The General Conference, as finally constituted by the Statute and developed by a decade of practice, still has only rather circumscribed functions and powers. These may be classified as follows:
7 . 2 . 1 . Statutory
The Statute assigns the Conference only relatively few specific powers that it can exercise independently (i.e., without having to follow a recommenda-tion) of the Board:
(a) Election of some members of the Board (Articles V. E. 1 and VI. A. 3);
(b) Consideration of the Board' s annual report (Articles V. E. 4 and VI. J);
(c) Approval of amendments to the Statute (Articles V. E. 9 and XVIII. C(i));
(d) Request of advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice (Article XVII. B);
(e) Fixing the scale of assessed contributions (Article XIV.D);
(f) Restoration of a member' s right to vote in spite of nonpayment of a s -sessed contributions (Article XIX. A);
(g) Carrying out general reviews of the Statute (Article XVIII. B);
(h) Organization of the Conference itself; decision that a particular session of the Conference shall meet away from Headquarters (Article V. C);
adoption of Rules of Procedure and determining what decisions, in
ad-dition to those specified in the Statute, are to be taken by a two-thirds vote (Article V.C).
Most of the specific powers of the Conference are to be exercised upon recommendation by the Board:
(i) Approval of States for membership (Articles IV. B and V. E. 2);
(ii) Suspension of a State from the privileges and rights of membership (Articles V . E . 3 and XIX. B);
(iii) Approval of the budget (Articles V . E . 5 and XIV. A);
(iv) Approval of the reports to be submitted to the United Nations (Articles V.E. 6 and VI. J ) ;2
(v) Approval of relationship agreements with international organizations (Article V. E. 7 and XVI. A);
(vi) Approval of the appointment of the Director General (Articles V . E . 10 and VILA);
(vii) Approval of general rules relating to the Staff Regulations (Article VII.E);
(viii) Approval of rules and limitations on the borrowing power of the Board (Articles V . E . 8 and XIV. G);3
(ix) Approval of rules regarding the acceptance of voluntary contributions (Articles V . E . 8 and XIV.G);3
(x) Approval of the manner in which the General Fund may be used (Articles V.E. 8 and XIV.F).3
In addition to these specific functions and powers, the Statute also a s -signs certain general ones to the Conference:
(A) To discuss any question or matter within the scope of the Statute or r e -lating to the powers and functions of any of the statutory organs (Article V.D);
(B) To make recommendations to the membership (but apparently not to individual members) and to the Board (Article V.D);
(C) To propose m a t t e r s for consideration by the Board (Article V . F . 2);
(D) To request the Board to submit reports (Article V . F . 2);
(E) To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference by the Board for this purpose (Article V . F . 1).
Though this list may appear long, its very length supports the thesis that the powers of the General Conference are severely limited; only the absence of any substantial plenary grants to the Conference makes this al-most indecently detailed listing necessary. An examination of the above-mentioned powers confirms this estimate. The only non-specific powers that the Conference may exercise independently of the Board are to discuss, to recommend or to request r e p o r t s . The powers of the Conference to take actual decisions are generally restricted to: questions of its internal orga-nization; the approval of specific proposals submitted to it by the Board (the Conference can at most recommend changes); decisions on questions specifically referred to it by the Board. In only very limited matters (e.g., election of members of the Board; approval of amendments to the Statute)
can it make any independent disposition, and most of these powers are cir-cumscribed by numerous statutory restrictions.
In practice, when the Conference takes action it only rarely indicates what the relevant statutory basis is. In many cases of course the specific source of its authority is obvious: e . g . , in elections to the Board or the approval of the budget. However, when exercising its general powers under Articles V.D and V.F. 2, it is often impossible to determine whether the Conference is making a recommendation to the Board, or is proposing a matter for its consideration, or is exercising its right to request a report.
Actually of course this rarely makes any difference for the Board will gen-erally comply with any request to make a study or a report, and in any case it can never be obliged to take any action under either of these Articles (though perhaps it is required to respond to requests for reports).
In spite of a certain formal vagueness in this area, it should be r e -cognized that the Conference's principal direct influence on the course of the activities of the Agency is exerted precisely through the resolutions that it adopts under its general authority, rather than in exercising its specific powers and functions. As will be shown in later Chapters, the Conference has several times successfully pressed the Board to undertake programmes for which neither its members nor the Secretariat had demonstrated much enthusiasm.4 For, ultimately, the Conference has the undoubted political (some might say: moral) authority as the organ in which all Members are represented — and this is backed by the (albeit restricted) power of the purse, since it must approve each annual budget by a two-thirds majority.
