Economic remittances of Senegalese abroad and national responses from

Economic remittances, overview

As Figure 4.2. below shows, the weight of Senegalese international emigrants is felt through the economic flows streaming from them. Globally, The World Bank has calculated that the economic remittance transfers to developing countries were four times greater in 2010 (US$ 325 billion) than in 2000 (Cisse, 2011). Although the total amount is unknown – because many of these flows are transferred through unidentifiable informal channels – according to the estimates represented in the figure below, Senegal personal remittances accounted for 10,54% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009. In contrast, they represented 6,25% of GDP in 2001. By 2015, migrant transfers were estimated to amount to 14,14% of GDP. Economic remittances, which are mainly assigned to the daily consumer expenditure of the recipient households (in 58.5% of the cases), have become the principal source of Senegal’s external financing ‘far exceeding FDI (foreign direct investment), external borrowing; and, above all, the ODA which had long been the most reliable and stable source of financing’ (Cisse, 2011, p. 224). As regards to the geographical origin of the remittances, data from 2007 shows that 52% stremmed from the EU. The share of remittances from the West African Economic and Monetary Union countries (7%) is lower than the flow from the USA (7.7%) (Cisse, 2011, p. 225).

Figure 4.2. Senegal: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and received Personal Remittances, 1985-2016 (in current US$)

Source: Own elaboration from World Development Indicators database, the World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home [last accessed 9 June 2018]

Who sends this money and how are these Senegalese economic remittances distributed in the country? The last household survey conducted in 2013 by the Senegalese National Agency for Statistics and Demography (ANSD in French) does not provide quantitative data as regards to economic remittances (ANSD, 2013).

However, the Migration and Remittances Household Surveys conducted for the Africa Migration Project and jointly undertaken by the African Development Bank and the World Bank deliver related-data for Senegal and five other African countries (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda).⁸⁵ According to this survey, of the total Senegalese international emigrants, 2,74% were residing in Kolda before leaving (CRES, 2011, p. 37). In addition, according to the survey, from the total volume of financial transfers received overall in Senegal, 61,42% had gone to rural

85 Data was obtained in 2009-2010, See the website:

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data [last accessed 9 June 2018]

0 2E+09 4E+09 6E+09 8E+09 1E+10 1,2E+10 1,4E+10 1,6E+10

Personal remittances, received (current US$) GDP (current US$)

areas (the rest of the share was divided between Dakar and other urban areas) (CRES, 2011, p. 45). On the other hand, regarding gender and education levels of those migrants sending economic remittances, only 14% of them were women, while those without any formal education had sent 56,16% of the total amount of remittances (CRES, 2011, p. 48). The geographic distribution of remittances shows that the Kolda region received 0,9% of the total amount (see Table 4.2. below, whereas the Séddhiou region does not appear because at that time it belonged to Kolda, as the current administrative boundaries were not in place at that time).

Table 4.2. Distribution of remittances in Franc CFA per regions, year 2009 Region Total amount of remittances

(FCFA) Share (%)

Dakar 101.000.668.120,72 21,02

Diourbel 160.435.838.668,30 33,38

Fatick 8.118.494.088,62 1,69

Kaolack 23.469.125.943,12 4,88

Kolda 4.334.416.592,29 0,9

Louga 57.099.833.111,23 11,88

Matam 19.625.362.578,58 4,08

Saint-louis 24.126.092.290,35 5,02

Tambacounda 8.962.136.769,50 1,86

Thies 70.865.550.275,51 14,75

Ziguinchor 2.543.293.641,05 0,53

Total 480.580.812.079,27 100

Source: Obtained from data originated by the Migration and Remittances Household Survey 2009, The World Bank (CRES, 2011, p. 46).

Governmental responses at national level to international migration of Senegalese Jointly with the increased domestic weight of migrants’ international remittances, the role of the Senegalese abroad in national politics was also boosted from 2000 onwards. Before winning the presidential election in 2000, Abdoulaye Wade was very aware of the influence of migrants’ and the potential role they could play in guiding their family’s vote. Campaigning from his French residence before the elections, he sought to mobilise migrants by using their transnational connections ‘as voting multipliers’ back home (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 15). In doing so, Wade gave to the Senegalese diaspora the status of political interlocutors. When Wade

came into power, amid different processes (such as the approval of a new constitution in 2001), actions were undertaken to show the commitment of the government towards the needs of Senegal’s international emigrants. As a milestone of this new policy-making, and after a symposium with the diaspora held in 2001, one can identify the definition of a Governmental Plan of Action (Plan d’Action – Nouveau Partenariat avec les Sénégalais de l’extérieur, Juillet 2001). Further, this obtained a higher institutional rank as the body in charge of Senegalese people living abroad was upgraded to the category of a Ministry through the creation of the Ministère des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur in 2003 (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014).

