When Du Pont went global: how the Du Pont family built a multinational empire (1910-1967)

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Thesis

Reference

When Du Pont went global: how the Du Pont family built a multinational empire (1910-1967)

LOMBARDI GAUTHIER, Liza

Abstract

La thèse se concentre sur les mécanismes de multinationalisation de l'entreprise américaine Du Pont de Nemours, entre 1910 et 1967. Fondé en 1802 par la famille éponyme, ce producteur de poudres explosives s'est développé et a diversifié ses activités aux Etats-Unis au cours du XIXème siècle, et ce jusqu'à devenir l'un des principaux groupes chimiques américains. Durant le XXème siècle, la Du Pont s'érige comme un compétiteur international en développant ses affaires en Europe, en Asie, et rapidement d'une manière globale sur tous les continents. Partant de cette histoire, la thèse cherche à comprendre quelles ont été les motivations de la famille à agrandir de telles manières ses activités, et comment l'entreprise familiale a survécu à cette internationalisation. Ces questions sont développées au regard des relations politiques et économiques américaines, aussi bien qu'internationales, et en comparaison avec le développement multinational d'entreprises contemporaines à la Du Pont.

LOMBARDI GAUTHIER, Liza. When Du Pont went global: how the Du Pont family built a multinational empire (1910-1967) . Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2014, no. SES 843

URN : urn:nbn:ch:unige-389643

DOI : 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:38964

Available at:

http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:38964

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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WHEN DU PONT WENT GLOBAL

How the Du Pont Family Built a Multinational Empire (1910-1967)

THÈSE

présentée à la Faculté des Sciences économiques et sociales de l’Université de Genève

par

Liza Lombardi

sous la direction du

Prof. Youssef Cassis

European University Institute

pour l’obtention du grade de

Docteure ès sciences économiques et sociales mention histoire économique

Membres du jury de thèse:

Prof. Juan FLORES, Université de Genève, président du jury Prof. Mary O’SULLIVAN, Université de Genève

Prof. Andrea COLLI, Università Bocconi

Prof. Nuria PUIG, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Thèse no 843

Genève, le 6 juin 2014

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La Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales, sur préavis du jury, a autorisé l’impression de la présente thèse, sans entendre, par là, n'émettre aucune opinion sur les propositions qui s’y trouvent énoncées et qui n’engagent que la responsabilité de leur auteur.

Genève, le 6 juin 2014

Le doyen

Bernard MORARD

Impression d'après le manuscrit de l'auteur

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À Lionel et à mes fils, naturellement.

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RÉSUMÉ

La thèse porte sur l’histoire de la compagnie chimique américaine Du Pont de Nemours, sous l’angle de sa gestion et de son actionnariat, en relation avec son internationalisation. La Du Pont a été maintes fois étudiée par la littérature comme un élément comparatif ou un cas d’étude isolé, comme cela est le cas dans cette thèse. En effet, le groupe américain présente un intérêt certain pour les historiens des entreprises de par sa longévité – l’entreprise a été fondée en 1802 – et ses succès quasi permanents depuis 212 ans. Du Pont de Nemours est également un cas d’étude pertinent de par son implication dans l’Histoire : l’entreprise est à l’origine de certaines des plus grandes innovations chimiques – le nylon, le Teflon – et a tenu une place considérable lors des deux conflits mondiaux du XXème siècle. Enfin, dans le monde des affaires, la Du Pont a été impliquée dans certains des plus grands procès contre la cartellisation de la production chimique américaine du XXème siècle.

L’expansion de la Du Pont en dehors des frontières américaines a commencé en 1910, et durant les années 1970 l’entreprise est représentée sur chaque continent. Ces décennies sont considérées comme la période durant laquelle l’entreprise a perdu ses caractéristiques de firme familiale. Cette thèse de doctorat entend modérer ces considérations en démontrant premièrement que l’entreprise reste sous le contrôle de la famille du Pont entre 1802 et 1980, et deuxièmement en présentant le rôle essentiel que la famille a tenu dans le processus de multinationalisation. Qui plus est, la thèse présente comment la famille a fait de son entreprise un groupe global, mondial, et a su conserver le contrôle de la Du Pont après cela. Cette thèse est donc en lien avec la littérature sur l’histoire des entreprises, plus précisément sur l’histoire des entreprises familiales, leur expansion, leur longévité, aussi bien qu’avec la littérature sur les investissements internationaux et les particularités – si ce n’est difficultés – pour les entreprises familiales de procéder à de tels investissements.

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation considers the history of the American chemical enterprise Du Pont de Nemours from the angle of its management and ownership, as well as in relation to its internationalization. Du Pont de Nemours has long been studied in the literature as a comparative element, or as a single case study, as it is in this dissertation. And indeed, the American chemical group is of interest for many scholars because it has existed for 212 years and has experienced amazing longevity with a nearly constantly growing turnover. Du Pont is also a significant case study because it was involved in the most important antitrust suits of the 20th century, had bought most of the major chemical innovations of this century as well (nylon, Teflon), and had played a significant role during both World Wars.

The expansion abroad took place mostly between 1910 and 1970s while the firm was considered as losing its family characteristics. This work moderates this hypothesis by demonstrating first that the company's ownership and management remained under the du Pont family’s control between 1802 and 1980, and second that the du Pont family remained a decisive element for the international expansion of Du Pont Company, and that the role of the family had been regularly misunderstood by the literature. Furthermore, this doctoral dissertation demonstrates how a family led a company to become global and kept control of it afterwards. It is in line with business history literature about family firms – their expansion, their longevity – as well as the literature about international investments and the peculiarities, if not difficulties, for family firms to become international without consequences for their family management or ownership.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I deeply thank Prof. Youssef Cassis, my supervisor, Prof. Mary O'Sullivan, Prof. Juan Flores, president of this jury, Prof. Nuria Puig, and Prof.

Andrea Colli for accepting to be members of this jury.

