Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

These principles include (1) the ability of every pair of the considered multi-winner voting rules to select the same and unique commit- tee of a given size; (2) the ability of

To be more speci…c, the optimal size of the committee is k, if (i) the most e¢ cient equilibrium, in the committee with k members, maximizes the social surplus among all equilibria

When the voting rule allows to vote for more than one candidate, the fact that the number of voters who cast a given ballot is independent of the number of voters who cast another

(2012) that given a positional rule, the q-Condorcet efficiency is equal to one for any quota q greater than q ⇤ , whereas the pioneering work of Gehrlein and Lepelley (2006)

Given an arbitrary weighted scoring rule for three-candidate elections, the aim of this paper has been to provide the exact limit of its Condorcet effi- ciency as the total number

Gehrlein and Lepelley (1998) showed that with more than three candidates and under the impartial culture assumption, AV is more likely to elect the Condorcet loser than the

With four candidates and two-member committee, given that the collective ranking is abcd and that the two-member committee is (a, b), the PSP will occur with a partial ballot after

Then in this section, for each probabilistic hypothesis and each rule un- der study, two series of results are provided: (a), Örst, for iterative Borda, Coombs and Hare rules,