Interpreting in conflict zones: the users' point of view. A case study

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Master

Reference

Interpreting in conflict zones: the users' point of view. A case study

PROIETTI, Francesca

Abstract

Interpreters in conflict zones bridge the linguistic gap during a conflict and are often locals with no previous experience of interpreting. This particular category of interpreters will be analysed in this research project but from the users' point of view. In this inductive qualitative case study, two members of the Dutch army have been interviewed regarding their experience with local interpreters when they were deployed in Afghanistan. The aim of this study is to find out their impressions on the interpreting service and, more specifically, if they believed that the interpreters' background was more an advantage or a disadvantage, if the interpreters were ever at risk and if the interpreters' jobs were financially worth these potential risks. By comparing the users' different experiences, this study shows how the type of working and personal relationship between the user and the interpreter has a tangible influence on the interpreters' working conditions, perceived trustworthiness and security.

PROIETTI, Francesca. Interpreting in conflict zones: the users' point of view. A case study. Master : Univ. Genève, 2018

Available at:

http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:131154

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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FRANCESCA PROIETTI

Interpreting in conflict zones: the users’ point of view.

A case study.

Mémoire présenté à la Faculté de Traduction et d’Interprétation Pour l’obtention du MA en Interprétation de Conférence

Directeur de mémoire : Prof. Lucía Ruiz Rosendo Juré : M. Benoît Kremer

Juin 2018

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STUDENT INFORMATION:

Francesca Proietti

Ecole de Traduction et d'Interprétation University of Geneva

40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve, CH-1211 Genève 4, Switzerland francesca.proietti23@gmail.con

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Interpreters in conflict zones bridge the linguistic gap during a conflict and are often locals with no previous experience of interpreting. This particular category of interpreters will be analysed in this research project but from the users’ point of view. In this inductive qualitative case study, two members of the Dutch army have been interviewed regarding their experience with local interpreters when they were deployed in Afghanistan. The aim of this study is to find out their impressions on the interpreting service and, more specifically, if they believed that the interpreters’ background was more an advantage or a disadvantage, if the interpreters were ever at risk and if the interpreters’ jobs were financially worth these potential risks. By comparing the users’ different experiences, this study shows how the type of working and personal relationship between the user and the interpreter has a tangible influence on the interpreters’ working conditions, perceived trustworthiness and security.

Key Words: interpreting, conflict zone, users, working conditions, safety, Afghanistan.

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1. Introduction

“There will always be war”. This is what Wilhelm Frick, a Nazi official, revealed to Leon Goldensohn, the author of The Nuremberg Interviews (1946). If Frick was right and wars are as constant in our history as they will be in our future, it is still safe to say that there will always be, as there always have been, mediators who will play a key role during these conflicts.

Interpreters in conflict zones (ICZ) are the link that make up for the linguist gap during a conflict (Stahuljak, 2000): in international missions, they help troops that come from different countries communicate amongst themselves, but they also provide help to members of these armies when they need to talk to the locals. In this research project, the main focus will be on local interpreters hired by the military. This particular category is comprised of civilians who are usually “identified by chance or circumstance” (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2018: 15) by the armies deployed on the ground. Local interpreters are usually new to this profession and do not have experience as interpreters.

When analysing the role of interpreters within conflict zones, many authors have covered different conflicts, pointing out the unique qualities of each conflict with regards to the interpreters that worked in that particular conflict. Dragovic-Drouet (2007) studied the working conditions of interpreters during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, and has highlighted several different issues, from the inadequate level of linguistic knowledge and skills of the interpreters, to the issue of subjectivity when interpreters were personally involved or related to parties in the conflict. Baker C. (2010) and Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud (2018) looked at the same conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina but from two different perspectives: Baker C. (2010) focused on the ambiguous positions of local interpreters, highlighting how this is reflected in their working conditions; whereas Ruiz Rosendo &

Persaud (2018) analysed interpreter training in the Bosnian conflict and came to the conclusion that both users and interpreters needed training. Stahuljak (2009; 2010) analysed the role of interpreters within the Croatian conflict and their role as intermediaries: more specifically, she analysed their need to bear witness and how their role as neutral mediators sometimes clashed when working in a conflict situation.

