Thesis jury:
Thierry KELLNER (Université libre de Bruxelles)
Vanessa FRANGVILLE (Université libre de Bruxelles)
Luca TOMINI (Université libre de Bruxelles)
Éric FLORENCE (Université de Liège)
Coraline GORON (Duke Kunshan University)
From the Avoidable to the Desirable:
the Chinese Communist Party ‘Green’ Authoritarian Strategy
Shanghai as Case Study
Thesis submitted by Virginie ARANTES
in fulfilment of the requirements of the PhD Degree in Political Sciences
(“Docteur en Sciences Politiques et Sociales”)
Academic year 2019-2020
Abstract
Acknowledgments
The path towards completing this dissertation has been a challenging, inspiring and adventurous one, and it is with a note of nostalgy that I write these last few words to thank all of those who have contributed to its achievement.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors Dr Thierry Kellner and Dr Vanessa Frangville, for their continuous support, encouragement and patience. I have been extremely lucky to have been taken under their wings when most needed. Without both their guidance, the goal of the project would certainly not have been realised. More than an intellectual journey, Thierry’s contagious passion for knowledge and Vanessa’s ability to make the impossible possible will keep on pushing me forward.
I am extremely grateful to Dr Luca Tomini for his numerous inputs and priceless advice. Your generosity has been one of the valuable contributions to this thesis.
Many thanks to Dr Yue Che and my fellow colleagues at East China Normal University. I am extremely grateful for their warm welcome. The fieldwork wouldn’t have been so successful without their extreme kindness and support.
A big ‘Thank you!’ to all the informants, activists and scholars for their willingness and co-operation throughout the fieldwork. A warm thank you to Dawa, for allowing me to use her busy time and supporting me to reach out to important actors in the field.
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Olivia Bina and the Urban Transitions Hub team from the Lisbon Institute of Social Sciences. Thank you for the insightful conversations and for helping me at such a critical stage of the writing.
I thank my Cevipolien colleagues for the stimulating discussions during the lunch breaks, for the exciting football games and all the fun we have had in the last five years. In particular, I am grateful to Leslie for our sports and stretching breaks, to Lara for helping me keep things in perspective, but also to Emilien, Marco, Arthur, Fanny V., Fanny S., Suzan, Robin, Katia, Tic et Tac, David and all the rest who have contributed to making writing this thesis such an
enjoyable experience. I will deeply miss the salle détente.
Overview of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction ... 1
Chapter 2 Theorising China’s Path Towards an ‘Ecological Civilisation’ ... 13
Chapter 3 Shanghai’s ‘Collaborative’ Authoritarian Logic: A Civil Society Lost in Translation? ... 49
Chapter 4 An IRON Fist in a Velvet Glove: SGOs New Roles in Constructing a ‘Clean’ Grassroots Governance Model ... 95
Chapter 5 Beyond-State Experimentations: Will the Market Set Them Free? ... 129
Chapter 6 Environmentalism and Authoritarian Resilience ... 163
Detailed Table of Contents
Abstract ... i
Acknowledgments ... ii
Overview of Contents ... iv
Detailed Table of Contents ... v
Figures ... ix Tables ... x Graphs ... x Boxes ... x Abbreviations ... xi Chapter 1 Introduction ... 1
Research Questions and Aim ... 4
Background and Approach ... 5
The Chapters Ahead ... 9
Chapter 2 Theorising China’s Path Towards an ‘Ecological Civilisation’ ... 13
The Ecological Apocalypse ... 14
Environmental Movements: An Opportunity for Greater Openness of the Political System? ... 18
As the Public Learns More, How Has the CCP Responded? ... 21
2.3.1 From Hu to Xi ... 22
2.3.2 The ‘Ecological Civilisation’ Narrative ... 26
Environmental Authoritarianism ... 28
2.4.1 A Brief Overview ... 29
2.4.2 Coercive and ‘Collaborative’ Mechanisms: Towards the Perfect Mix? ... 31
Actor-Network Theory: Decoding State-Society Dynamics ... 35
2.5.1 ANT Concepts ... 39
Research Design and Methodology ... 41
2.6.1 Qualitative Approach ... 41
Phase Two: Fieldwork and Qualitative Analysis ... 43
Phase Three: Analysis of Qualitative Data ... 44
2.6.2 Typology of the Observed Organisations ... 45
Concluding Remarks ... 47
Chapter 3 Shanghai’s ‘Collaborative’ Authoritarian Logic: A Civil Society Lost in Translation? ... 49
Shanghai: China’s ‘Green’ Mask? ... 50
Environmental Policy and Governance in Shanghai ... 52
3.2.1 Brief Historical Background ... 54
3.2.2 Dealing with Local, National and Global Forces ... 55
3.2.3 A New Path Towards Sustainable Development ... 57
Coping with Rising Environmental Challenges ... 58
3.3.1 The Development of Environmental Movements in Shanghai ... 59
3.3.2 Setting the Scene: Shanghai’s Environmental SGOs Specificities and Conditions 61 The Development Road of Chinese SGOs ... 62
3.4.1 Brief Historical Development ... 65
3.4.2 Regulatory and Policy Measures ... 66
3.4.3 The Current Situation ... 68
3.4.4 Central, Local and Cultural Specificities ... 71
Achieving a ‘Co-Governance’ Model: SGOs ‘Orderly’ Growth in Shanghai ... 75
3.5.1 SGOs’ Role as Service Providers: A Shattered Path? ... 78
3.5.2 The Perfect Command-and-Control Revolution? ... 83
Shanghai’s Environmental Governance: A Changing Landscape ... 84
Restructuring Urban ‘Grassroots’ Governance: The Background ... 86
3.7.1 The Logic Behind Local Urban Government Structures ... 88
3.7.2 Strengthening a Grassroots Regime Construction ... 90
Concluding Remarks ... 93
Chapter 4 An IRON Fist in a Velvet Glove: SGOs New Roles in Constructing a ‘Clean’ Grassroots Governance Model ... 95
Shanghai’s Environmental Authoritarian Turn: A Waste ‘Revolution’? ... 97
4.1.1 Case Study: Translating Interests for a ‘Clean’ City ... 101
Description: The ‘Green Account’ Programme ... 101
Interessement/Enrolment ... 104
Mobilisation ... 111
4.1.2 #Waste’s Guiding Role in Environmental Governance ... 112
4.1.3 Are SGOs Playing with the Devil? ... 115
4.1.4 Governance-Beyond the State: A Foucauldian Reflection ... 121
Environmental Governmentality ... 121
Concluding Remarks ... 124
Chapter 5 Beyond-State Experimentations: Will the Market Set Them Free? ... 129
Embracing the Market: An Open Door for the Emergence of a New Organisational Ecology? ... 131
5.1.1 Social Enterprises: A Brief Overview ... 131
5.1.2 Social Enterprises Scaling up in China ... 132
5.1.3 What Is a Chinese Social Enterprise? ... 134
Why Embrace a ‘Vague’ Social Enterprise Model? ... 136
An Emerging Trend in Shanghai ... 136
