Comparison of outcomes: Centralized vs Decentralized governance . 64

From the previous analysis, we may conclude that the type of research under collaboration can be used as an incentive tool, both under centralized and decentralized structures of governance. Nevertheless, the optimal project is not always the same for both structures.

In fact, when the Firm governs the collaboration and selects a less applied project than its most-preferred (and …rst-best), it is also true that a Consortium facing moral-hazard from the University also prefers x > 0: Taking into account the conditions that ensure x >0 for the centralized context with either moral-hazard from the University (situation AU) or double moral-hazard (situation AU F), and for the decentralized context with Firm’s initiative (situation F), we conclude that: Region 1^{F G} Region 1^{AU F} Region 1^AU: Furthermore, the following corollary holds:

Corollary 2.3.3 In the Region 1^{F G}; it is possible to establish the following comparison between optimal research projects: 0< x^F < x^{AU F} < x^AU:

Figure 2.6 below presents this corollary as well as the expected joint gain for the di¤erent scenarios, considering parameters in Region1^{F G}.

0 =x* 1 x

EW^AU EW^*

x^AU x^AUF

EW^AUF

x^F EW^F

0 =x* 1 x

EW^AU EW^*

x^AU x^AUF

EW^AUF

x^F EW^F

Figure 2.6: Joint expected gain under Consortium (EW ; EW^AU; EW^{AU F}), and under Firm’s governance with non-veri…able e_u (EW^F).

A similar reasoning can be developed forx= 1:Comparing University and Consortium governance, having the University choosing a less basic project than individually it would prefer, is a su¢ cient condition for all the remaining projects being also smaller than 1.

2.4 Policy Intervention: Prize

From the previous section, it is clear that informational asymmetries on the amount of e¤ort that each partner decides to allocate to the common project, a¤ect the outcome of such collaboration. In order to reduce the negative impact of a moral-hazard problem, the governor of the relationship (either the Consortium or one of the partners) may decide to deviate from its most preferred project. An additional way to reduce ine¢ ciencies arising from the moral-hazard problem is to allow a monetary transfer between partners. In this section, I analyze a third mechanism to motivate the partners to dedicate more resources for the collaboration: through (public) prizes.

Given that raising public funds is costly, society is only willing to give an extra-reward for the collaborative research, when the associated bene…ts more than compensate.¹¹ In the case of a research project, these bene…ts can be several. In the framework of the present chapter, all the bene…ts are already considered in the values of the project. Nevertheless, society may still be interested in promoting a more e¢ cient outcome by increasing the reward of a successful project developed under collaboration, that is, by giving a prize.

The conditions presented here under which this public intervention is optimal, may then be consider as alower boundary for those cases where other bene…ts for society may exist.

The previous analysis of collaboration outcome considers two alternative governance structures: centralized and decentralized. It has been shown that the centralized structure allows to obtain a higher joint expected gain and, hence, leads to a more e¢ cient outcome.

The conditions under which society prefers to give an extra-reward for the collaboration with centralized governance, are then su¢ cient to ensure that society also prefers to intervene under a decentralized structure. Therefore, I only focus on giving an extra-reward (prize) for research collaboration with Consortium governance.

Letz 0represent the prize for the research that is already collaborative and 2R⁺ be the cost of such public funds. Considering that both market and scienti…c values re‡ect all the bene…ts from a research project, a Social Planner’s objective function is represented by:

ES = p(V_F +V_U+z) C_F C_U (1 + )zp

= p(VF +VU z) CF CU:

The probability of successp; the market and scienti…c values of a successful outcome,V_F and V_U; and the cost of resources involved, C_F and C_U; are the same as de…ned in the Section 2 (expressions (2.2.3), (2.2.1), (2.2.2), (2.2.4), and (2.2.5), respectively). .

Let us consider the case where the Social Planner has the capability to de…ne both the total amount of the prize, z; and the fraction that each party receives: 2 [0;1] is the fraction for the Firm, whereas(1 )the fraction for the University. After observing

11As explicit in the model and common in the literature, the cost of public funds relates not only to the decrease of resources somewhere else, but also to distortions that such decrease creates (La¤ont &

Tirole, 1993).

the Social Planner’s decision, the Consortium decides on the type of project to develop, and on the amount of resources to allocate, in a similar way as before.

The objective functions for the Firm, the University, and the Consortium are now, respectively:

E _F =p(V_F + z) C_F; E _U =p[V_U+ (1 )z] C_U;

EW =E _F +E _U:

When both e¤orts are veri…able and, hence, contractible, the Consortium chooses the project x= 0; whether there is or not a prize. Since the Consortium’s decision does not consider the cost of the public funds, ;the possibility of having a prize leads to excessive levels of e¤ort, from the social point of view. Therefore, in the symmetric information case, the best social solution is not to give a prize to collaboration.

When the involvement of at least one the collaborators is non-contractible, however, it may be optimal to give a prize for such partner. The prize not only motivates the non-contractible e¤ort, but also allows to choose a project that is closer to the …rst-best.

Next proposition states the result.

Proposition 2.4.1 When the e¤ort of at least one of the partners is non-veri…able, its e¤ort is su¢ ciently important for the success of the project, the success of the project is su¢ ciently valuable, and the cost of public funds is not very high, it is optimal to give a prize to such partner.¹²

In case of a double moral-hazard, either = 0 or = 1; that is, it is never socially optimal to simultaneously give a prize to both partners.

Furthermore, with a prize, the optimal project comes closer to the …rst-best.

When only University’s e¤ort is non-veri…able, the Consortium may motivate the University for a higher involvement by choosing a project closer to its most-preferred, as seen in the previous section. Under such scenario, the prize has the double impact of increasing the resources involved in the research, and of approximating the project type to the …rst-best (x = 0): When the cost of collecting public funds is not very high, the socially optimal solution is to attribute a prize to the University, which acts as an incentive substitute of a more basic research.

When only Firm’s e¤ort is non-veri…able, the Consortium chooses the most applied research, independently of the existence or not of a prize. When the cost of public funds is not very high, however, it may be socially desirable to attribute a prize to the Firm.

Such intervention increases the involvement of the Firm in the collaborative research to an amount closer to the …rst best, thus improving the probability of a successful outcome.

When the e¤orts of both partners are non-veri…able, the previous arguments justify the allocation of a prize for their involvement on the collaborative project. Nevertheless,

12In Appendix Two, the proof of the proposition makes explicit the upper boundary of compatible with the prize of each partner.

only one of the two partners should receive the extra-reward. When R_U is high, the University e¤ort is relatively more important for a successful outcome. Giving a prize to academics increases the amount of resources that they are willing to devote for the collaboration project and, hence, the expectation of a joint gain enlarges. Conversely, whenR_F is high, the prize should be given to the Firm.