Todorova (2016) looked into the work of interpreters in Kosovo and Macedonia, drawing from her own experience as an interpreter during this conflict in the late 1990s and early

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2000s. She focused specifically on the issue of interpreters’ neutrality and the relationship of trust that was built between the parties involved in the communication, thanks to the mediation of the interpreter.

In this paper, the focus will be on the most recent phases of the Afghan war. This particular conflict, and the interpreter’s role within it, has been analysed by many authors, providing crucial insights. Anderson (2014) interviewed local Afghan interpreters who worked for the U.S army, focusing on: their working conditions, their relationship with the troops, the dangers they had to face on the job and the difficulties encountered when they required a VISA permit to leave their country. Cummings (2012), on the other hand, examined the duties assigned to Afghan interpreters, highlighting that not only did interpreters have to translate, but they also had to play the role of cultural advisors and were considered a source of intelligence. Gómez Amich (2017) examined the way in which the Afghan interpreters worked, and the potential repercussions on their invisibility and neutrality.

To achieve this, she interviewed five Afghan interpreters who served for the Spanish army, specifically on how they perceived their role.

As most of the studies on interpreters in conflict zones published in the field of Translation Studies focus on the self-perception of interpreters in conflict zones and on their accounts regarding their experience and working conditions (Bernabé, 2013;

Carville, 2012; Gómez Amich, 2017; Snelmann, 2016; Ruiz Rosendo & Muñoz, 2017), this research will instead focus on the perception, attitude and experiences of users of interpreting services in Afghanistan.

It is important to note that very few authors in this field have interviewed the users:

Palmer (2007) interviewed seventeen British and French journalists who made use of interpreters in Iraq, whereas Baker (2010) interviewed more than 30 local and international officers who were involved in the peacekeeping operations and had worked with local interpreters in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud’s (2018) research analysed interviews with seven members of the forces’ personnel working in the peacekeeping operations in the Bosnian war, focusing on their experience with interpreters working for them.

In this inductive qualitative case study, the interviewees are two members of the Dutch army who used interpreting services when they were deployed in Afghanistan. The first

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user interviewed is a captain who served for two tours in Afghanistan (the first one in 2009 in the Uruzgan province and the second in 2015 in Mazar-i-Sharif), whereas the second user is a full colonel who served for one tour in 2009 in the Uruzgan province. The aim of this study is to find out if, according to them, the local interpreters were more useful because of their cultural background, if they believed their interpreters were ever at risk (and if so, why) and if their jobs were financially worth the risk.

This paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, the role of the ICZ is analysed, taking into consideration all the main aspects which must be born in mind when studying this professional category. Firstly, the history of interpreting in conflict zones will be examined, including the “frequent invisibility of interpreters” (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016: 1), in order to understand why, despite their importance, there are few proofs of their existence in historical records. Following on from this, categorisation is taken into consideration. An initial division is made based on the different stages of war: preparatory stage, warfare and end of conflict (Baigorri-Jalón, 2011). After this first analysis, the three categories identified by Allen (2012) are described and presented: military linguists, humanitarian interpreters and local interpreters. The focus will be on the latter, exploring all the different characteristics and issues associated with local interpreters including:

recruitment, employment contracts, job description, training (or lack thereof), reasons to accept the role, equipment, risks, positionality, professional ethics, neutrality and protection after the conflict had ended (i.e. granting of VISAs and/or refugee status).

Chapter 3 is centred on Afghanistan: its population and recent history will be analysed in order to better understand what is like to live and work there. In the second part of this chapter, the local interpreters in Afghanistan will be analysed from two different angles:

firstly, through the work of Gómez Amich (2017), who interviewed five local Afghan interpreters who currently live in Spain after working for the Spanish army. Secondly, through the work of Anderson (2014), a filmmaker and journalist who has filmed a documentary for VICE news on Afghan interpreters. The focus in his documentary is on those interpreters who still live in Afghanistan after working for the U.S. Army, and who were not granted a VISA to leave their own country after the U.S. troops left.