5.1.4 An Open Door but Not for Everyone ... 141
A Need to (Re)Define Civil Society in China ... 141
5.2.1 Welfare Mix: Conceptualising and Contextualising China’s SGOs ... 143
Growing Organic Connections: Scaling Sustainable Rural Farming Up and Out 145 5.3.1 Setting the Context ... 146
5.3.2 #Farming: Bridging the Urban-Rural Divide ... 147
5.3.3 Decrypting How People and Technology are Shaping the Future of a More Sustainable Food System in Shanghai ... 148
5.3.4 Problematisation ... 148
Farmers – Common Interests: ... 150
Cooperative – Extending Scale ... 150
Social Enterprise – Striking for a Self-Sufficient Economy ... 151
5.3.5 Interessement/Enrolment ... 153
5.3.6 Mobilisation ... 154
5.3.7 Grassroots Scalar Politics ... 155
An Alternative Channel for Civil Society? ... 157
Concluding Remarks ... 160
Chapter 6 Environmentalism and Authoritarian Resilience ... 163
From Theory to Practice ... 164
6.1.2 Step 2: Constructing a New Political Framing ... 167
6.1.3 Step 3: (Re)Aligning Public Participation in a Coordinated Framework ... 170
Shanghai 2035: The ‘Green’ Consensus ... 172
6.2.1 Access to the City ... 174
6.2.2 The ‘Living Circle’ ... 176
Prospects ... 179
Inconsistencies ... 182
A Chinese Model of Sustainable Urbanisation? ... 187
6.5.1 Shanghai: A New Urban Environmental Regime? ... 189
Concluding Remarks ... 191
Chapter 7 Conclusion ... 195
Answering the Research Questions ... 196
Contribution and Implications ... 198
Limitations and Avenues for Further Research ... 200
Bibliography ... 203
Figures
Figure 1 – Organisation of the thesis ... 11
Figure 2 – Propaganda Poster referring to the ‘Chinese dream’ ... 25
Figure 3 – Xi Jinping is elected President of the People's Republic of China ... 26
Figure 4 – State-society dynamics in environmental governance ... 32
Figure 5 – Environmental authoritarianism analytical framework ... 33
Figure 6 – Recycling and environmental carnival poster ... 52
Figure 7 – Shanghainese street ‘green’ advertisement ... 53
Figure 8 – Shanghai's urban environmental management major stages ... 55
Figure 9 – A hazy day in the Bund ... 57
Figure 10 – Entrance of Pudong Public Welfare Street ... 62
Figure 11 – #Student members after a green class activity at a primary school ... 74
Figure 12 – Shanghai’s governance apparatus ... 89
Figure 13 – View plan of a shequ ... 91
Figure 14 – Gated-communities in Shanghai ... 91
Figure 15 – Propaganda image: 'Recycling starts from you and me' ... 97
Figure 16 – Main and Secondary Obligatory Passage points ... 104
Figure 17 – Entrance of two Residentials’ Committees ... 106
Figure 18 – Entrance of a Neighbourhood Community. ... 107
Figure 19 – Volunteer checking whether a resident correctly segregated its waste ... 108
Figure 20 – The 'green account' programme scheme ... 110
Figure 21 – Community trash containers after the ‘green account’ ... 111
Figure 22 – Karaoke session during a 'Green Account' activity ... 113
Figure 23 – Volunteer sharing a picture of a dead bird’s stomach filled with plastic ... 115
Figure 24 – Screening of Wang's documentary Plastic China with environmental activists . 117 Figure 25 – #Waste volunteer poses with its students after a class ... 118
Figure 26 – #Waste's WeChat group conversation between a volunteer and three workers 119 Figure 27 – #Waste Maoist reference ... 120
Figure 28 – #Waste staff WeChat post demanding residents to act as ‘good citizens’ ... 120
Figure 29 – China's welfare mix ... 143
Figure 30 – #Farming Programme Framework ... 148
Figure 31 – #Farming's social organisation certificate ... 151
Figure 32 – #Farming’s Social Enterprise Registration Certificates ... 152
Figure 33 – Environmental Propaganda ... 169
Figure 34 – Propaganda stating that 'Social morality must be maintained', 1984. ... 170
Figure 35 – Construction site covered with 'green' propaganda ... 175
Tables
Table 1 – SGOs Typology ... 45
Table 2 – Laws and Regulations Governing SGOs in China ... 66
Table 3 – Development Phases of China’s Purchase of Services ... 78
Graphs
Graph 1 – Growth of Chinese Social Organisations by Year ... 63Graph 2 – Top Ten Cities in Terms of the Number of Social Organisations Nationwide ... 73
Boxes
Box 1 – 2015 Tianjin Explosions ... 34Box 2 – The ‘Key’ Example ... 40
Box 3 – Shanghai Tower: An Icon of China’s ‘Green’ Turn ... 51
Box 4 – Pudong’s Public Welfare Street: SGOs Incubator ... 62
Box 5 – The Pizza Hut Little Green Superman project ... 74
Box 6 – SGOs Administrative/Organisational Development in Shanghai ... 80
Box 7 – Basic facts of NPI ... 81
Box 8 – The 2008 Sichuan Earthquake and the Rise of Social Entrepreneurship ... 132
Abbreviations
ANT Actor Network Theory
CCP Chinese Communist Party
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation
ESG Environmental Social and Governance
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GONGO Governmental Oriented Non-Governmental Organisation
MEE Ministry of Ecology and Environment
MOCA Ministry of Civil Affairs
MSW Municipal Solid Waste
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMBY Not In My Backyard
NPI Non-Profit Incubator
OPP Obligatory Passage Point
PRC People’s Republic of China
SGO Social Good Organisation
Chapter 1
Introduction
In March 2006, farmers from a small village by China’s Jinsha River kidnapped seven
hydropower surveyors to stop the Tiger Leaping Gorge (hǔ tiào xiá 虎跳峡) Dam in Yunnan.1
The next day, a deputy country head came and helped the leader of the group of seven to escape. Trust had broken down. As the news spread, 10,000 farmers formed a tight cordon around the Deqin County government office. Although the cold night arrived, protesters stayed gathered. The demonstration continued for two days and ended without violence with the retreat of the farmers and the announcement of the cancellation of the dam. The campaign became one of the biggest success stories of China’s ’green awakening’ (Hong, 2007) and ‘a nail stuck in the companies’ throat’ (Geall, 2013, p. 206).
Although the incident played a major role in the cancellation of the project, non-governmental organisations (NGO) were key in educating, informing and maintaining the actors together throughout the two-year campaign (Geall, 2013; Shapiro, 2013). Suppressed during the Mao era and driven ‘out of existence’ or ‘underground’ following the Tiananmen
protests (Hsu, 2010),2 their numbers were estimated at 500,000 in 2006, most of them
unregistered (Geall, 2013, p. 4). As Isabel Hilton put it (Geall, 2013, p. 4): ‘It was hard to be exact, or to define what that term (NGO) might mean across a wide range of options, but clearly civil society in China was bouncing back from the crushing catastrophe of the Mao era’.
