IAEA ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL

How would the IAEA organize such monitoring work internally? Once again, it should be emphasized that such an activity has no relationship to nuclear safeguards; these would not be safeguards inspections. Therefore, the work would not be entrusted to the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA, but rather jointly to the Department of Nuclear Energy and the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. Here the IAEA would be performing a service to its Member States.

In practical terms the IAEA would set up ad-hoc internal teams, with personnel drawn from these two Departments, with the occasional involvement on a personal basis of some safeguards inspectors and with safeguards technical support. Because of the required confidentiality, this would not be a team of external experts, as used by the IAEA for peer review missions in the safety and nuclear licensing fields.

As far as practical verification arrangements are concerned, the IAEA would make use of human and technical resources to carry out its monitoring functions. There would be human inspections with the physical and visual review of facility features, the taking of environmental samples to assess possible leaks and spills, etc. The technical equipment in support of inspections would include radiation detection equipment, seals and sampling equipment.

In special situations, the IAEA could also call on remote monitoring, that is, with tamperproof digital cameras transmitting pictures back to IAEA headquarters on a regular basis or upon image changes.

The IAEA would have to report in an appropriate fashion on the findings of its verification activities. Upon detection of irregularities this would be done as soon as possible to the partners, on a confidential basis. At yearly intervals the IAEA would submit to the partners a confidential Annual Report.

However, by its very status as an independent international organization, the IAEA would need to report briefly at yearly intervals to its own constituency, the Board of Governors, on the general scope of the controls performed.

9. CONCLUSIONS

The final disposal of spent fuel (and radioactive waste) in shared reposi-tories must be looked upon as only one element of a broader strategy of parallel options. National solutions should remain a first priority. This is the only approach for States with many nuclear power plants in operation or in past operation. For other States with smaller civilian nuclear programmes, a dual track approach may be more appropriate in which both national and

MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES RELEVANT TO SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT

international solutions are pursued. Small countries should keep options open (national, regional or international), if only to maintain the minimum national technical competence necessary to act in an international context ([1], para. 302).

On 1 June 2006, the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by former IAEA Director General Hans Blix handed over its report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan [8].

The report notes:

“The IAEA has long served as a forum for considering proposals relating to the fuel cycle and for new types of nuclear power reactors. It is desirable that States continue to use the IAEA for these purposes, e.g. to discuss the ideas of fuel banks, regional arrangements for the production of fuel, and the management and disposal of spent fuel, as well as the possibility of proliferation-resistant fuel cycles.”

As far as the management and disposal of spent fuel is concerned this is, first of all, a plea for multilateral and international approaches formulated from a non-proliferation perspective. Yet, non-proliferation will hardly be the driving force since international safeguards already exist for that purpose and since the risk associated with spent fuel is quite limited, in particular for recycled spent fuel.

The driving forces towards multilateral facilities for the back end of the fuel cycle will be economics and practical considerations. Once the political burden of public acceptance has been overcome, the benefits of combining facilities will be overwhelming. While still not politically acceptable, one can argue with a fair degree of confidence that the 27 country European Union will not build 16 deep repositories in each of the countries operating a nuclear power plant. Logic and common sense will ultimately prevail in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

REFERENCES

[1] Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/640, IAEA, Vienna (2005).

[2] Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, INFCIRC/546, IAEA, Vienna (1997).

[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Principles of Radioactive Waste Management; Safety Series No. 111-F, IAEA, Vienna (1995).

[4] Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, INFCIRC/386, IAEA, Vienna (1990) .

[5] Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, www.basel.int

[6] The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/

225, IAEA, Vienna (1999).

[7] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Handbook of Nuclear Law, IAEA, Vienna (2003).

[8] THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, Weapons of Terror, June 2006, www.wmdcommission.org

DISCUSSION

A. GONZÁLEZ (Argentina): Perhaps the most important problems connected with the multinational approaches relevant to spent fuel management are legal problems.

For example, studies have shown that parts of Patagonia are eminently suitable for the storage of radioactive waste, but the import of radioactive waste into Argentina is prohibited by law. The same applies to the Russian Federation, for example where legal problems have arisen even in connection with the import of small spent sources.

Maybe the IAEA could establish a forum for the consideration of such legal problems with a view to solving them, but I am not very optimistic about the prospects for success.