I am indebted to Prof. Youssef Cassis, my doctoral thesis supervisor since 2008, who has allowed me to achieve this final version of my dissertation. Prof. Cassis was also my master’s thesis supervisor between 2007 and 2008. Therefore, I thank him for believing in my abilities since that date to, first, have allowed me to work in his department while he was director of the Department of Economic History at the University of Geneva, and second, to have believed in my capabilities to compose some interesting research in the field of business history. While my work was going forward, Prof. Cassis was always available to attend my lectures at various conferences. Both his reading of my papers before the lectures and his comments after have always been rewarding contributions to my writing. When I started writing this dissertation, Prof. Cassis read an infinite number of versions of each chapter, with an equally infinite amount of patience. His strong stances concerning my questions, the literature I employed, as well as my use of the archives allowed me to produce the final document that an international jury can now discuss. I thank Prof. Cassis for all this work, as well as for his constant support and friendship throughout the years.

Prof. Mary O'Sullivan has followed my work since 2010 when she arrived at the University of Geneva. I am also very indebted to her as she has given many new impulses to my dissertation. Prof. O'Sullivan also read an indeterminate number of versions of this dissertation and always gave me an accurate and new look on every chapter. Her expertise both in business and financial history was an important contribution to the reframing and narrowing of my questions. The literature she suggested to me, as well as the archives she knew in the United

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States, allowed me to progress in my writing. Her strong support concerning both this dissertation and my work at the Paul Bairoch Institute has helped me to always go ahead, without sorrow for the mistakes I had made and only with a belief that I could still do better.

I also thank Prof. Juan H. Flores for accepting the task of being the president of my jury. His careful reading of some chapters of this dissertation, the literature he helped me find – especially concerning Latin America – and his help with two papers I submitted to conferences in Geneva and Mexico have all been considerable stones to building, hopefully, a strong dissertation. I am also deeply indebted to him as a friend, for his strong support during the past six years, his constant good advice concerning both my dissertation and my private life, and his help during the "difficult days ahead." I thank him for all of this today, and I know I will also have to thank him tomorrow, and the many other days after that.

It was an obvious fact that I wanted Prof. Andrea Colli, as a master in family businesses, to be invited to this jury. His books and articles concerning family firms are one of the strongest pillars of this dissertation. My encounter with Prof.

Colli at one of his lectures at the University of Geneva in 2008 was an immediate help for my dissertation. I received further help from him during a conference in Utrecht (2009), as well as at the Business History Association’s summer school that same year. Since then he has carefully followed my work, read with attention my papers and chapters, and given me strong advice concerning this dissertation, which I have followed as best as possible. I thank him for all his work and his support during these years.

I thank Prof. Nuria Puig. Her work concerning Spanish family firms was an important inspiration for this dissertation, as well as a strong source of information and knowledge on which I built my questions. Prof. Puig has followed my work since the Business History Association’s summer school in 2009 and since then we have spent many days working together at other

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conferences. Her reading my papers, as well as her listening to my lectures have always been important contributions to the building of this work.

I also deeply thank my inner circle of trustful colleagues and friends, who have surrounded me during these years of thinking and writing. Thank you Christian Stohr, my officemate and friend, for always trying to help me enjoy my day with your shoemaker stories – which I still do not understand, but I am sure that is ok with you. Thank you to Jean Rochat for you indeterminate number of visits to my office and your permanent reassurance while I was getting married, giving birth to my eldest son, or enjoying a night out. These moments have added to the memories when we were both writing our dissertations; you were a real support.

Thank you very much to Yann Decorzant, Matthieu Leimgruber, Sylvain Wenger, Edoardo Altamura, and all of my other colleagues at the Paul Bairoch Institute. It has been a pleasure to work, eat, and spend time with each of you.

Thank you also to my parents and friends for your non-judgmental presence throughout these years, despite finding it difficult to understand what I was doing and why I “ended” my dissertation so often. Thank you.

My deepest thanks go to my husband, Lionel Gauthier, who supported me during the toughest as well as the best moments of this dissertation, even though he was also doing his own - brilliant – PhD and raising our eldest son Luca. I love you today and tomorrow. Thank you for giving me the two best sons ever. Finally, to Luca and my “not arrived yet” second son, thank you for making me a mother. Thank you for always making me remember that the most important things in life happen at home with you. I love you, my boys, and I am already the proudest mother on Earth.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 2.1: The shareholders of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, 1802. 62

Figure 2.2: Family Tree, from founders to Alfred I., T. Coleman and Pierre S. du Pont.

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Table 2.3: Successive Presidents of the Du Pont Company 65 Table 2.5: Shareholders of Du Pont & Company, 1902. 77

Table 2.6: How the cousins acquired control of the 1899 Du Pont & Company and of Laflin & Rand. 83

Table 2.7: Assets of Du Pont Powder in 1905. 87

Table 2.8: How the cousins acquired control of companies (1902-1905). 89

Figure 2.9: Assets and Capital Evolution; Ratio of the Total Assets and Liabilities (1903–1914). 92

Figure 2.11: Shares of common and preferred stock (1903-1914). 94 Figure 2.12: Family tree, the cousins' branch. 103

Table 2.13: Owners of Du Pont Securities stock. 117

Table 2.15: Du Pont Securities owning of Du Pont Powder (2), number of shares and percentage, in 1915. 119

Table 2.16: Du Pont Powder's ownership, 1915. 120

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Table 2.17: The committees in Du Pont Powder in 1915–light grey are family members. 124

Table 3.1: Ownership of the Delaware Corporation in 1915. 133

Table 3.2: Senior Managers of the Delaware Corporation in 1915; light grey indicates family members. 135

Figure 3.4: Organization of Du Pont in September 1921. 141

Table 3.5: Family Management in the Delaware Corporation during the Presidencies at the End of Each President's Tenure. 144

Figure 3.6: Family Tree 146

Figure 3.8: Assets and capital evolution, ratio of the total assets and liabilities (1915–

1980). 151

Figure 3.9: Number of Common and Debenture/Preferred Stocks issued. 152 Figure 3.10: Number of Debenture/Preferred Stocks Issued. 152

Table 3.11: Big Owners of Du Pont’s Common Stocks. 156

Table 3.12: Pierre S. du Pont’s Total Ownership in Various Companies (1924). 157

Table 3.13: Christiana Securities Ownership. 158

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Table 3.14: Presidents of Christiana Securities. 159

