Implicit mechanisms in postchoice preference modulation

Why do we believe that the evidence of post-choice preference modulation relying on implicit processes is relevant? According to De Houwer & Moors (in press), “the distinction between implicit and explicit processes is functional only if it allows us to increase our understanding of (the processes underlying) behavior”. As explained in section 2.4.2, we considered the possibility that postchoice preference modulation may be implicit, i.e. automatic (De Houwer & Moors, in press), because it can occur without an explicit memory of the choice. This result has implications for several theoretical interpretations of postchoice preference modulation.

First, it directly impacts cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964).

Cognitive dissonance reduction, in the context of the free-choice paradigm, is assumed to be mediated by the accessibility to awareness of the fact that one’s choices are in conflict with the desirable aspects of the rejected option and with the undesirable aspects of the chosen one (Festinger, 1964). Taken together with other results showing that implicit

processes can underlie postchoice preference modulation (e.g., Egan et al., 2007; Jarcho et al., 2011; Lieberman et al., 2001), our results suggest that the classical cognitive dissonance model cannot accurately account for postchoice preference modulation, unless one assumes that dissonance elicitation and reduction may be implicit.

Second, according to self-perception theory (Bem, 1967), by observing one’s own choice, one can retroactively deduce one’s preferences. In line with this, Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma (1971) have argued that “subjects ordinarily take the experimenter seriously and are inclined to believe it to be important. Additionally, the caricature of the scientist is that he is an objective observer, impressed above all by rationality, order, consistency, and coherence. Given such formidable cues for the appropriate presentation of self, it is little wonder that consistency results are obtained time and again” (p. 691).

Managing public self-image might consequently explain why consistency is sought by individuals. However, in the context of the free-choice paradigm, the absence of an explicit memory of the choice makes it implausible that participants are consciously trying to manage their image (Bem, 1967) or public image (Tedeschi et al., 1971).

In the same vein, note that our results rule out postchoice preference modulation as experimenter demand effects (e.g., Orne, 1962), as might have been inferred from Tedeschi et al.’s quotation. Thus, although we used, in all experiments, self-reported measures of preferences, the fact that post-choice preference modulation was present both when choices were remembered and when they were forgotten makes it unlikely that the effect observed is merely due experimenter demand. The only possible way to salvage this interpretation would be if, in the course of the experimental sequence Rating1-Choice-Rating2-Memory task, participants did remember their choices during the second rating, but later forgot them during the memory task. While we cannot formally exclude this possibility, this strikes us as highly implausible because the second rating was immediately followed by the memory task.

Third, our results can be explained by differentiation and consolidation theory (Svenson, 1992, 2003), which argues that postdecision differentiation (also called consolidation) processes aim at protecting a decision against future threats. According to this theory, post-decision differentiation processes result in a perceived congruency between a decision and current preferences, including post-choice preference modulation.

Crucially, this process may occur unconsciously (Svenson, 1992). Our results could

consequently be explained in the framework of this theory, by hypothesizing that post-choice preference modulation allows congruency, without requiring explicit processes.

Fourth, self-anchoring interpretation (Gawronski et al., 2007) and endowment effects (e.g., Beggan, 1992; Reb, & Connolly, 2007) are consistent with implicit processes at stake in postchoice preference modulation. These two interpretations highlight respectively, the role of the self in postchoice preference increased valuation of chosen stimuli, and the role of the subjective feeling of ownership. Our results have no bearing on these two interpretations. Note that they are not mutually exclusive with the hypothesized mechanism presented in the next paragraph.

As briefly alluded to above, another interpretation for our results could be that making a choice can implicitly modulate the relevance of the stimuli involved in this choice. This relevance modulation may in return have consequences for the pleasantness of the stimuli; the relevant stimuli being evaluated as more pleasant and the non-relevant stimuli being evaluated as less pleasant. This interpretation is congruent with results showing that when different odorants are equally exposed but some of them are designated as targets and others as nontargets in an identification task, considering an odorant as target leads to an increase of its liking (Prescott, Kim, & Kim 2008). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that ignoring a stimulus in a visual search during a single exposure can conduct to its devaluation, distractors being rated consistently more negatively than targets (Raymond, Fenske, & Westoby, 2005). Similarly, after a Go/No-GO task in response to faces, the No-Go faces were evaluated as less trustworthy than the Go faces (Doallo et al., 2011). Therefore, these two studies showed that the goal-conduciveness for the task of the target lead to a subsequent increase of its pleasantness (Prescott et al., 2008); similarly, the goal-obstructiveness of the distractors leaded to a subsequent decrease of their pleasantness (Raymond et al., 2005). Thus, the task-relevance of the stimuli has direct impact on its pleasantness evaluations. A similar mechanism could be proposed in the case of choices.

Therefore, chosen stimuli may be considered as more relevant, and consequently, more pleasant, whereas rejected stimuli may be considered as less relevant, and consequently, less pleasant. Interestingly, relevance detection is often considered the primary process involved in emotion elicitation and differentiation, and its evaluation can be implicit (Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005). Such a process could therefore be critical in shaping

preferences that might potentially elicit emotions if further appraisal processes are involved.

To sum up, the importance of accessibility to awareness has been emphasized in the cognitive dissonance literature, notably by McGregor, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 1999, while saying that “individuals seem to have a remarkable capacity for avoiding awareness of inconsistencies unless their noses are quite vigorously rubbed in them” (p. 331). While we literally used participants’ noses, post-choice preference modulation still appeared to not necessarily require explicit processes. Such evidence comes with direct theoretical repercussions and impacts the most important theory, cognitive dissonance theory, in the field of preference flexibility induced by decision-making processes.

The third part of this section will be dedicated to discussing theoretical implications of the evidence that post-choice preference modulation could be long-lasting.