Paul English
Adult, Professional and Community Education, Texas State University (USA)
Abstract
Chris Argyris and Don Schön argued that people act based on espoused theories rather than theories-in-use. Espoused theory is considered what people believe their actions or intentions are achieving, while theory-in-use is considered the current practice that people use. People attempt to learn and change organizations for the better through espoused theory while ignoring the current state. The purpose of this paper is to identify gaps in organizational learning in organizations that affect the safety function, inhibiting moving towards improved occupational safety. Organizations must identify the specific attributes held within Model I or Theory-in-Use and Model II Espoused theory.
Keywords: Occupational safety, organizational learning, learning from incidents
Many organizations continue to attempt to apply different concepts within safety to achieve maximum results of keeping employees safe. While occupational safety has been, and continues to be a support service, many organizations fail to understand Organizational Learning (OL) at face value.
The theories of single and double-loop learning were introduced over forty years ago, with no application to occupational safety. Some have described that the approach to safety was based off scientific management theory, which was replaced by Total Quality Management (TQM), culminating into the continuous improvement model we now have today (Provan et al., 2020, p. 2). The purpose of this paper is to identify gaps in OL that affect the safety function, inhibiting moving towards an improved occupational safety process. To achieve this, organizations must identify the specific attributes held within the theories of action as defined by Argyris and Schön (Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1996).
The goal of occupational safety within organizations is to eliminate or minimize workplace injuries and incidents. Espoused theories of occupational safety within organizations includes the “zero incident” mindset, the idea that all incidents and injuries can be prevented. However, many
organizations fail to identify the different theories-in-use that prevent any significant change in the safety management process. “We often make sense of our own actions by filtering them through the lens of an espoused theory” (Cormode, 2020). There are many different attributes within safety management, dealing with competing theories. Organizations want to produce a safe work environment for all employees, but consistently fail to identify theories-in-use for safety, while continuing to espouse theory of what safety is to the organization. “We study the product, not the process, we look at what happened, not what is happening” (Conklin, 2018, p. 5). Only when
organizations identify learning issues found in these theories of action can new knowledge be created including Learning from Incidents (LFI) for safety.
Theory-in-Use (Model I) Single-Loop Learning
To understand why organizations do not move out of a theory-in-use for safety, meaning must be applied to the context. Organizations will define safety goals and agendas with intent of reducing injuries and incidents. However, a previous lack of OL outside of Model I will inhibit any attempts to
167 improve safety. The goal of reducing recordable injuries or the Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) as defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is one example of a model of unilateral control to achieve the bigger goal of reducing injuries without any observable data.
Organizations that rely on TRIR metrics as a guide to measure safety performance are managing safety within Model I. This strategy appeals to the larger goal of reducing incidents, specifically recordable injuries. Any reduction in this category would be viewed as an improvement with little public testing within the organization to determine why this reduction took place. A recent study reviewing the use of TRIR as a metric to compare construction companies revealed that the occurrence of recordable injuries and the use of TRIR to measure safety performance is statistically invalid. “Because of the random nature of TRIR, it is unclear if a change in performance (positive or negative) is due to an underlying change in the safety system or if the organization is simply
observing random variation” Hallowell et al., 2020, p. 12). If organizations continue to utilize TRIR as a metric for performance, the organizations will continue to create low freedom of choice, encourage defensive behavior, and reduce the risk-taking of looking for additional metrics to apply to observable data. No new knowledge will be created stemming from incidents, leading to self-sealing or single loop learning.
Other attributes that signal organizations are utilizing theory-in-use include the inability to share honest information. Organizations that fail to recognize communicating correct information due to the perceived notion that the correct information may be seen as
embarrassing or as a threat (Argyris & Schon, 1996). Incidents that have contributing factors linked to lack of compliance or established safety processes within the organization often get downplayed or not reported at all. False information or the lack of sharing information will also lead to self-sealing learning that does not go beyond a specific person or location within an organization.
