by Jack Wilmot
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN ECOWAS
With the exception of the provisions governing the ECOWAS Fund, where under Article 27 of Protocol 4, it is provided that each member State on the Board of Directors of the Fund "shall have one
val . II mauors before the Board of Directors shall he decided hy a member xuue to a proposal submitted for the decision of the Council of Ministers, the proposal shall. unless such objection is withdrawn, he rcfcrr d to the Authority for its derision." There is no guidance as to how the Auth or ity should arriv e at its decision. In practice, the Authority hus, si n c e its inception. taken all its decisions by unanimity or consensu s. The question is whether the status quo should remain and, if so, whether it should be Iormulixcd in the revised Treat), or whether it should he modined and inrorporarcd in the revised Trenty. by unanimity or consensus also condui 's to the promotion 01 a congenial atmosphere and harrnonious working rcl.ui nship.•IS no party has any reasonable cause to f cl aggri vcd th,u its vital int r ts
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures."
However, in cases where there is no express provision to the contrary, a simple majority suffices and each State has one vote. In most cases, however, a qualified majority is required in which votes are weighted so that the larger States exert a greater influence. Thus france, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom each has ten votes;
Spain, eight votes; The Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Portugal, five votes; Denmark and Ireland, three votes; and Luxembourg, two votes.
•
While the principle of majority vote, particularly qualified majority vote, prevents small states from blocking important decisions, it equally makes it possible to outvote large member States through aggregation of votes. The principle thus underscores the equality of member States.
Notwithstanding this balanced approach, the majority principle has remained relatively unimportant in the decision-making process of the EEC. The -reason dates back to 1965 when France, afraid that its vital interests
iIi
the financing of the new agricultural policy were threatened, blocked decision-making for more than six months by"a policy of the empty chair." It was not until January 1966 that this dispute was resolved by the Luxembourg Agreement which states that in the case of decisions in which very important interests of one or more countries are at stake, the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions that can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community.
In the PTA (Preferential Trade Area of East and Southern Africa) Treaty, provision is made for adopting decisions by consensus (Article 6 (5» while in the Arab Maghreb Union Treaty, decisions by the Presidential Council are to be taken unanimously (Article (».
Indeed, in most regional groupings of the developing countries, unanimity is required for all important decisions, although in some cases, majority decision is prescribed at certain levels. Thus, in both the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Andean Common Market, the Executive Council and the Commission respectively take their decisions by majority, vote, while all decisions in the Economic Council must be taken unanimously. Again, the unanimity rule prevailed in the defunct East African Community while it features in the Treaty establishing UDEAC (Central African Customs Union).
Similarly, in the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, decisions are, as a rule, to be taken by consensus.
However, an alternative of two-thirds rnaiority vote of member States is provided in cases of failure to reach a consensus, unless otherwise specified in the Treaty (Articles 10(4) and 13(4».
On balance, it would appear desirahle to make an express provi ion in the revised ECOWI\S Treatv to allow for decisions to he
~ rriv 1 at hy onsensus or fa ili ng that, hy a two-thirds majority of
III irn b r States, unless a simple majority or other provision is p cificd . Ge ne r a lly, unanimity or consensus may he invoked for im po rta n t policy de.ivio n s or for derisions in which vital interests of ne or more member States are at stake. But in administrative and op e r a t io n a l matters, for example, a derision rna) be arrived at by rna jority voting if unanimity or con se n s us cannot he reached. An alt rnutive provision to consensus is nece ssary to ensure that the minority does not frustrate the progressive desire of the majority and hold hack the integration process. On the other hand, care must be taken to avoid a situation where the majority would ride roughshod over the vital interests of the minority as this may threaten the integrity of the Community. A judicious balance would have to he struck. This could he achieved only through pragmatism and practical experience, coupled with a spirit of mutual accommodation, weighing vital national interests against the overall interests of the Community.
It is not considered desirable to introduce the principle of qualified or weighted voting into the decision-making process of FCOWAS. The rationale behind the principle of qualified or weighted voting is that member States which contribute more to th • financial resources of the Community should generally have a greater y in the affairs of the Community. Since the size of ontrihution is determined by ability to pay, it could he argued that the effort made by the smallest contributor is just as signiflcant in relation to that cou n t ry ' s capacity as the effort of the largest contributor in relation to the latter's means. Resides, in other iniernutiona I fora, dev lopi ng countries have often invoked the principle of equ lit) of tat national sovereignty and international solidarity either to a iI weighted voting as intrinsically unjust (as in the c e of the veto power in the Security Council of the Unit d ation, or of qualifi d voting in the International Monetary Fu nd (lMF) and the World Ban k ), or to argue for the con tin ued practice of the m jo ri ty v ting princ iple State or the Au tho rity on ground of the infring rnent of th pr vi ion of the Tr at r or a d ri ion f the uthority r Co u n il or n gr und of
composition of the Council of Ministers is variable. The Ministers actually present in the Council vary according to the subject under ' discussion -agriculture ministers for farm policy, finance ministers for budgetary matters, etc. This means that legislation on agriculture or education, for example, is actually enacted by Ministers 0 f Agriculture or Education, as the case may be, meeting in Council.