7.2.2. Additional authority
An examination of the resolutions and decisions of the General Conference discloses that a number of these are not based directly on any statutory pro-vision but evidently derive from other sources. Though most of these ac-tions are only of minor import, it is worthwhile noting that these sources include:
(a) The Rules of Procedure of the Conference, according to which it:
(i) Appoints various committees (e.g., Credentials Committee — Rule 28;
General Committee — Rule 40) ;5
(ii) Approves credentials (Rules 28 and 29);
(iii) Approves its agenda and allocates items to its committees (Rules 18, 42(b) and 47);
(iv) Establishes a closing date for its session (Rule 42(b));
(v) Establishes an opening date for the next regular session (Rule 1);
(vi) Authorizes the Board to invite certain types of organizations to be r e -presented at the next regular session (which in effect constitutes a sus-pension or extension, pursuant to Rule 105, of Rule 32(a)).6
(b) Previous Conference Resolutions, such as the one by which it established the Working Capital Fund and which requires an annual decision on the uses to which the Fund may be put during the next fiscal year.7
(c) International agreements to which the Agency is a party (even if these were not among those submitted to the Conference for approval), such as the agreement admitting the Agency to UNJSPF, according to whose Regulations the Conference elects certain members of the Staff Pension Committee — and incidentally determines how many members the Com-mittee shall have.8
(d) Referrals by the Board to the Conference pursuant to Statute Article V.F. 1. Though the Board has never yet stated explicitly, in referring a question to the Conference, that it was doing so on the basis of that Article, its requests for a Conference decision on certain matters can most conveniently be explained in this manner. In this connection it should be noted that it is not clear whether the Board can on its own ini-tiative refer any matter (not included in the specific recitations of Ar-ticle V.E) to the Conference on a basis other than ArAr-ticle V . F . I ; nor is it clear whether, having once done so, it is bound by the decision of the Conference — since the Conference has never yet contravened the r e -commendation of the Board in any question thus submitted to it, this point has remained moot. It may also be asked whether Article V.F. 1 is a special grant of authority to delegate decisions to the Conference (which would imply either a formal superiority of the smaller organ over the larger one or an ad hoc reversal of roles) or whether it ac-tually constitutes a special mechanism whereby the Board can extend the specific statutory authority of the Conference.9 In any case, the actions taken by the Conference which are at least apparently based on this Article, are:
(i) Endorsement of the initial programme;10
(ii) Establishment of the Working Capital Fund;11
(iii) Approval of Vienna as the location of the permanent Headquarters;12
(iv) Approval of the text of the Headquarters Agreement;13
(v) Approval of the Rules on the Grant of Consultative Status of Non-Governmental Organizations; w
(vi) Decision to seek participation in EPTA;1S
(vii) Noting the Agency1 s Safeguards System, as well as the extensions there-of and the revisions thereto; J6
(viii) Approval of the Executing Agency Agreement with the UN Special Fund;17
(ix) Various decisions taken pursuant to the Board-adopted Financial Regu-lations, e.g., consideration of the Agency1 s accounts and appointment of the External Auditor.18
7.3. PROCEDURES 7 . 3 . 1 . Rules of Procedure
The original draft of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference was prepared by the Preparatory Commission pursuant to the specific man-date in paragraph C. 3 of Annex I to the Statute.19 It was largely a simpli-fied version of the Rules of Procedure of the UN General Assembly.20 A reduction in length had been achieved by replacing the separate rules for
committees by a single provision (Rule 82, providing that these bodies should apply as far as appropriate the rules governing the conduct of business at plenary meetings). No provisions were made for special subsidiary bodies (such as ACABQ or the General Assembly's Committee on Contributions).
These draft Rules were first adopted on a provisional basis at the first regular session of the Conference,21 and thereafter were considered in de-tail by the Administrative and Legal Committee of the first special session.