Institutionally constrained by the state, as will be discussed in detail further, since the mid-1990s, many organisations found ways to develop by either registering as profit companies with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce or not registering at all (Saich, 2000; Ma, 2004;
1 The Tiger Leaping Gorge is a canyon in the Yunnan province of China. It’s one of the deepest canyons in the world where the height difference between the top of the mountain and the roaring Jinsha River (a primary tributary of the upper Yangtze River) below can be up to almost 3800 meters. It is located 60 kilometres north of Lijiang City, Yunnan in southwestern China. It is part of the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas World Heritage Site.
Shieh, Shawn; Schwartz, 2009). In view of their rising numbers and dissatisfaction amongst the population vis-à-vis the regime, many scholars prospected the emergence of a contentious environmental movement (Brettell, 2003; Lin and Ross, 2005; Stalley and Yang, 2006; Xie and
Ho, 2008; Xie, 2009; Spires, Tao and Chan, 2014; Reese, 2015).3 Normally defined as
environmental NGOs (ENGO) in the literature, they rapidly came to symbolise the potential of an ‘association revolution’ (Tai, 2015). From the 2000s, a flourishing literature focused on the dynamics of ENGOs development in China, particularly on their potential in opening up spaces for citizens to organise around environmental issues (Wang and He, 2004; Ho, 2007; Hsu, 2014; Tai, 2015; Wang, 2015). Although the scholarship made clear that organisations
faced limitations at multiple levels,4 many scholars assessed their rise to reflect state-society
relations and the expansion of civil society.5
In light of this literature, in 2014, I started the following research with the aim to empirically assess the role of what I have termed Social Good Organisations (SGO) in environmental governance. Some scholars might have called them grassroots environmental organisations, civil society organisations or non-governmental organisations. I choose this term to emphasise the organisations’ focus on doing something for the ‘common good’. I agree with some scholars such as Allison Gauss or Suzanne Perry when they claim that the word ‘non-profit’ or ‘non-governmental’ usually describe what the organisations are not rather than
what they are.6 All the observed organisations, despite having varying degrees of autonomy
and organisational structure (small, informal, for-profit, non-profit, registered, non-registered, community-based, etc.), have in common the goal to pursue a ‘general’ public benefit and positively impact the society or the environment. Therefore, using such a ‘restrictive’ and ‘contested’ term (Najam, 1996) complicates the analysis of the diversity of China’s organisation sector. In my opinion the concept of SGO better represents the social, political and legal environment for the emergence and development of bottom-up organisations in China. When the term NGO is used, it refers exclusively to legally registered organisations in Mainland China.
As will become clear through the case studies presented in the empirical chapters (a registered NGO in Chapter 4 and a social enterprise in Chapter 5), SGOs develop different institutional logics making it difficult to define what is covered in China by the term ‘non-governmental organisation’. As Lewis (2010) stresses:
3 Moreover, activists and journalists were rising with the development of internet and social media.
4 For instance, at a micro-level, environmental organisations needed to gain legitimacy among the Chinese population; at a macro-level, they needed to keep up with the national legislation aimed at regulating their registration status or development.
5 For example, Teets (2013, p. 14) claimed that ENGOs acted as effective links between the government and the civil society, enhancing the pluralisation of society.
The world of NGOs contains a bewildering variety of labels. While the term ‘‘NGO’’ is widely used, there are also many other overlapping terms used such as ‘‘non-profit,’’ ‘‘voluntary,’’ and ‘‘civil society’’ organizations. In many cases, the use of different terms does not reflect descriptive or analytical rigour, but is instead a consequence of the different cultures and histories in which thinking about NGOs has emerged.
Leaving aside conceptual discussions for the moment, since the beginning of the 2000s, the number of SGOs and environmental movements continued to grow, giving form to a more ‘pluralistic’ civil society (Van Rooij, Stern and Fürst, 2016). By expanding their ‘sphere of conflict’ and derailing the construction of dams or chemical plants, environmental SGOs defied the conventional image of political and civic life in an authoritarian country (Lei, 2018). Focusing on the wide literature which tends to view SGOs as agents of democratisation, expectations rose about their transformative capacity, both for civil society and political change (Hsu and Hasmath, 2015). Yet, they have failed to challenge China’s one-party rule and their growth prospects have been thwarted under Xi (Kostka and Zhang, 2018).
Developed between 2014-2018, the following thesis reflects the new face of Xi's complex tools towards increasing the party's centralisation of power. Although citizens and environmental SGOs have been accorded the legal rights to sue polluters, new laws and regulations, as Shawn Shieh (2018) defends, show the state ‘ambitious effort to remake civil society in the Party-state's image’. The promulgation in early 2016 of the Charity Law and the Overseas NGO Management Law are a good example. The following dissertation takes this tightening period as an opportunity to re-evaluate state-society relations. How is the CCP maintaining its authoritarian approach to governance despite an increasingly pluralistic society?
Research Questions and Aim
Starting from the general assumption that China’s environmental crisis is not only an environmental issue but also a challenge for the preservation of China’s single-party rule, the following thesis seeks to assess how the CCP has been trying to ‘enhance’ its power and
legitimacy by the means of ‘green’ strategies.7 The ultimate goal being to assess the impacts
and outcomes of what I frame as an environmental authoritarian approach towards environmental governance. Specifically, I am interested in how the party-state is trying to regain control over the environmental sphere by developing ‘collaborative governance’ mechanisms with specific environmental groups and/or organisations. As highlighted earlier, this realm of ‘social good’ organisations reflect their need to align with ‘good governance’ practices to enhance their legitimacy towards the government and the public in general.
This research attempts to answer the following question: how is the Chinese Communist Party co-opting, sculpting and managing grassroots environmental organisations to its advantage? Does it enable the state to respond to environmental issues more efficiently and/or to maintain social stability (and, by extension, the CCP’s resilience capacity)? More specifically, the key objectives of this research are:
1. to understand the role of environmentalism in the Chinese state’s resilient authoritarianism and contribute to the literature on the public participation role in authoritarian regimes;
2. to assess exactly how the institutional mechanisms of environmental governance are arranged in China’s urban spaces, as much as their impacts and outcomes for environmental protection; and
3. to examine how and why resistance emerges at a grassroots level. Following the above, this thesis asks several more specific research questions:
1. How is public participation being shaped in China’s urban spaces?
2. What is the role of SGOs in today’s national and local governance system? 3. If plurasition is emerging from the grassroots? How and why?