Wade’s second term, initiated in 2007, saw the upgrading of the Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais à l’éxtérieur, which had been created by decree in 1995 as a consultative body. It was relaunched in 2010 by another decree (République du Sénégal, 2010). Since then people also refer to it as Haut Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur. Following the introduction of this same 2010 decree, after a first General Assembly that took place in 1999, the Council had entered into a

‘paralysis’. The Council’s main function was ‘to advise and make recommendations in connection with the development and implementation of government policy on the management, protection and promotion of Senegalese Abroad’ (République du Sénégal, 2010). It has 75 members, 30 of whom are elected by an electoral college consisting of representatives appointed by migrant Senegalese associations. These representatives are recognised by the authorities of the country of residence, and regularly registered with the diplomatic or consular missions covering the geographical area of residence of the Senegalese. The other 45 members are appointed by the President of the Republic. The president elected in 2010 was Mor Kane, a Senegalese living in a city called Burgos, in Spain, who in 2012 campaigned to mobilise emigrant votes for Wade,⁸⁶ information that can be understood as evidence of the extent to which this Council is controversial among migrant Senegalese.

Apart from consultative spaces such as the Council of Senegalese abroad, and as regards to Senegalese emigrants’ formal political participation, Senegal is now

86 Source: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/02/24/internacional/1330106164.html [last access 12/May/2016]

among the 31 African countries with legislative or constitutional provisions for external voting. This means that Senegalese citizens can exercise their voting right

‘without having to be physically present on the national territory’ (Lafleur, 2013, p.

25). In the Senegalese case, the citizens abroad can register and vote in countries of residence where the state has diplomatic representation. Moreover, all Senegalese citizens have the right to vote and be elected, also in local elections (République du Sénégal, 2014a).⁸⁷ Senegalese emigrants – besides being able to vote and be elected from, and being visible in, national politics as advisors or Government members – had specific representation in the Senate until that body was eliminated in 2012.⁸⁸ In that year the Senate had 100 seats: 35 of them were elected by the departments and 65 by the President of the Republic. Out of these 65 appointed by the President, four seats represented Senegalese living abroad (République du Sénégal, 2007). Lastly, concerning the citizenship of those Senegalese settled abroad, Senegal does not recognise dual citizenship.

In 2012 Macky Sall won the hectic presidential elections, which mobilised with intensity Senegalese emigrants.⁸⁹ By 2016, the Government of Senegal was configured into 34 ministries.⁹⁰ The Ministry dedicated to the Senegalese abroad was suppressed after the 2012 elections with the related policymaking being included within the so-called Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur. On the 20th March 2016 there was a referendum which was perceived in the press and media as a motion of confidence in President Macky Sall. Finally, 15 constitutional changes were approved (among them reducing presidential terms from seven years to five, or enhancing local councils’ power). Importantly, another one of these 15 changes reflected an old diaspora claim and gave a new status for the Senegalese living abroad in order to let them elect their own representatives in Parliament (Ndiaye, 2016). Some journalists refer to this new constituency as the 15^th

87 The Senegalese collective has long been mobilised to pressure the Senegalese Consulate to facilitate the voting rights of emigrants. According to one interviwee in Barcelona, they could vote from abroad since 2003.

88 Created in 1999, the Senate had already been suppressed during the period 2001-2007.

89 For instance, as an observant I went to a demonstration in front the Senegal’s Consulate in Barcelona, in 2012, where emigrants protested against Wade’s third term.

90 See: http://www.gouv.sn/-Le-Gouvernement-.html [last checked 9/May/2016]

region. The change was implemented in the last legislative elections of 2017, when the National Assembly grew from 150 to 165 seats.⁹¹

Apart from migrants’ political participation, Ceschi and Mezetti identified social protection and economic/entrepreneurial investments as the other main subjects underpinning the relationship between governmental institutions and Senegalese abroad (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 16). According to the authors, Macky Sall’s presidency is especially committed to meeting the demands of the diaspora and seeks negotiation and ratification of conventions on social security in key destination countries such as West and Central Africa and France (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p.

16). However, lacking any evaluation of the degree to which this claim has been advanced, it is worth mentioning that crucial government plans such as the Stratégie Nationale de Développement Economique et Social-SNDES 2013-2017, or the Plan Sénégal Emergent do not explicitly tackle aspects of migrants’ social protection (République du Sénégal, 2014b, 2012).

