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PERD Workshop - Oil & Gas Engineering Issues for the Beaufort Sea
Timco, Garry
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PERD Workshop
Oil & Gas Engineering Issues for the Beaufort Sea
The Program of Energy Research and Development (PERD) held a 2-day Workshop in
Calgary on oil and gas engineering issues for the offshore Beaufort Sea.
The Workshop took place at the Sandman (Downtown) Hotel on Tues/Wed October 18
&19, 2005. The purpose of the Workshop was to inform Industry of the considerable
amount of PERD research that has been done in the Beaufort region and to get their
input on remaining R&D issues.
Tuesday morning was dedicated to summarizing some of the recent PERD research
related to the Beaufort Sea. Tuesday afternoon focused on Industry interests and R&D
issues related to the offshore Beaufort region. Wednesday was spent discussing
emergency evacuation systems from offshore structure in ice-covered waters.
The program for the Workshop is shown on the following two pages. The presentations
have been summarized into a pdf format and are available for each of the sessions.
The Workshop was organized by Dr. G.W. Timco of the Canadian Hydraulics Centre,
National Research Council, Ottawa, Ont., K1A 0R6 Canada. He can be contacted for
further details (email
[email protected]).
PERD/CHC Report 60-117
This document contains the presentations from Wednesday on escape, evacuation and
rescue from structures in ice-covered waters.
PERD Workshop
Oil & Gas Engineering Issues for the Beaufort Sea
Sandman (Downtown) Hotel, 888 - 7th Avenue S.W., Calgary, Alberta
October 18 &19, 2005.
Agenda
Tuesday Morning, October 18
8:00 - 8:30
Coffee, Muffins & Registration
Session 1: Chairman, Garry Timco
8:30 – 8:40
Welcome and Introduction, G. Timco
8:40 – 9:05
Overview of the PERD Program, S-L Marshall
9:05 – 9:30
PERD Research in Offshore Environmental Factors, P. Smith
9:30 – 9:50
PERD Research in Canada’s North, S-L Marshall
9:50 – 10:10 The Canadian Ice Service – Products & Services, M-F Gauthier
10:10 – 10:30 Coffee
Session 2: Chairman, Peter Smith
10:30 – 10:50 PERD Seabed Stability Research in the Beaufort Sea, S. Blasco
10:50 – 11:00 Recent Progress in Understanding Nearshore Seabed Processes in the
Beaufort-Mackenzie Delta Region, S. Solomon
11:00 – 11:20 Sea Ice Statistics in the Beaufort Sea, H. Melling
11:20 – 11:40 Multi-year Ice – Strength and Decay, M. Johnston
11:40 – 12:00 Ice-Structure Interaction, G. Timco
12:00 – 1:10 Lunch
Session 3: Chairman, Terry Baker
1:10 – 1:25
ISO Arctic Structures Code: Update, K. Croasdale
1:25 – 1:55
Devon Canada’s Beaufort Activities, Winter 05/06 – SDC at Paktoa,
B. Livingstone
1:55 – 2:10
ConocoPhillips View of R&D Requirements for the North, D. Seidlitz
2:10 – 2:25
BP View of R&D Requirements for the North, H. Vrielink
2:25 – 2:40
Shell Oil’s View of R&D Requirements for the North, J. Ruser
2:40 – 3:00
Inuvik Hunters and Trappers Committee, E. Wilson
3:00 – 3:20 Coffee
Session 4: Chairman, Steve Blasco
3:20 – 3:50
R&D Requirements for O&G Production from the Beaufort Sea, B. Wright
3:50 – 5:00
Panel Discussion with audience participation of key R&D Issues for
Wednesday Morning, October 19
8:00 – 8:30
Coffee & Muffins
Session 5: Chairman, Sheri-Lynn Marshall
8:30 – 8:55
PERD Research in Marine Transportation and Safety, R. Frederking
8:55 – 9:15
ISO Arctic Structures Code: EER Update, S. Knight
9:15 – 9:40
Shell Oil’s Perspective of EER Systems for the Sakhalin Region,
C. Brummelkamp
9:40 – 10:05 EER System Design Integrity Consideration, S. Knight
10:05 – 10:25 Coffee
Session 6: Chairman, Bob Frederking
10:25 – 10:45 EER Research at the CHC/NRC, G. Timco
10:45 – 11:00 The Use of a Grounded Rubble Field as a Temporary Refuge, B. Wright
11:00 – 11:15 Engineering Aspects for a Temporary Refuge on a Grounded Rubble
Field, D. Masterson
11:15 – 11:35 Environmental Issues for EER Systems in Ice, D. Dickins
11:35 – 11:55 Reliability of Arctic EER Systems, F. Bercha
12:00 – 1:10 Lunch
Session 7: Chairman, Brian Wright
1:10 – 1:30
Experiments on Evacuation in Pack Ice Conditions, A. Simoes Re
1:30 – 1:50
EER Issues in Ice-Covered Waters, A. Kendrick
1:50 – 2:10
Ice Strengthened Lifeboat Concept – JIP, E. Gatehouse
2:10 – 3:00
Open Discussion on EER Issues for Structures in Ice-Covered Waters
Discussion Leaders - S. Knight and C. Brummelkamp
3:00 – 3:20
Coffee
3:20 - 3:35
Discussion on Formalizing the EER Network, S. Knight and
C. Brummelkamp
PERD Workshop on Oil and Gas in the Offshore Beaufort Sea
October 18 and 19, 2005, Sandman Hotel, Downtown Calgary
List of Registrants
Baker, Terry
Indian and Northern Affairs
[email protected]
Beauchamp, Benoît
Arctic Institute of North America
[email protected]
Beitch, Gary
Chevron Energy Technology Company [email protected]
Bercha, Frank
Bercha International Inc.
[email protected]
Blasco, Steve
Natural Resources Canada
[email protected]
Brovkin, Alexander
ASRC Energy Services Tri Ocean
Engineering Ltd.
[email protected]
Brown, Tom
University of Calgary
[email protected]
Brummelkamp, Cees
Shell International Exploration and
Production B.V.
[email protected]
Croasdale, Ken
K.R. Croasdale & Assoc
[email protected]
Dahlman, Randy
Chevron Canada Resources
[email protected]
Dickins, David
DF Dickins Associates Ltd.
[email protected]
Frederking, Bob
Canadian Hydraulics Centre
[email protected]
Fuglem, Mark
C-FER Technologies
[email protected]
Gatehouse, Evan
Robert Allan Ltd.
[email protected]
Gauthier, Marie-France Canadian Ice Service, EC
[email protected]
Green, Dennis
Indac Synergy Inc.
