As seen in the previous chapter, the evidence at our disposal is suggestive of at least initial political fragmentation occurring as early as Monte Albán IIIa, and, more importantly, not being limited to outlying regions alone, but involving parts of the Valley of Oaxaca itself. By the Late Classic period, once thought to represent the
“apogee” of the Zapotec state, the evidence for the breaking up of the Monte Albán state is even stronger, and we are likely confronted with a valley already well on the path to Postclassic balkanization. In the following sections I will briefly bring together the different lines of evidence supporting this view and discussed separately in the previous chapter. I will first present the data from a provincial perspective, and discuss what the Early Classic Jalieza data might indicate as far as this and other emerging centers are concerned. I will then address the evidence from Monte Albán, and discuss how it might help us understand the capital’s trajectory during the Classic. Subsequently I will take a valley-wide perspective, and attempt to broadly trace the valley’s long-term trajectory toward the Postclassic. Finally, a
number of still-unresolved questions and emerging hypotheses will be discussed, thus suggesting a number of directions for future research.
The View from Early Classic Jalieza
Recent theoretical directions in the archaeology of ancient complex societies have questioned many aspects of the ecological determinism often championed in the 1960s and 1970s. Approaches such as action theory (see Marcus and Flannery 1996:31) have helped to renew interest in the role individuals may play in shaping socio-political trajectories, and move away from deterministic explanation in which human actors were mere “cogs in a machinery”.
Self-interested changes initiated by specific individuals played an important role in the emergence of the Monte Albán state (Marcus and Flannery 1996), and unquestionably did the same in shaping the path that led to its eventual break up.
One way in which the effects of this type of actions can be reflected in the settlement patterns are, in Balkansky’s (2002:99) words, “settlement characteristics not attributable to ecological necessity”. One fundamental change which occurred during the Early Classic and which definitely is not attributable to ecological necessities is the relocation of over half of the entire valley population to a series of new, defensible terraced hilltop sites (see Figure 4.8).
If we take for granted that the Monte Albán state was at this time firmly in control over all its valley provinces, such a shift should be interpreted as reflecting a change in central strategy. However, if we assume undisputed Monte Albán control, we are somewhat at a loss in attempting to explain the peculiar geographical distribution of these hilltop settlements, which are almost exclusively clustered in the eastern and southern parts of the valley. Scenarios invoking some unknown threat to the Zapotec state from those directions are unconvincing. The only conceivable potential threat to Monte Albán in this period was the powerful Teotihuacán state to the north, but no similar investment in defensible settlements occurs in the northern Etla branch of the Valley of Oaxaca, the most direct route toward the Basin of Mexico. If boundary maintenance was the rationale behind terraced hilltop sites, we would similarly expect this class of sites to appear in Etla. After all, after Monte Albán’s retreat from the Cañada de Cuicatlán by early Monte Albán IIIa (Redmond 1983; Spencer 1982), northern Etla had become the effective boundary between the Valley of Oaxaca and its neighbors to the north, including the Mixteca. Instead, the new hilltop settlements appear far from the northern boundary, in the southern and eastern peripheries of the valley. Furthermore, defensive features at at least some of the sites in the eastern Tlacolula area appear to have been directed as much (if not more) against valley threats as toward external ones (Feinman and Nicholas 2004a, 2004b). It is clear, in my view, that to understand the Early Classic shift to hilltop sites, we need to adopt a more dynamic view of the internal development of Monte Albán state. We need to take into account the self-interested actions and initiatives of provincial players, and not rely solely on Monte Albán-centric models.
Early Classic Jalieza is a particularly telling example of the magnitude of the effort this shift to terraced hilltop sites often comported. The Monte Albán II occupation in the area was minimal, interpreted as representing no more than a small number of hamlets (Blanton et al. 1982; Kowalewski et al. 1989). By the end of the following Monte Albán IIIa period, however, the area witnessed the growth of a veritable urban center, eventually covering close to 4km2 with an estimated population of around 13’000, resulting in the construction of over 700 artificial terraces (Kowalewski et al.1989). The shift to Jalieza can not be explained in terms of ecological necessity, the location of the new center
being a relatively poor choice if agricultural production was the driving rationale. Any location in the western section of the Valle Grande, closer to the rich alluvium, would have been a much more sensible choice.