The strategic planning documents from the current presidency (Macky Sall) follow approaches already explored by Wade’s government and gathered by Ceschi and Mezzetti under the economic/entrepreneurial investments’ category. The general rationale underpinning these approaches is that international economic remittances are too focused on household consumption which, according to the government amounts to, on average, 90% of the economic remittances (République du Sénégal, 2012, p. 10). During Wade’s presidency, actions were implemented seeking to promote migrants’ use of remittances towards development and productive investment although with a mixed degree of success. As a preeminent example led by the central government, it is worth highlighting a financial mechanism for initiatives organised by Senegalese abroad, called FAISE (Fonds d’Appui à l’Investissement et aux Projets) that was created in 2008 (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014). Another plan, the REVA, Retour des Émigrés vers l’Agriculture, launched in 2006 by Wade and still economically supported by the Spanish government in 2013, has been a much contested programme underpinned by securitisation and migration control principles which was initially targeted at young people repatriated from Spain (Datola, 2014, p.

91 See: https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-40767291 [last checked 20/September/2018]

60; Diedhiou, 2014, p. 56). There are also two big national programmes – established bilaterally with Italy and France and called respectively, Plasepri⁹² and PAISD⁹³ – that promote co-development and the role of migrant associations within the host country (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 16).⁹⁴ In this vein, neither Spain, nor Catalonia at a regional level, have structured a co-development programme similar to PAISD or Plasepri.

During fieldwork in Dakar and Kolda during 2012, stakeholders very often mentioned PAISD as an example of good practice. Initially called (from 2005-2008)

‘Initiatives de co-développement’, PAISD was implemented from 2009 to 2013.

PAISD is based on five components: the first is primarily focused on supporting migrants wishing to start entrepreneurial activities in Senegal (it has been mainly targeted at individual migrants, and projects are based in the Dakar region); the second component helps volunteer consultants (the highly-skilled diaspora) to transfer their expertise; the third line of initiatives co-funds infrastructure projects (up to 70% are financed by the PAISD) and are promoted by diaspora associations; the co-funding has a multiplier effect, as ‘every euro collected generates 2.3 euros of investment’ (Datola, 2014, p. 61). From 2005-2012, 134 projects were funded, with a total investment of 15.4 million euros (4.7 million euros collected by migrant associations) (Datola, 2014, p. 61). This component has been mainly deployed in the Senegal River Valley (regions of Matam, Saint-Louis, in Northern Senegal), to a lesser extent it has also funded projects in the Tambacounda region (Datola, 2014, p.

61). The fourth component aims to involve second generation migrants towards their parents' homelands. The fifth component seeks the promotion of information and communication technologies, although it does not target migrants directly (Datola, 2014, p. 61).

92 Plasepri, which was founded in 2008, is a credit and technical assistance programme developed in an agreement between Italy and Senegal to promote the development of private enterprises in Senegal http://www.plaseprifenase.it/it/il_programma_plasepri.asp [last accessed 5/July/2016]

93 PAISD was launched in 2005 to promote co-development between France and Senegal http://www.codev.gouv.sn [last accessed 5/July/2016]

94 Overall, Plasepri allocated 20 Million euro for credit aid and subventions for 3.7. Million euro by Italy and 350.000 by Senegal; PAISD allocated 9 Million euro by France, 745.000 by Senegal (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 16).

Later, towards the end of 2017, PAISD was relaunched with a financing agreement between the French Development Agency, the European Union and the state of Senegal. According to the EU, this new round of PAISD will co-finance Senegalese diaspora initiatives aimed at the development of Senegal for four years at a cost of 14€ million.⁹⁵ In contrast with the previous programmes, the new initiative is expected to work with migrants settled in France, Belgium, Italy and Spain. While this present research did not account for co-development processes covered by the PAISD, the territorial scope of the new PAISD is also larger, encompassing the regions of Tambacounda, Kédougou, Kolda, Sédhiou, Ziguinchor, Saint-Louis et Matam.

4.2.2 Local collectivities: more power over development in a customary and ethnic background

Decentralisation process

Senegal, influenced by the French state model implanted during the colonial time, is administratively divided by departments (départements). They are subdivided into districts (arrondissements), municipalities (communes, currently including former rural communities or communautés rurales), and villages (villages). The village or neighbourhood is the basic administrative unit. Local collectivities (collectivités locales) are rural municipalities, municipalities and, from 1996 to 2014, also the regions.

Indeed, during the period upon which this dissertation is focused, the administrative and political constituencies within the country were organised according to the 96-07 Law of 22 March 1996, known as the Decentralisation Law. It is beyond the scope of the dissertation to discuss the motivations and results of the decentralisation process experienced by Senegal. This would need to be framed, among other factors, within the decentralisation wave and the state reform pressures placed on developing countries by key donors such as the World Bank since the 1990s. It is important to highlight, though, that this Senegalese law from 1996 resulted in the erection of regions as local governments,⁹⁶ and in the transfer of competences related to nine

95See: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/all-news-and-stories/paisd-un-partenariat-pour-renforcer-la-contribution-des-migrations-au_en [last accessed 22/September/2018]

96 Local governments refer here to the expression, translated from French: 'local collectivities' (collectivités locales).