Table 3.15: Senior Managers of the Delaware Corporation in 1972; light grey indicating family members. 161

Figure 3.17: Sales and Net Income; Ratio of Total Liabilities (1903–1935). 165

Table 3.18: Du Pont R&D Expenditure, 1922–1929 (in thousands of dollars) 167

Table 3.19: Du Pont's Sales in 1924 168

Table 3.20: Du Pont's Investments Abroad. 169

Table 3.21: Increase in Debenture/Preferred Stock (1915–1940). 171

Table 3.22: Increase in Common Stocks (1915–1940). 173

Table 3.24: Du Pont's Investments Abroad (1956–1979). 183

Table 3.25: Increases in Preferred Stocks (1940––1980). 184

Table 3.26: Increases in Common Stocks (1940-1980). 185

Table 3.27: Senior Managers of General Motors in 1926. 192 Table 3.28: Du Pont's Interlocks (1911–1979). 196

Table 4.1: American and British Companies' Sales to South America in 1920 226

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Figure 4.2: Exports of Powder to Mexico in Thousand USD 238

Table 4.3: US FDI in Mexico – selected years and sectors, million USD. 245

Table 5.1: U.S. Foreign Direct Investments in Europe (billion USD). 264

Table 5.2: American Foreign Direct Investments in manufacturing in the UK and in the Common Market (million USD). 264

Table 5.3: Sales and net income of the Cuba Cane Products Company 1930-1935, million USD 282

Table 5.4: American Foreign Direct Investments in Europe from 1966 to 1979. 297

Table 5.5: Hourly Cost of Manpower (USD). 298

Table 5.6: Parallel between Du Pont's Investments in Europe and the European Economic Integration. 310

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

My doctoral dissertation entitled When Du Pont Went Global. How the du Pont Family Built a Multinational Empire (1910-1967) considers the history of the American chemical enterprise Du Pont de Nemours from the angle of its management and ownership, as well as in relation to its internationalization. The expansion abroad took place mostly between 1910 and 1970s. The business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., believed that these were the decades during which the company is generally considered to have gradually lost its family characteristics and this loss is precisely what should have permitted the company to expand into fields of new activities.1 I intend to moderate this hypothesis by demonstrating first that the company's ownership and management remained under the du Pont family’s control between 1802 and 1980, and second that the du Pont family remained a decisive element for the international expansion of Du Pont Company, and that the role of the family had been regularly misunderstood by the literature.2 Furthermore, my doctoral dissertation demonstrates how a family led a company to become global and kept control of it afterwards. This dissertation is in line with business history literature about family firms – their expansion, their longevity – as well as the literature about international investments and the peculiarities, if not difficulties, for family firms to become international without consequences for their family management or ownership.

Du Pont de Nemours has long been studied in the literature as a comparative element, or as a single case study as I am doing in my dissertation. The

1 Chandler, A. D. J. (1977). The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.

London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Ndiaye, P. (2001). Du nylon et des bombes, Du Pont de Nemours, le marché et l’Etat américain, 1900-1970. Paris, Belin. This literature is discussed later.

2 Since the 1970s, Du Pont can be considered a company that operates worldwide, with a global corporate management. That is why I stop my analysis at this point in history.

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American chemical group is of interest for many scholars because it has existed for 212 years and has experienced amazing longevity with a nearly constantly growing turnover. Du Pont is also a significant case study because it was involved in the most important antitrust suits of the 20th century, had bought most of the major chemical innovations of this century as well (nylon, Teflon), and had played a significant role during both World Wars. All these characteristics and the history of Du Pont have made this company a thrilling case study. Moreover, the quality of the archived material gathered in the Hagley Museum allows scholars to go deep in their investigations about the company.

Until today the main contributions about the Du Pont Company are the works of Alfred Chandler – who considered its organization, structure, and management – and the studies from David Hounshell and John K. smith – who wrote about the research and development evolution within the company. In both cases, perhaps more specifically in Chandler, Du Pont is described as a family business that, from 1915, starts to lose this characteristic when the company's directors – mostly family members – modified the company's organization to make it the

"modern company": multidivisional, managed by salaried businessmen, partly untied from the family control.³

The internationalization of Du Pont is considered in chapter seven of Alfred Chandler and Stephen Salsbury’s book, Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation, as well as in the work of Taylor and Sudnick from 1984. In

3 Chandler, A. D. J. (1962). Strategy and Structure. Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA, The M.I.T. Press, Chandler, A. D. J. and S. Salsbury (1971). Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation. New York, Harper & Row, Chandler, A. D. J.

(1972). Stratégies et structures de l’entreprise. Paris, Les Editions d’Organisation, Chandler, A. D.

J. (1977). The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Chandler, A. D. J. and H. Daems, Eds. (1980).

Managerial Hierarchies. Comparative Perspective on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise.

Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, Hounshell, D. A. and J. K. Smith (1988). Science and Corporate Strategy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Ndiaye, P. (2001). Du nylon et des

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Chandler and Salsbury’s chapter – Investment Overseas? – the authors develop the case of a failed investment with a French company (1904–1907) and the acquisition in 1910 of a nitrate field in Chile, two cases which I do not develop in this dissertation.4 Taylor and Sudnick’s work set up a chronology of investments abroad, but did not choose a particular angle to discuss the internationalization.

These scholars have described with non-exhaustive archived work – considering what I have found in the Hagley Museum – some of Du Pont's businesses abroad. Furthermore, they do not study systematically the role of the du Pont family. Thus, even if the topic of my dissertation, the internationalization, is somehow told by Taylor and Sudnick, their work does not contribute to the literature about the company's governance and does not contribute to the literature about family firms and international investments.⁵ However, both Chandler and Salsbury's chapter, and Taylor and Sudnick's book are considerable contribution to my dissertation.

To this date Du Pont has never been studied as a major family firm, which kept this characteristic after the creation of the modern company and also after World War II. In addition, Du Pont has only been studied once as a multinational company. Therefore, I see a great interest in looking at both issues. Indeed, the literature understands that expansion abroad is the most difficult time for a company to remain a family business: how can a family keep control over a business that is all over the planet? By looking at the existing publications on this subject, my case study can be read as a contribution to it.