[email protected]
Hagen, Doug
Canatec Associates International Ltd.
[email protected]
Hansen, Mark
Shell International Exploration and
Production Inc.
[email protected]
Hinnah, Dennis
Minerals Management Service
[email protected]
Johnston, Michelle
Canadian Hydraulics Centre
[email protected]
Jordaan, Ian
C-CORE
[email protected]
Kear, Russ
Chevron Canada Resources
[email protected]
Kendrick, Andrew
BMT Fleet Technology Limited
[email protected]
Kennedy, Kurt
IMV Projects
[email protected]
Knight, Steve
AgipKCO
[email protected]
Langford, Colin
Canatec Associates International Ltd.
[email protected]
Livingstone, Bill
Devon Canada Corporation
[email protected]
List of Registrants (continued)
PERD Workshop on Oil and Gas in the Offshore Beaufort Sea
October 18 and 19, 2005, Sandman Hotel, Downtown Calgary
Marshall, Sheri-Lynn
Natural Resources Canada, OERD
[email protected]
Masterson, Dan
Sandwell Inc.
[email protected]
Matskevitch, Dmitri
ExxonMobil Upstream Research
Company
[email protected]
McGonigal, David
Canatec Associates International Ltd.
[email protected]
Melling, Humphrey
Fisheries and Oceans
[email protected]
Millman, Peter
Devon Canada Corporation
[email protected]
Pilkington, Roger
Canatec Associates International Ltd.
[email protected]
Ralph, Freeman
C-CORE
[email protected]
Rendle, Mark
ConocoPhillips Canada
[email protected]
Ruser, John
Consultant
[email protected]
Scott, Bill
Chevron Canada Resources
[email protected]
Seidlitz, Dennis
ConocoPhillips Canada
[email protected]
Simões Ré, António
National Research Council
[email protected]
Smith, Peter
Bedford Institute of Oceanography
[email protected]
Solomon, Steve
Geological Survey of Canada
[email protected]
Stear, James
Chevron Energy Technology Company [email protected]
Timco, Garry
Canadian Hydraulics Centre
[email protected]
Vrielink, Hank
BP Canada Energy Company
[email protected]
Wilson, Evelyn
Inuvik Hunters & Trappers Committee
[email protected]
Wright, Brian
B Wright & Assoc.
[email protected]
Yergaliyev, Abzal
University of Calgary
[email protected]
Marine Transportation and Safety
POL
PERD Workshop
Calgary
2005 September 18 & 19
MTS POL
Objectives
Carry out R&D in aid of
(i) regulatory requirements for the safe and efficient
transportation of oil and gas by tankers, and
(ii) occupational and safety standards in offshore
operations.
In context of expansion and diversification of
Canada’s
oil and gas
production from
offshore and
northern regions.
POL Activity
Areas
1. Offshore Safety
2. Marine Operations
3. Ship Design
Canadian issues: ice, cold temperatures
and waves in combination
Budget ~$1,000k
POL Structure
POL Leader (R. Frederking,NRC)
OERD S&T Advisor (S-L. Marshall) Departmental Committee 1. T. Carrieres (EC) 2. R. Gagnon (NRC) 3. M. Hnetka (NRCan) 4. S. Prinsenberg (DFO) 5. P. Timonin (TC)
External Advisors
1. W. Bobby (CNOPB) 2. S. Hurley (Petro-Canada) 3. T. Keane (Canarctic Shipping) 4. P. McCarter (Canship Ugland) 5. V. Santos-Pedro (TC)Offshore Safety
Activity
Safety of personnel: transportation of personnel and
operations on platforms primarily under the unique
conditions of the East Coast and North:
- personal safety equipment (immersion suits etc.)
- evacuation equipment
- evacuation procedures
Development of performance-based guidelines for EER
- risk and performance evaluation tools
- model and field tests to determine benchmarks for
EER systems
Marine Operations
Activity
Navigation systems during transit: allow ships to detect
and avoid hazardous ice such as bergy bits,
multi-year floes, etc.
- hardware; advanced radar
- operations: training, nowcasts and forecasts of ice,
communication of information to ship
- operational systems for scheduling and for route
planning and selection
Loading operations:
- final approach
Ship Design
Activity
Definition of ice impact loads on:
- hull (during transit)
- machinery, propellers and thrusters during
transit, loading and operation
Icing and low temperature factors:
- vessel stability
- impairment of ship-board and other operations
- information for design criteria and regulations
POL Outcomes
Project outputs (data, models, algorithms, equipment
specifications) for Guidelines, Codes and Standards
•
Improved standards and codes used by offshore
regulators (CNOPB, CNSOPB, NEB, TC)
•
Improved operational procedures, information and
systems employed by operators of vessels during
transit and loading
•
Improved safety equipment and procedures
available for offshore operators
Offshore Safety
Projects
•
Support
of the development of performance standards
for objective selection and development of EER
systems for the offshore (NRCan)
•
Evacuation systems in ice affected waters (NRC)
•
Performance of TEMPSC in ice (TC)
•
Human performance in launch of survival craft
(NRCan)
•
Evacuation in landfast ice in Beaufort Sea (NRC)
•
Evacuation by slides and chutes in range of weather
(NRC)
Marine Operations
Projects
•
Ice Navigation Simulator (TC)
•
Detection of small ice masses with advanced radars
(TC)
•
Forecasting the presence of small ice masses (EC)
•
Local iceberg forecasting (EC)
•
Forecast model for the North-west Passage and
Canadian Arctic Archipelago (EC)
•
Operational ice-ocean model for the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago (DFO)
Bergy bit detection
Bergy bit drift and
decay
Ship Design
Projects
•
numerical modelling of hydrodynamic and ice impact
forces on a ship hull (NRC)
•
compilation of ship-iceberg collision events (NRC)
•
analysis of extreme ice loads on a propeller (TC)
•
Adoption of International standards for ice class ships
(TC)
•
Prediction of marine icing on offshore structures
(NRC)
Bergy bit impact
Terry Fox
Bergy bit impact
forces
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 5 10 15MOTAN Impact Force (MN)
Impa c t Pa ne l & St ra in Ga uge Forces (MN) Strain Gauge Impact Panel MOTAN alone
Bergy bit collision
simulation
Bergy bit collision
simulation
Bergy Bit Sway vs Ship Travel Time Model Scale Simulations of a Tanker Passing in Close Proximity to a Bergy Bit (no collision)
1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.5 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Time (s) Be rg y Bi t S w a y ( m ) 1.0 million elements, former CPU Cluster 0.25 million elements, former CPU Cluster 2 million elements, new CPU Cluster 0.25 million elements, new CPU Cluster 1.0 million elements, new CPU Cluster
Model Tanker speed = 1.2 m/s
Time when bow passes by Bergy Bit = 2.7 s X Maximum sway value from physical model tests
Marine Icing
Camera
Freezing wetted
snow on deck
Future
•
Renewed interest in frontier gas
•
Beaufort Sea
•
Arctic Archipelago
•
Labrador
•
New projects
•
Tanker loading
•
?