policy domains to collectivités locales (in sectors such as planning, urbanisation, education or health, and social action) (République du Sénégal, 1996). Consequently, there are two options for the administrative management: a deconcentred administration or a decentralized government (ANSD, 2011). In the deconcentred system, the region is under the authority of the Governor, the department under that of the Prefect, the district (arrondissement) under that of the Sub-prefect and the village or neighbourhood under the authority of the Chief of the village or district. On the other hand, in the decentralised system, the region is a local authority governed by the Regional Council, the municipality by the Municipal Council and the rural community by the Rural Council (ANSD, 2011, p. 3). These councils are elected every five years by universal suffrage⁹⁷ using direct party lists and proportional representation between parties, according to a rural ratio. Subsequently, the councillors elect a president. Therefore, this president is a Mayor (also called municipal council president, or a rural community president - Président de la Communauté Rurale, PCR – depending on the local collectivity). The last local elections were held on the 29th June 2014 (the next elections are due in 2019).⁹⁸ In terms of decentralised cooperation competences, already in place before the reform of 2014, local collectivities have autonomy to undertake cooperative actions that lead to agreements with local authorities of foreign countries or international public or private development agencies (République du Sénégal, 2013). In fact, being able to attract foreign investment is very important in a decentralised system with scarcity of resources at subnational levels. After the 2012 presidential elections, state competences over decentralised cooperation moved from a ministry named

‘Decentralised cooperation’ to the ministry of ‘Local Governance, Development and Spatial Planning’ (Ministre de la Gouvernance locale, du Développement et de

97 The first elections for regional assemblies, rural councils and municipal councils were held in 1996 (Fanchette, 2011, p. 231).

98 Currently, Senegal is divided into 14 regions. However, after the last administrative, territorial and local reform of 2014 (called Acte III de la decentralisation), departments have become local collectivities; rural communities and districts have become municipalities, and regions are no longer a local collectivity (Regional councils and Regional presidents have disappeared) (République du Sénégal, 2013). Therefore, currently, municipalities (554 of them) and departments (42 of them) are the only local collectivities (villages or neighbourhoods configure municipalities). There are, as I write the dissertation, Departmental Councils (elected by direct universal suffrage) with a Department President, and a Mayor in each municipality. Nevertheless, during fieldwork in 2012 and 2014, people referred to Rural Council Presidents (called PCR, standing for Président de Conseil Rural) and Rural Councils, and this denomination prevails in the present document even if the rural category is not applied anymore under the law.

l'Aménagement du territoire). Within the former ‘Decentralised cooperation’ ministry there were contacts and programmes (such as PAISD, Plasepri) mostly with the French government, but also involving the Spanish and Italian governments. The freshly appointed person in charge of the area of Planning, who a few months earlier has been an emigrant in France himself, explained in 2012 how local collectivities were expected to be the sole actor dealing with other subnational foreign governments:

A: At the level of the ministry, since we support the local authorities, the direction of the decentralized cooperation is suppressed, it no longer exists in the ministry, it has been said that it is the local authorities, themselves, who will directly manage the decentralized cooperation. [Via the Regional Development Agencies?] No, directly. [...]

Q: So development agencies should not be involved in development anymore?

A: It's directly, we only have to support and monitor the management of resources so that there are no diversions, so that there is good governance. But the execution of projects, even the negotiation of projects, is the exclusive domain of local authorities.

Government representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (1-5-P23)

Despite regional government being eliminated after the 2014 reform, the Development Regional Agencies (Agences Régionales de Développement, ARD) still exist. They were envisaged in the 1996 decentralisation law, but were only put in place later on. According to the interviews, the ARD were strengthened when the World Bank fostered the PNDL from 2006 onwards. PNDL stands for Programme National de Développement Local (National Program for Local Development, PNDL). Launched in 2006, it involves in the overall policy implementation the Government of Senegal to achieve the objectives of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and those of the Development Millennium (MDGs, but after 2015 named: Sustainable Development Goals). The Development Regional Agencies ensure the implementation of the PNDL at the local level, giving support to local development planning and evaluation of local collectivities. There are seven Development Regional Agencies, among them, one in Dakar and another in Kolda.

As we shall see later, in 2012 they were performing in very different ways.

Customary or traditional authority⁹⁹

Post-colonial Senegal, although influenced by the centralist and Jacobite French conception of the state, has been among the first Western African countries to engage in decentralisation processes (Fanchette, 2011, p. 231). The different decentralisation reforms, besides giving more competences to the local level, have increasingly involved greater recognition of local elected people’s work in monetary terms.

Overall, as a representative of a Senegalese migrant association originally from Kolda but living in Girona expressed it in 2014, the incentives to become a Mayor or a

Overall, as a representative of a Senegalese migrant association originally from Kolda but living in Girona expressed it in 2014, the incentives to become a Mayor or a