In addition, even though Du Pont had been deeply studied by Chandler and other authors, the analysis set up in this dissertation with a year-to-year look at bombes, Du Pont de Nemours, le marché et l’Etat américain, 1900-1970. Paris, Belin. I will define what I consider to be a family firm in Chapter One.

4 Chandler, A. D. J. and S. Salsbury (1971). Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation. New York, Harper & Row.,Chapter Seven, Investment Overseas, 169-200.

5 Taylor, G. D. and P. E. Sudnik (1984). Du Pont and the International Chemical Industry. Boston, G.K. Hall & Company.

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the increasing and decreasing liabilities, the rise of capital, and the successive managers in each organ – which mattered with regard to the decision-making power – had never been done. By so doing, I understand the du Ponts differently than Chandler does, and in a very different way to Taylor and Sudnick. The conception of the du Ponts as straightforward managers, operating according to the soundness of business, and with a certain intuition of what would work well and what would not, can be questioned when looking deeper into the details of the company and family’s history.

Therefore, to understand the main questions of my doctoral dissertation this chapter presents, in the first section, the literature concerning the definitions of family firms and discussions about the survival of family firms, and in a second section, literature about multinational companies, again about their definitions and discussions concerning the family firms that become multinationals.

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1.1. FAMILY FIRMS: DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

According to the business historians Andrea Colli, Mary Rose, and Harold James, among others, three types of family firms exist: the one when the firms are owned and managed by the family, the one when there is only family ownership, and the last being the other way round, when there is only family management.⁶ But, first of all, who is "family"? To Mark Casson being a family member means being a member of the classical nuclear family, or having contracted to a marriage with a member, or having been adopted by the family.

This definition proposes to include people from the same blood, and also people from an inner circle to the components of a family. This inner circle can be composed of lifelong friends and they would be considered as equal to family members in their influence over the company.⁷

Concerning the ownership, and to Casson again, the firm deserves the title of family business when at least two family members possess an important voting power among others through their stock ownership. This means that very few people can make a family business: two influential stockholders only. In 2009 Colli and Rose widened this proposition by defining that to be called a family firm, the importance of the family owned equity has to be sufficient in order to exert control over decision making processes; it mostly differs from country to country. In Italy possessing 5% of the voting power is enough to have control

6 Chua, J. H., J. J. Chrisman, et al. (1999). "Defining the Family Business by Behaviour."

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 23(4): 19-39, Colli, A. (2010) "Family Firms in European Economic History " http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583862. James, H. (2006). Family Capitalism.

Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental European Model. Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Rose, M. (1993). Beyond Buddenbrooks: The Family Firm and the Management of Succession in Nineteenth Century Britain. Entrepreneurship, Networks, and Modern Business. J. Brown and M. Rose. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

7 Casson, M. (2000). Enterprise and Leadership, Studies on Firms, Markets and Networks.

Cheltenham, Elgar. 198

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over the firm, but in the United States it is not considered as sufficient.⁸ The ownership is of importance because in the case of American corporations, of interest in the case of Du Pont, the ownership generally means having the power to vote for the composition of the company's senior management: the election of a president and the board of directors. Afterwards, the president and the board are entitled to form the finance and executive committees. Therefore, the family can choose to be conservative in terms of management, or not. The sociologist Robert Freeland thus considers that a family who controls the voting stock controls the future of its company. To him control is even stronger when the family both owns control of the voting stock and when it is well represented on the company's finance committee: thus, the control over the company's capital is total and locked.⁹ The family in the finance committee is entitled to decide how to raise capital (call on the market, retained earnings, borrowings, etc.); therefore, to decide whether or not the family keeps its main ownership.

Thus, considering now the management, Mark Casson emphasizes that it is sufficient that the CEO or general manager be a family member in order to give the family firm appellation to a business: the family firm characteristic can be summed up by the authority of one family member over the decision making process, only.¹⁰ Other scholars address a list of the roles which, when taken by a family member, suffices to determine: first, and as Casson describes, the chief operating officer is a member of the founding family; second, the majority of the executive committee is from the founding family, and; three, a majority of the

8 Colli, A. and M. Rose (2009). Family Business. The Oxford Handbook of Business History. G.

Jones and J. Zeitlin. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 194 Colli, A., P. Fernández Pérez, et al.

(2003). "National Determinants of Family Firm Development? Family Firms in Britain, Spain, and Italy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries." Enterprise and Society 4(1): 28-64. 19.

9 Freeland, R. F. (2001). The Struggle for Control of the Modern Corporation. Organizational Change at General Motors, 1924-1970. New York, Cambridge University Press.

10 Casson, M., P. J. Buckley, et al., Eds. (2010). Entrepreneurship: Theory, Networks, History.

Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 198.

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finance committee is from the founding family.¹¹ These criteria are understood as equally strong in making a company a family firm.

In this dissertation, I chose to mostly define the family firms as companies owned by the founding family, with an owned equity sufficient to influence the composition of the senior management. To understand whether the share of the business owned by the family is enough to exert this control, I will dissect the composition of the board of directors, which should reflect the choice of the shareholders. As long as the family members are well represented in the board, I consider that the family owned equity as sufficient to control the company. The choice of the president is also relevant in this case. Finally, in addition, I choose to follow Freeland's hypothesis concerning the composition of the finance committee: in Du Pont, as long as a majority of the finance committee members are from the founding family, I consider that the du Pont exert a clear control over the company's management. Thus, the control of both the ownership and the finance committee are necessary to classify Du Pont among the family businesses.

As mentioned, Chandler considers in the Visible Hand in 1977 that during the 1970s the du Pont family controlled only part of the voting stocks, and that the family's control over the senior management was now weak, almost totally lost.¹² For the historian Pap Ndiaye, the end of the family management was even earlier; it happened in 1940 when the last president issued by blood from the founding family resigned from this position.¹³ However, Du Pont was a big

11 Miller, D. and I. Le Breton-Miller (2006). "Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities." Family Business Review 19: 73-87. Bennedsen, M., F. Pérez- Gonzalez, et al. (2010). The Governance of Family Firms. Corporate Governance. A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice. R. C. Anderson and K. Baker. Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons: 371- 390.