ISO Arctic Structures Standard
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Technical Panel 8b
Status Update
October 2005
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Technical Panel 8b
Terminology
Escape Process whereby personnel move away from a Hazardous event to a place where its effects are reduced or eliminated
Departure of personnel from an offshore installation in an emergency when the installation is no longer deemed safe
-Preferredversus Primarymeans of evacuation Process by which those who have entered the sea or surface of the ice directly or in an evacuation craft are subsequently retrieved to a place where medical assistance is available
-Includes Survivaland Recoverycomponents Evacuation
Rescue
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Technical Panel 8b
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Panel 8b
EER Technical Panel Make Up
z10 technical EER experts representing a cross-section of the industry subject, from Canada (4); Europe (3 + substitute); USA (2) and Russia (1)
zPanel members have been the same from the outset which aids in maintaining continuity as the Standard is progressed
Name of Representative Country Jim Poplin – Panel Chairman USA
Dave Dickins USA
Frank Bercha Canada
Victor Santos-Pedro Canada
Antonio Simoes Re Canada
Garry Timco Canada
Cees Brummelkamp Europe
Steve Knight Europe
Morten Morland Europe (sub)
Dag Onshuus Europe
Dmitrey Onishchenko Russia
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Panel 8b
EER Technical Panel Scope Overview
Standard applies to the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue ‘SYSTEM’ For offshore installations operating in regions where ice can be present at least part of the year it promotes the need to demonstrate the adequacy of the EER system, from first warning and escape from the incident, to Muster, evacuation from the installation and rescue of personnel to a Place of Safety, without incurring casualties
Philosophy strives to instill ‘local’ Goal-setting Performance Standards Verifiable attributes / benchmarks that provide qualitative or quantitative measures of performance, appropriate to the area of operation, which must be achieved by the EER system, its equipment, persons and procedures through the installation lifecycle Standard enhances existing requirements by setting them out as performance-based goals from which designers and operators should establish the functional requirements of the EER system rather than rely on prescriptive standards alone
Focus on design optimization
The need for timely (integrated) design optimization that includes appropriate EER hardware, maintenance and operational considerations
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Panel 8b
Challenges
Technical
Extreme environmental conditions varying from solid stationary ice, dynamic ice, grounded and ungrounded ice rubble to partial cover, and open water pose formidable challenges There is no single Evacuation method currently available that enables personnel to abandon an installation under the full range of environmental/ ice conditions. Design concepts, developments and research is ongoing to satisfy these challenges Personnel
The technical panel comprised of world experts with limited time available, however with their support for improvement of EER systems the progress to date has been achieved Logistical
Delayed receipt of WG8 editorial comments has slowed progress
Interaction with ISO 15544 (emergency response; open water EER) required to establish boundaries
Financial
Travel costs for most panel members is being covered by their individual companies and government agencies limiting the number of technical panel meetings
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Panel 8b
Contents
1 Introduction
Normative General
2 Normative References 3 Nomenclature
Definitions and acronyms
4 EER Philosophy
EER governing principles
5 Environment
Cold regions environmental conditions
6 Hazard and Risk Analysis
Hazard Identification and risk analysis
7 Continuous Assessment
Environment, risk, hardware integrity, personnel competence, procedures and controls
8 EER Design
EER integrated design
9 Escape
General escape design, communications and alarms, escape routes and Temporary Refuge
10 Evacuation
Evacuation decision hierarchy, preferred evacuation systems, primary means of evacuation, secondary means of evacuation, tertiary evacuation systems, personal protective devices, man overboard recovery, emergency response organization, drills and training
11 Rescue
Survival, recovery and rescue platforms
Informative Supplementary
Annex A – Informative Risk Analysis Guidelines for EER Systems Annex B – Informative Arctic Environment Guidelines for EER Systems
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Panel 8b
EER Chapter Development History
Meetings held to develop, review and agree content
#5 San Diego, USA September 2005 #4 St. Petersburg, Russia in conjunction with IAHR June 2004 #3 The Hague, Netherlands April 2004 #2 Ottawa, Canada December 2003 #1 Banff, Canada – kickoff meeting September 2003 Sections developed by subgroup meetings of technical panel members
Also by conference calls, document reviews/ comments and emails Status
Working drafts of Normative and Informative sections submitted 10 November 2004, review comments awaited
Review of goal setting objectives against ISO 15544 progressing Next meeting: Calgary, 20 October 2005
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati o n & P ro duc tion Ltd.
EPT-P Projects
Sakhalin II Development Phase 2 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) Systems
by
Cees Brummelkamp – Shell Int E&P Projects - Rijswijk
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati o n & P ro duc tion Ltd. Kholmsk Poronaysk Nogliki Piltun Okha Nikolayevsk-na- Amure Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinskiy Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Sakhalin Island Katangli DeKastri Il’inskiy Nysh Boatasyn Gas Compression Station No. 2 174 km 599 km Oil Booster Station No. 2 SAKHALIN II PROJECT OVERVIEW
–Phase I and I A: PA-A (Molikpaq) seasonal production followed by Pressure Maintenance Project (completed).
–Phase II: Integrated oil, gas and LNG project (Integrated Plan of Development approved June 2001- Financial Investment agreed March 2003)
•Infrastructure Upgrade Project •PA-A year round production, •drilling and production Lun-A platform,
•drilling and production PA-B platform,
•Oil/condensate and gas pipelines, •Onshore processing facility •LNG plant and LNG / Oil Export Terminal
–Phase III: Potential development of South Piltun and Northern Lunskoye (future). C o pyr ight: S hel l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd.
