Explicit vs. implicit level of processing in cognitive dissonance theory

Some authors have criticized Leon Festinger’s theory as insufficiently precise. For instance, Aronson (1968, p.8) suggested that although some predictions can be derived from this theory, “if you want to be sure, ask Leon”. In his original book, Festinger (1957, p. 9) himself wrote that he “attempt[s] to state the theory in as precise and unabiguous terms as possible. But since the ideas which constitute this theory are by no means yet in a completely precise form, some vagueness is unavoidable”.

One of these fuzzy aspects regarding cognitive dissonance theory is this: Does cognitive dissonance reduction rely on explicit or implicit levels of processing? In 1960, Hovland & Rosenberg wrote that “the whole problem of whether responsiveness to inconsistency requires awareness seems to be an open one” (p.222). Fifty-five years after the first version of cognitive dissonance theory was published (Festinger, 1957), this is still a matter of debate.

Cognitive dissonance reduction is typically considered to be based on explicit mechanisms. Festinger, in 1957, however “makes no assumption about whether the organism consciously “experiences” dissonance, although at one point he does speak of a subject’s

“having learned, during the course of his existence, how unpleasant dissonance is””

(Hovland & Rosenberg, 1960, p.222). According to Wicklund and Brehm (1976), “as set forth by Festinger (1957) dissonance theory sounded much like a model of consciously mediated cognitive activity. The person becomes aware of a contradiction between sets of cognitions, then proceeds to reconcile the contradiction” (p. 98).

In Festinger (1964)’s book, in the case of the free-choice paradigm, it becomes clear that the need for cognitive dissonance reduction should be mediated by the accessibility to awareness of the fact that one’s choices are in conflict with the desirable aspects of the rejected option and with the undesirable aspects of the chosen one. In Festinger’s (1964, p.

98) words, it will “become salient for the person. In other words, immediately after the decision the person focuses his attention on the dissonance that exists, and, of course, attempts to reduce it”. Festinger (1964) called into question that any other way to do so would exist. Thus, “although Festinger (1957) was not totally explicit on the issue of whether consciousness is necessary, he took a more definite position in 1964” (Wicklund, & Brehm, p.

98). Wicklund and Brehm (1976) further argued that “following the decision there is evidently

a transitory period during which the person appears to be increasingly aware of the discrepant nature of his actions. This phase can be reflected in heightened awareness of dissonant elements, and by cognitive changes that move in directions opposite to dissonance reduction” (p.123).

Other authors, like Zanna & Aziza (1976), have further postulated testable predictions in this direction: “Since it is natural to assume that, like other cognitive processes, dissonance reduction takes time to effect and requires “cognitive work”, it would seem reasonable to propose that the results are not automatic and that distraction (i.e., diversion of cognitive activity away from the inconsistent cognitions) would mitigate the need to resolve the dissonance dilemma” (p. 577).

What empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that cognitive dissonance reduction is based on explicit mechanisms?

In Brehm (1956)’s experiment (see section 2.3.1), most participants spent 15 minutes inspecting and rating eight objects, i.e. roughly 2 minutes per object. The influence of this amount of time has been the object of investigation. More precisely, Davidson & Kiesler (experiment reported in Festinger (1964)’s book) have investigated whether the amount of time to consider information regarding the alternatives before having to make a choice matters in postchoice preference modulation. Davidson & Kiesler hypothesized that “the more thoroughly the alternatives have been considered and thought through prior to the decision, the more rapidly, or more effectively, can dissonance reduction proceed after the decision”

(Festinger, 1964, p.17). Half of the participants were given items of information regarding the alternatives quite rapidly, while for the other half, they were given quite slowly. The first group, who had little time to think and review the information they got, displayed a less prominent postchoice preference modulation than the first group, which is consistent with the hypothesis. Moreover, the authors measured participants’memory after choice regarding the items of information they received. Participants in the long-deliberation-time-condition remembered more information regarding the alternatives than participants in the short-deliberation-time-condition, in particular the items consonant with their choices.

Allen (1965) showed that the modulation of postchoice liking ratings following a difficult choice was less pronounced when post-choice time was filled with an extraneous cognitive task. Lyubomirsky and Ross (1999) have shown that distracting participants (by instructing them to focus on neutral images, objects and geographical scenes) reduced

postchoice preference modulation. As explicited by McGregor, Newby-Clark, and Zanna (1999), “individuals seem to have a remarkable capacity for avoiding awareness of inconsistencies unless their noses are quite vigorously rubbed in them” (p. 331).

More recent empirical evidence has, however, challenged the assumption that participants would have to explicitly remember the choices they made – hence implicit processes could be at play. Choices can modulate preferences without requiring conscious or intentional recollection of them. Post-choice hedonic evaluation changes have been demonstrated in young children and capuchin monkeys (Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007).

Lieberman and colleagues (2001) also demonstrated preference modulation following choice in patients with anterograde amnesia, which were, by definition, unable to explicitly recall their choice. Moreover, it has been shown that postchoice preference modulation could be achieved even when participants are asked to make choices not only numerous but in fast succession (80 choices in 10 minutes; Jarcho, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2011), which goes against results from Davidson and Kiesler.

In line with this, Kelly (2009) has suggested that “dissonance might be due to simple associations: Perhaps the mere association of a stimulus with rejection is what causes the attitude change observed in the spreading of alternatives”(p.7). More precisely, the rejection may create a response inhibition toward the rejected stimulus, which may change preference in an unconscious way. From this, Kelly (2009) derives a response inhibition hypothesis – according to which, after perfoming binary choices, in a go/ no go task, participants would “respond more accurately when a no-go signal is paired with a rejected stimulus than with the chosen or control stimuli, and that they will respond less accurately when a go signal is paired with a rejected stimulus than with the chosen or control stimuli” (p. 9). Although results did not match these operational hypotheses, participants were more accurate in responding to chosen stimuli, and in discriminating between the go and no-go signals for chosen stimuli than for rejected stimuli. Although speculative, inhibition caused by rejected stimuli could consequently be operating at the perceptual level, but still below the threshold of awareness.

Taken together, this empirical evidence tends to suggest that postchoice preference modulation may rely on implicit processes.

Let us finish this section by making explicit that by implicit processes, we mean automatic processes. This has been described as the currently best available definition (see De Houwer & Moors, in press). However, the different automaticity characteristics, i.e.

unintentional, uncontrolled, unconscious, efficient, and fast, are not always present in co-occurrence (see Moors, & De Houwer, 2007). Consequently, according to De Houwer &

Moors (in press), “because different processes can possess different features of automaticity, one should specify the automaticity features one has in mind when using the term implicit”. In the context of preference modulation following choice, we use the term

“implicit” to signify modulations that occur without an explicit memory of the choice, i.e.

the process leading to postchoice preference modulation may be unconscious (see Bargh, 1994 and Moors & De Houwer, 2006 for a review). Put in cognitive dissonance literature terms, an implicit modulation does not require awareness that the choice conflicts with pre-existing preferences. Of course, this moves the ambiguity in defining implicit processes to defining automatic, unconscious or unaware processes, whose precise meaning is perhaps less clear-cut than would be desirable (refer e.g., to Bargh, 1994;

Moors & De Houwer, 2006).

Having concluded our discussion of the degree to which cognitive dissonance reduction requires explicit processes, which is still a topic of much debate, and the definition of what we mean by implicit processes, let us move on to the question of how stable preference modulations following choice are.