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In Chapter 4, the methodology and the results of the interviews will be presented. The experiences of the two users interviewed will then be compared and analysed. Finally, Chapter 5 will present the conclusion of this paper.

This preliminary study provides an original contribution to the literature. In fact, few researchers have focused their attention on the users of interpreting services, as it is a hard-to-reach population of study. This study provides insights into the user’s perception of interpreting services in conflict zones. It focuses on the particular relationship that is built between the user and the interpreter and on the repercussions it has on the interpreters’ working conditions, trustworthiness and security. The limitation of a small sample hinders the possibility of generalising the results of this research. However, based on the findings, some interesting points were raised and could be the starting point for further research.

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2. Interpreting in Conflict Zones

2.1. The role of interpreters in conflict zones

Clausewitz (1930) defined war as an act of violence intended to compel the opponent to fulfil one’s will. This act of violence, according to the philosopher, can be caused by instinctive hostility or hostile intention. It is a use of force aimed at destroying the enemy.

For the purpose of this study, however, the perspective will be enlarged in order to consider not only wars but conflicts in general. The word ‘conflict’ describes numerous types of hostilities: it can describe mere contradictions that can lead to violence, but it can also be used both for an actual war and for all the phases that follow its de-escalation (Moser-Mercer, 2015).

According to Brahm (2003), there are different phases of a conflict that are worth mentioning. According to him, the first phase of a conflict is the latent phase, where the preconditions for a conflict are present, but there is an ongoing stalemate between those involved. The situation remains unchanged until an event triggers the “emergence” or beginning of the conflict. This phase can be followed by either a settlement or by an escalation: the first leads to resolving the conflict, the second to the outbreak of the war.

After this “destructive phase”, which could last indefinitely, there are two possibilities:

another stalemate, a situation in which neither of the parties at war can win but only increase their casualties. The other possibility, the ideal one, is the beginning of a negotiation, followed by a peace settlement and a peacebuilding process.

During any type of conflict and any phase of the conflict, some sort of mediation is always necessary, because there is still a need to communicate (Pöchhacker, 2015). Moreover, throughout history, many conflicts have involved nations that did not share a common language, a common history or a common culture. Yet, the conflict was still possible because linguistic or cultural boundaries were never enough to avoid an outbreak of a war (Moser-Mercer & Bali, 2008).

Linguistic mediation is possible thanks to the interpreters working in conflict zones. This professional category still lacks a proper definition (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016) and the term includes different types of interpreters. The interpreters working in conflict zones are of invaluable help for the armies that hire them: not only do they help troops coming from different countries to communicate, but they also help foreign troops

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understand the locals, their culture and their needs during the conflict and during its aftermath (Baigorri-Jalón, 2011).

According to Juvinall (2013), U.S. troops sent to Iraq were almost blind without their interpreters: they could not make sense of what was happening around them. As Ruiz Rosendo and Persaud (2018) explain when analysing the situation of local interpreters in the Bosnian War, it was because of the presence of interpreters that troops are able to communicate with locals. These locals possess useful knowledge and are able to explain what is happening in their country. Interpreters are therefore crucial when it comes to making up for this linguistic gap (Stahuljak, 2000).

Despite their importance, however, interpreters in conflict zones are rarely cited in archives and proofs of their existence are few and far between (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016). This could be due, as Probirskaya (2016) explains, either to the nature of the profession itself, which requires the interpreter to be almost invisible, or to the nature of the archives that have been organised and written in order to avoid mentioning the presence of the interpreter. The invisibility of the interpreter throughout history could be due, as Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud (2016) point out, to various reasons. First of all, it could be because of the primacy of the written over the spoken word: this could be why chronicles usually report the activity of translators, but rarely mention interpreters.

Another possible reason could be related to either the interpreters’ social status (historically they were enslaved women, war prisoners or displaced people), or to their secondary role in important historical events. However, despite this invisibility, the importance of the role they have played during conflicts throughout history is indubitable (ibid).