SAKHALIN II PROJECT OVERVIEW
Detail 1 20” Gas Line 20” Oil Line 100,000 BPD oil production 140,000 BPD waterflood 65 MMSCFD gas export Crude dehydration Gas dehy & dp control 24 km PA-B to PA-A 17 kmPA-A to shore 41 km shore to Boatasyn Boatasyn PA-B 70,000 BPD oil production 120,000 BPD waterflood ~92 MMSCFD gas export Crude dehydration Gas dehy & dp control 45 slots, 6 km radius 4 leg gravity base
PA-A
LNG Tanker
(2007 Nov) Non ice strengthened 2 ice breaker support vessels LNG Plant
9.6 mtpa; 2-trains Oil Export Terminal 36” Loading Line6 km Tanker of Opportunity Domestic Supply Off-Take Detail 3 24” Oil & Condensate Line
195,000 BPD 48” Gas Line 639 km OPF to OET 20” oil PA to OPF 197 km Piltun shoreline to OPF Detail 2 Nysh 4” glycol return LUN-A Future 42” line Onshore Process Facilities 42” gas line 12” condensate ~ 1800 mmscf/d 30 slots, 6 km radius Produced water separation 60,000 bpd condensate 20” gas line from PA C o pyr ight: S hel l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd. C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd.
Sakhalin Offshore Platforms Overview
Concepts
•Piltun-B Platform: Drilling, 44 Well Slot, Oil and Associated Gas Production
and Processing
•Lunskoye-A Platform: Drilling, 30 Well Slot, Free Water Separation,
Gas/Condensate Multiphase Export
Throughputs
•Piltun-B Platform: 70,000bbls/d oil, 100 MMscf/d gas
•Lunskoye-A Platform: 1,800 MMscf/d gas, 60,000 bbl/d condensate/oil
Environment
•13 km Offshore Sakhalin Island, Far East Russia •Harsh Environment; -35degC, high seismicity, sea ice •Sensitive Area: frontier region, migration and
feeding areas for Grey Whale Cop
yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd.
Sakhalin Offshore Environment Open water season
Early June to late November Summer sea temps circa 11 deg C
Storms (Sep – Dec) Significant wave heights Relatively shallow water depth
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati o n & P ro duc tion Ltd.
Sakhalin Offshore Environment Ice Season
Ice can be present Dec to May. -39 deg C minimum temperature
Ice profile:
Thick, heavily deformed and very dynamic first year pack ice. Ice sheets up to several metres thick reduces swell presence
Ice drift 0.5 – 2 metres / second.
Ice drift reversal twice daily in a predominantly north – south axis Potential ice rubble build up.
Small broken ice floes in significant swell.
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati o n & P ro duc tion Ltd.
SEIC EER Development Road Map
Evaluate Select Develope Validate
Amec Study Marine Institute Study Select Evacuation System Lifeboat Ice Trials Evacuation Chute Development Other Trials -immersion suits etc. Escape and Evacuation Study C o pyr ight: S hel l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd.
Evacuation Option Study EVALUATION
Industry search to identify possible evacuation systems. 12 possible systems selected. Assessed against 14 parameters. SELECTION / RECOMMENDATION
No single system could perform adequately in all conditions. Combination of systems required for year round coverage. Under DEVELOPMENT
TEMPSC in ice conditions Skyscape deployment to SBV (ice)
C o pyr ight: S hel l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd.
Evacuation Options Assessed
Evacuation options assessed were:
Helicopter TEMPSC (davit, freefall, PROD)
Seascape system (esp. LRC) Selstair to sea/SBV
ARKTOS Skyscape/Viking chute to sea/SBV
Tertiary means of escape
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd.
Marine Institute Evacuation Option Study
Study ranked systems by performance and operability
Open Water
Best - TEMPSC with improved launching arrangement
Worst - systems designed specifically for operating in ice environment
Partial Ice Cover
Best - TEMPSC may continue to operate well but improved launching arrangements lose their advantage
Worst - systems designed specifically for operating in ice environment continue to rank lower
Full Ice Cover
Requires an ice capable system or method to directly access a support ship
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd. Conclusions of Studies
Both Amec & Marine Institute studies showed that in dynamic ice conditions offshore Sakhalin it is desirable to have alternative main
evacuation systems
1. System suitable for open water and partial ice cover conditions e.g. lifeboats, ice enhanced.
2. System suitable for full ice conditions e.g. method to directly transfer personnel to attendant Standby Vessel (SBV) LUN-A and PA-B using lifeboats with Prod assistance and evacuation chutes modified to access standby vessel
SEIC continue the development of these and other evacuation systems
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati o n & P ro duc tion Ltd.
EER Systems under Development
•Systems assessed by EER Network:
–Hovercrafts Trials –Seascape System JIP –TEMPSC in Ice JIP
–On-Ice Trafficability/Immersion Suit Study –Deployment of Skyscape onto SBV
–Other Research Programs (Canada PERD and NRC/IMD)
C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati o n & P ro duc tion Ltd. Chute Development
Chute normally deployed to sea and stabilised by submerged weight. Proven system. Development to allow deployment to SBV deck. Retain sea deployment mode.
Reduced swell in ice conditions. Heave compensator to stabilise. Extensive testing and certification.
Optimum location on topsides to assist SBV station keeping. C o pyr ight: S hel l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd. TEMPSC Development
•Extend the use of TEMPSC into the ice season.
•Re-certification of vessel due to vessel modifications is undesirable •TEMPSC trials – Confederation Bridge
–Steel hull reinforcement –Larger engine –Propulsion cage –Winterisation •Winterisation of TEMPSC –Engine heater –Space heater –Entry points –Davits –Coxswain windows C o pyr ight: S hel l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd. C op yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd.
Sakhalin II Phase 2 EER Systems
Conclusions
EER systems proposed at end of FEED, subject to EER analysis at detailed design:
Preferred Evacuation :
Helicopters
Primary Evacuation :
Open water/ partial ice cover =<4/10 - TEMPSC with PrOD Ice cover >4/10 - Evacuation Chute onto IBSV
Secondary Evacuation :
Evacuation Chute directly to sea, onto IBSV or, in certain situations onto ice surface
Tertiary Evacuation :
Liferafts with personal descent devices, lifejackets and immersion suit, and
lifebuoys Cop yr ight: S h el l E xpl or ati on & P ro duc tion Ltd. End
Slide # 1
AgipKCO
EER Sy st e m
D e sign I n t e gr it y
Con side r a t ion s
St e ve Kn igh t
H e a d of Em e r ge n cy Re spon se Syst e m s Cor p or a t e H SE
Slide # 2
•
Abou t Agip KCO ( br ie fly )
•
Ar ct ic ( a n d ope n w a t e r ) EER Ch a lle n ge s
•
Pe r for m a n ce Ba se d Appr oa ch
•
Cu r r e n t R & D
•
St a t u s
Slide # 3
The Ka sha ga n Fie ld
Agip Kazakhst an Nor t h Caspian Oper at ing Com pany N.V. is t he Oper at or of t he Nor t h Caspian Sea Pr oduct ion Shar ing Agr eem ent ( PSA) for t he developm ent of 11 blocks in t he Kazakhst an sect or of t he Caspian Sea wher e t he giant field of Kashagan has been discover ed.