In a state-mandated foundation scenario, perhaps a better rationale behind the establishment of Jalieza could be found in its location at the intersection between the important Valle Grande-Tlacolula (locally known as Camino de Tlacolula) pass to the east and the north-south Central Valley-Ejutla route (known as Camino de Oaxaca). After all, Jalieza’s immediate predecessor, the Cerro Tilcajete site (Elson 2003a, 2003b) appears to be placed and laid out in a way which suggests that monitoring traffic along the north-south route was a primary concern. Arguably, Jalieza’s establishment sometime in IIIa might similarly reflect a central desire to monitor and regulate the flow of people and goods along these important routes. In this view, the shift to the east of the preceding Cerro Tilcajete site could reflect the growing importance of the Tlacolula-Valle Grande route. The latter was, until the advent of modern transportation and roads, the most direct and fastest route between the Tlacolula and Valle Grande branches of the valley, both of which became major population areas in the Early Classic (Kowalewski et al.1989). Significantly, the area immediately to the south of the Early Classic Jalieza site where the Camino de Oaxaca and the Camino de Tlacolula meet, was where one of the valley’s major markets was held every Friday from at least late pre-conquest times until well into the 19th century, before being moved south nearer to the present-day town of Ocotlán de Morelos (Burgoa 1674: 55, 63).
It is thus conceivable that the establishment of Jalieza was originally spurred by its proximity to a major traffic node, and perhaps the site was meant to house state administrators in charge of monitoring and regulating the flow of traffic and goods between the two new population poles of the valley, the Valle Grande and Tlacolula. However, even if Jalieza’s founding was state-sponsored, the subsequent growth of the site is harder to explain in a state-driven strategy scenario. By the end of IIIa Jalieza had grown to a size unprecedented for any site in the valley apart from Monte Albán, thus at least potentially achieving the status of rival of the capital itself. As Balkansky (1998:474-475) has noted, if we were to judge from the IIIa settlement hierarchy alone, we should likely interpret the data as indicating that the Monte Albán state had already fragmented, and that Jalieza (and the DMTG cluster) were already autonomous by the end of the period. Surely, such a potentially unstable situation would not have been in the state’s interest. Instead, we have to look elsewhere, in particular at developments occurring at the site itself, to understand the processes underlying Jalieza’s dramatic growth and, by extension, the emergence of other terraced hilltop sites.
The evolution Jalieza underwent between the time of its founding to its eventual abandonment is hard to explain unless we take the motivations and self-interest of the local Jalieza elite into account. If we take nearby Cerro Tilcajete (Elson 2003a, 2003b), the major Monte Albán period II regional center of the Valle Grande, as a measure of what we would expect a regional administrative center to look like, the differences with the Early Classic Jalieza are striking. At its maximum extent, Cerro Tilcajete occupied a mere 24.5 ha, with a population estimate of between 800 and 1600 people (Elson 2003a:111). The site was characterized by a small 0.12ha plaza surrounded on three sides by mounds, the likely civic-ceremonial center of the settlement. On the principal, central mound on the north side of the plaza, an elite-residential structure (Structure 1) was excavated overlooking it (Elson 2003a: figure 31). Due to its locations, it is highly probable that Structure 1 housed the site’s highest-status elite household. Given this interpretation, the relatively small size (c.144m2) and lack of elaboration of the structure, as well as the fact that no sub-floor burials were found (although the evidence suggests a long-term occupation of the site) could be considered as somewhat puzzling. However, this pattern meets the expectations for a residential structure tied to a temporary administrative position. Structure 1 likely housed the highest echelon of provincial administration in the Valle Grande, a position which, in a high integration-level scenario, we would expect to have been filled on a temporary basis by rotating officeholders without strong local ties, possibly members of Monte Albán’s elite itself. The lack of sub-floor
burials is, in this perspective, a clear indication that the residence, and the office that went with it, were likely not tied to any particular individual and his household on a long-term basis.