On the Committee1 s recommendation, 22 the draft proposed by the P r e p a ratory Commission was adopted with only a minor refinement in the p r o -visions covering the representation of other organizations and of Non-member States.23
The original Rules have remained substantially unchanged. Minor amendments were adopted at the second, fourth and sixth regular sessions in order to:
(a) Complete Rule 1 by fixing September as the month in which r e g u l a r sessions would normally be convened;24
(b) Alter certain Rules relating to the representation and participation of specialized agencies at sessions of the Conference;25
(c) Change the Rules regarding the election of members of the Board, con-sequent on the amendment of Article VI. A. 3 of the Statute.26
7.3.2. Sessions 7 . 3 . 2 . 1 . Regular
Article V. A of the Statute requires the holding of regular annual sessions of the General Conference. Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure provides that they shall normally be convened in September — a time chosen in part so as to precede slightly the normal convening of the UN General Assembly,27
so that the Agency' s annual report (which must be approved by the Con-ference) can still reach the Assembly comparatively early in its session.2 8 Though the first regular and special sessions of the Conference29 lasted a total of 23 days, subsequent sessions have never exceeded two weeks and the tendency has been towards their gradual contraction. 30 The briefest session took place in 1964, when the Conference spanned only eight days;
this session followed immediately on the third Geneva Conference and it was felt that many of the informal contacts, which constitute a principal raison d' etre of the General Conference, had already taken place; still, this ab-breviation was protested, 31 and subsequent sessions were again scheduled to last somewhat longer.
These short sessions are feasible because of the almost negligible amount of real business that comes before the Conference. This in turn reflects both positive and negative factors:
(a) The narrowly restricted competence of the Conference, much of which was practically exhausted by the approval of several sets of " r u l e s "
during the initial y e a r s ;
(b) The considerable stability and still modest level of activity of the Agency — though greater activity would most directly affect the
Secre-tariat and secondarily the Board, any increase in the importance of the Agency would necessarily also be reflected in the work of the Conference;
(c) The gentlemen' s understanding, to which lip service was paid from the first days of the Agency but which only became effective through practice, to keep the Agency free from most political controversies that properly should be fought out in the United Nations. This effort at apoliticizing the Agency has been effective because the geographic make-up of both of its representative organs makes the raising of most political issues less profitable than in many other international fora (i. e., the approxi-mately 25 members of the United Nations that are not yet Members of the Agency are among the smallest and most labile participants in the General Assembly).
In view of the considerable cost of and the small amount of business transacted at each regular session, the question is increasingly being raised whether these should not take place on a biannual basis.32 The first obstacle to such a change is the Statute, which in a number of places requires or at least foresees annual sessions: in particular, the budget, which must be approved by the Conference, is required to be formulated and approved on an annual basis;3 3 elections to the Board must be held annually; and the reports that must be submitted annually to the United Nations must be approved by the Conference. Altogether changes would have to be made at least in Statute Articles V.A; VI.A-D; XIV. A; in III.B.4 or V.E.6; and in VI. J or V.E. 4 in order to permit less than annual sessions of the Con-ference .3 4
Aside from these statutory obstacles, there appear to be two main rea-sons for maintaining the annual rhythm: Considering the already limited sig-nificance of the Conference, many States that are not regular members of the Board fear that their influence over that body (and thus the activities of the Agency) would be reduced even further by less frequent sessions; also, the Conference offers an unparallelled opportunity for the principal personal-ities in the atomic energy field in each country and in several intergovern-mental organizations to meet for informal conversations. These two ob-jections make it unlikely that either the necessarily extensive amendments of the Statute be adopted or that some less drastic but immediately practic-able alternative be approved, such as the reduction of every second annual session to a short formal meeting that could even be convened under special rules at UN Headquarters in New York (where all Members of the Agency are permanently represented through resident representatives or observers) to dispose only of the irreducible residue of business required by the pre-sent Statute.35
7.3.2.2. Special
Article V.A of the Statute provides that the Director General shall convene the General Conference in special session when the Board or a majority of the Members request him to do so.3 6 Procedural Rules 3-6 and 16-19 of the Conference regulate the implementation of this provision.