When the conflicts became worldwide with the two World Wars, the need for interpreters during the different stages of the conflict became more and more impellent. In the period from 1914 until the Nuremberg Trials, the profession of the conference interpreter as it is known today began to take shape (Gaiba, 1990; Baigorri-Jalón, 2014; Ruiz Rosendo &

Persaud, 2016). Meanwhile, during the same period, the profession of the interpreter in conflict zones also evolved and acquired different characteristics. However, these characteristics varied according to the type of conflict, the country where the conflict took place or who the employer was.

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2.2. Different types of interpreters

Interpreters in conflict zones are not all of the same kind: their working conditions, their contract and what is required from them can change. Baigorri-Jalón (2011) describes how the profession changes along with the different moments that characterise a conflict. The first stage is the preparatory process: diplomacy and intelligence are crucial in this moment and interpreters are needed to mediate between the two parties that are on the brink of a war. At this point, the negotiations are more delicate than usual and the interpreters hired are usually very-well trained professionals. The employer requires complete loyalty from the interpreter, and both parties during these types of negotiations need to have complete trust in their interpreter.

The second phase described by Baigorri-Jalón (ibid) is the warfare: when the war has been declared and the operations on land take place. Here the military personnel speak different languages or have to interact with the locals. In this stage, many of the activities that take place need the help of interpreters: propaganda, psychological warfare, contact with prisoners of war, control of occupied territories, evacuation of non-combatants, etc.

In this phase, it is possible that the interpreter is asked to perform numerous tasks, not all strictly related to the tasks normally required from an interpreter (Ruiz Rosendo &

Persaud, 2016). This phase may also include the possibility of a foreign invasion (when a country is occupied by a foreign force); an example of this is when the Nazi party occupied France during World War II. In this case, interpreters have to mediate between locals and foreign troops, even with all the ethical dilemmas that this may involve, as Baigorri-Jalón (ibid) points out.

During the final phase, the interpreters are needed for the peace negotiation process, but also in the rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants in civilian life and then during the armistice negotiation and signing. In some cases, interpreters may also be required to work in military tribunals in the settlement for responsibilities (ibid: 178). Post conflict scenarios, like peace-building and peacekeeping operations, also require interpreters in order to carry out many different tasks. As carefully described by Ruiz Rosendo & Muñoz (2017: 185-186) these tasks vary from “mediating between the troops or military observers (…) [to] fact-finding missions and other investigations involving local governments, special envoys, representatives of victims’ associations and NGOs” etc.

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Another type of classification frequently used is the one described by Allen (2012) who identifies three types of interpreters in conflict zones: military linguists, humanitarian interpreters and local/contract interpreters. Military linguists are soldiers who happen to speak several foreign languages and provide interpreting services to assist their fellow soldiers during field and intelligence operation. What is important to understand about this category is that these interpreters are “first and foremost soldiers” (Ruiz Rosendo &

Muñoz 2017: 188): they wear a military uniform, they carry weapons (Snellman, 2016) and they receive training (both linguistic and military). According to Allen, (2012) armies are investing more and more on this section of the military since they are useful when it comes to conflictive languages such as Arabic, Pashto, Dari, Urdu and Farsi. However, other languages are also considered useful, like Spanish, Portuguese and French.

The second group, humanitarian interpreters, is composed of interpreters that are employed by international aid and news organisations. They work on the field in case of a conflict and/or a disaster (earthquake, flooding or a hurricane) and are needed to help NGO’s and international organisations during the complex logistics that this type of aid requires. These interpreters work in a very fragile environment, are exposed to situations of human suffering and can rarely rely on an institutionalised professional community or a standardised code of ethics.

The third category identified by Allen (2012) is the focus of this research: local interpreters. In the next subsection, this category will be analysed: in particular, their professional profile and skills, their tasks, their training (or lack of), the reasons why they accept the job, their positionality and the dangers they have to face (and how the army takes care of their protection) will be examined. Subsequently, their code of ethics, how they deal with the neutrality that is usually a crucial feature of interpreting, and their level of trustworthiness will be analysed. The final part of this subsection will look into what happens when the foreign troops leave the conflict zone and how these interpreters live the aftermath of the conflict.