Agip KCO, a com pan y fully owned by En i t hr ough Agip Caspian Sea B.V., oper at es t he Nor t h Caspian Sea PSA on behalf of a consor t ium of oil com panies:
Eni ( Oper at or ) , KazMunayGas, Exx onMobil, Shell, Tot al, ConocoPhillips and I NPEX.
The Envir onm e nt Developm ent s in t he Nor t h Caspian Sea pr esent a num ber of challenges and oper at ions ar e car r ied out in sensit ive envir onm ent . Agip KCO uses t he m ost effect ive and up- t o- dat e t echnology and com plies w it h I nt er nat ional Good Oil Field Pr act ice t o m it igat e t he envir onm ent al im pact t o t he m ax im um ext ent feasible. Abou t Agip KCO
Slide # 4 Kashagan is the largest of the offshore fields
in the North Caspian PSA area.
Other Agip KCO fields, Kashagan SW, Aktote, Kairan and Kalamkas have separate appraisal programmes from Kashagan.
These offshore fields are large by international standards but still considerably smaller than Kashagan. Present status of the assets:
•Kashagan: offshore: appraisal and development activities; onshore: construction of the Oil, Gas and
Sulphur treatment centre in Eskene West. •Aktote - Appraising the discovery and evaluating results;
•Kairan - Appraising the discovery and evaluating results;
•Kalamkas - Appraising the discovery and evaluating results;
•Kashagan South West - Ongoing geological studies
Slide # 5
Schematic of the Kashagan Field Development Phasing
Kashagan located about 80 kilometres from Atyrau and extends over a surface of approximately 75 km by 45 km. It is currently estimated that there are 38 billion barrels of oil-in-place.
Kashagan is also the largest oil field discovered over the last thirty years worldwide.
Its development represents one of the greatest current challenges of the petroleum industry given the following characteristics: • Deep, high-pressure reservoir;
• High (16-20%) sulphur content with associated production of hydrogen sulfide;
• Shallow waters that range from 3 to 4 meters and freeze from November to March and sea-level fluctuation during the rest of the year;
• Wide temperature variations from -30C to +40C
• A very sensitive environment with a variety of internationally protected species of fauna and flora.
Slide # 6
Given its size, Kashagan will be developed in three subsequent phases and will require careful coordination of simultaneous operations comprising development and production, construction of new plants and upgrading and expansion of those existing
During the three phases, production will increase from an initial 75,000 bopd to a peak plateau production of 1.2 million bopd in the second half of the next decade
The Experimental Program (EP) is the first phase of the development of Kashagan. It will enable the company to gather a series of new data that will be used to update the reservoir modelling and optimise the successive phases Full Field Development (FFD) refers to the second and third development phases of Kashagan that continue the development
Slide # 7 H e a lt h Sa fe t y En vir on m e n t Slide # 8
Ar ct ic ( a n d Ope n W a t e r )
EER Ch a lle n ge s
Slide # 9To design and oper at e an appr opr iat e EER syst em
t hat pr ov ides per sonnel w it h a ‘good pr ospect ’ of
sur v ival
To int egr at e accident & env ir onm ent hazar d
analyses
To coor dinat e syst em int er faces w it h all involved
To sat isfy at - r isk wor ker s & st akeholder
expect at ions
To dem onst rat e com pliance w it h HSE- MS ( ALARP)
and cont inuous im pr ovem ent Policy
Slide # 1 0
• What defines t he Escape, Evacuat ion & Rescue syst em ? • When t o begin t hinking about it ?
• What m et hod should be applied t o est ablish requirem ent s? • What aspect s need considerat ion?
• How t o det erm ine what equipm ent is safet y? • How can we be sure t he design is accept able? • I s it necessary t o t ake a perform ance based approach? • Who needs t o be involved?
• Can “ one design fit all” applicat ions & locat ions?
Slide # 1 1 TR INSTALLATION PROCESS AREA POTENTIAL
LIMIT OF HAZARD ZONE - FIRE - EXPLOSION - TOXIC GAS PLACE OF SAFETY
PRECAUTIONARY
Evacuation
WIND DIRECTION MAY BE ANOTHER INSTALLATION, LAND OR VESSEL WITH MEDICAL FACILITIES MUSTER N OT TO SCALE!
WHEN EARLY WARNING ISAVAILABLE When dow n- m anning of all non- essent ial personnel is possible prior t o event
OCCV
Offshore Com m and & Cont rol Vessel
FOG
W AV ES
I CE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESCUE VESSEL (ERRV) HELICOPTER
HOVERCRAFT
Slide # 1 2
EVACUATION ROUTES LEAD FROM T.R. TO METHOD OF EVACUATION SECONDARY MEANS OF EVACUATION TERTIARY MEANS OF ESCAPE TR INSTALLATION PROCESS AREA HOVERCRAFT IBSV/ ERRV AVAILABLE ONLY IF SUITABLE IN HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENTS MAH EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESCUE VESSEL (ERRV) LIMIT OF EMERGENCY
RESPONSE ZONE (ERZ) - FIRE - EXPLOSION - TOXIC GAS PLACE OF SAFETY EMERGENCY EVACUATION WIND DIRECTION POINT OF TRANSFER TRANSFER TO RRV MAY NOT BE NECESSARY IN THE CASE OF IBEEV
MAY BE ERRV, ANOTHER INSTALLATION OR ONSHORE LOCATION WITH MEDICAL FACILITIES RESCUE ESCAPE HELICOPTER N OT TO SCALE RECOVERY
EMERGENCY
Evacuation
OCCV
Offshore Com m and & Cont rol Vessel
FOG
W AV ES
I CE
Slide # 1 3
TR
Rescue/ Recovery Vessel (existing IBSV’s or new) (distance can vary)
Installation
(variations are artificial Island, Barge, Jacket, other)
A B
Note: Transfer arrangement at (B) is required where IBSV is used for precautionary evacuation. Revetment or
vertical quayside
Ice trapped between EER craft/ vessel EVACUATION EMBARKATION & TRANSFERS
Method of protecting personnel from external hazards TBA. Providing one at
transfer point may not be necessary.
