• Aucun résultat trouvé

Tales from the Dark Side:

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2022

Partager "Tales from the Dark Side:"

Copied!
16
0
0

Texte intégral

(1)

Tales from the Dark Side:

SIP Operational Experiences

joshua sahala

(2)

overview

About IntelePeer

A brief history of SIP

What keeps us up at night: current operational

issues

(3)

about IntelePeer

Enhanced voice and application services provider

Voice traffic exchange between applications and/or telephony devices over TDM or IP

Wholesale focus

(4)

A Brief History of… SIP

The Session Initiation Protocol

– originally designed by Henning Schulzrinne and Mark Handley starting in 1996

– Current RFC is 3261

– An application-layer protocol with a similar request/response transaction model to HTTP – Can use UDP, TCP, or SCTP for transport – Common ports

• 5060 is typically used for non-encrypted signaling

• 5061 is used for TLS-encrypted signaling

(5)

A Brief History of… SIP

(cont.)

SIP Network Elements

– Each resource identified by URI

• sip[s]:username:password@host:port

– UA (user agent): end-point used to create and/or receive SIP messages, thereby managing a SIP session

– RFC 3261 defines three server elements:

• Proxy, Registrar, Redirect

– SBC (session border controller): the “man in the middle” between UA and SIP server

(6)

What keeps us up at night

Current operational issues

– “we don’t need no steenking standards”

– Can you hear me now?

– Moving on, moving up

– Won’t you be my neighbor?

(7)

Current operational issues:

“we don’t need no steenking standards”

Variety of SIP implementations and “best practices”

– Proprietary [codec|signaling|messaging|anything]

• Good for vendors…you, not so much

• Quality and compatibility issues

– Multi-vendor is harder than it should be

• Repeated trans-coding wastes resources and impacts quality

(8)

Current operational issues:

“we don’t need no steenking standards”

(resolutions)

Agree to configuration details before turn-up

Extensive inter-op testing

Special/extra hardware resources are dedicated to trans-coding

– Resource hogs are isolated when possible

(9)

Current operational issues:

can you hear me now?

Monitoring is a hodgepodge of tools and methods

– Homegrown tools work well…for the pieces that that tool focuses on

• Various log and reporting formats (CDR ==

comma-separated-values of doom)

– Correlation between an “IP event” and “voice quality”

is a major challenge

• Even with accepted quality standards, (mos, pesq, etc), complicated when measuring end-to-end

• Vendor tools reach only as far as that vendor’s hardware

(10)

Current operational issues:

can you hear me now? (cont.)

Monitoring is further complicated by realms of responsibility and understanding

Lack of communication/understanding between voice and IP groups

– Complicates and lengthens problem isolation and resolution

– Who sets the priorities and what is truly important?

• Example: intermittent packet loss amounting to

<0.0001%

– Eventually traced to default interface buffer sizes

(11)

Current operational issues:

can you hear me now? (resolutions)

Work closely with vendors

– Update tools for any log/reporting format changes

*before* new hardware or software is rolled-out

Ongoing projects to make monitoring and event correlation better

Standardize reporting and alerting formats

Document, document, document

Educate

Test… then test some more

(12)

Current operational issues:

Moving on, moving up

Have outgrown the original cages/cabinets

Can’t move a site without some interruption:

– Build and kill

• Requires a lot of extra hardware/money/time

• Things still break

– Turn everything off and “carry” equipment down the stairs (avoiding building security)

• Still some measure of build-and-kill

• No matter how many times the circuits were tested, they still might not come up

(13)

Current operational issues:

Moving on, moving up (resolutions)

before

Inconsistent cabling standards and rack layouts

– Hardware was added as needed, often where it fit – Too easy to pull the wrong

cable or bump something else

Inconsistent naming conventions

after

(14)

Current operational issues:

Won’t you be my neighbor?

SIP is just an “application”, so why not peer with me?

– Voice group: “What’s peering? Go talk to sales”

– IP group: “Are you an ISP with 100,000,000 IPv4 subnets and 100K ASNs? No? Go talk to sales”

(actual peering requirements lowered to protect the guilty)

– Larger ISPs/Telecoms want to be paid for the minutes AND for the bits

PSTN paradigm still largely pervades: everything is a “one-way” circuit, measured in number of DS0’s

– Potential for wasted capacity

(15)

Current operational issues:

Won’t you be my neighbor? (resolutions)

Document our requirements before negotiations begin

Educate internal groups

Make sure that all of the necessary people are at the table

Automated tools to help with the “translations” and

capacity planning

(16)

Thank You

Questions?

Contact:

– joshua sahala - jsahala@intelepeer.com

Références

Documents relatifs

The notion of using a source to obtain information is captured in PMLs SourceUsage class, which serves to record the event of information assertion that can also be a general case

In the case of a bimaterial, as far as localized waves as Love waves can be used, the evaluation of the boundary terms for detecting the crack is easier to estimate because such

In fact, most of us (and I include myself here) have done rather worse than that – in that having identified the need to think beyond growth we have then reverted to the more

The purpose of this section is to briefly describe a possible attack scenario based on open data, knowledge discovery (and data sciences in general) and social en- gineering..

njootli to describe the elkin Gallery: ubc invisible: commission ( how to Get a indigenous artists but sounding, Listening, (b ociety c radio Waves niversity of n tarro, “

4 More than 60% of those physicians were 45 years or older, 5 suggesting that at least 43 000 Canadian physicians had some degree of hearing loss.. This prevalence echoes

The computer security context in which we intend to use CREAM’s retro- spective analysis calls for a different procedure because of three main singularities that make it peculiar:

We show that, although it is important to take into account in the model of the system the capability of an attacker to measure time, the problem of checking whether such a model