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Deux problèmes sur les réseaux

1er octobre 2008

Ecole des Ponts, France

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Affectation dynamique du trafic : il y a un équilibre ! avec Nicolas Wagner.

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Traffic assignment

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Traffic assignment

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Traffic assignment

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Traffic assignment

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Static traffic assignment

Supply A directed graphG = (V,A), acost function ca :R+ →R+for eachaA.Assumptions : ca isnon-decreasingandcontinuousandGis strongly connected.

Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V →R+.

Realization Aflowx : R →R+ whereR = (Ro,d)(o,d)∈V×V, such that X

r∈Ro,d

x(r) = b(o,d), withRo,d being the set of allo–d route ofG.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have

x(r)>0⇒X

a∈r

ca(xa)≤ X

a∈r0

ca(xa),

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Static traffic assignment

Supply A directed graphG = (V,A), acost function ca :R+ →R+for eachaA.Assumptions : ca isnon-decreasingandcontinuousandGis strongly connected.

Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V →R+.

Realization Aflowx : R →R+ whereR = (Ro,d)(o,d)∈V×V, such that X

r∈Ro,d

x(r) = b(o,d), withRo,d being the set of allo–d route ofG.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have x(r)>0⇒X

a∈r

ca(xa)≤ X

a∈r0

ca(xa),

wherexa :=P

r∈R:a∈rx(r)(Wardrop ).

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Static traffic assignment

Supply A directed graphG = (V,A), acost function ca :R+ →R+for eachaA.Assumptions : ca isnon-decreasingandcontinuousandGis strongly connected.

Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V →R+.

Realization Aflowx : R →R+ whereR = (Ro,d)(o,d)∈V×V, such that X

r∈Ro,d

x(r) = b(o,d), withRo,d being the set of allo–d route ofG.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have x(r)>0⇒X

a∈r

ca(xa)≤ X

a∈r0

ca(xa),

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Static traffic assignment

Supply A directed graphG = (V,A), acost function ca :R+ →R+for eachaA.Assumptions : ca isnon-decreasingandcontinuousandGis strongly connected.

Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V →R+.

Realization Aflowx : R →R+ whereR = (Ro,d)(o,d)∈V×V, such that X

r∈Ro,d

x(r) = b(o,d), withRo,d being the set of allo–d route ofG.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have x(r)>0⇒X

a∈r

ca(xa)≤ X

a∈r0

ca(xa),

wherexa :=P

r∈R:a∈rx(r)(Wardrop ).

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Static traffic assignment : results

Theorem

There is always an equilibrium. Moreover, the values ca P

r∈R:a∈rx(r)

at equilibrium are unique.

Formulation as a convex program→computable.

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Static traffic assignment : limitation

This model has alimited significance:

the time needed to travel along the route is not modelled.Each user occupies the whole route continuously.

→need ofdynamic traffic assignment model.

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Static traffic assignment : limitation

This model has alimited significance:

the time needed to travel along the route is not modelled.Each user occupies the whole route continuously.

→need ofdynamic traffic assignment model.

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Dynamic traffic assignment

Since the 70’s, several models has been proposed, for instance :

Vickrey (1969)

Merchant and Nemhauser (1978) Friez and al. (1989)

90’s : Leurent (LADTA), Bellei, Gentile and Papola, Akamatsu and Kuwahara

Roughly speaking, the models are such that

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Dynamic traffic assignment model

Time intervalI = [0,H].

Users aredynamic flows:x :R×I. The quantityx(r,h)is the number ofusers choosing the router at timeh.

ya :I →R+. The quantityya(h)is the number ofusers entering the arcaat timeh.

Useful notation : Xr(h) :=

Z h h0=0

x(r,h0) and Ya(h) :=

Z h h0=0

ya(h0)

(cumulated flow).

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Dynamic traffic assignment model

Supply A strongly connected directed graphG = (V,A), aarc travel time functiontafor eachaAsuch thatta(Ya)is aI →R+ continuous map,

depending continuously of the cumulated flowYa. Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V ×I →R+.

Realization X

r∈Ro,d

x(r,h) =b(o,d,h)for all(o,d)∈V ×V andhI.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have

x(r,h)>0tr(X~)(h)≤tr0(X~)(h),

where forr =a1. . .an, we havetr(X~)(h) := Pn

i=1tai(Yai)(hi) withYai :=φai(X)and

h1:=handhi+1:=hi +tai(Yai)(hi)fori =1, . . . ,n1.

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Dynamic traffic assignment model

Supply A strongly connected directed graphG = (V,A), aarc travel time functiontafor eachaAsuch thatta(Ya)is aI →R+ continuous map,

depending continuously of the cumulated flowYa. Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V ×I →R+.

