BIBLIOGRAPHIE
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FORTIER L., DRYMER S, « Indirect expropriation in the law of international investment : I know it when I see it, or Caveat Investor », ICSID Review – FILJ, 2004, n° 2, pp. 293-327.
KUNOY (B.), « Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational Arbitration», The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 2005, n° 3, pp. 467-491.
LEBEN (Ch.), « La liberté normative de l’Etat et la question de l’expropriation indirecte », in LEBEN (Ch.) (Dir.), Le contentieux arbitral transnational relatif à l’investissement. Nouveaux développements, Paris, LGDJ, 2006, pp. 163-183.
LEVESQUE (C.), « Les fondements de la distinction entre l’expropriation et la réglementation en droit international », Revue de Droit Public, 2002, pp. 39-92
MANCIAUX (S.), « "Les mesures équivalentes à une expropriation" dans l’arbitrage international relatif aux investissements », in HORCHANI (F.) (Dir.), Où va le droit de l’investissement? Désordre normative et recherche d’équilibre, Actes du colloque organise à Tunis les 3 et 4 mars 2006, Paris, Pedone, 2006, pp. 73-94.
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NOUVEL Y., « Les mesures équivalant à une expropriation dans la pratique récente des tribunaux arbitraux », AFDI, 2002, pp. 79-102.
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DOCUMENTSREPRODUITS
Document 1 – Affaire Tippetts, Tribunal irano-américain, 22 juin 1984 (Extraits)
Document 2 – Affaire LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. c. Argentine, CIRDI n°
ARB/02/1, Décision sur la responsabilité, 3 octobre 2006 (Extraits) Relire la Résolution 1803 (Séance 1)
EXERCICES
Résoudre le cas pratique ci-joint
CASPRATIQUE
Le Tangokistan connaît depuis plusieurs années de graves difficultés économiques et financières. Il supporte ainsi une dette extérieure particulièrement élevée qui le place dans une situation délicate auprès des Etats créanciers.
Afin de remédier à cette situation, le Tangokistan procède depuis 2002 à des réévaluations annuelles de l’ensemble de la fiscalité sur les entreprises. Le niveau des réévaluations est fonction de la santé économique des différents secteurs d’activité visés et l’évolution est faite de sorte qu’elle soit la plus indolore possible. Le Tangokistan ne tient pas à créer de difficultés supplémentaires à la charge des opérateurs privés.
Le secteur pétrolier, le plus prospère du pays en raison de l’entière dépendance des Etats voisins des ressources pétrolières du Tangokistan, subit depuis 2002 les augmentations d’impôts les plus significatives.
L’entreprise Jazzexxon, entreprise incorporée au Hiphopistan, est liée à l’Etat par un contrat de licence d’exploitation des ressources pétrolifères du Tangokistan, conclu le 1er septembre 1992. Ce contrat de licence prévoit notamment que le Gouvernement n’adoptera pas de modifications de la réglementation fiscale qui aggrave de manière significative les charges pesant sur le cocontractant à la date de signature du présent contrat (article 27 du contrat de licence).
Depuis son établissement au Tangokistan et en particulier depuis ces dernières années, Jazzexxon a vu ses charges fiscales augmenter de manière très importante, rendant son activité de moins en moins rentable. La dernière augmentation fiscale en date du 1er janvier 2006 finit par rendre l’impôt global supporté par l’entreprise trop lourd pour cette dernière qui est forcée d’abandonner certains centres de raffinement, dont les coûts de fonctionnement dépassent désormais les recettes tiré de leur activité.
Dans ces conditions et bien que l’entreprise n’ait jamais remis en cause les mesures d’augmentation précédentes tant qu’elles n’affectaient pas substantiellement son activité, Jazzexxon se considère dépossédée d’une partie de son investissement et entend réclamer réparation auprès du Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends en matière d’Investissement.
Le Tangokistan et le Hiphopistan sont liés, depuis le 14 avril 1991, par un traité bilatéral de promotion et de protection réciproques des investissements étrangers.