B. PELLAUD (Switzerland): There are national laws — even local ones

— prohibiting the importation of radioactive waste, but one can solve the legal problems by changing the laws. Of course, that requires political decisions.

In the light of the adoption, in 1989, of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, which arose out of scandals about the dumping of toxic waste in African countries, the OECD/NEA member countries committed themselves to transferring toxic waste only among themselves. Perhaps arrangements like those arrived at by various OECD/NEA member countries in respect of toxic waste could be arrived at for spent fuel, although it might take as long as 50 years. Much depends on whether or not there will be an increased acceptance of nuclear power generation.

H.G. FORSSTRÖM (IAEA): Laws are a reflection of the political situation, and the political situation is a reflection of public opinion. What developments could, in Mr. Pellaud’s view, change the political situation in

MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES RELEVANT TO SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT

favour of the establishment of multinational facilities for the management of spent fuel?

B. PELLAUD (Switzerland): In my view, if there is a major expansion of nuclear power (which, in most of the countries in question, would happen with the backing of the public), there will occur a kind of ‘crystallization’ among politicians, who will start asking, “Couldn’t we do things better by not having about 50 enrichment plants, 10–20 reprocessing facilities and 30–50 geological repositories?”

As regards developments at the grass roots level, I would mention that in my country the socialists are in favour of Switzerland’s joining the European Union but not of the establishment of multinational facilities for radioactive waste management; they believe that every country should manage its own radioactive waste. However, the younger generation is concerned less about radioactive waste than about global warming, so things may change — and I think that applies to other countries as well.

T. TANIGUCHI (IAEA): Mr. Pellaud mentioned the monitoring of good management, of the absence of dangers to humans and the environment, and of good physical protection and material security. In my view, the absence of dangers to humans and the environment is exactly what safety is. Also, good management is, together with sufficient financial resources, a precondition for safety. In that sense such monitoring would basically cover safety and security.

I wonder if there is anything beyond safety and security, because how to monitor safety and security is a challenging issue when it comes to multina-tional facilities.

Safety is covered by the Joint Convention and the Safety Standards, and physical protection and security is covered by the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We are now developing basic guidance reports for security. In that sense, the international framework in this area is evolving, but I feel that to go beyond peer reviews to monitoring is a sensitive issue for the IAEA.

B. PELLAUD (Switzerland): I see no difference here between a multina-tional facility and a namultina-tional facility. In neither case will the technical design be subjected to international scrutiny, because the national safety authority will decide what is appropriate.

Safety would be a national responsibility, with the IAEA carrying out peer reviews of the kind it is already carrying out at national facilities in order to assess if the safety is being properly handled.

One could imagine a degree of environmental monitoring where releases of water or gas are collected simply to make sure that there is no excess contamination. That also has been done in one form or another by the IAEA.

As regards security, rules exist. There are standards, for example INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 (Corrected), covering the storage of nuclear material, including spent fuel.

It would involve several departments of the IAEA because it concerns waste on one side and safety on the other. But I think all the mechanisms are in place. They would simply need to be ‘repackaged’, so to speak, re-described in such a way that they could immediately be recognized as applicable to a national and a multinational facility.

A. GONZÁLEZ (Argentina): I agree with Mr. Taniguchi, and I am not convinced by what Mr. Pellaud has just said.

The problem is that, if international monitoring occurred, it could occur only in respect of issues where countries have entered into legally binding commitments, and this has happened only in the safety area. There are no legal undertakings in the area of financial management (countries can do whatever they want with their financial resources), nor in the area of technical design (countries can design facilities in any way they like). The only legally binding undertaking of countries in the spent fuel safety area is the Joint Convention.

That can be monitored, but as to the rest I think it is very unlikely that countries will agree to be monitored.

B. PELLAUD (Switzerland): There is a misunderstanding here which will be visible in the written paper. When I talked about international monitoring, I was not talking about the international community as a whole passing judgement on the way in which a multilateral facility is operated. There would be a multilateral agreement among the governments involved, which would decide at some point in time that they will entrust the monitoring to a particular body — which could be a private company like Bureau Veritas or the IAEA. The IAEA would not carry out monitoring pursuant to a convention, but as a service.

The real question is “Can the IAEA perform such services? Would it be appropriate?”

T. TANIGUCHI (IAEA): On this important issue it is very clear that, when a multinational facility is established, it should be under the responsi-bility of the regulatory authority of the country where it is located.