Background and Approach
Following a bloodless power struggle, Deng Xiaoping rose to power in December 1978 and
made clear that profound changes would lie on the horizon.8 Roughly a month later, China’s
new leader flew to the United States at the invitation of President Jimmy Carter. Leaving
behind Mao’s repudiation of American imperialism,9 Deng stated that ‘Sino-U.S. relations
have reached a new beginning’.10 But while Deng was opening himself to the outside world,
voices calling for freedom and reform started to emerge. Initially supported by Deng to push political enemies aside, the movement was crushed when people started asking for political reforms and putting the rule of the CCP intro question. It was called the ‘Beijing Spring’. Raising itself against the communist regime, the movement aimed to expand Deng’s four
modernisation programme by adding a fifth, democracy.11
Increasing economic freedom was being translated into greater freedom of opinion which was, at that time, crystallised by the democracy wall, a place where citizens could express their anti-government and anti-CCP feelings. Throughout the 1980s, several students and intellectuals demonstrated and called for open government and democracy (Kwong, 1988). Yet, a national upsurge only gained momentum in 1989, after the death of Hu Yaobang 胡耀 邦, the former head of the Communist Party (Cox, 1989). Seeing how the demonstrations had escalated, some predicted the ‘collapse of China’, but the movement ended in blood when
guns were fired on the 4th of June 1989 and tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square. Contrary to
initial predictions, the Chinese party-state consolidated control after the massacre, and in the decades that followed, large-scale demonstrations disappeared (Béja, 2010).
After the brutality of the 1989 repression, no one had imagined that this act of violence
would be so successful.12 The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of
the Soviet Union kept Western observers hopeful about the transformation of China’s single-party rule. Yet, contrary to these expectations, as Strittmatter (2019) points out, ‘the memory of the massacre has practically been wiped out; the state-ordered amnesia is complete’. The party-state embarked into a period of assertive control while nationalism as a concept gradually reclaimed its place in the communist party discourse (Cabestan, 2005). Deng
8 Andrew Cohen (March/April 2014) ‘Eternal Spring: Ma Desheng’, Art Asia Pacific Magazine, Issue 87, available at http://artasiapacific.com/Magazine/87/EternalSpring (accessed 12 January 2020).
9 Although it should be noted that Sino-American relations had already started in 1972 when Mao and Nixon met in China.
10 Exchange of remarks between President Carter and Vice Premier Deng. Source: The Department of State Bulletin March 1979, Volume 79, Issues 2022-2027.
11 Deng’s four modernisations were agriculture, industry, science and technology and defence. ‘The Fifth Modernisation’ was advanced by human rights activist Wei Jingsheng 魏京生. It was originally placed on the Democracy Wall in Beijing on December 5, 1978. The text is available at http://weijingsheng.org/doc/en/THE%20FIFTH%20MODERNIZATION.html
changed his ‘friendly’ view on Sino-U.S. relations and asserted that China was threatened by foreign subversive forces (Nathan, 2019).
According to Cabestan (2005), China’s success in the 1990s is explained by its diplomatic isolation, selective integration into the globalised institutions and instrumental deployment of nationalism. Many scholars have tried to apprehend what made post-Tiananmen China resilient to the forces of change that led to such dramatic transformations in Eastern Europe. Since then, other events have predicted the collapse of the CCP, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis or a so-called ‘Jasmine revolution’ at the beginning of the 2010s.13 But, as
evidenced by history, the CCP has proven its adaptability and capacity to respond to domestic pressures and international economic forces (Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019).
In 2003, Andrew Nathan (2003) introduced the concept of authoritarian resilience to account for the regime’s capacity to reconsolidate itself despite its authoritarian, undemocratic approach to power. The aim was to comprehend why the theories forecasting the collapse of China had proven wrong. Ever since, several scholars have been trying to explain China’s authoritarian resilience (He and Warren, 2011; Naito, 2017; Doyon, 2018; Li and Zhou, 2019; P. Wang, 2019; Qiaoan and Teets, 2019), some claiming that China’s authoritarian model could become a threat to the dominant Western model of market capitalism (Halper, 2010). The interest over authoritarian resilience as a concept has been growing since Nathan first introduced it in 2003 and has since then been applied to various contexts such as Egypt (Bellin, 2012) or Malaysia (Ruzza, Gabusi and Pellegrino, 2019).
In China, the interest has been increasing since Xi Jinping took office in 2012 and,
especially, in the context of the country’s alarming smog episodes.14 2013 will be remembered
as the year when China’s toxic smog (Zhou et al., 2015) reshaped the awareness of Chinese
citizens.15 In those days, ‘mass protests’ were estimated at 30,000 to 50,000 every year and,
according to Chen Jiping, a former leading member of the party’s Committee of Political and
Legislative Affairs, many of the ‘incidents’ were linked to the environment (Orr et al., 2014).
In 2013, the annual State of the Environment report16 recorded 712 cases of ‘abrupt
environmental incidents’, a 31 per cent surge compared to the previous year.17 Meanwhile, a
Pew Research Centre survey (Kohut and Wike, 2013) concluded that Chinese citizens’
13 The name is inspired and named after the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in 2011. The call for a jasmine revolution in China was made online. But differently from Tunisia or Egypt, where massive street protests emerged, the movement was silenced with online censorship and demonstrations crackdowns.
14 Although I mainly focus on environmental problems as a cause of a loss of legitimacy, as Éric Florence (2014) has highlighted, rural-urban extreme unequal conditions have also caused discontentment.
15 Refer to Olivia Boyd (19 December 2013) ‘What happened to China’s environment in 2013’, China Dialogue, available at https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6586-What-happened-to-China-s-environment-in-2-13- (accessed 23 April 2016).
16 The report is available on the website of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment: http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/Reports/soe/soe2011/201606/P020160601591756378883.pdf
concerns about the environment had risen from 36 per cent in 2012 to 47 per cent in 2013.
Without a doubt, China’s environmental crisis had become a real obstacle to social18 and
economic19 development in China.
Thus, new questions started to arise on the resilience capacity of China’s authoritarian system to the gravity of its environmental condition. For instance, considering China’s catastrophic environmental situation, how come the regime has managed to stay in power while further reasserting its authoritarian rule? Should environmentalism be considered as a new dimension reinforcing rather than weakening authoritarianism? Further developed in Chapter 2, resilience is understood as the capacity of the regime to tolerate, recover or respond to a disturbance or a threat. In this case, what seems to be a legitimacy threat to PCC power as a result of the country’s catastrophic environmental situation. It is important to highlight that my interest over the concept of resilience does not presuppose the idea that changes should lead to a weakening of the CCP or the democratisation of the regime. Also, the research presented here posits itself against a ‘dichotomous stereotyping’ of China’s civil society (Salmenkari, 2017) by not recognising that an antagonism relation exists between state and society. As such, SGOs are not analysed through a ‘political opposition’ lens, but rather as collective activities that aim to achieve certain goals, some ending up assisting the state, other challenging it.
In contrast to the dominant discussions of environmentalism (Dryzek, 1987; Eckersley, 1992), which concentrates on the relationship between democracy and environmentalism, the following dissertation asks whether environmental protection can become a playground for the authoritarian regime to pursue ulterior motives and goals. Using the concept of environmental authoritarianism, this thesis examines how China’s authoritarian regime instrumentalises environmental discourses to co-opt society at the grassroots level. I particularly assess environmental impacts and outcomes of such authoritarian mechanisms by focusing on state-society raising ‘collaborative’ mechanisms. The implementation of cooperation and legitimation strategies are investigated at an urban city level in the field of environmental sustainability. Broadly, the following research aims to advance research on authoritarian resilience, shed light on China’s public participation, and contribute to understanding the possible outcomes of authoritarian modes of environmental governance.