Heads of Government meet as the European Council (or 'Summit') two or three times a year to discuss major issues and to chart the future course of the Community.
Decisions entailing secondary legislation (akin to statutoryregulations in municipal law) may be taken at the level of the (subordinate) institution required to implement the primary legislation. Alternatively, given the sensitivities of governments, it may be deemed more appropriate for proposals on such matters to be submitted to the Council for prior approval, especially if the ensuing decision is intended to bind member States.
By way of comparison, it may be noted that in the Treaty establishing the Arab Maghreb Union "Only the Presidential Council (comprising Heads of State) shall have the Authority to take decisions"
( Article 6), while in the African Economic Community such powers are vested as a rule in the Assembly of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers (Articles 10 and 13).
Decisions are normally the product of deliberations on proposals or recommendations. It is not clear in the ECOWAS Treaty which institution has the primary responsibility for initiating proposals for legislation. But, in practice, the responsibility is exercised by the Executive Secretariat, presumably in pursuance of the general provision in Article 10(d) requiring the Excr ut ive Secretary to " ... make such proposals (to Council) as may assist in the efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the Community." Without prejudice to the responsibility of the Technical and Specialised "Commissions to submit recommendations to the Council of Ministers on matters falling within their respective spheres of competence, it is proposed that in the revised Treaty, a clear provision be introduced in Article 8 empowering the Execu tive Secretariat to make formal proposals for legislation as a first step in , the decision-making process.
THE RQLE QF INTEREST GRQUPS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PRQCESS
There is hardly any provision in the ECOWAS Treaty prescribing a role for interest groups in the decision-making process.
This is a serious omission which must be rectified in the revised Treaty. A similar lacuna AXists in most other African economic integration groupings, including the Central African Customs and
.~ nom ic Un io n (UOEA ) and the defunct East Afric.. n Community
(l: ). In Iart, in the case of LJDEAC there is an express resolution of th ' Head s of State and Government passed in 1967, to the effect that
F C dcc i ions must he made wholly at the inter-governmental level.
In co n tras t, almost all the Latin American economic integration gro u p in gs make provis io n for the formal involvement of rcprcscntutivcs of professional and socio-economic in terest groups in their decision-making process. for example, the Central American Com mo n Market (CAC~I) has a number of working parties through which the private sector participates in the activities of its institutions. Similarly, the Andean Group has such bodies as the Co nsulta tivc Committee and the Economic and Social Advisory Committee to ensure the involvement of the private sector in the deci sion-making process.
In recognition of the importance of interest groups in economic integration, the Treaty of the African Eco no m ic Community makes provision for the establishment of a mechanism for on s u lta tio n with sor io-eronornic organisations and associations "including inter alia producers, transport operators, workers, employers, yo u t h , women, artisans and other professional organisations and associations with a view to ensuring their involvement in the integration proce ss of Africa. " Article <)1). In the EEC Tr atv, Article 193 tablishes an E on o m ic and Social Com m ittee onsist in g of "repre .cntatives of the va r io u s cate go r ies of economic and so ial activity, in p rticular, rcprcscntat ives of producers, farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occupations and repr se n ta tiv of the general public" This Committee, according to Article I <)R, "must be co n s u lted by the Councilor by the Commission where (the) Tr ty 0 provides"
or may he consulted in all c ses in which they consider it appropriate.
The importance of interest groups in the integration pro ess cannot he ovcr-crnph siscd . One of the ultimat obj tiv of ECOWAS is stated in Article 2( 1) of the Tr aty " ... r i ing the rand rd of living of (the Community' ) people ... ". his b in g the ~ ',the imperatives of democracy require that the p ople be consulted on the measure d igned to "rai e (their) standard f Hving." B id , m ' of the Co m m u n ity de i ions have to he impl m nted ith r dir tl or indirectly by the e to-economic op rate r and other int r t groups. heir commitment, in th i re gard, ou ld b nhan d i th Y have b en as (dated with the evo lu tio n f the d i i n and th ir view , ba ed n the ir pra .ti al e.'peri n e p rat r on the gr und , have h en brough t to h ar on th fin l out om. urth rmor , th conce pt ofgra r at p rticip tion in the d vel pm nt pr h n g in d tr ng urr.n ) at the n tion I le el. Thi a r n hould b rai cd to the Comm u n ity lev I a ell. Ind d, a h b n n ted el wh e re, one f the r on for the rather low p in the irnplern cntati n of COWAf) d i ion i b au of I k f inv01\ement ')f the p op le in the de ision-rnaklng pro
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for the above and other reasons, it has virtually been agreed by the Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty that there should be established in ECOWAS a new institution to be known as the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), which shall be composed of representatives of socio-economic organisations and associations. It is proposed that the Committee's role be consultative. It must be consulted on all proposals for a decision which affects interest groups represented on it.
The Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty also proposes to recommend the establishment of an ECOWAS Parliament to be composed of representatives of the people of member States constituting the Community. In the context of the decision-making process, it is proposed that the role of this institution should, in the initial stages, also be advisory. However, while the Economic and Social Committee would examine legislative
proposals from the point of view of particular interest groups. the ECOWAS Parliament would do so from the perspective or citizcn s or the Community as a whole, and their interest in the overall development of the Community.
Parliament should normally be consulted on all proposals for legislative action, particularly proposals on politically im po rta n t measures and its opinion should be taken into account in arriving at a final decision.
Ultimately, Parliament may also be endowed with powers to make proposals for legislation on its own initiative.
Lastly, Parliament may be given supervisory powers over the activities of the Community. It should be enabled to keep the Community institutions on their toes by insisting on their actions being subjected to scrutiny through written and oral questions.
BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN ECOWAS
Under the decision-making process adumbrated above, a binding Community decision, particularly with automatic applicability in member States would, as a rule, begin with the drafting of a proposal by the Executive Secretariat which would set out the content and form of the measure to be submitted to the Council or the Authority, as the case may be, with a detailed explanation of the grounds for it. At the same time, a copy of the proposal would be forwarded to the ECOWAS Parliament, and in cases where the contemplated measure affects interest groups, to the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) as well.
Parliament and ECOSOC (where the latter is also consulted) would examine the proposal and forward their formal written opinions
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It is pr p d that I W S m ti nu es to avail it II 01 th i s kind of in tru rn nt wh n \ .r a pr priat In th ram rw o r I poli t i I co-o p ration , for . m I " it might b und de i abl r th Comm u nit..' in r a in gl) t d pt r comm nd tio n . m 'a n 1 can rting p lici and anion.
The Community may also be requested, whenever necessary, to state an opinion on a current situation or a particular event in the Community or member States. Such opinions could form the buxi of.
decisions and subsequent actio n.
FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS OF DECISION-MAKING INSTITUTIONS
The decision-making process outlined above points to the need for more frequent meetings of the Community institutions , particularly the Authority and the Council. than is the case at present. Currently, the Authority normally meets once a year in ordinal")' session, while the Council of Ministers meets twice in a year (Articles 5 and G). although there is provision for extraordinary meetings as and when necessary. However, as part of the measures designed to streamline the decision-making process and quicken the pace of integration, it is essential that these institutions meet more frequently.
Frequent meetings would enable the Authority to give the right leadership and guidance and the proper impetus: for the accelerated development of the integration process. If they are well prepared and focussed on substantive issues germane to the integration process, such meetings would provide more opportunities for Heads of State and Government to address collectively, and on a more regular basis, major political and economic developments in the sub-region and to adopt timely measures rather than ex-post solutions. This is particularly necessary in view of the increasing importance being accorded by member States to political co-operation in the sub-region. More frequent meetings of the Authority would also help to keep national implementing agencies on their toes, in full awareness of the imperatives of accountability. Furthermore, they would help keep alive the interests of citizens of the Community in, and hence their commitment to, the integration process.
In the light of the foregoing, consideration may be given to increasing the frequency of the ordinary meetings of the Authority from one to , say, two in a year or possi bly one every quarter. The agenda for meetings of the Authority should be so structured as to focus on the Authority's function as the su p re me legislative body, and should concentrate on specific policy issu es.
Meetings of the Council of Ministers wo uld be increased con seq u e n t ly since the Co u ncil has to prepare the .essio ns of the Authority. In addition , it would he necessary for sectoral mini teria l meetings to be held on a more regular ha is than has heen the case so far. The integration proces cann ot proceed at the desired pare without the active involvement of the sector ministers concern ed, at the
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fron t i n g member . tatcs, such increased expenditure may c a hitte r pill to swallow. II W<-'H.'r. considcrmg the h .nc fi ts to be d ri v .d fr III integ ratio n , no .ri_' is lOO high to pay if ir is an en xtiv mea ns
fron t i n g member . tatcs, such increased expenditure may c a hitte r pill to swallow. II W<-'H.'r. considcrmg the h .nc fi ts to be d ri v .d fr III integ ratio n , no .ri_' is lOO high to pay if ir is an en xtiv mea ns