Safety Interventions
Organizations that maintain constraints that are ideological for safety will force anything but free and unrestricted communication. Safety interventions are needed to force people and organizations to reflect on the attributes of safety programs, policies, and norms. Many organizations believe they live and breathe in espoused theory while really advancing the current theory-in-use. “Individuals may or may not be aware of the discrepancies between their espoused theories and their theories-in-use”
(Elkjaer & Nickelsen, 2016, p. 271). In these cases, management will become defensive when discussing safety issues, leading to a cycle of single loop learning that will eventually need an
intervention. This “double bind” effect as described by Argyris refers to an individual or organizations conflict with revealing or hiding errors. Hiding safety errors can be a punishable offense, while
revealing an error, “runs the risk of exposing a whole network of camouflage and deception” (Argyris, 1977, p. 6).
Unfortunately, the intervention may come in the form of a significant incident or emotional event. Organizations believe certain things because there is no reason to question or understand what people think, “the enemy of the question is always the answer. If I know something, then I don’t need to learn anything” (Conklin, 2018, p. 25). Lack of honest information transfer will lead to future incidents with similar characteristics, in turn creating defensive work groups within the organization.
Safety professionals will continue to maintain a reactive role in the process as, “line management asks safety professionals to explain and address incidents and non-conformances. This level of reactive activity prevents proactive exploratory activity to understand and support the current functioning of operations” Provan et al., 2020, p. 4).
Argyris and Schön believed that an error was a mismatch between intent and consequence, leading to the production of something other than what was intended. On the surface, single-loop learning can correct the consequence, while double-loop learning would offer to expose the question, possibly changing the assumption of what was learned. The “Project of Argyris” is to move espoused
168 theory into theory-in-use or to normalize double-loop learning (Bokenko, 2003).
Espoused Theory (Model II) Double-Loop Learning
In a 2003 interview, Argyris was asked how behavioral and cognitive psychology intersected with his ideas and theories. He was quick to point out that enabling organizational learning and producing it are two very different things. In his research, when he asked management to change or correct outcomes, many times management was unaware that they had control over the issues that led to the consequence. This was due to absence of the double loop in learning or the lack of reflection in assumptions and beliefs. Conklin acknowledges this stating that the pressure to fix a problem is stronger than the pressure to learn about the problem. “We don’t learn very well.
Alternatively, perhaps it would be better to say that learning has not been our first tool in understanding safety and reliability events” (Conklin, 2018, p. 53).
Argyris stated that he drove the theory of how to produce behavior in people and
organizations. What he discovered was a meta to study how well a process worked, helping people learn (Crossan, 2003, p. 45). In double loop learning, learning occurs when the organization shares and communicates openly, regardless of feelings or internal causation. Trust is gained through development of personal relationships and collaboration for the greater good or the safety of the employees. Moving occupational safety to a new paradigm that accepts human error as normal and looking at how an incident occurred as opposed to why can be considered double loop learning.
“Double-loop learning is based on open inquiry into deep-rooted causes, system failures and values.
This mode of learning questions the underlying assumptions of organisational work” (Littlejohn et al., 2010, p. 431). The idea is for people and organizations to learn from the process of why and how an incident occurred and not the product or incident itself. In other words, what processes were put or not put in place that created the result or incident. Conklin (2018, p. 29) points out:
By not creating a space for operational learning in our organizations and not giving the
profound users of our processes a voice in operational feedback, we have actually reduced the amount of learning that we do. By moving problem identification upward, we have actually reduced the amount of information that we gather about our systems and process.
Employee Feedback
If organizations do not get feedback from employees, no real learning will take place.
Employees are the subject matter experts at what they do. “They (employees) make money for the company at 2 a.m., when no one is looking or watching, by being smart and making good decisions”
(VanderWaal, 2020). Communication and feedback from employees can be considered a key strategic safety measure. Organizations that base safety performance solely on employee injuries, will not consider the total effort taken to reduce workplace incidents, including near misses and property damages. “Put another way, strategic measures focus on the process that affects the results rather than focusing solely on the results. This clarity increases safety awareness for both managers and employees” (Blair, 2017, p. 35). If organizations do base safety performance off injuries, no employee feedback is necessarily required. The value of employee feedback and collaboration must be
evaluated to move forward. “People and organizations will do what they value every time” (English, 2012, p. 129).