Slide # 1 4
Slide # 1 5
A Pe r for m a n ce Ba se d Appr oa ch
Slide # 1 6
H SE M S - 3 Ke y St a ge s t h r o Life cy cle
H EM P– Hazard & Effect s Managem ent Process ( from Concept t o Operat ions) HAZI D ( HAZEER)
MAH ( including environm ent hazards) SCE I dent ( EER)
SCE PSs ( Coarse) & Equipm ent Specs
QRA/ FSA: FERA, ESSA, SI A, TRI A, ( cyclic consequence anal/ design dev) SCE PSs ( det ailed) & Equipm ent Specs
ER– Preparedness for ( I nt egrat ed) Em ergency Response ER St rat egy
ER Plans ER Procedures ER Dossiers Training Drills & Exercises
I I R– I ncident I nvest igat ion & Report ing Feedback
Cont inuous im provem ent
SCE
Anyt hing t hat can Pr event , Det ect , Cont r ol or Mit igat e
t he effect s of a MAH
Slide # 1 7
An Em e r ge n cy Eva cu a t ion M e t h od
Ca spia n Con side r a t ion s
Environm ent al Fact ors
• I ce infest ed w at ers for an average of 115 days/ yr ( Decem ber t o March) • Pot ent ial lev el ice t hick ness t o 60cm ar ound offshore inst allat ions • Frequent m aj or ice m ov em ent s – t y pically 6 per season
• Shallow Wat er – cir ca 4 m et res in t he Kashagan area – St orm down- surge can reduce t his t o 2.5 m et res
• Sea lev el is subj ect t o short t erm and seasonal v ariat ions • Long t erm sea lev el is uncert ain
Explorat ion/ Product ion Hazards • Sour gas concent r at ions in ex cess of 15% H2S
• MAH Consequences: -¾ Fire/ Explosion/ Sm oke
¾ Toxic/ Un- ignit ed gas – wind driven, dispersing t o 27km ( I rrDH lim it )
Slide # 1 8
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Two Installations
Construction
Drilling
Slide # 1 9
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Two Installations
Add environment (ice)
Low water level?
Slide # 2 0
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Two Installations Add environment (ice)
Add wind direction & speed
Slide # 2 1
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Two Installations Add environment (ice) Add wind direction & speed
Add MAH consequences
E.g.
Unignited Blowout – Toxic Plume
Slide # 2 2
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Two Installations Add environment (ice) Add wind direction & speed
Add MAH consequences
E.g.
Ignited Blowout – Smoke/ Toxic Plume Explosion Overpressure Fire Radiation Slide # 2 3 .. .. . . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. … . .. . . ........ .. . . . .. . .. .. . . . . .. … .. .…. … . … .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. …. .. THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Two Installations Add environment (ice) Add wind direction & speed Add MAH consequences
Add POB and TRs Add Marine and Crew
Slide # 2 4 .. .. . . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. … . .. . . ........ .. . . . .. . .. .. . . . . .. … .. .…. Emergency Evacuation Method IBSV (ERRV)
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Two Installations Add environment (ice) Add wind direction & speed Add MAH consequences Add people and accommodation Add Logistics and people
Slide # 2 5
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS & COORDINATED PROCEDURES
Now consider CHANGES during the GOLDEN HOUR(and beyond):
•Wind direction •Ice •Collisions •Etc .. .. . . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. … . .. . . ........ .. . . . .. . .. .. . . . . .. … .. .…. Slide # 2 6 ‘TI ME’ Sket ch Elevat ion – from kick t o dist ant consequence
Slide # 2 7 Security GIS Meteo Ice Smoke/ Gas Plume VTS MOB POB Vehicles Logistics QRA Ice & Metocean HRO
MAH cause (release size/ orientation) Consequence forecasting At risk targets in plume POB distribution POB Mustered POB health (missing) Location Em. Services Prec. Evac options/ location Em.Evac craft condition F&G detection/ real time plot Temp. Wind direction Wind Speed Sea depth Sea state Ice state Broken track quality Evac route/ target POS Evac craft location/ trace Comms available/ failed Field of vision/ fog, night OIMs OSCs (may be different) SBV Masters Helicopters Hovercraft Em Evacuation Craft OMCC Other manned vessels Atyrau EC The Hague CMT Safety Critical Equip’t I.D.E.A.L. Integrated Data for Emergencies Acquired in Layers – Real Time
I.D.E.A.L. OILmap Sorted by user Slide # 2 8
Cu r r e n t Re se a r ch & D e ve lopm e n t
Slide # 2 9• Cont inuing t o support appropriat e Joint I ndust ry Proj ect s, E.g. I SL • Pr ogressing cur r ent and new Resear ch & Developm ent :
• Hov ercr aft in I ce and Fire/ Gas Env ir onm ent s
• Max im ising Diesel Engine Operabilit y in Hy drocar bon/ Tox ic/ Sm ok e envir onm ent s
• Dev elopm ent of EER sy st em soft w are for select ion and dem onst rat ing capabilit y • Developing I nt egr at ed ER Dat a Acquisit ion & Dissem inat ion Com m unicat ions • Perfor m ing full scale t rials t o v alidat e perfor m ance and ident ify unforeseen problem
areas
• Develop an all seasons low POB m et hod of em ergency evacuat ion
•I m p le m e n t in g p e r for m a n ce b a se d EER solu t ion s ( a st e p ch a n g e t o SOLAS)
Slide # 3 0
EER Research at the CHC/NRC
G.W. Timco
Canadian Hydraulics Centre
National Research Council of Canada
Ottawa, ON Canada
CHC Activities in EER
1. Environmental impact on EER Systems (with Dave Dickins) 2. Analysis of field data of Damage Zones for lifecraft deployment
¾ Conical Structures (with Jim Poplin)
¾ Vertical-sided Structures (with Brian Wright & Jim Poplin) 3. Numerical Modelling of Damage Zones – influence of structure shape 4. Life craft response in waves & ice (with Antonio Simoes Re) 5. Evacuation onto a grounded rubble field (with Brian Wright &
Dan Masterson)
6. Member of ISO/EER Technical Panel
Environmental Guidelines for EER Systems
Worked with Dave Dickins as part of the ISO Technical Panel on EER
Provided Guidelines on EER Systems with consideration of: • Low Temperatures
• Limited Daylight
• Strong Winds & Blowing Snow • Sea Spray & Atmospheric Icing • Cold Open Water Conditions • Currents
• Ice Conditions
Paper in press in Cold Regions Science & Technology ISO Normative & Annex
Damage Zones for Lifecraft Deployment
Ice Direction Updrift Alongside Downdrift (Wake) 0 5 10 15 20 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Time (minutes) Damage Distance ( m ) Updrift Direction Alongside Direction
Damage Distance
Molikpaq dataRubble Height
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Time (minutes) Ru bbl e He ight (m ) Updrift Direction Alongside Direction Molikpaq data0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Ice Thickness (m) U pd ri ft D a m a ge Le n g th ( m )
mixed mode failure crushing failure Ridge ice fracture
Updrift Damage Length
Molikpaq dataAlongside Damage Width
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Ice Thickness (m) A longsi d e D a m a g e W idt h ( m )
mixed mode failure crushing failure Ridge ice fracture ice fracture Dmin = 18.27 hice0.16 Dmax = 5.68 hice0.72 Molikpaq data
Level Ice Sheets
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 1 2 3 4 Ice Thickness (m) Maxi mum D a mage D ist ance ( m ) CHC Multi-faceted Cone CHC PEI Pier Dmax = 3.57 hi 0.64
Damage Distance – Conical Structures
Numerical Modelling – Damage Zones
•each test was run for 1500 s (375 m of ice movement)
Multi-Leg Platform - Thickness
Shape of the structure can influence size and shape of the damage zone and broken ice accumulation:
Influence of Structure Shape
Circular: appears to allow broken ice to move relatively easily around structure
Squareor Octagonal: does not allow easy ice movement around structure and large zones of ice accumulate in the front of it