In many ways, Jalieza presents a radically different picture. Although it was the successor to the Cerro Tilcajete site as paramount regional site based on the regional settlement patterns, the Jalieza paramount elite group developed a rather dramatically different relationship to its settlement. In a break with what we saw at Cerro Tilcajete, the Jalieza paramount elite household invested heavily in the construction of its official residence, Structure 4. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the structure was its stage-wise growth (see Figure 4.5). The initial stages of the building (Patio 1 unit area) were comparable in size to the earlier Cerro Tilcajete administrative elite residence (with a maximum estimated total enclosed residential space of around 169m2). Within perhaps as little as a few generations, however, the occupants of Structure 4 had gradually transformed their residence into an elaborate 389m2 three-patio palace, each stage characterized by better masonry construction and a sizeable investment in terrace construction. In its final form, the residence was inextricably linked with the south platform and its mound M-1, which I interpret, given the general layout and characteristics of the civic-ceremonial center of the site, as the likely highest level administrative and governmental area of the site (Chapter 3). A direct staircase led from within Structure 4 (from the north-eastern section of the Patio 3 Unit) to the top of the south platform, immediately to the south of the top mound M-1 (and thus hidden from view from the plaza and northern platform). Indeed, the most direct and clear access to Structure 4 from the rest of the site was from the plaza by way of the south platform, ascending the monumental staircase to the top and then descending at the back through this concealed staircase.
It is also significant that eventually, in the latest, most restricted and better-built section of the palace (the Patio 2 Unit), the occupants of the structure had a small group of carved decorative elements inserted in a step (Figure 3.15). We know relatively little of the distribution of carved and decorated monuments in the valley during this period, as many of the possible IIIa monuments we known of are usually found out of their original contexts, and are therefore difficult to date with absolute certainty (see Marcus 1976). It is possible that the possession and display of such monuments was in some ways uncommon and even restricted. In any event, it is clear that the Structure 4 fragments were not in their original context, and were acquired “second-hand” by its inhabitants, probably from elsewhere in the valley, perhaps from one of the large Valle Grande alluvium sites. We can only guess at the meaning and importance these monuments might have had for the occupants of Structure 4. One of these, the carved ceramic brick, is a representation of Lightning, or Cociyo, one of the most important Zapotec supernaturals, closely tied to the traditional elite sanctification ideology. However, given the very peculiar fact that this one particular carving appears to have been placed into the construction upside-down, as well as the fact the other three monuments appear to be rather indistinct fragments of a larger original composition, it is unclear whether the rationale behind their acquisition and inclusion into the residential construction was ritual-related. More likely, the possession, and a strictly horizontal, private display of these carved monuments, was important from a status-related point of view, and Structure 4’s occupants were perhaps simply emulating elite behaviour at the capital.
A final, significant difference with Cerro Tilcajete’s Structure 1 is given by the presence of sub-floor burials.
After one of the later stages of construction, one of its occupants was interred in a simple rectangular tomb underneath one of the higher rooms of the structure, and was accompanied by a set of high-status offerings including over twenty ceramic vessels, a very good quality urn and two decorated and inscribed cajetes (Burial 10, Figure 3.16). Beyond indicating the high status of the original occupant of the tomb (Individual 1), Burial 10 is significant insofar as it indicates the existence by this time of a strong, long-term and multigenerational link between the residence and its occupants. We can probably assume that by the time of individual 1’s death, and the subsequent reopening of the tomb
and placement of Individual 2 alongside, the paramount elite position at the Jalieza urban center had become fully hereditary.
Early Classic Jalieza’s palace in many ways represents an ideal transitional stage between the simple, single patio residence of Cerro Tilcajete’s administrative elite, and the later Late Classic/Postclassic multi-patio palaces of Yagul and Lambityeco. Perhaps as little as two centuries separate the latter from the Jalieza palace, and the initial, almost timid changes in provincial elite architecture visible at Jalieza have evolved into elaborate residential-cum-ceremonial complexes at Lambityeco, characterized by multiple patios, elaborate stucco and carved decorations, and periodically reopened sub-floor family crypts (Paddock et al. 1968; Paddock 1983b). The Lambityeco palace reflects the hereditary autonomous status of its elite occupants, while Cerro Tilcajete’s Structure 1 probably reflects the subordinate, temporary administrative position of its own. Jalieza’s Structure 4, with its evidence for being a transitional stage between the two, reflects, in my opinion, the growth of autonomous local power and authority, and the gradual emergence of autonomous local hereditary rule in this part of Oaxaca.
By the end of the Early Classic, the Jalieza site appears to have reached its maximum occupation. As mentioned, over 700 terraces had been constructed on the sides of the Danilin hill and its neighbour to the east, and possibly over forty artificial mounds characterized the site’s topography (Blanton et al. 1982; Kowalewsi et al 1989).
