 2.8, these rules were designed so as to make it difficult for the Conference to alter the draft of the Statute proposed by the Meeting. Naturally anticipating some ob-jections to these restrictive rules, the participants agreed that at the Conference they would support these proposed rules unanimously. 64
The proposed agenda for the Conference was also adopted.
The greatest difficulty involved the list of invitees. The Soviet, Czecho-slovak and Indian representatives insisted that invitations should be ad-dressed to North Korea and to North Viet-Nam, and to the People's Republic of China; on the latter point they received qualified support from the United Kingdom. However, the majority of the Meeting decided that the list of invitations should be restricted in the sense of the resolution of the 10th
General Assembly, i . e . , "all states Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies". To resolve this point it was finally agreed that the invitations to the Conference be extended, on behalf of the Working Level Meeting, "by the Government of the United States of America to States members of the United Nations and65 of the specialized agencies", but that the text of each invitation would include an elaborate paragraph r e -cording the disagreement of the Meeting on this point.66
It was also agreed to extend invitations to ten specialized agencies to be represented at the Conference.
Finally at the 21st session on 28 June 1956 the formal report of the Meeting was adopted, to which were attached a short historical account of the origin of the Meeting, a list of participants, the proposed text of the Statute together with the particular reservations of four Governments, the proposed agenda and provisional rules of procedure of the Conference on the Statute.67