Theoretically, to assess the resilience capacity of the CCP, the dissertation is developed around the concept of environmental authoritarianism, a non-democratic model of environmental governance using both coercive and ‘collaborative’ mechanisms. The concept is developed in detail in Chapter 2. Methodologically, an inductive and ethnographic
18 It was estimated that life expectancy in the north of the country has decreased by 5.5 years because of the environmental crisis (Rohde and Muller, 2015).
approach has been followed. A participatory approach combined with semi-structured interviews represent the primary sources of data. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with SGOs, members and representatives, as well as with academics and citizens (refer to Appendix A). Yet, although studying state-society dynamics represents the focus of the study, the urban context also needs to be specified. Thus, the dissertation also brings questions concerning space, embodiment, everyday life and people’s own status in their urban places and practices. The main theme being the environment, the urban sustainability problematic takes a considerable importance. How to analyse, by the means of spaces and visual methods, the importance that the environment has taken in people’s lives? How does the changing structures of Shanghai as an urban space changes and redefines the relationships of people and their perception of sustainability and care for the environment?
The empirical data is analysed through the lens of actor-network theory, commonly abbreviated to ANT, and also known as the sociology of translation. ANT is applied in the empirical chapters 4 and 5 to explore the relational ties developed by our two case studies: (1) #Waste, an environmental NGO focused on waste sorting who has come to collaborate with the local government; and (2) #Farming, a social enterprise that supports local farmers and sustainable farming. ANT is used as a method to ‘follow the actors’ and assess how the
relations between them are constituted, that is, ‘what actors achieve by scaling, spacing, and
contextualizing each other’ (Latour, 2005).
ANT’s four ‘moments of translation’ (refer to Chapter 2) framework is particularly fit to show how actor networks are constructed. I use it as a tool to explain the very process by which society is constantly reconfigured (Callon, 2001). Briefly, for Callon (1986), network
building is about a leading actor who effectively translates his/her definition of a
problem/approach/idea to other actors. Hence, ANT is primarily empirical and seeks to make sense of complex social situations. I use this methodological approach to show how both the state and grassroots organisations associate heterogeneous actors in their development strategies. In this vein, I highlight the contours of Chinese social-politic life by leaving aside a dichotomous opposition between the state and the society (Huang, 1993). ANT is used to describe as closely as possible how environmental governance is evolving by leaving aside presumptions of what state-society relations are in an authoritarian state. I apply ANT not as a theory but as a method to examine how ‘participatory’ environmental governance mechanisms manifest themselves in China’s urban areas.
Yet, although ANT’s ‘flat ontology’ can be useful to describe the various actors at play in an authoritarian regime such as China, its horizontal perspective can ‘limit’ the analysis when it comes to identifying power asymmetries. Therefore, to recalibrate the importance of power
in the analysis, I combine ANT with Foucault’s concept of governmentality in Chapter 4 and
– is used to better illustrate how the state objectives require ‘soft’ strategies and how collaborative projects with SGOs can reinforce the party-state presence at the grassroots level.
In Chapter 5, grassroots scalar politics is used as a lens to better illustrate how SGOs engage
at different spatial scales to defend their interests, autonomy, rights and resources.
The Chapters Ahead
The dissertation aims to bring together the result of my empirical analysis which covers three broad themes: environmentalism, civil society and authoritarianism.
Chapter 2 Theorising China’s Path Towards an ‘Ecological Civilisation’
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical underpinning of this thesis. It starts with a critique of existing theories claiming that there is a self-evident relationship between democracy and ecology by exploring the CCP’s ‘ecological civilisation’ approach. Then, the chapter moves on to further develop a conceptual framework by combining an environmental authoritarian governance literature with actor-network theory. Chapter 2 also provides the methodology used in this thesis. It explains the research design chose, the rationale for opting for a case study approach, and justifies the case selection. Furthermore, the chapter spells out the data sources and research methods used in detail.
Chapter 3 Shanghai’s ‘Collaborative’ Authoritarian Logic: A Civil Society Lost in Translation? Chapter 3 explores Shanghai Municipality collaborative approach to governance and describes the city’s political commitment to make sustainable development a long-term development goal. The chapter starts by discussing the city’s historical and conceptual context, then, the specificities of current environmental governance strategies are explained, particularly the increasing use of SGOs in delivering public services. Chapter 3 presents the major issues and approaches implemented by authorities in Shanghai to respond to the many environmental and societal challenges ahead and acts as an introduction to the statements made in the empirical chapters of the dissertation.
Chapter 4 An IRON Fist in a Velvet Glove: SGOs New Roles in Constructing a ‘Clean’ Grassroots Governance Model
Chapter 4 is the first empirical part of the thesis. It covers the first case study, a state-SGO collaborative approach to waste management. Chapter 4 reinforces the counterintuitive idea that SGOs’ activities strengthen, rather than weaken, China’s authoritarian regime presence at the grassroots level.
Chapter 5 Beyond-State Experimentations: Will the Market Set Them Free?
case study to engage in grassroots scalar politics is recognised as enhancing the SGO capacity to defend its interests.
Chapter 6 Environmentalism and Authoritarian Resilience
This chapter links the empirical research to the theoretical presumptions and discusses how environmental authoritarianism takes form in urban settings. Furthermore, the chapter questions the prospects and inconsistencies of CCP’s authoritarian approach to governance and tries to depict how state-society relationships could evolve in the future.
Chapter 7 Conclusion
Chapter 2
Theorising China’s Path
Towards an ‘Ecological
Civilisation’
Economic development has brought increasing pressure on the country’s environment compromising the quality of living conditions in China. Yet, it was this so-called Chinese economic miracle that boosted the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy after the shock and outrage that Tiananmen produced. The conflicting goals of environmental protection and economic development quickly became China’s máodùn 矛 盾 (or contradiction). A growing debate has emerged regarding the resilience capacity of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the face of its catastrophic environmental degradation. The wider literature claims that environmental movements are generally conducive to democracy (Eckersley, 1992; Drosdowski, 2006). So, why is China’s authoritarian regime proving so resilient? Could it be that China is leading us to (re)question such theoretical assessments? In this first chapter, the potential conflict between environmental and political interests is analysed using Xi Jinping’s ‘ecological civilisation’ narrative. Contrary to what several historical cases, such as Poland or Hungary have indicated, environmental conflicts do not always lead to a move towards democracy (Narath and Varone, 2009).
the ability of the party-state to co-opt environmental politics in view of pursuing other strategic goals.