12 Chandler, A. D. J. (1977). The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.

London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

13 Ndiaye, P. (2001). Du nylon et des bombes, Du Pont de Nemours, le marché et l’Etat américain, 1900-1970. Paris, Belin.

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business – Du Pont's assets amounted to $9.56 billion in 1980, while it was ranked as the seventh company worldwide in that year in terms of revenues and profits.¹⁴ A trend in the business history literature defines family firms as rather conservative, or as companies that lose their characteristics of family businesses when they increase their activities to such a level. The next section covers the discussions on this topic.

1.1.1. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FAMILY FIRMS

Since the 1930s many scholars have discussed the topic of family businesses and their evolution. Historically, the main stream in business history is to consider family firms during the 20^th century, especially in the United States, as progressively losing their "family" characteristics as they became big businesses. From Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means to David Landes, but also from Alfred D. Chandler Jr. to William Lazonick, all realized that there are great difficulties for families to keep control of their companies when the family business increases in size or activities.¹⁵ These authors defend that family companies have to consequently modify their structure, management, and ownership. More recently the scholars Stephen Nickell, Daphne Nicolitsas, and Neil Alistair Dryden argue that the stockholders or directors of a family business have a discretionary power that goes against some changes and expansion and which mostly defends a status quo within the firm, which assures family control.¹⁶ Therefore, either the family loses control when the firm becomes a big

14 Fortune 500, 1980.

15 Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means (1932). The Modern Corporation & Private Property. New York, Macmillan. Landes, D. (1969). The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change en Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to Present. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Chandler, A. D. J. (1990). Scale and Scope, the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Lazonick, W. (1992). "Controlling the Market for Corporate Control: The Historical Significance of Managerial Capitalism." Industrial and Corporate Change 1(3): 445-487.

16 Nickell, S. J., D. Nicolitsas, et al. (1997). "What Makes Firms Perform Well?" European Economic Review 41: 783-796. 786.

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business or it chooses to avoid expanding their activities too much, or expanding without having to call on the financial market. Chandler emphasizes the importance of managerial capitalism in the United States during the 20^th century, within American companies, and its implication for family businesses. Indeed, managerial capitalism implies, according to Chandler, that a family firm has to increase their management capacities, among other resources, in order to increase its activities, and consequently the outsiders, the salaried managers, outpaced in number the family members, sometimes outpaced their control over the management. These observations have been used in the debate about the performance of states and the claimed French and British backwardness; family capitalism might have been responsible for it, whereas in the United States the managerial capitalism was responsible of the American growth. The literature understands that managerial companies forming the managerial capitalism are more competitive, grow bigger, and finally bring more important growth in the states.¹⁷In contrast with managerial capitalism, considering Great Britain in the first half of the 20^th century, Chandler talks about personal capitalism. This means that most of the British companies had not, during the inter-war period, proceeded to the three-pronged investment in manufacturing, marketing, and management, which the American companies had. This deepening in capital invested in these three sectors made of the American companies big businesses, ultra-competitive at home and abroad.¹⁸ And, as mentioned, Chandler takes Du Pont as a case study to demonstrate how the company

17 Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means (1932). The Modern Corporation & Private Property. New York, Macmillan. 219-232, Landes, D. (1969). The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change en Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to Present. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 192. Milward, A. S. (1992). The European Rescue of the Nation-State. Londres, Routledge. 304-312. Foreman-Peck, J. and M. R. (1994). Public and Private Ownership of British Industry, 1820-1990. Oxford, Clarendon Press., Bloom, N. and J. van Reenen (2007). "Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries." Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 227-252. Cheffins, B. R. (2008). Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed. Oxford, Oxford University Press.26-33.

18 Chandler, A. D. J. (1990). Scale and Scope, the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism.

Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 48-49.

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proceeded to change in governance – especially with an important restructuring into a multidivisional company during 1920 and 1921 that deepened the extent of its managerial hierarchy –diversify its production and consequently increase its turnover, open subsidiaries, and expand abroad:

"The Du Pont Company, the innovator in both strategy of diversification and the multidivisional structure, offers a good example of the ways in which products were developed. […] At Du Pont the decisions concerning product development were made at two levels – the corporate office and the divisional headquarters. At the corporate level the general executives on the executive committee who determined the strategy of the enterprise as a whole relied on two corporate staff departments: the Development Department, which became a broad planning and investigatory office that guided products development; and the Chemical Department (later called the Central Research), which coordinated the company's research activities, as well as carrying out research of its own. The division managers also had their own research and development organizations with their own laboratories and auxiliary facilities."¹⁹

Thus, Chandler explains that Du Pont was highly hierarchical, that the decision- making process was parted between many departments, the executive committee, and the board of directors. He demonstrates here that the managerial capitalism had been extended to Du Pont and that it permitted this company to diversify its production, and thus expand its business and internationalize its activities. Without this hierarchy Du Pont would not have been able to do this. However, some recent business history literature considers that Chandler’s point of view here is too dualistic. Professional salaried managers

19 Ibid. 181-182.

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who are also family members are considered as enviable, as the next subsection demonstrates.

In Contrast with Berle and Means

Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, Mary Rose, Youssef Cassis, Harold James, and Andrea Colli, among other scholars, are in opposition with some elements of the aforementioned literature.²⁰ These scholars considered equally the survival of the family firm over decades, the "embeddedness" with the community in which the family business is set up, its reputation – considered as a family capital – and also its sustainability as a family controlled business. These analyses highlight performances of family firms, their longevity, and the fact that they are able to deal both with time and with the expansion of their activities.²¹ Rose, in 1993, defends that the literature had to go beyond the so-called Thomas Mann's Buddenbrook's effect, which considers that family firms could only last three family generations. On the contrary, Rose presents that family firms can expand their activities, become big businesses, and keep their family characteristics.²² Cassis, by discussing the cases of many European big businesses during the 20^th century, underlines with strength that some family big businesses not only

20Lévy-Leboyer, M. (1974). "Le patronat français a-t-il été malthusien?" Le Mouvement Social 3(Jul-Sept): 3-49., Jones, G. and M. Rose, Eds. (1993). Family Capitalism. London, Frank Cass., Rose, M. (1993). Beyond Buddenbrooks: The Family Firm and the Management of Succession in Nineteenth Century Britain. Entrepreneurship, Networks, and Modern Business. J. Brown and M.