Only one special session has been held so far, under the circumstances and for the reasons discussed in Section 4 . 1 . This session was convened
by the Secretary General of the First Conference pursuant to a unanimous decision of the Conference itself - which practically and logically took the place of a request by a majority of the Members.37
7 . 3 . 2 . 3 . Location
Article V. A of the Statute (and Procedural Rule 7) provide for the sessions of the Conference to take place "at the headquarters of the Agency", unless the Conference determines otherwise. The quoted words have in practice been interpreted to mean the headquarters city (i. e . , Vienna) rather than narrowly the "headquarters seat" (buildings) defined in the Headquarters Agreement. The Preparatory Commission convened the First Conference in Vienna, before its status as headquarters had yet been confirmed; all subsequent sessions have been held there, except for the Ninth, in Tokyo.38
Thus no pattern of holding itinerant sessions has developed.
7.3.3. Structure and organization
In spite of the limited functions and the short duration of each session of the General Conference, its structure is almost as complex as that of the UN General Assembly — on which of course it is patterned. In the smaller context of the Agency this complexity has a certain rococo effect.
7.3.3.1. The Plenary
As in the General Assembly, the General Conference in plenary meeting is the forum for:
(a) General debate;
(b) Disposition of recommendations of committees;
(c) Decisions on certain items not referred to any committee (including particularly elections and appointments of various types).
Because of the brevity of the sessions, the relative amount of business trans-acted directly in Plenary39 is probably larger than in the United Nations.
The Plenary elects the President and the eight Vice-Presidents of the Conference. These officers, like those of the Committees, only hold their offices until the end of the session in which they are elected.
The President is the only Conference officer mentioned in the Statute,40
and he is elected ad personam from among the delegates (each Member being entitled to one) at the Conference. However, because of the short duration of and limited activity at each session he has acquired none of the extensive representational and political status that presiding officers of similar organs have in some organizations, nor does he perform any functions between ses-sions of the Conference.41 Though the President elected at one session frequently acts as Temporary President at the next, he no longer does so in the ad personam capacity in which he was elected, since that function is to be performed by whoever is the delegate from the delegation from which the previous President had been chosen.42 Even if a special session is called, new elections must be held for a President.43
The Rules of Procedure of course give no guidance on who should or should not be elected President. The following practice, based in part on gentlemen's agreements, appears to have developed: 44
(i) The President is elected from the host State, whenever the Conference is held for the first time in that State;
(ii) No delegate from the five "most advanced"45 Members is elected Pre-sident;
(iii) Within the above limitations, as far as possible, the Presidency is rot-ated among the areas listed in Article VI. A. 1 of the Statute;46 the se-quence up to now has been [Western Europe (Austria — host State)], South East Asia and Pacific, Far East, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, South Asia, Western Europe, [Far East (Japan - host State)], South East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.
During the Plenary the President, or a Vice-President acting for him, has the usual powers of a presiding officer.47 He is also ex officio Chair-man of the General Committee,48 Temporary ChairChair-man of the two Main Committees when these are convened for the election of their Chairman,49 and Chairman of the Committee for Pledges of Voluntary Contributions when-ever that Committee has been established. 5 0 The only subsidiary body whose membership is proposed (albeit only nominally) by the President is the Credentials Committee,51 and neither the Rules of Procedure nor any resolutions empower him to appoint or nominate persons to particular posts, though customarily the informally selected, unopposed candidates for posi-tions of External Auditor and of representatives on the Staff Pension Com-mittee are formally proposed by the presiding officer.52
The only other officers of the Conference itself, as distinguished from those of its Committees, are the eight Vice-Presidents. Unlike the Presi-dent they are not elected ad personam: only countries are named, whose delegates then hold these posts. Pursuant to Procedural Rule 34, the Vice-Presidents are elected after the President and the Chairmen of the two Main Committees, "with due regard to equitable geographical representation";
unlike the Rules of the General Assembly,53 those of the Conference include no distribution formula. Though Rule 34 is not entirely clear, its structure suggests that what is required is an equitable distribution considering at least these eleven officers as a unit rather than only the Vice-Presidents by themselves. Furthermore, Rule 40 provides that the General Committee, which consists of these eleven officers plus four additional Members elected by the Conference, "shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character". As a matter of fact, no pattern is discernible by studying the
unlike the Rules of the General Assembly,53 those of the Conference include no distribution formula. Though Rule 34 is not entirely clear, its structure suggests that what is required is an equitable distribution considering at least these eleven officers as a unit rather than only the Vice-Presidents by themselves. Furthermore, Rule 40 provides that the General Committee, which consists of these eleven officers plus four additional Members elected by the Conference, "shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character". As a matter of fact, no pattern is discernible by studying the