This chapter is comprised of six sections: First, I start by introducing China’s alarming environmental crisis and how it has endangered the life of Chinese people, the pace of China’s economic growth and, consequently, threatened the legitimacy of the ruling authoritarian party. Second, I explore why the rise of environmental movements, as a response to
environmental degradation, has been interpreted as a prelude for a wave of democratisation.20
Although environmentalism in itself cannot be relied on as the sole factor behind democratisation, it has been seen as an important component of the changes taking place in the politics and society of transitional democracies (Hicks, 1996). Thus, environmental movements were seen as inextricably linked to the development of new freedoms for the public as well as jarring political change. Still, in the third section, despite a growing environmental awareness among Chinese citizens, I argue that China’s experience turned out to be much different from the fall of the communist regimes in Central European states. To explain how China’s managed to resist to the risks inherent to its severe environmental conditions, I explore, in the fourth section, the concept of environmental authoritarianism. I particularly connect it with China’s ‘ecological civilisation’ discourse to unravel the state’s innovation mechanisms to ‘penetrate’ the society. Then, the fifth section outlines the central commitments and language of ANT and how it may contribute to revealing aspects and issues of China’s new environmental governance mechanisms. Lastly, the conceptual framework of this thesis is presented by combining both the environmental authoritarianism concept and the ANT literature. Finally, the operationalisation of the conceptual framework and its application to the case studies (including the methodology chosen) is presented.
The Ecological Apocalypse
The baiji dolphin is the largest mammal living in the Yangtze, China’s longest river. Or at least, it used to be. Fishermen and environmentalists alike have long complained fish are dying out in the Yangtze. Their concerns were real. The baiji dolphin, present in the Yangtze River for 20 million years, is thought to be the first dolphin species driven to extinction due to the impact of humans. Its demise was rapid and shocking, going from a healthy population of some 6000
animals to extinct in a few decades according to Whale and Dolphin Conservation.21 This
mythic species which disappeared at the blink of an eye has become a symbol of the devastating environmental price China has paid after decades of uncontrolled development.
20 By democratisation I understand a shift from one-party rule to a pluralist, multi-party parliamentary systems with democratically elected and accountable government.
An annual fishing ban of three months each year was put into place in 2003 to protect the
Yangtze’s fish stocks.22 The ban expanded to four months in 2016. A year-round ban on all
fishing activities has been included in a guideline issued by the State Council in 2019.23 These
measures were taken as desperate solutions to solve the many consequences of what has been a wild economic growth.
In the past forty years following the ‘reform and opening-up (gǎigé kāifàng 改革开放)', a
time of accelerated economic growth, marked by improvements in living standards, and continual changes in the social landscape, profoundly transformed China’s Environment. The massive industrialisation process not only severely impacted biodiversity but plunged the entire country into a tangible ecological crisis. While China’s GDP grew on average ten per cent each year for more than a decade, it was at the expense of its environment and public health. The toxic legacy resulting from this process was very severe: air, soil and water pollution, food and energy security. According to Rohde and Muller’s study (2015), about 1,6 million people were dying annually due to cardiovascular and respiratory problems due to air pollution. Consequently, in the biggest Chinese cities, outdoor air pollution became a huge challenge for public health (Kan, 2009). Life expectancy in the north of the country decreasing
by 5.5 years compared to other less developed areas in the south (Chen et al., 2013).
In 2008, the Beijing Olympics were identified as the most polluted games ever. Both athletes and spectators exposed themselves to dangerous levels of smog. Despite the Chinese government considerable efforts to reduce pollution by shutting down factories, restricting car usage and slowing down construction, high levels of pollutants persisted. According to the USC US-China Institute, the smog was so severe that some countries made arrangements for their athletes to train in neighbouring countries and travel to Beijing just prior to the
opening ceremony.24 Besides, a lack of confidence prevailed as Beijing authorities’ levels of
pollution readings showed inconsistencies compared with the ones provided by the
Associated Press.25
So, unfortunately for the CCP, grey skies, smog and face masks became China’s symbol worldwide. The country’s alarming situation started to create terms never heard before, such as ‘cancer villages’, to describe small communities adjacent to chemical, pharmaceutical or
power plants. Conditions in these so-called ‘cancer villages’ were reported by the BBC and
22 Despite environmental benefits, the fishing ban is raising concerns of fishermen. Refer to Dominic Morgan (22 November 2019) ‘Yangtze Fishing Ban Leaves Communities High and Dry’, Sixth Tone, available at https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1004863/yangtze-fishing-ban-leaves-communities-high-and-dry (accessed 23 November 2019).
23 Cao Ling, Wang Yamin, John Mimikakis, Zhou Wei, hosts (21 June 2019) ‘The history of overfishing in China’, Sustainable Asia (podcast), available at https://chinadialogueocean.net/8795-podcast-history-overfishing-in-china/ (accessed 12 September 2019).
24 USC US-China Institute (2008) ‘Air Quality At The 2008 Beijing Olympics’, available at https://china.usc.edu/air-quality-2008-beijing-olympics (accessed 13 January 2017).
The Guardian, some ofthe largest broadcasters in the world.26 If in the north of the country
public anger rose over air pollution, appeals started to spread regarding water supplies, accused of raising the numbers of cancers at alarming rates. Even though Chinese authorities
spent millions,27 85 per cent of the water in the city’s major rivers was undrinkable in 2015,
according to official standards, and 56.4 per cent was unfit for any purpose.28 According to the
same sources, around 70 per cent of the country’s rivers and lakes were severely polluted. But water pollution is not an isolated problem. It is closely linked to soil pollution: untreated wastewater contaminates soil and, conversely, pollutants in soil pollute surface and groundwater sources. Soil and water pollution ending-up threatening food security. This vicious cycle saw the emergence of food scandals all over the country. The 2008 Chinese milk scandal represents one of the most widespread food safety incidents after 6 infants died from kidney damage. Another serious example is the cadmium pollution of rice, particularly severe in Hunan, China’s largest rice-producing province. All these issues elevated protecting the environment into one of the most pressing challenges all over the country.
When the PEW survey (Wike and Parker, 2015) asked Chinese people what their top concerns were back in 2015, air pollution and water pollution ranked second, right after officials’ corruption, but ahead of wealth inequality, crime, unemployment and other concerns. The survey also showed that fears about food safety had tripled since 2008. Similarly, a survey-based study conducted in 2014 among Shanghai’s students in Jiaotong, East China Normal, Fudan and Tongji University showed that college students regarded
environmental issues with a high sense of urgency (Kong et al., 2014). When it came to
whether environmental concerns should be prioritised over economic growth, 60 per cent of the participants completely agreed with this statement. According to the analysis, the higher the family income, the more priority was put on environmental concerns.
Produced by former CCTV journalist Chai Jing back in 2015, Under the Dome (qióngdǐng
zhī xià 穹顶之下) very well depicts the horrendous flip sides of China’s economic 'miracle'. The documentary criticises China’s environmental policy and was recognised as a powerful tool to enhance public environmental consciousness. The attention it got was so huge that in the time frame of three weeks, the documentary went from viral on the internet, to being blocked by government censors, to be the subject of a question to Premier Li Keqiang at a
26 (2013) ‘China acknowledges “cancer villages”’, BBC, available at www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21545868 (accessed 14 April 2015); Jonathan Watts (2010) ‘China’s “cancer villages” reveal dark side of economic boom’, The Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jun/07/china-cancer-villages-industrial-pollution (accessed 12 November 2019).