Rose. Manchester, Manchester University Press. Cassis, Y. (1997). Big Business. The European Experience in the Twentieth Century. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Colli, A. (2003). The History of Family Business, 1850-2000. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. James, H. (2006). Family Capitalism. Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental European Model. Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, James, H. (2012). Krupp. A History of the Legendary German Firm. Princeton.

21 Cassis, Y. (1997). Big Business. The European Experience in the Twentieth Century. Oxford, Oxford University Press, Colli, A. (2012). "Contextualizaing Performances of Family Firms: the Perspective of Business History." Family Business Review 25(3): 243-257.

22 Rose, M. (1993). Beyond Buddenbrooks: The Family Firm and the Management of Succession in Nineteenth Century Britain. Entrepreneurship, Networks, and Modern Business. J. Brown and M.

Rose. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

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existed during the 20^th century, but also continued to perform well. He takes as an example the French tire company Michelin, a family business, which kept its place in the European top ten biggest companies after the Second World War and again during the 1980s. Cassis presents similar facts for other companies such as Guiness, Krupp, Siemens, and Peugeot.²³ Following Big Business, numerous works defend the performances of family firms. In 2006 James wrote a history of the de Wendels, Haniels, and Falcks, three families who had established their businesses. He describes their longevity as family businesses and explains their sustainability through each family’s capacity to adapt to their changing environments. According to James, the decision-making power of the family is more adapted to the economic variations and to the market's logics than non-family businesses.²⁴ His point of view is followed by Fernández Pérez and Puig who present in their study of Spanish family firms better adaptability of these companies to the civil war and the Franco dictatorship, as well as to the fall of the dictatorship, than the purely managerial companies.²⁵ The ability of the founding family to keep control of their business for such a period of time prompts Mark Casson to consider these family firms as "dynastic family firms".²⁶ Some of the aforementioned family firms, especially the de Wendel business, certainly deserve this appellation.²⁷

To keep strong family control over a company implies that the management and the owners of a company make important choices in the course of their activities: the most decisive issues being to remain independent or to issue

23 Cassis, Y. (1997). Big Business. The European Experience in the Twentieth Century. Oxford, Oxford University Press., 80-82.

24 James, H. (2006). Family Capitalism. Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental European Model. Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

25 Fernández Pérez, P. and N. Puig (2007). "Bonsais in a Wild Forest? A Historical Interpretation of the Longevity of Large Spanish Family Firms." Revista de Historia Economica 25(3): 459-497. 459- 497.

26 Casson, M. (1999). "The Economics of the Family Firm." Scandinavian Economic History Review 47(1): 10-23.

27 The de Wendel's first ironwork was started in 1704 already.

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capital on the market. The autonomy-oriented companies encounter issues in expanding their capital, whereas the market-oriented companies have to deal with the entry of outside influence. However, there is no need to consider family firms with such a rigid dichotomy. Indeed, to Christina Lubinski the governance in family firms is generally observed as balancing between both autonomy and openness; family firms use pyramidal structures, dual-class stocks, or cross- holdings in order to be able to keep control, as well as to call for capital from the market. Also of importance, the family business employs professionally trained family members, far from the idea that there are family managers without managerial skills on one side and professional managers on the other side.²⁸ Finally, the idea that family governance survives only in small and medium-sized companies has been overthrown since studies have shown that among 27 economies, 30% of the largest companies were family controlled. The study from La Porta et al. consider that the norm in the United States is that large companies have widely held ownership; however, the scholars counted that 20%

of the largest U.S. companies had family ownership.²⁹ Recently, Rosa Nelly Trevinyo-Rodríguez considered, according to The Family Business Magazine of 2004, that:

“[..] evidence reveals that these businesses [family businesses] play a significant role in the global economy. Indeed, a number of world- class firms such as Wal-Mart, Ford Motor Co., Samsung, LG, Cargill, Tata Group, Cemex, Du Pont, Ikea, Grupo Carso, Michelin, etc. are classified among the world’s 250 largest family-run companies, each with annual revenues of at least $1.2 billion. Many

28 Lubinski, C. (2011). "Path Dependecy and Governance in German Family Firms." Business History Review 85(Winter): 699-724. 699-700.

29 La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (1999). "Corporate Ownership around the World." The Journal of Finance 54(2): 471-517. 592.

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of them dominate not only their local economies, but also the global market, reaching far beyond their national borders.”³⁰

Therefore, following Brian Cheffins and Steve Bank, and concerning the divorce of ownership from control, it is possible to consider that Berle and Means can be considered as a myth, even for large U.S. companies.³¹ Leslie Hannah, in his studies of the large American companies at the turn of the 20^th century, takes a strong stance toward "the erroneous belief that America led in divorcing ownership from control."³² And actually, family control of a company seems even to present advantages peculiar to family businesses, as the next section shows.

Advantages of Family Governance

Yossef Ben-Porath in his article about the "F-Factor" was in 1980 already defending that family businesses had significant characteristics in order to expand their activities:

“The family plays a major role in the allocation and distribution of resources. The way in which members of families have dealings with each other, the implicit contract by which they conduct their activities, stands in sharp contrast to the textbook market transaction. Between these two extremes are many other transaction modes and institutions involving elements of both:

transactions between friends, business partners, and employers

30 Trevinyo-Rodríguez, R. N. (2009). "From a Family-Owned to a Family-Controlled Business.

Applying Chandler's Insights to Explain Family Business Transitional Stages." Journal of Management History 15(3): 284-298. 286

31 Cheffins, B. R. (2008). Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

32 Hannah, L. (2007). "The "Divorce" of Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re- Calibrating Imagined Global Trends." Business History 49(4): 404-438.