Realization X

r∈Ro,d

x(r,h) =b(o,d,h)for all(o,d)∈V ×V andhI.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have

x(r,h)>0tr(X~)(h)≤tr0(X~)(h),

where forr =a . . .a , we havet (X~)(h) := Pn

t (Y )(h)

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Dynamic traffic assignment model

Supply A strongly connected directed graphG = (V,A), aarc travel time functiontafor eachaAsuch thatta(Ya)is aI →R+ continuous map,

depending continuously of the cumulated flowYa. Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V ×I →R+.

Realization X

r∈Ro,d

x(r,h) =b(o,d,h)for all(o,d)∈V ×V andhI.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have

x(r,h)>0tr(X~)(h)≤tr0(X~)(h),

where forr =a1. . .an, we havetr(X~)(h) := Pn

i=1tai(Yai)(hi) withYai :=φai(X)and

h1:=handhi+1:=hi +tai(Yai)(hi)fori =1, . . . ,n1.

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Dynamic traffic assignment model

Supply A strongly connected directed graphG = (V,A), aarc travel time functiontafor eachaAsuch thatta(Ya)is aI →R+ continuous map,

depending continuously of the cumulated flowYa. Demand Ademand functionb :V ×V ×I →R+.

Realization X

r∈Ro,d

x(r,h) =b(o,d,h)for all(o,d)∈V ×V andhI.

Equilibrium Wheneverr,r0Ro,d, we have

x(r,h)>0tr(X~)(h)≤tr0(X~)(h),

where forr =a . . .a , we havet (X~)(h) := Pn

t (Y )(h)

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Dynamic traffic assignment

TheYacan be computed from thetaknowing allXr (under some assumptions).

Existence of an equilibrium ? In general, it is an open question.

Zhu and Marcotte prove an equilibrium for Friez’s model (with a stronger assumptions on travel time).

Ladta : Unknown.

Lindsey + Leurent, Wagner studied time departure choice on one arc (Vickrey model) : their is an equilibrium.

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Dynamic traffic assignment

TheYacan be computed from thetaknowing allXr (under some assumptions).

Existence of an equilibrium ? In general, it is an open question.

Zhu and Marcotte prove an equilibrium for Friez’s model (with a stronger assumptions on travel time).

Ladta : Unknown.

Lindsey + Leurent, Wagner studied time departure choice on one arc (Vickrey model) : their is an equilibrium.

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Results

Our result

• a general model with minimal assumption :continuity, fifoness (in a weak form), causality, no infinite speed.

• existence of an equilibrium that containsallprevious results.

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Traffic assignement as a continuous game

R: set ofroutes,I := [0,H]time interval.

M(R×I): set of measures onR×I (choice of time departure allowed).

Tr : set of continuous mapsM(R×I)→ C(R,R)(tr ∈ Tr is such thattr(~X)(h)gives the time needed to traverse the route r).

user: characterized by a functionu : S

r∈RTr

×R×I →R¯ (that is upper semicontinuous inr andh, and continuous in the travel times, (theutility-function) :u(~t,r,h): a choice(r,h)7→

the payoff, when route travel times are~t := tr1,tr2, . . . ,.

U: space of usersu.

Atraffic gameis a measureU onU.Number of users:

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Traffic equilibrium

Arealizationof the traffic game is a measure onU ×R×I.

Denotetr1,tr2, . . .by~t.

Given a traffic gameU, a realizationDis aCournot-Nash equilibriumif we haveDU =U and

D {(u,r,h) : for each(r0,h0)∈R×I, u(~t(DR×I),r,h)u(~t(DR×I),r0,h0) o

=N

DR×I is exactly the cumulated flowsX. Set Xr(J) := DR×I({r} ×J).

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Khan-Mas-Colell’s theorem ?

Khan-Mas-Colell’s theorem tells us thatthere is a Nash equilibrium, provided that the utility function are continuous in the realization of the game (=here the travel times).

For traffic assignement :DR×I 7→u(~t(DR×I),·,·)mustbe continuous.

Reformulation : Our purpose : prove that~X 7→~t(~X)is continuous.

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Khan-Mas-Colell’s theorem ?

Khan-Mas-Colell’s theorem tells us thatthere is a Nash equilibrium, provided that the utility function are continuous in the realization of the game (=here the travel times).

For traffic assignement :DR×I 7→u(~t(DR×I),·,·)mustbe continuous.

Reformulation : Our purpose : prove that~X 7→~t(~X)is continuous.

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Khan-Mas-Colell’s theorem ?

Khan-Mas-Colell’s theorem tells us thatthere is a Nash equilibrium, provided that the utility function are continuous in the realization of the game (=here the travel times).

For traffic assignement :DR×I 7→u(~t(DR×I),·,·)mustbe continuous.

Reformulation : Our purpose : prove that~X 7→~t(~X)is continuous.

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Arc exit time

Giventa, thearc exit timefunction is

Ha(Y)(h) := h+ta(Y)(h) forY ∈ M(R)andh∈R

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Assumptions on travel time

Continuity Ha :M(R)→ C(R)is continuous.