L’article Ier de ce traité prévoit que les concessions entrent dans la définition des investissements protégés par le dispositif conventionnel. L’article XVII prévoit quant à lui la compétence du CIRDI pour tout différend né au sujet d’un investissement, entre une Partie contractante et le national de l’autre Partie contractante.
L’article X relatif aux mesures d’expropriation et aux mesures d’effet équivalant prévoit que :
1. Aucune des Parties ne pourra, directement ou indirectement, nationaliser ou exproprier un investissement effectué sur son territoire par un investisseur d'une autre Partie, ni prendre une mesure équivalant à la nationalisation ou à l'expropriation d'un tel investissement («expropriation»), sauf :
a) pour une raison d'intérêt public;
b) sur une base non discriminatoire;
c) en conformité avec l'application régulière de la loi ; et
d) moyennant le versement d'une indemnité en conformité avec les paragraphes 2 à 6.
2. L'indemnité devra équivaloir à la juste valeur marchande de l'investissement exproprié, immédiatement avant que l'expropriation n'ait lieu («date d'expropriation»), et elle ne tiendra compte d'aucun changement de valeur résultant du fait que l'expropriation envisagée était déjà connue. Les critères d'évaluation seront la valeur d'exploitation, la valeur de l'actif, notamment la valeur fiscale déclarée des biens corporels, ainsi que tout autre critère nécessaire au calcul de la juste valeur marchande, selon que de besoin.
L’article XI contient la disposition suivante :
Chacune des Parties contractantes assure en permanence le respect de ses engagements à l’égard des investissements des investisseurs de l’autre Partie contractante.
Questions :
L’entreprise Jazzexxon vous sollicite afin de préparer le mémoire écrit qu’elle déposera auprès du CIRDI dans la procédure sur le fond. Elle souhaite faire valoir le fait que la série de mesures adoptées par le Tangokistan équivaut à une expropriation rampante lui donnant droit à une indemnisation. Jazzexxon considère également que cette série de mesures constitue une violation des obligations contractuelles et conventionnelles du Tangokistan et que dès lors elle a droit à la restitutio in integrum le Tangokistan ayant engagé sa responsabilité.
De quelle manière l’entreprise doit-elle mener son argumentation afin d’obtenir entière satisfaction auprès du Tribunal ?
Document 1 – Affaire Tippetts, Tribunal irano-américain, 22 juin 1984 (Extraits) III. The Merits
1. The Claim for Depravation of Property
The TAMS-AFFA partnership was established in August 1975 as a 50/50 partnership. Equal shares of the IR 1,000,000 capital were held by each partner, and TAMS-AFFA was managed by a four-member coordination committee, two members of which were appointed by each partner. Article 6 of the articles of partnership required that any decision by TAMS-AFFA required the consent of at least one member appointed by TAMS and at least one member appointed by AFFA. Authority to sign documents creating obligations for TAMS-AFFA was vested in two persons, one appointed by each partner. The evidence indicates that TAMS-AFFA operated on the prescribed principle of joint control until 1979.
As a consequence of the Iranian revolution, work on the TIA project stopped almost completely in the December 1978 -January 1979 period. Prior to further significant discussions between TAMS-AFFA and the CAO concerning the Future of the TIA project, the Plan and Budget Organization of the Government of Iran on 24 July 1979 appointed a temporary manager for AFFA. The Farmanfarmaian family was one of the fifty-one individuals or families whose enterprises were placed under Government management pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the Law for the Protection and Development of Iranian Industry. Although the appointment named only AFFA, there seemed to be more confusion as to whether the new manager was manager only of AFFA or also of TAMS-AFFA. The Official Gazette published the appointment of 11 August 1979. as that of the manager of TAMS-AFFA, and the new manager assumed the right to sign Checks an TAMS-AFFA'S accounts by himself and make personnel and other decisions without consulting TAMS.