Multi-leg platform: largest updrift zone, where ice jammed between two front legs
Conical: similar response to a vertical-sided circular structure
Damage Zone Summary
 Quantitative information on the size and extent of the damage zone around both vertical and conical structures in moving ice conditions
 Numerical modelling examined the influence of structure shape on the damage zone
 Results presented in papers published in conference proceedings (POAC’01, POAC’03) and Cold Regions Science and Technology
(available on the CHC website)
Life craft Response in Waves & Ice
Collaborative project with IOT/NRC
Investigated the response of life craft to different environmental conditions of waves & broken ice Two years of testing performed at the CHC ice tank in
Ottawa
Results presented later by Antonio Simoes Re
Life craft Response in Waves & Ice
Evacuation onto Grounded Ice Rubble Fields
• Collaborative project with Brian Wright & Dan Masterson • Examine the feasibility and engineering issues associated
with using a Temporary Refuge (TR) on a grounded rubble field in the Beaufort Sea
• The CHC investigated historical data on the size and extent of grounded rubble fields – time line of its evolution and decay
Rubble Field at the Amauligak F-24 site
1987/88
Time-Line for the Amauligak F-24 Rubble Field
The initial rubble pile (December 22 event) continued to grow, but its lateralextent did not increase appreciably. January 9-January 11: rubble began to build-up on the N caisson face, until it covered it completely. January 23: build-build-up on the W and NW caisson faces. A rubble pile did develop to the S caisson face; however, it never matched the size or stability of those on the E-NE or W faces.
October 30
new ice began to form at Amauligak F-24 (slightly later than average) Until early November Open water November 22 1st rubble build-up along the E end of the N face. At its maximum: 5-7m high, 15-20m out. Was thought to be grounded but broke-up and drifted away by November 25 December 20 25-30m diameter rubble pile developed off the N end of the E face. Covered the complete face (70-80m long, 70m wide, 10-15m high) by December 27 through April maximum thickness of the ice (1.7m) After December 31 ice rubble developing past that date was stable and survived until spring break-up January portions of the rubble piles were grounded and stable April 26 break-up of the rubble started at the S side. from May 26 to June 7 the rubble gradually disintegrated and broke away due to ablation, wave erosion, swell movements and ice impacts. June 1 open water (ice in concentrations < 2/10ths) June 9 last piece floated away December 20 through February 22
build-up of the rubble pile (nearly elliptical shape with the major axis in the E-W direction, highest point ~14m above WL (E of caisson)). tidal crack along the N boundary of the rubble pile separates the rubble from surrounding ice
By March
a stable grounded rubble field had already formed. Boundary of the rubble field had an oval shape and extended away from the caisson to 60m to 100m. Sail heights up to 10m above WL. March and May field trips FY ice with numerous leads and areas of open water surrounded rubble field.
Amauligak F-24 (1987-1988)
Quantifying the Roughness of a Rubble Field
Summary
• The Canadian Hydraulics Center of NRC has been actively engaged in several different aspects related to EER issues
• This is an extremely important topic and it is not easy to solve for Arctic conditions
• Research in this area will continue
• All papers and reports are available on our website:
www.chc.nrc.ca
We would like to acknowledge and thank PERD and the CCTII program for financial support
The Use of a Grounded Ice Rubble Field
as a Temporary Refuge
Grounded Ice Rubble Fields Around
Beaufort Sea Structures (Low Freeboard)
Grounded Ice Rubble Fields Around
Beaufort Sea Structures (High Freeboard)
Deeper Water Ice Rubble Formations
Important Considerations for TRs in Rubble
The main topic areas that should be addressed when evaluating the option of placing a TR on the grounded ice around a Beaufort Sea structure include:
• the type of Beaufort Sea structure • the type of ice regime in which it is deployed
• the type and extent of the ice rubble that may form around the structure • the time dependent nature of the ice regime and ice rubble around the
structure
• the preferred location of the TR(s) in relation to the structure, its rubble field and its apparent stability
• the preferred location of a TR(s) in relation to the hazards that may occur • the type and number of on-ice routes to the TR(s) around the structure • egress from the platform and an orderly response
Basic Considerations & Logic Flow for the Selection of an Appropriate TR Location Near a Beaufort Sea Structure that is Surrounded by Grounded Ice Rubble and/or Landfast Ice
Extent & Geometry of Rubble Field
- distances of stable rubble areas around the structure in all compass directions - surface topography of the stable rubble areas around the structure, again in all compass directions - apparent stability of the rubble field, and the proximity of the active ice interaction zone in all directions
Preferred Location for the TR(s)
- necessary distance away from the hazard onboard the structure to avoid its effects (e.g.: the heat from a fire, fall out from the plume of a blowout, etc.) - the orientation of the TR(s) relative to the structure to "avoid" the main effects of the onboard hazard (e.g.: predominant wind directions that would define a plume) - a comfortable distance away from the edge of the ice rubble field, in an area where ice interactions that may lead to changes within the rubble should not be seen
Type of Ice Regime
- structure in persistent moving pack ice - structure in moving pack ice that is expected to become landfast - structure in landfast ice
"does the existing rubble field allow for the safe and practical placement of a TR(s) that meets the
preferred location requirements?" or "is landfast ice present around the structure that
provides a safe location for the TR"
Detailed Planning
- choose best over-ice routes from egress points onboard the structure to the TR(s), given the ice topography - choose a location for the TR(s) within the ice rubble that is fairly flat and "open", if possible (to mitigate hazards such as "not sighting" polar bears, and to allow for relatively easy personnel assembly and helicopter landings nearby - confirm that the ice is sufficiently thick and stable at the selected location(s) and along the routes to them
yes
no Time Dependency
- wait for grounded rubble to form and grow in extent and/or; - wait for landfast ice to form around the structure - anticipate the timing of ice break up around the structure
Implementation
- create routes to, and deploy TR(s) - maintain routes to the TR(s) over the course of the stable ice period - demobilize the TR(s) prior to the destabilisation and break-up of the ice area(s) in which it (they) are located
Important Areas
• Awareness of Ice-Related Issues & Scenarios by the Operator • Well Defined EER Plans & Procedures
• Training of People
- education of management & onboard staff - appropriate Arctic clothing
- routine reviews & drills - rescue aspects
• Not a particularly difficult EER consideration as compared with the “ice shoulder” seasons
• North Star has set some precedents
PERD Workshop on Oil & Gas
in the Offshore Beaufort Sea
October 18 & 19, 2005
by Dan Masterson
Sandwell Engineering Inc.
