4.3.1 OCP principle
The confrontation between China and Taiwan started with the creation of the PRC in 1949. At that time, the victory of communists led the anti-PRC to form the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) sustained by the Kuomintang (KMT). The Chinese government developed a doctrine in international relations to isolate Taiwan but also to attempt a peaceful reunification of China. The OCP acknowledges that there is one China (PRC) and that Taiwan is a part of China through the principle of
“one China, two systems”, which allows the opponents of this doctrine to be spared with relative autonomy for Taiwan. However, what are the actual effects?
A white paper released by the Taiwan Affairs Office in 20006 details China’s po-sition in foreign affairs regarding Taiwan relative to the rest of world. Indeed, “all countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China have [...] understanding with the Chinese Government not to establish any ties of an official nature with Taiwan”.
More precisely, China is the only sovereign state that represents the Chinese people in the international community: “as part of China, Taiwan has no right to repre-sent China in the international community, nor can it establish diplomatic ties or enter into relations of an official nature with foreign countries”. Nevertheless, to Taiwan’s benefit, the Chinese government allows Taiwan to belong to international organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Community, the Asian Develop-ment Bank, and the World Trade Organization under the name “Chinese Taipei”.
Furthermore, “the Chinese Government has not objected to non-governmental eco-nomic or cultural exchanges between Taiwan and foreign countries” increasing unof-ficial relations7 with Taiwan through representatives and trade offices. “The Taiwan government uses its “official unofficial” representatives to pursue both traditional government-to-government diplomacy and public diplomacy aimed at securing pop-ular support for Taiwan in democratic countries” (Rigger, 2011).
The Taiwanese authority has adopted an opposing position about the OCP. On the one hand, the Taiwanese constitution that went into effect in 1947 underlines the principle of “two Chinas” through article 141 concerning foreign policy: “The foreign policy of the Republic of China shall be conceived in a spirit of independence and self-reliance and based on the principles of equality and reciprocity to promote friendly relations with other nations and abide by treaties and the Charter of the
6http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm
7 http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-odd-couple-japan-taiwans-unlikely-friendship/
United Nations so as to protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, foster international cooperation, advance international justice, and insure world peace.”8 This is a scathing response to the principle of “one China, two sys-tems”. For instance, Taiwan also severed diplomatic relations with several foreign countries due to the (re-)establishment of diplomatic ties with China, such as with Senegal in 2005: “The Republic of China (Taiwan) deeply regretted this and decided to break relations with Senegal immediately and stop all aid programs to the country to safeguard the dignity and sovereignty of our country”9. The diplomatic resistance of Taiwan has also led to a dual recognition that undermines the reunification project of China. China uses its diplomatic and economic influence to compel them: “the Chinese government is firmly against this scheme”10. The situation clearly resem-bles a fight of influence between the “two Chinas” in which international economic relations represent the main playing field.
Figure 1 presents certain trade differences between China and Taiwan. The figure illustrates the balance of power between China and Taiwan, in which the weight of Taiwan in world trade remains highly marginal relative to that of China. First, we observe that export flows carry greater weight in the Taiwanese GDP than in the Chinese GDP, i.e. approximately 60% and 45%, respectively, in 2012, with an impressive growing trend over the studied period. Second, unlike Taiwan, China reverses the trend in the early 1990s, when export flows are weighted by the world GDP. This trend clearly demonstrate the impact of the export-growth strategy of China since this period.
8http://www.taiwandocuments.org/constitution01.htm
9http://www.sinodaily.com/2005/051025183334.cmrz89g6.html
10http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-6.htm
4.3.2 Foreign policy as a determinant of bilateral trade
As discussed by Fuchs and Klann (2013) regarding the case of the Dalai Lama, we suppose that countries that do not respect the OCP are “victims” to economic and political retaliations by China leading to a trade-deteriorating effect. According to the white paper previously quoted, China made the OCP an exception to the prin-ciple of non-interference that characterizes Beijing’s foreign policy. Indeed, “certain countries have breached the undertaking made at the time of the establishment of diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China by evolving official relations with Taiwan, thereby putting a spoke in the wheel of China’s reunification. The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the governments in question will take measures to rectify the situation”11. The threat of severing diplomatic ties is the principal tool used by China but also by Taiwan when countries do not respect their doctrine in for-eign policy. To date, more than 160 countries have entered diplomatic relations with China, demonstrating the relative effectiveness of the OCP. We also observe a simi-larity effect between the beginning of diplomatic relationships with China and their break with Taiwan. In other words, when countries establish diplomatic relations with China some time later they break up with Taiwan.
Several facts well illustrate how China lobbies foreign countries. In 1992, the French government sold planes to Taiwan when China decided to order France to close its Canton consulate in retaliation12 because this agreement threatened the territorial integrity of China. “We strongly demand the French Government refrain from approving such a contract. If it ignores the strong opposition of the Chinese side and insists on having its own way, the Chinese side will react strongly.”13
Sim-11http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-6.htm
12http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-24/news/mn-3575_1_china-french-sale
13 http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/20/world/chinese-angered-by-french-arms-sale-to-taiwan.html
ilarly, the Chinese government has suspended several military agreements with the American administration and companies because of the arms sales to Taiwan in 2009-201014. Moreover, under the Clinton Administration, the announcement of a visit to the US by the Taiwanese President led to a diplomatic conflict between the two countries. US Congress largely voted for this unofficial visit at the expense of the White House’s reluctance under Chinese pressure15. Since 1976, the Government of Papua New Guinea has recognized China, but in 1999, the former approved the establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, provoking China to threaten to
“use its veto on the Security Council in relation to any matter that might come up referring to Papua New Guinea”16. Papua New Guinea ultimately surrendered.
However, the first success was the UN’s recognition of China in 1971 (Figure 2), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 26th ses-sion, through Resolution 2758 at the expense of Taiwan17. European countries, LDCs (mainly Africa) and oil producing countries supported the accession of China whereas the US resolution adopted by Japan, Australia, Pacific islands and the ma-jority of South-American countries (Table 9). This result in favor of China is not due to chance because Chinese leaders have essentially visited African countries (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia) in order to establish and expand trade relations since the mid-1960s18, i.e. some years before the famous UN resolution. According to the National Archives of President Nixon, the Taiwanese diplomacy had fear that European economies support their exclusion
14http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/world/asia/31china.html
15 http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/11/world/clinton-rebuffs-senate-on-letting-taiwan-president-visit-us.html
16http://www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s34814.htm
17Albania presented this resolution eight times against the US, which defended maintaining Taiwan in the UN, which was finally rejected by 59 voices (55 for and 15 abstentions) whereas the Albanian resolution as adopted by 76 voices (35 against and 17 abstentions).
18http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceza/eng/zghfz/zfgx/t165323.htm
in order to develop and increase trade with China: “they’re afraid that other coun-tries might use their absence from the UN as sort of a pretext for discriminatory actions against them, even in the trade sector”19. Nevertheless, there were official and unofficial relations with Taiwan20 despite this decision, with foreign countries like the US voting the Taiwan Relations Act (1979)21 without challenging the UN resolution.