Article
Reference
Croyances, dispositions et probabilities (Peirce et Ramsey)
ENGEL, Pascal
Abstract
There are two versions of the "pragmatic" theory of belief as a disposition to act: peirce's theory is associated with an "objectivistic" view of the theory of probability as a measure of degrees of belief, While ramsey's theory is associated with the "subjectivist" and bayesian concept of probability. In this paper it is argued that both theories share a functionalist account of belief, As dependent on desire and action, And that the normative character of bayesian decision theory is the best approach for a theory of belief as a disposition to action.
ENGEL, Pascal. Croyances, dispositions et probabilities (Peirce et Ramsey). Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger , 1984, vol. 174, no. 4, p. 401-426
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