Limited speed there existstmin >0such that for all Y ∈ M(R)and allh∈R, we have Ha(Y)(h)>h+tmin.

Fifo Leth1 <h2inRand letY ∈ M(R). Whenever Y[h1,h2]6=0, we haveHa(Y)(h1)<Ha(Y)(h2).

Causality For allh ∈RandY ∈ M(R), we have Ha(Y|h)(h) = Ha(Y)(h).

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Assumptions on travel time

Continuity Ha :M(R)→ C(R)is continuous.

Limited speed there existstmin >0such that for all Y ∈ M(R)and allh∈R, we have Ha(Y)(h)>h+tmin.

Fifo Leth1 <h2inRand letY ∈ M(R). Whenever Y[h1,h2]6=0, we haveHa(Y)(h1)<Ha(Y)(h2).

Causality For allh ∈RandY ∈ M(R), we have Ha(Y|h)(h) = Ha(Y)(h).

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Assumptions on travel time

Continuity Ha :M(R)→ C(R)is continuous.

Limited speed there existstmin >0such that for all Y ∈ M(R)and allh∈R, we have Ha(Y)(h)>h+tmin.

Fifo Leth1 <h2inRand letY ∈ M(R). Whenever Y[h1,h2]6=0, we haveHa(Y)(h1)<Ha(Y)(h2).

Causality For allh ∈RandY ∈ M(R), we have Ha(Y|h)(h) = Ha(Y)(h).

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Assumptions on travel time

Continuity Ha :M(R)→ C(R)is continuous.

Limited speed there existstmin >0such that for all Y ∈ M(R)and allh∈R, we have Ha(Y)(h)>h+tmin.

Fifo Leth1 <h2inRand letY ∈ M(R). Whenever Y[h1,h2]6=0, we haveHa(Y)(h1)<Ha(Y)(h2).

Causality For allh ∈RandY ∈ M(R), we have Ha(Y|h)(h) = Ha(Y)(h).

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Arc flowing function

Let~Yabe inM(R×R); the flow of users following router and leaving the arcaon the time subsetJis :

ψar(~Ya)(J) :=ψa(Y~a)({r}×J) :=

Yar(Ha(Ya)−1(J)) ifar

0 if not.

(1)

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Flows on routes → flow on arcs

AnoutflowofX~ is a measureYa :=P

rYar onRsuch that for everyr =a1a2..an:

1 Yar

1 =Xr

2 Yar

irai−1(Y~ai−1)fori =2..n

3 Yar =0ifa ∈/ r

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Uniqueness and continuity of the outflow

Proposition

GivenX~, there exists a unique outflowYa. Moreover, the map φa :X~ 7→Ya is continuous.

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Continuity of t

r

is proved !

Continuity oftr is proved.

Indeed

tr(X~)(h) :=

n

X

i=1

tai(Yai)(hi)

withh1 :=handhi+1 :=hi +tai(Yai)(hi)fori = 1, . . . ,n1 can be rewritten :

tr(~X)(h) = Han

φan(~X)

◦. . .◦Ha1

φa1(~X)

(h)−h for allhI.

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Continuity of t

r

is proved !

Continuity oftr is proved.

Indeed

tr(X~)(h) :=

n

X

i=1

tai(Yai)(hi)

withh1 :=handhi+1 :=hi +tai(Yai)(hi)fori = 1, . . . ,n1 can be rewritten :

tr(~X)(h) = Han

φan(~X)

◦. . .◦Ha1

φa1(~X)

(h)−h for allhI.

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There is an equilibrium

Continuity of thetr ⇒continuity of the utility functionu(tr,·,·)

⇒we can apply the theorem.

Theorem

Given a directed graphG= (V,A)with arc travel time

functions(ta)a∈Asatisfying assumptions of causality, fifoness, limited speed and continuity and given a measureUon the set of possible users (identified with their utility function), there is a Nash equilibrium.

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There is an equilibrium

Continuity of thetr ⇒continuity of the utility functionu(tr,·,·)

⇒we can apply the theorem.

Theorem

Given a directed graphG= (V,A)with arc travel time

functions(ta)a∈Asatisfying assumptions of causality, fifoness, limited speed and continuity and given a measureUon the set of possible users (identified with their utility function), there is a Nash equilibrium.

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A versatile model

The model is reallyversatileand contains previous models.

Playing with the mapu(~t(X~),r,h),

1 we cover also the case when there is no possible choice of time departure.

2 we can put arbitrarily taxes on some routes or time departure.

They will always be a Nash equilibrium : contains previous results of equilibrium.

(41)

A versatile model

The model is reallyversatileand contains previous models.

Playing with the mapu(~t(X~),r,h),

1 we cover also the case when there is no possible choice of time departure.

2 we can put arbitrarily taxes on some routes or time departure.

They will always be a Nash equilibrium : contains previous results of equilibrium.

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