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Implementing Secure Converged Implementing Secure Converged Wide Area Networks (ISCW)Wide Area Networks (ISCW)Cisco IOS Firewall

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Implementing Secure Converged Implementing Secure Converged

Wide Area Networks (ISCW) Wide Area Networks (ISCW)

Cisco IOS Firewall

Firewall Design Overview Firewall Design Overview

• Firewall defines traffic interaction between

“zones” or trust levels

– e.g. ASA security-level

• Common zone definitions

– Inside

• Most trusted network – Outside

• Least trusted network – DMZ

• Somewhere in between

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Firewall Filtering Logic Firewall Filtering Logic

• Allow traffic from trusted zones to untrusted zones

– Return traffic should be okay

• Block traffic from untrusted zones to trusted zones

Two Zone Firewall Design

Two Zone Firewall Design

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Three Zone Firewall Design Three Zone Firewall Design

Three Zone Firewall Problems Three Zone Firewall Problems

• Which is the “more” trusted zone?

• Typical logic is…

– Inside to outside allowed

• Return traffic okay – Inside to DMZ allowed

• Return traffic okay

– Outside to DMZ allowed

• Return traffic okay

– DMZ to inside/outside dropped

• Why would DMZ originate traffic?

(4)

Copyright

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Types of Firewalls Types of Firewalls

• Stateless packet filters

• Application Level Gateways (ALG)

• Stateful packet filter

Stateless Packet Filters Stateless Packet Filters

• Statically configured filters – e.g. extended ACLs

• Typically filter based on…

– Layer 3

• Source & destination address

• Protocol number

– Layer 4

• Source & destination port

• Established flags

• Problems

– Management overhead – Complex design not feasible

• e.g. three or more zones

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Application Level Gateways Application Level Gateways

• AKA Proxy Servers

– Client connects to proxy

– Proxy connects to destination on behalf of client

• Advantage

– Adds application level awareness to filtering

• Disadvantage

– Typically PPS limitations

Stateful

Stateful Firewalls Firewalls

• Dynamic filtering based on session tracking

– What goes out must come back in

• “State” of flow typically tracked by

– Source & destination address – Source & destination port – Protocol flags

• e.g. SYN, ACK/SYN, FIN, RST

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Stateful

Stateful Firewall Problems Firewall Problems

• Not all protocols “stateful”

– UDP is connectionless

• Non-standard applications

– Outbound and inbound flows not mirror images

– e.g. HTTP (standard) vs. FTP (non-standard)

IOS Firewall Feature Set IOS Firewall Feature Set

• IOS Firewall

• Authentication Proxy

• IOS Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)

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IOS Firewall IOS Firewall

• Combination of multiple features to obtain ALG based stateful firewall

• Previously…

– CBAC & ip inspect – Reflexive ACLs before that

• Currently…

– Zone Based Policy Firewall (ZBPF)

• Adds ALG support to state tracking

– e.g. I know FTP is different inbound vs. outbound

• Includes SYN flood protection – Previously TCP Intercept

Authentication Proxy Authentication Proxy

• Tracks inside to outside traffic flows

• Denied flows can trigger authentication request towards AAA

• If authentication successful, per-user ACL is downloaded from AAA

– Both TACACS+ and RADIUS support

• Scalable solution for what used to be

“Lock-and-Key”

– AKA “dynamic” ACL

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IOS IPS IOS IPS

• Tracks traffic flows against “signature”

database

• Takes action based on matches

– e.g. alarm, drop, reset, etc.

• More detail later…

Configuring Stateless Filters Configuring Stateless Filters

• Standard ACLs

– Match only on source IP address

• Extended ACLs

– Match on…

• IP protocol number

• Source address

• Destination address

• Protocol options

– TCP / UDP ports (eq, neq, lt, gt, range) – ICMP Type Code

• Packet markings – DSCP – IP Precedence – TOS

• ACL logging support

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Configuring CBAC Configuring CBAC

• Define inspection rule

• Define untrusted to trusted stateless filter – CBAC exceptions

– Implicit/explicit deny

• Apply inspection rule – Inside in

– Outside out

• Optional – Audit rules

– SYN flood protection

• Verification and monitoring show ip inspect sessions

Basic CBAC Configuration Basic CBAC Configuration

R6#

ip inspect name CBAC tcp ip inspect name CBAC udp ip inspect name CBAC icmp

!

ip access-list extended OUTSIDE_IN deny ip any any

!

interface FastEthernet0/1 ip access-group OUTSIDE_IN in ip inspect CBAC out

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Zone Based Policy Firewall Zone Based Policy Firewall

• Uses ASA logic of application specific class- maps & policy-maps to match traffic and…

– Inspect – Drop – Pass

• Allows complex designs to be more modular – e.g. multiple DMZs

• Much more granular support for application inspection

• Configuration more cumbersome, but workflow more logical

– e.g. basic SDM config is 50+ lines

Basic ZBPF Configuration Basic ZBPF Configuration

R6#

class-map type inspect match-any INSPECTIONS match protocol tcp

match protocol udp match protocol icmp

!

policy-map type inspect INSIDE_TO_OUTSIDE class type inspect INSPECTIONS

inspect

class class-default drop

!

zone security INSIDE zone security OUTSIDE

zone-pair security INSIDE_TO_OUTSIDE source INSIDE destination OUTSIDE service-policy type inspect INSIDE_TO_OUTSIDE

!

interface FastEthernet0/0 zone-member security INSIDE

!

interface FastEthernet0/1 zone-member security OUTSIDE

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ZBPF Verification ZBPF Verification

• What are the zones?

show zone security

• Where are they applied?

show zone-pair security

• What is being inspected?

show class-map type inspect

• How is it being inspected?

show policy-map type inspect

• What are the overall statistics?

show policy-map type inspect zone-pair

• What are the current sessions?

show policy-map type inspect zone-pair sessions

IOS Firewall Configuration Examples IOS Firewall Configuration Examples

R3 R4

Fa0/0 102

301 103 201

R1 R2

Fa0/0

S1/0.301 S0/0.102

S0/0.103 200.0.12.0/24

R6

Fa0/0 Fa0/0

Fa0/0.10 Fa0/1 S0/0.102

200.0.13.0/24 200.0.16.0/24

10.0.0.0/24 192.168.2.0/24

172.16.34.0/24 192.168.2.100/24

R5

Fa0/0 Fa0/0.56 10.0.56.0/24

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