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and employees. […] Some transactions can take place only between mutually or unilaterally identified parties.”³³

In line with Ben-Porath, Habbershon and Williamson consider that family control even provides what they call the "family-ness": The fact that the family control proves to be positive for a company's expansion.³⁴ Indeed, members of the same clan, fighting for the family business, might have more incentive to be concerned by their tasks. It was proven by various research scholars that family control implies less agency costs – the fact that information could be lost or that there could be a lack of transmission exists less inside family businesses, as the family members often meet and exchange their information.³⁵ Furthermore, family members are more inclined "to govern" their company with a

"stewardship" attitude.³⁶ This term covers the fact that a family manager is naturally inclined to go deeper in every action he undertakes for the company.

First of all, he considers that he will stay in the company for a long time – generally the family presidential term of offices are longer than in other business (15 to 25 years in family firms versus 3 to 4 years in other companies). Related to this, the "steward" would provide a more important commitment to building capability, to discretion for engaging in risky business at home, and to avoid a

"quick-fix" – as Miller and Le Breton-Miller call the action chosen quickly in order to rapidly fix a problem without having regarded all the issues pertaining to such

33 Ben-Porath, Y. (1980). "The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange." Population and Development Review 6(1): 1-30. 1.

34 Habbershon, T. G. and M. L. Williamson (1999). "A resource-based framwork for assessing the strategic advantages of family firms."." Family Business Review 12: 1-15.

35 Miller, D. and I. Le Breton-Miller (2006). "Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities." Ibid. 19: 73-87. Westhead, P. and C. Howorth (2006). "Ownership and Management Issues Associated With Family Firm Performance and Company Objectives."

Family Business Review 19(4): 301-316.

36 Davis, J., D. Schoorman, et al. (1997). "Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management."

Academy of Management Review 22: 20-47.

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decisions. Consequently, the "steward" looks at farsighted investments, and intuitively commits himself deeply to the family’s affairs.³⁷

Chapters Two and Three describe how the Du Pont Company was owned, managed, and how it expanded its activities first between 1802 and 1915, and second between 1915 and 1980. Both chapters present that the du Pont family’s control over the company was total during the 19^th century and a determinant for the company's expansion during the 20^th century, and even at the end of the 1970s. However, the international business and business history literatures also discuss the question of whether family firms go abroad, and if they do, how.

Therefore, the next section defines what multinational companies are and confronts the literatures on the question of family multinationals.

1.2. FAMILY FIRMS AND MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES

In 1914 Du Pont de Nemours was already listed among the American multinationals because of its joint venture with Nobel in Canada and the nitrate fields it owned in Chile.³⁸ However, the company had a rather slow development abroad, in contrast with other companies such as Ford.³⁹ This stresses the differences that Christina Lubinski, Jeffrey Fear, and Paloma Fernandez Pérez describe among companies that are "born international," the companies that internationalize "cautiously", and those that do not internationalize at all.⁴⁰ Du

37 Miller, D. and I. Le Breton-Miller (2006). "Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities." Family Business Review 19: 73-87.

38 Wilkins, M. (1970). The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914. London, Oxford University Press. 213-213, 216.

39 Ford had already five assembly plants and car manufacturers abroad in 1914. Wilkins, M. and F.

E. Hill (1964). American Business Abroad. Ford on Six Continents. Detroit, Wayne State University Press. 434.

40 Lubinski, C., J. Fear, et al., Eds. (2013). Family Multinationals. Entrepreneurship, Governance, and Pathways to Internationalization. New York, Routledge. 1 Graves, C. and J. Thomas (2008).

"Determinants of the Internationalization Pathways of Family Firmy: An Examination of Family Influence." Family Business Review 21(2): 151-167. 153.

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Pont was of the second kind, those that internationalize “cautiously.” Wilkins previously considered that: "Unlike most American companies in growth industries, the three principal U.S. chemical producers (Du Pont, Union Carbide, and Allied Chemical) were far from audacious in their search for international markets."⁴¹ Du Pont started becoming international by following the Uppsala model of internationalization. First, the company used to export its production, and this already since the 19^th century. Second, the company established sales offices in Europe, as well as in Latin America, already in the early 20^th century.

And finally, the company participated in manufacturing plants in other countries, before building its own factories.⁴² However, when can a company be considered as a multinational?

1.2.1. DEFINITIONS

The most straightforward definition of a multinational company (MNC) is of a business owned in a home country, which invests in host economies.⁴³ More precisely, a MNC must have assets abroad. The nature of the assets differ according to authors: Raymond Vernon develops that the MNC must have at least a subsidiary in five or six different countries.⁴⁴ Richard Caves presents that the number of subsidiaries abroad does not matter, but that the control and the management that the mother company exerts over it is determinant when considering a company as a MNC. He underlines that some mother companies prefer to have a less important role in the foreign subsidiary and then only hold a

41Wilkins, M. (1975). The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad, From 1914 to 1970. Boston. 78.

42 Johanson, J. and J.-E. Vahlne (1977). "The Internationalization Process of the Firm-A Model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments." Journal of International Business Studies 8(1): 23-32.

43 Jones, G. (2005). Multinationals and Global Capitalism, From the Nineteenth to the Twenty- First Century. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 3. Wilkins, M. (1986). Defining a Firm: History and Theory. Multinationals: Theory and History. P. Hertner and G. Jones. Aldershot, Gower: 80-95. 81.

44 Vernon, R. (Fall, 1971). "Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U. S. Enterprises." The International Executive 13(4): 1-3.

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minor fraction of it.⁴⁵ Geoffrey Jones specifies that firms investing abroad through portfolio investments (involving the acquisition of foreign securities without any control over the management of the equity) are considered to be multinational companies, as well as enterprises having set up a foreign direct investment that involves management and control.⁴⁶

In this dissertation I retain this quote from Mira Wilkins as defining a multinational company: “[…] as a firm that is headquartered in one country and extends itself over borders – as a firm. In some […] cases, there may be more than one headquarters.”⁴⁷ And thus, I consider Du Pont as being a multinational company from 1910, as soon as it had its first investments abroad: a 45%

interest in a Canadian joint venture. This was a subsidiary controlled partly by Du Pont's management, as a number of senior managers in the Canadian investment came from the mother company. Before that Du Pont had only exported its production to other countries and is, therefore, not considered at that point to be a multinational.