27 Refer to Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the PRC (2018) ‘2017 Report on the State of the Ecology and
Environment in China’, available at
http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/Reports/soe/SOEE2017/201808/P020180801597738742758.pdf (accessed 23 November 2019).
press conference where he vowed that the government would be harsher on environmental issues.29
Under the Dome not only unveiled the schizophrenic roots of environmental protection versus economic development but also exposed the deepening interest of the Chinese public in learning about their country’s Environment. Social media, environmental journalists and consequent rising media attention contributed to the enhancement of Chinese citizens’ environmental consciousness. Environmental severity in China gave form to massive protests
such as the Nujiang anti-dam construction movement in 2004 (Lin, 2007; Lin and Lin, 2007).
At that time, social networks and the media played a huge role in the diffusion of information (Roeder, 2013). As Judith Shapiro (2013) stressed: ‘The activists’ strategies… reflect both the importance of new social media and the shifting constraints under which civil society must operate in an authoritarian state’.
In regard of China’s severe environmental situation from the mid-1990s to the beginning of 2010s, several scholars hoped that a growing environmental movement would help boost the development of a more demanding civil society (Lu, 2007; Chen, 2010; Geall, 2013). This
period was marked by the establishment of Friends of Nature, China's first environmental
NGO, in 1993. The idea was strengthened by several scholars who saw the rise of environmental consciousness and an increasing number of environmental organisations (Kassiola, 2010; Hsu, 2014) as a prelude that would allow civil society to fulfil its potential (Geall, 2013).
The growth of Chinese SGOs was considerable. As one Professor working in
environmental education for more than 20 years argued,30 20 years ago, the NGO sector was
quasi-non-existent: ‘When I worked for the environmental education initiative programme in Beijing in 1997, it was the first time for me to know there is something called an NGO… and you know, I worked for a University based in Shanghai’. Though 20 years ago, the concept of NGO was unknown to the vast majority of Chinese citizens, nowadays, even in remote areas, SGOs work in a wide variety of areas. SGOs have improved in quantity, scale and quality (Chao and Onyx, 2015). Basing himself on statistics given by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ruge Gao (2014) claimed that in 2008 China had about 200 000 SGOs and more than 5000 focused on environmental issues.
Though, in the next chapter, I focus more in detail on the different types of SGOs currently operating in China, it should be noted that registered SGOs are divided in three categories in
China: social organisations (shèhuì tuántǐ 社会团体), civil non-enterprise units (mínbàn fēi
qǐyè dānwèi 民办非企业单位) and foundations (jījīn huì 基金会). Social organisations are
29 Steven Mufson (16 March 2015) ‘This documentary went viral in China. Then it was censored. It won’t be forgotten’, The Washington Post, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2015/03/16/this-documentary-went-viral-in-china-then-it-was-censored-it-wont-be-forgotten/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b24d5fa96270 (accessed 13 November 2018).
equivalent to membership associations (sectoral associations, academic associations, etc.). They normally represent a specific social sector or a large social group. Civil non-enterprise units refer to public institutions, social groups or social organisations established with the use
of non-state-owned assets for purposes of engaging in non-profit social service activities.31
The expansion of environmental non-government organisations (ENGOs) in the past two decades has been perhaps the most conspicuous phenomenon in the recent history of civil society in China. Many factors promoted the early development of ENGOs in China: the political reform of government, the defects of environmental governance, public worries about environmental problems, international interaction, and the efforts of influential elites. In recent years, ENGOs have been further boosted by the change of public ideas about the environment, the professionalisation of ENGOs, the development of the internet, and increasing environmental deterioration. (Fei, 2016)
While environmental issues were slowly recognised as encouraging for the development of civil society, it also started to be seen as a threat to social stability and the CCP’s leadership. On the one hand, it showed the CCP’s incapability to deal with the problem, and, on the other, environmental issues started to weigh heavily on the country’s gross national income. As such, the environment became a real obstacle for both social and economic development. More importantly, by putting economic and social stability at risk, a real threat to the CCP’s legitimacy and, therefore, to the survival of the Party.
Environmental Movements: An Opportunity for
Greater Openness of the Political System?
For quite a long time, economic development and the improved living standards had contributed to maintaining a stable society. But, as just argued, the alarming environmental impacts and the emergence of spaces conducive to more active citizen participation - SGOs, social media, the decentralisation of government, mass protests, economic liberalisation, and so on - helped push the boundaries for civil society development. In particular, because environmental issues urgency enhanced activists’ ability to negotiate with the state.
The environmental movement in China stands out from other types of social movements for various reasons. Of course, the extent of environmental degradation, the rapid economic growth and the improvement in people’s living standards which enhance the population concern to protect their environmental rights and interests. But the reduced state capacity and the international dimension of environmental problems (greenhouse effect) also increase the
tolerance of the party-state when compared to other sectors (human rights, etc.) (Hsu, 2014). A transnational civil society movement for climate justice has been critical at keeping pressure on states and global institutions to take action as environmental issues become institutionalised in global affairs.
So, even though China’s authoritarian government arrested and detained activists advocating human rights and Tibetan independence, they have tolerated, albeit with
increasing restrictions, the development of environmental organisations.32 The alarming
dimension of environmental issues expanded the political space afforded to green civil society, enabling environmental SGOs to emerge and operate with a certain degree of freedom.
Furthermore, events like the earthquake in Sichuan in 2008, which killed more than 70,000 people, have been a concrete example for Chinese citizens, but also for the government, that SGOs are able to solve problems more effectively than the government in times of crisis. In 2011, Qu Geping, the ancient Director of the Environmental Protection Agency, argued the following: ‘I always have a positive opinion about these organisations (NGOs). The government needs them. I think they’re going to be another arm for the government to manage the country’ (Marcuse and Carson, 2011). It will become clear later on that Qu Geping was quite right regarding the future of SGOs’ role on the resilience capacity of the party-state.
According to the 2015 Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report,33
the number of environmental protests had increased by 29 per cent on average from 1996 to 2011. Also, as Ruge Gao (2014) stressed, China went from zero to more than 400,000 NGOs between 1994 and 2009, much of which deals with issues related to the Environment. In the literature, conventional wisdom draws a relatively straight line between civil society development and democratisation. Civil society is the third stage of four according to Fukuyama’s thesis (1995). Plus, as the cases of several Communist Eastern European countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary indicated, civil society plays a key role in the democratic transition (Battěk and Wilson, 1985).
Various historical examples around the world proved that having actors outside the reach of the government co-creating knowledge and new ideas diverging from the state can put the nature and mechanisms of authoritarian political control at threat. For instance, in post-industrial societies, environmental concerns were linked to evolving value systems and matters of quality of life (Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009). In general, the environment has been explained as a good mobiliser of civil society in geographical areas as diverse as Asia (Ho, 2011), Eastern Europe (Hicks, 1996) and Latin America (Jacobs, 2002). Even though environmental groups developed according to their modes of democratic transition, they shared a close relationship between democratic consolidation and environmental politics.