During the months of August through November 1979 TAMS representatives in Iran managed to rectify at least partially these violations of the partnership agreement. They restored, for example, the practice of two signatures on Checks, and they obtained the co-operation of the Government-appointed manager in their ultimately successful efforts to be paid some 34 million Iranian rials owed to them by TAMS-AFFA and to obtain permission to convert that sum to dollars for export from Iran to the United States. However, the crises in the relations between the United States and Iran that developed in November 1979 reversed this trend. The last remaining TAMS representative with signature authority apparently left the country in December 1979. TAMS wrote and telexed TAMS-AFFA on several occasions in January and February 1980 concerning
further work on the TIA project but received no responses.
After December 1979, TAMS-AFFA ceased all communication with TAMS, neither reporting to it on the Status of the TiA project and TAMS-AFFA's finances nor responding to its letters or telexes. It seems evident from the pleadings filed by TAMS-AFFA in the present case that TAMS-AFFA continues to function, although doubtless at a reduced level of employees and expenditures, and that it is being managed by the Government-appointed successors to the original Government-appointed manager.
In light of these facts, the Tribunal concludes that the Claimant has been subjected to "measures affecting property rights" by being deprived of its property interests in TAMS-AFFA since at least 1 March 1980 and that the Government of Iran is responsible, by virtue of its acts and omissions, for that deprivation. The Claimant is entitled under international law and general principles of law to compensation for the full value of the property of which it was deprived. The Tribunal prefers the term "deprivation" to the term "taking", although they are largely synonymous, because the latter may be understood to imply that the Government has acquired something of value, which is not required.
A deprivation or taking of property may occur under international law through interference by a state in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to the property is not affected.
While assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, thus requiring compensation under international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral.
The intent of the government is less important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of their impact.
In the present case, the Claimant and the Government-appointed manager of TAMS-AFFA managed to cooperate sufficiently well in mid 1979 so that such appointment could not by itself in this case be considered an act depriving the Claimant of its property. However, the developments of late 1979 and early 1980, particularly the complete absence of answers to letters and telexes and of any communication from TAMS-AFFA to the Claimant, effectively ended such cooperation and deprived the Claimant of its property interests in TAMS-AFFA. If any doubt remained about this question in early 1980, it has been removed by the absence of new developments and the passage of time.
Document 2 – Affaire LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. c. Argentine, CIRDI n° ARB/02/1, Décision sur la responsabilité, 3 octobre 2006 (Extraits)
D. Considerations on Indirect Expropriation […]
185. In order to establish the sustainability of an indirect expropriation, the Tribunal must define the concept.
Generally, bilateral treaties do not define what constitutes an expropriation –they just make an express reference to
“expropriation” and add the language “any other action that has equivalent effects.” Likewise, Article IV of the Bilateral Treaty does not define the term “expropriation” and does not establish which measures, actions or conduct would constitute acts “tantamount to expropriation.” Therefore, the Tribunal shall look to international law in determining the relevant criteria for evaluating this claim.
186. A State may, at its discretion, under Article IV of the Bilateral Treaty and in accordance with general principles of international law, make use of its sovereign power to expropriate private property with the purpose of satisfying a public interest. However, expropriation in any of its modalities requires due process and compensation under international law.
187. Although in scholarly authority two kinds of expropriation are known, we will obviously skip the direct one, understood as the forcible appropriation by the State of the tangible or intangible property of individuals by means of administrative or legislative action. The parties admit that the claim at issue does not involve a direct expropriation. In the case of the Argentine Republic, one could not say that it appropriated Claimants’ investment, which is the indispensable requirement if one is to talk of direct expropriation. Instead, we shall limit ourselves to the assumption of the indirect expropriation, one qualified by the Bilateral Treaty itself as “measures tantamount to expropriation.”