The clustering of the latter into three distinct groups is suggestive of a subdivision of the site into three spatially distinct areas, in addition to the civic-ceremonial core of the site. These three subdivisions, suggestive of a possible barrio-like organization of the site, are located to the south-east, west, and north of the hill and the civic-ceremonial core. It is probable that these clusters are indicative of well-established social stratification within the site’s elite class by the end of IIIa. The evidence from Structure 3 (Area A-2), an elaborate elite-residential structure with esquinas remetidas, which was very likely constructed relatively late in the site’s occupational sequence, is a possible indication of this. Ongoing analysis of its data and that of the neighboring two-room temple (Structure 1) are likely to give us some better insight into the internal organization of this specific site subdivision and the site as whole.
Under any scenario, it is clear that Jalieza’s dramatic population growth can only be explained through a large-scale influx of population from sites elsewhere, whether from the valley or outlying regions. The foundation of the Yoruba cities of New Oyo and Abeokuta (Law 1977:275-276; Ajayi 1973:151 ) we saw in Chapter 2 show different ways in which provincial leaders successfully concentrated population to create these new centers. In the Abeokuta case, around 150 previously autonomous communities rallied around a number of chiefly leaders and aggregated in what was, at least initially, a defensive response to the increasing internal conflict within the Oyo state. In the case of New Oyo, as prince Atiba set out to build himself a new power base, he destroyed several surrounding villages and forcibly resettled their population in his mother’s home village, where he set out to recreate the ancient capital. In both cases, urbanization was a locally-driven process which had the goal of providing the new centers with a critical mass of inhabitants. In both cases, aggregation was instrumental in providing the labour and revenue base on which these two new centers built their subsequent military and political regional pre-eminence. Jalieza’s dramatic growth was very likely the outcome of a similarly locally-driven process, whether through a campaign of forced resettlement, through the cooption of other local elites, or other means. Once the settlement reached urban proportions, the Jalieza paramount elite (i.e. the occupants of Structure 4) had achieved an important competitive advantage over their neighbours, and had likely reached the point where they would have represented a threat to the Zapotec capital’s hegemony over the entire valley.
So far, we know little of the reasons behind Early Classic Jalieza’s abandonment at the very end of the Monte Albán IIIa period. Intra-valley conflict, specifically an increasing antagonism between emerging provincial dynasties and
Monte Albán, might have forced a relocation to an even better defensible location. So far, no evidence for violent conflict or warfare have been identified at Jalieza, although the site appears to have been undergone a relatively sudden and large-scale abandonment near the interface between period IIIa and IIIb-IV. The excavations conducted so far at the site have not recovered any evidence of clear long-term occupation during the immediately subsequent period. Only a number of isolated finds of deliberately interred whole IIIb-IV-type G.35 ceramic vessels (Area B-1 and Area A-2), possibly reflecting a continuing ritual use of the site, have been encountered. While it is too soon, after only two seasons of excavations, to speculate on the reasons behind the abandonment of the IIIa Danilin Jalieza site, it is surely significant that its successor as regional paramount center in IIIb-IV had shifted to a new, more easily defensible eastern location (Blanton et al.1982; Kowlaewski et al. 1989; Finsten 1995). Centered on the Jialéez mountain ridge (also known by its modern name of Cerro Piedra de Gavilán), in a controlling position over the major Ocotlán-Tlacolula mountain pass, and extending over a 5.3km2 area with an estimated population of over 16’000 people, the later Jalieza
Monte Albán, might have forced a relocation to an even better defensible location. So far, no evidence for violent conflict or warfare have been identified at Jalieza, although the site appears to have been undergone a relatively sudden and large-scale abandonment near the interface between period IIIa and IIIb-IV. The excavations conducted so far at the site have not recovered any evidence of clear long-term occupation during the immediately subsequent period. Only a number of isolated finds of deliberately interred whole IIIb-IV-type G.35 ceramic vessels (Area B-1 and Area A-2), possibly reflecting a continuing ritual use of the site, have been encountered. While it is too soon, after only two seasons of excavations, to speculate on the reasons behind the abandonment of the IIIa Danilin Jalieza site, it is surely significant that its successor as regional paramount center in IIIb-IV had shifted to a new, more easily defensible eastern location (Blanton et al.1982; Kowlaewski et al. 1989; Finsten 1995). Centered on the Jialéez mountain ridge (also known by its modern name of Cerro Piedra de Gavilán), in a controlling position over the major Ocotlán-Tlacolula mountain pass, and extending over a 5.3km2 area with an estimated population of over 16’000 people, the later Jalieza