When employee feedback is included in safety, responsibility and operational effectiveness will be jointly controlled by the organization. Employees are the preverbally “boots on the ground” in any organization. For OL to occur within safety, we must learn to trust the employees performing the job tasks. Organizations that defend policies and procedures over employees will fail to learn. “If you ask workers to tell you about potential failures, you must be prepared to hear, accept and act on
information and not protect a system or process over people” (Conklin, 2012, p. 48). Blair points out
169 that priorities need better identification to improve workplace safety. “Many organizations deal with symptoms and consider the problem solved. However, the removal of a symptom generally does not solve the underlying problems” (Blair, 2013, p. 63).
Double loop learning includes learning-oriented norms of trust, individuality that open confrontation on difficult issues. Espoused theory expects that all issues brought before the organization are discussed freely among all to determine the solution, creating a high freedom of choice. Moving from Single to Double-Loop Learning will require creating new knowledge around the safety process and letting go of old habits and rituals that provided no observable data to improve worker safety.
Learning from Incidents (LFI)
Many organizations rely on incident review or Learning from Incidents (LFI) as a form of learning within an organization to reduce future incidents. This includes some form of communication that requires employees to receive information and process past incidents, attempting to apply the incident to their specific job role or task. This knowledge transfer is considered an espoused theory since the organization is sharing information in a timely manner regarding a serious safety event.
Knowledge does not equal behavior or learning. “Incident information does not always result in learning and action to change professional practice in the ways that are needed to prevent future incidents” (Littlejohn et al., 2017, p. 80).
Employees rarely have time to reflect on what the incident means to them in relation to their specific role or job task. This inability for organizations to reflect and create incident knowledge for learning is defined as single loop learning. Organizations that suffer from a lack of OL towards safety can “over invest” in learning on specific incidents instead of looking at organizational norms, policies, and values. LFI only looks at the incident, rather than the total, holistic approach identified by Argyris and Schön of OL. “To learn at an organizational level, experiences of groups and individuals need to be shared and knowledge needs to be transferred within the organization” (Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 2014, p. 90).
LFI Concepts for Learning
LFI has two important concepts regarding learning: inclusion, and participation. “Double-loop learning is based on open inquiry into deep-rooted causes, system failures and values. This mode of learning questions the underlying assumptions of organisational work” (Littlejohn et al., 2010, p. 431). The acquisition of knowledge should occur as close to the shop floor as possible while including the management hierarchy to support learning. “Opportunities for double-loop learning are now often missed due to difficulties in the identification of organizational factors and managerial weaknesses that created the conditions for the event to occur” (Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 2014, p. 88). Many organizations hold LFI as a core value within safety that is completely reactive to initiate action to prevent further reoccurrence.
The belief that a learning event has been created will foster a change in safety, is misconstrue at best. For safety, operational and organizational learning is needed. The intended learning is
replaced with the need to get past the event outcome itself, to continue the operation. This act gives,
“immediate satisfaction and putting the problem behind us, versus learning and improving” (Conklin, 2018, p. 38). In other words, organizations will have anxiety of the actual learning event and getting the LFI information disseminated to the rank and file, than learning something from the event itself.
“Double-loop learning within an organisation includes focus on reflection, critical examination of the whole system, openness, trust and exploration of the power relations” (Littlejohn et al., 2010, p. 431).
Without the employee, manager, or organization to reflect on past incidents, the goal of learning becomes restricted at best.
170 Conclusion
For OL to take place to advance safety, safety practitioners as well as organizational managers must identify specific characteristics of how and what organizations are learning. The belief that simply disseminating information regarding LFI will create new knowledge around safety can be considered classic single loop learning. Valid, observable safety information must be communicated without fear of reprise or embarrassment. Organizations must stop attempting to manage safety outcomes and start managing the safety processes. This may include letting go of past programs and
“safety rituals” that have increasingly diminished returns for employee safety and OL. Management must be willing to collaborate to determine what is working, and pitch was is not. “These actions are the result of self-generating beliefs which remain largely untested. One adopts those beliefs because they are based on conclusions which are inferred from what one observes, added to past experiences”
(Blokland & Reniers, 2020, p. 3). Organizations must be willing to test all attributes of the safety program for valid information. Occupational safety must be willing to move from a punitive, reactive mode to an inclusive, social mode that incorporates all aspects of the organization for learning.
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