1.2.2. KEY FACTORS TO GO ABROAD

When Du Pont started to internationalize, the incentives to invest abroad were sometimes difficult to read or, on the contrary, sometimes very clear. The reasons why companies choose to become international is covered by a vast amount of literature. Raymond Vernon considers that the investments abroad are a function of the internal market saturation, of the progressive products

45 Caves, R. E. (1982). Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 149.

46 Jones, G. (2005). Multinationals and Global Capitalism, From the Nineteenth to the Twenty- First Century. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Hertner, P. and G. Jones, Eds. (1986).

Multinationals: Theory and History. Aldershot, Gower. 3.

47 Wilkins, M. (2009). The History of Multinational Enterprise. The Oxford Handbook of International Business. A. Rugman and T. L. Brewer. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 3-33.7.

SeeRugman, A. and B. T. L., Eds. (2009). The Oxford Handbook of International Business. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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standardization, and of the threat of import-substitution policies.⁴⁸ More precisely, concerning companies similar to Du Pont, Mira Wilkins considers that American companies invested abroad between 1914 and 1970 for a number of reasons: first, the market attraction; second, the importance of the investment size; third, the existence (or not) of a tariff barrier, and; fourth, the host government's demands.⁴⁹ In 1994 Mira Wilkins took these determining factors and developed them as the four main parameters that attract multinational companies into host countries: "the opportunity parameter" (which is about the prospects in the host market such as raw materials), "the political parameter"

(which is about the local political conditions, the political stability or instability of a country), "the familiarity parameter" (which means that a multinational finds familiar conditions that lower transaction costs in a host country, language being an important familiarity factor), and "the third country parameter" (which is about the conditions inside the host country).⁵⁰ Again, John R. Dunning's OLI theory, the eclectic paradigm, considers the interests of the owner and the localization of the investment, as well as the internalization process. In line with Mira Wilkins, the scholar considers that the host economies are the determining criteria for investing: its attractiveness as a host includes its most important parameters for investors as being the country’s physical and human resources, or industrial policies.⁵¹ Finally, Mira Wilkins considers that after the Second World War, and especially since 1955 and until 1970, a growing number of American companies undertook to reduce or even eliminate the "importance of the international division and to adopt what has been variously called worldwide, global,

48 Vernon, R. (1966). "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 80(2): 190-207.

49 Wilkins, M. (1975). The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad, From 1914 to 1970. Boston.

50 Wilkins, M. (1994). "Comparative Hosts." Business History 36(1): 18-50. 25-27.

51 Dunning, J. H. (1988). "The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement and Some Possible Extensions." Journal of International Business Studies 19(1): 1-31, Mucchielli, J.-L.

and T. Mayer (2004). Multinationals Firms’ Location and the New Economic Geography.

Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

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cosmopolitan organization structure."⁵² Some of these factors proved to have been important for Du Pont. For example, we notice the importance of foreign governments' demands – real invitations in fact – especially concerning the investment in powder plants. Of importance as well, tariffs that benefitted Du Pont or not were always studied before the company entered a country, as well as what the cost would be to set up a manufacturing plant with regard to the cost of exporting the same product. However, the literature about foreign direct investments encompasses a rich discussion concerning the difficulty – and advantages – for family firms abroad, as the section below shows.

1.3. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FAMILY MULTINATIONALS

The international business and business history literatures consider that family firms are rather reluctant to expand abroad. The family controlled business is considered to not be inclined toward risky ventures. To expand in host countries, family firms view the same issues as when they increase their activities at home:

lacking the resources and management necessary to keep control over developments of the business. Family firms might have to hire external managers to fulfill the management tasks abroad. Therefore, family controlled businesses are risk adverse; they fear the negative impact that an international expansion may have on their family control.⁵³ Miller and Le Breton Miller consider that when the family hires external managers that surrounds the clan in its family governance, it could have some positive input and could open the field of possibility for a company. But, according to these scholars, it means that family firms have to evolve into managerial companies in order to grow abroad.⁵⁴

52 Wilkins, M. (1975). The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad, From 1914 to 1970. Boston. 382.

53 Donckels, R. and E. Frohlich (1991). "Are Family Business Really Different?" Family Business Review 4(2): 149-160.

54 Chandler, A. D. J. (1990). Scale and Scope, the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism.

Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Miller, D. and I. Le Breton-Miller

When Du Pont went global: how the Du Pont family built a multinational empire (1910-1967)

Thesis

Reference

When Du Pont went global: how the Du Pont family built a multinational empire (1910-1967)

LOMBARDI GAUTHIER, Liza

LOMBARDI GAUTHIER, Liza. When Du Pont went global: how the Du Pont family built a multinational empire (1910-1967) . Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2014, no. SES 843

URN : urn:nbn:ch:unige-389643

DOI : 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:38964

WHEN DU PONT WENT GLOBAL

How the Du Pont Family Built a Multinational Empire (1910-1967)

THÈSE

présentée à la Faculté des Sciences économiques et sociales de l’Université de Genève

par

Liza Lombardi

sous la direction du

Prof. Youssef Cassis

European University Institute

pour l’obtention du grade de

Docteure ès sciences économiques et sociales mention histoire économique

Membres du jury de thèse:

Prof. Juan FLORES, Université de Genève, président du jury Prof. Mary O’SULLIVAN, Université de Genève

Prof. Andrea COLLI, Università Bocconi

Prof. Nuria PUIG, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Thèse no 843

Genève, le 6 juin 2014

RÉSUMÉ

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

TABLES AND FIGURES

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. FAMILY FIRMS: DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

1.1.1. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FAMILY FIRMS

In Contrast with Berle and Means

Advantages of Family Governance

1.2. FAMILY FIRMS AND MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES

1.2.1. DEFINITIONS

1.2.2. KEY FACTORS TO GO ABROAD

1.3. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FAMILY MULTINATIONALS