As an illustration, differently from Taiwan, where environmental movements served as an important component of the pro-democracy movement against the Kuomintang (Ho, 2011), South Korea’s ruling bloc drastic change emerged, in part, as a response to intense ‘politics of protest’ by environmental civil society groups (Kim, 2000). Meanwhile, environmentalism has not been only recognised for enabling regime transition but also for its capacity to strengthen democracy. As Jacobs demonstrates (2002, p. 60), in Brazil, participation in ecological movements acts as an important factor in the struggle for citizenship, rights, and government accountability. As Eckersley (2019, p. 4) argues:
[…] environmental movements have enriched liberal democracy by increasing the amount and range of
environmental information available to publics; exposed environmental injustices, discrimination and racism; widened and enriched democratic debate and policy choices, and enabled the strengthening of environmental laws, policies and practices that have protected the health and wellbeing of citizens and environments.
Information disclosure and public participation played a significant role in the consolidation of the democratic transition of Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, the rise of environmental mobilisation during the second half of the 1980s in state-socialist countries of Europe. At that time, environmental degradation became to objectify everything that was wrong with state socialism as, not exhaustively, industrialisation, unregulated state control over the economy, lack of transparency, and the like (Carmin and Fagan, 2010; Corry, 2013). As the cases of Hungary and Latvia illustrate, communist regimes fell apart as environmental movements grew and spread across the socialist states, bringing a new form of ‘democratic governance’ with the implementation of a multiparty parliamentary system, rule of law, and a budding civil society (Steger, 2004). As such, environmentalist critiques of industrialism, materialism and top-down government have been identified as beneficial to the democratic transition in the literature (Stec, 2005).
Looking at China’s situation and the wide literature on democratic transitions, the consensus went that China would head towards democracy and the market economy. As China’s population grew wealthier and severe environmental problems gave way to green activism and public demonstrations, several scholars hoped that it would encourage its people to yearn for democratic freedoms, rights and the rule of law (Saich, 2000; Yang and Calhoun, 2007; Mertha, 2014; Kassiola, 2010; Hsu, 2014).
Ever since the emancipatory social movements of the 1970s and 1980s forced environmental issues onto national and international political agendas, the assumption has become deeply entrenched that ecology and democracy are inextricably linked. Political ecologists, in particular, have argued that the liberation of the environment and the empowerment of citizens are two sides of the same coin, and have engaged in a struggle for radical democratization even in established democracies. (Blühdorn, 2011, pp. 1–2)
environmental movements exist, in China, a step in the direction of democracy did not occur. The strength of the Chinese State and the insufficient capacity of SGOs prevented them from achieving large-scale policy changes. This situation happened for two main reasons. First, because the party-state learned how to change, modernise itself, and, especially, adapted to the new economic and social reality (Cabestan, 2014; Florence, 2014). In particular, since Xi Jinping took the reins of the CCP in 2013 and considerably restricted the development and actions capacity of SGOs. All these changes and adaptations will be described further on. Secondly, because as Tong Yanqi (2005) very well depicted, the aim and focus of China’s environmental movements tend to be local and directed towards local governments asking for immediate change but quickly dissipating after goals had been reached.
According to the author (2005, p. 168), environmental movements associated with environmental grievances are triggered by specific crises and generate big public concern because participants personal interests are at stake. Rapid economic growth boosts the emergence of environmental movements (because it increases the severity of degradation) and, at the same time, increase population demand for a high quality of life (as material well-being is acquired), so as political space. As just explained, in Taiwan, the environmental movement developed with the liberalisation and democratisation process (Tong, 2005, p. 186). In China, as I explore below, everything has been made to make sure these movements do not put the authoritarian political structure at risk. Though the following thesis focuses on the institutionalisation of SGOs, it is important to take into account that environmental movements stayed largely fragmented and diffused. While not being the focus of the following dissertation, it also explains why China’s environmental movements never got a chance to really challenge the CCP.
As the Public Learns More, How Has the CCP
Responded?
In China, despite increasing mass incidents related to the Environment, protests started to suffer from censorship and violent suppression by authorities. Several individuals were detained, arrested and sentenced to prison (US Government, 2015, p. 39). The emergence of new actors (e.g. judges, environmental NGOs and citizens) in China's environmental
governance processes (Van Rooij et al. 2016) was also increasingly confined, and their action
reclaimed by governmental instances. In chapters 3 and 4, the new mechanisms developed by the state to co-opt civil society are thoroughly analysed.
on power, many things have changed.34 In spite of Hu Jintao’s administration efforts to
strengthen central authority (Leutert, 2018), a ‘fragmented’ (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988), ‘soft’ (Cabestan, 2004) and ‘participatory’ authoritarianism made it easier for society to
empower itself vis-à-vis the state (Kornreich, 2016).35 Yet, as I stress below, the space of civil
society has shrike considerably under Xi Jinping.
As Defraigne and Florence (2013) explain, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao series of measures aimed at achieving a ‘harmonious society’ had failed to counter the forces of decentralisation and rampant marketisation. Although, a new concept of ‘people-centred’ development (yǐrénwéiběn 以人为本) claimed that the sole pursuit of GDP growth does not inherently contribute to human development. Thus, as a consequence of the gap lying between the law and its application, calls for changes in social, political and environmental values and practices did not occur. According to Goron (2017), this can be explained by the resistance of officials who still relied on GDP growth for their promotion. As argued by the author, the consequences were dramatic as the most damaging years for the environment occurred during this period.
2.3.1 From Hu to Xi
For Bina (2008), President Hu’s aim to realise ‘efficient and rapid’ economic development had several limitations. Despite reinforcing the need to balance the pursuit of economic, social, and environmental objectives, the issue of the economy’s confrontation with the environment was a challenge for the ruling party. Besides, policy implementation had limited leverage over Provincial Governments and municipalities. Broadly, although Hu had expanded a call for the establishment of an ecological civilisation, the issues related to the Party’s unity and decentralisation posed serious problems to the implementation of Hu’s ‘harmonious society’. The way Xi Jinping has used Discipline Commission to strengthen his grip over the nation’s top decision-making bodies very well demonstrate the hurdles faced by his predecessor.
When Xi came to power, he quickly imposed concrete rules to enforce discipline. Even though anti-corruption campaigns had started in the late 1990s under Jiang Zemin and in 2009 at the end of Hu’s term, Xi showed his determinacy to recentralise the CCP’s power (Yuen,
2014). But the hostility of Xi was not only directed towards big tigers and small flies (lǎohǔ
cāngyíng yīqǐ dǎ 老虎苍蝇一起打) as the death of grassroots activist Cao Shunli, in March 2014, demonstrated. Cao was detained for trying to participate in the 2013 Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record at the United Nations Human Rights Council in
34 According to Young Nam Cho (2004), Hu-Wen leadership were unable to undertake strong and radical political reform because they lacked a strong power base to do so.