188. Generally, the expression “equivalent to expropriation”
or “tantamount to expropriation” found in most bilateral treaties, may refer both, to the so-called “creeping expropriation” and to the de facto expropriation. Their common point rests in the fact that the host State’s actions or conduct do not involve “overt taking” but the taking occurs when governmental measures have “effectively neutralize[d] the benefit of property of the foreign owner.”51 Ownership or enjoyment can be said to be
“neutralized” where a party no longer is in control of the investment, or where it cannot direct the day-to-day operations of the investment. As to the differences, it is usual to say that indirect expropriation may show itself in a gradual or growing form —creeping expropriation— or through a sole and unique action, or through actions being quite close in time or simultaneous —de facto expropriation.
189. In order to establish whether State measures constitute expropriation under Article IV(1) of the Bilateral Treaty, the Tribunal must balance two competing interests: the degree of the measure’s interference with the right of ownership and the power of the State to adopt its policies.
190. In evaluating the degree of the measure’s interference with the investor’s right of ownership, one must analyze the measure’s economic impact – its interference with the investor’s reasonable expectations – and the measure’s duration.
191. In considering the severity of the economic impact, the analysis focuses on whether the economic impact unleashed by the measure adopted by the host State was sufficiently
severe as to generate the need for compensation due to expropriation. In many arbitral decisions, the compensation has been denied when it has not affected all or almost all the investment’s economic value. Interference with the investment’s ability to carry on its business is not satisfied where the investment continues to operate, even if profits are diminished. The impact must be substantial in order that compensation may be claimed for the expropriation.
192. The tribunal in Tecmed required a finding that Claimant had been “radically deprived of the economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto –such as the income or benefits related to the [investment…]– had ceased to exist.”54 In other words, if due to the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their value or economic use for the Claimants and the extent of the loss.
193. Similarly, one must consider the duration of the measure as it relates to the degree of interference with the investor’s ownership rights. Generally, the expropriation must be permanent, that is to say, it cannot have a temporary nature, unless the investment’s successful development depends on the realization of certain activities at specific moments that may not endure variations.
194. There is no doubt that the facts relating to the severity of the changes on the legal status and the practical impact endured by the investors in this case, as well as the possibility of enjoying the right of ownership and use of the investment are decisive in establishing whether an indirect expropriation is said to have occurred. The question remains as to whether one should only take into account the effects produced by the measure or if one should consider also the context within which a measure was adopted and the host State’s purpose. It is this Tribunal’s opinion that there must be a balance in the analysis both of the causes and the effects of a measure in order that one may qualify a measure as being of an expropriatory nature. It is important not to confound the State’s right to adopt policies with its power to take an expropriatory measure. “This determination is important because it is one of the main elements to distinguish, from the perspective of an international tribunal between a regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state’s police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real substance.”
195. With respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be said that the State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general welfare purpose. In such a case, the measure must be accepted without any imposition of liability, except in cases where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to the need being addressed. The proportionality to be used when making use of this right was recognized in Tecmed, which observed that “whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact, has a key role upon deciding the proportionality.”
196. As is observed by The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, “a state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide
general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of the states, if it is not discriminatory…”. This criterion was used by the Tribunal of Iran-United States of America claims in the Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates.
197. As was stated in the Oscar Chinn affair of 1934, adopted by the Permanent Court of International Justice:
“No enterprise… can escape from the chances and hazards resulting from general economic conditions. Some industries may be able to make large profits during a period of general prosperity, or else by taking advantages of a treaty of commerce or of an alteration in customs duties; but they are also exposed to the danger of ruin or extinction if circumstances change. Where this is the case, no vested rights are violated by the State.”
3. Tribunal’s Conclusion
198. In the circumstances of this case, although the State adopted severe measures that had a certain impact on
Claimants’ investment, especially regarding the earnings that the Claimants expected, such measures did not deprive the investors of the right to enjoy their investment. As in Pope & Talbot, the true interests at stake here are the investment’s asset base, the value of which has rebounded since the economic crisis of December 2001 and 2002.
199. Further, it cannot be said that Claimants lost control
199. Further, it cannot be said that Claimants lost control