Pushing Through a Pressure Ridge
at McKay Lake NWT
Snow Plows and Drill
Panarctic Floating Ice Island
Flooding an Ice Road
Environmental Issues for EER
Systems in ice
Environmental Issues for EER
Systems in ice
PERD
Workshop on Oil and Gas in the Beaufort Sea: Emergency Evacuation Systems from Offshore
Structures in Ice-covered Waters Calgary October 19, 2005 David Dickins DF Dickins Associates Ltd. La Jolla, California www.dfdickins.com
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
WG8 Technical Panels ISO 2G8 AS25B
Arctic Structures Standard
-Escape, Evacuation, and Rescue – 8b
Annex B – Informative Arctic Environment
Guidelines for EER Systems
Submitted Jan 2005 to:
Cold Regions Science and Technology
Garry Timco and David Dickins
Topics
Topics
• Temperature
• Daylight
• Strong Winds/Blowing Snow
• Icing
• Freezing Open Water
• Variable ice Concentrations
• Rubble • Landfast Ice
Temperature
Temperature
• Material Selection • Lubricants/Fluids • Engine Preheaters • Cooling Systems • Protective Clothing • Mobility • Communications • DexterityDaylight
Daylight
• Lighting design for escape routes, muster points etc.
• Orientation on solid ice or navigating through pack ice
• Lighting systems onboard survival craft
• Detection of ice hazards
• Rescue surveillance, positioning and recovery
Strong Winds and Blowing Snow
Strong Winds and Blowing Snow
• Potential for severe frostbite
• Disorientation in whiteout conditions
• Ice pressure combined with limited to no visibility
• Inability to judge ice surface conditions
• Inability to fly or land helicopters for evacuation or rescue
Wind Chill
Wind Chill
Sea Spray and Superstructure Icing
Sea Spray and Superstructure Icing
• Mechanical systems immobilized by ice build-up
• Walkways and entryways blocked by ice accumulation
• Need to account for icing in design and layout
• Need to provide rapid deicing in critical areas -fluid, heat or mechanical
Freezing Open Water
Freezing Open Water
• Choice of effective immersion/survival suits to cope with exposure to extreme air temp as well as freezing water
• Potential for rapid icing of survival craft.
• Extremely hazardous marine environment for small craft in freezing water with wave action.
Variable Ice Conditions Matched to
Craft Capabilities
Variable Ice Conditions Matched to
Craft Capabilities
• Ice Concentration • Ice Speed • Ice Thickness • Ice Type • Floe Size • Roughness/Deformation • Pressure • Ice/Wave Combinations• Rubble and Wake Effects
• Landfast with and Without Rubble
• Ice Melt (spring conditions)
New to Young Ice
Very Open Drift Ice 1-2/10
Very Open Drift Ice 1-2/10
4-6/10 Open Drift Ice
4-6/10 Open Drift Ice
6-8/10 Young Dynamic Pack Ice
6-8/10 Young Dynamic Pack Ice
7-9/10 Pack Ice with Small Floes and
7-9/10 Pack Ice with Small Floes and
Managed Ice
Managed Ice
9+/10 Thick Pack Ice with
Wake Behind Molikpaq
9+/10 Thick Pack Ice with
Wake Behind Molikpaq
Zones of Relative Safety for Evacuation in
Moving Ice Cover
Zones of Relative Safety for Evacuation in
Moving Ice Cover
SDC in Stable Landfast Ice
SDC in Stable Landfast Ice
CIDS in Landfast Ice with Spray Ice and
CIDS in Landfast Ice with Spray Ice and
Natural Rubble
Natural Rubble
CIDS Surrounded by Rotting Fast Ice
CIDS Surrounded by Rotting Fast Ice
Grounded Rubble
Grounded Rubble
Hovercraft Options!
Hovercraft Options!
End Notes
End Notes
• Ice/Metocean conditions affect every aspect of EER system design and selection • Highly variable and dynamic ice
environments will dictate a mix of different systems optimized for a particular location
For:
PERD Workshop
Calgary
For:
PERD Workshop
Calgary
©By:
Frank G. Bercha, Ph.D.,P.Eng.
By:
Frank G. Bercha, Ph.D.,P.Eng.
October 19, 2005
October 19, 2005
RELIABILITY
OF
ARCTIC EER
RELIABILITY
OF
ARCTIC EER
© 2005 PERD © 20051.
Background
2.
What is meant by
reliability?
3.
Factors influencing EER
reliability
4.
PEERS
5.
Sample results
6.
Conclusions and
recommendations
OUTLINE
OUTLINE
1871 – Great Arctic Disaster – 32 whale ships wrecked and abandoned off the northern coast of Alaska
PERD © 2005
•
Performance-based EER Standards
•
Piper Alpha Commission
•
Ocean Ranger Commission
•
Transport Canada EER Task Force (2000 to
present)
•FGB is facilitator
•
ISO WG8 (2002 to present)
•TP2a - Reliability – FGB chair
•TP8b - EER – JP Chair, FGB member
1. BACKGROUND
•
EER Reliability Assessment
•
PEERS (1995 to present)
•
RPT (2000 to present)
Ocean RangerPERD © 2005
2. RELIABILITY…
2. RELIABILITY…
•
The probability that
a process, task, or
activity will be
completed without
casualties within a
required time limit
(if a time limit
exists).
PERD © 2005
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
a)
Full scale tests
b)
Model tests
c)
Computer simulation
d)
Human Performance
tests and studies
e)
Delphi Methods (expert
consultation)
PERD © 2005