Before moving on to this section, however, it is worth mentioning, as observed by Ruiz Rosendo and Muñoz (2017), that there are two more types of interpreters working in conflict zones: UN language assistants and staff or freelance conference interpreters.

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The first group is made up of civilians hired by the UN to work in the context of the UN peacekeeping operations. They work on the ground and are highly proficient in local languages and an international language (which has to be one of the official UN languages). Their recruitment process takes into consideration their proficiency in the working languages, their qualifications, their problem-solving skills and their capacity to work rapidly and accurately. They also perform other functions, such as writing minutes of meetings, translating documents and carrying out administrative tasks.

The other group, staff and freelance conference interpreters, work mainly for international organizations and go on field missions. They have a high language proficiency, they are extremely well trained and have past experience in interpreting. In the exploratory research carried by Ruiz Rosendo and Muñoz, who interviewed eight staff and freelance interpreters who had worked in the Middle East, it is shown how the fact that they are part of an international organization makes them more aware of the need for their neutrality and impartiality.

2.3. Local interpreters

Local interpreters provide the majority of interpretation services in conflict zones. They are usually untrained civilians (see Allen, 2012; Baigorri-Jalón, 2011; Gómez Amich, 2013;

Fitchett, 2012; Inghilleri, 2010; Ruiz Rosendo & Muñoz, 2017; Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016; Moser-Mercer & Bali, 2008; Todorova, 2016), hired locally (Baker 2010) and sometimes informally (Moser-Mercer, 2015). They perform several tasks: from escorting the troops on the field to interpreting in meetings between foreign troops and the national army (Allen, 2012).

As Moser-Mercer (2015) points out, often these interpreters are not employed and have to work without a legal contract. This (see section 2.3.10.) often puts them at a great risk because working outside a regulated framework of labour law does not provide them with the protection they would need (Pöchhacker, 2015). This is especially true if one considers that the enemy is not the only threat to fear: because of the help they provide to foreign troops, they are, in fact, often considered as traitors (Wang-Chi Wong, 2007; M.

Baker, 2010; Pöchhacker, 2015; Gómez Amich, 2013; Moser-Mercer, 2015) or are the subject of envy on the part of local communities (Bartolini 2009).

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2.3.1. Professional profile and skills

Local interpreters are recruited because they know both the local language(s)/dialect(s) spoken in the conflict zone and the language spoken by the troops hiring them. It must be highlighted that they are not professionals, and the primary reason for their employment is their knowledge and proficiency in the languages required by the army. That said, they do not, at least, start into this profession with the proper professional skills usually required of conference interpreters (Baigorri-Jalón, 2011).

Before we move on to the description of the specific tasks of locally hired interpreters, it is interesting to notice that armies nowadays have started to hire more and more civilians, according to Kelly & Baker (2013), since military linguists have begun to decline this position. Seemingly, military linguists would rather accept more military roles, with opportunities of career advancement, than accept an additional interpreting assignment.

This may be one reason as to why the military turned to civilians that could “keep open, tant bien que mal, the communication channel” (Baigorri- Jalón, 2011:177).

2.3.2. Tasks

Interpreters in a conflict zone are usually asked to undertake more tasks than just translating verbal elements from one language to another in a meeting. According to the job description provided by the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Career Exploration Program (ASVAB CEP) of the U.S. Department of Defence, interpreters in conflict zones have to:

- Identify, translate and summarise communications;

- Conduct escort interpretation;

- Perform written translations;

- Train the military personnel in order to familiarise them with the local language and raise cultural awareness;

- Collect, evaluate and combine data from multiple sources using language processing tools;

- Collect, translate analyse and report intelligence information;

- Monitor, identify and process communications involving activities of interest (Careers in the Military, 2004).

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Baker M. (2010) identifies some other tasks, such as conducting negotiations between the army and local military or civilians authorities but also performing inspections or delivering materials or aid. As it appears to be clear, the work of an ICZ is extremely different to the one of a conference interpreter: the duties that they have to perform go far beyond what is usually asked of an interpreter outside a war zone (Ruiz Rosendo &

Persaud, 2016).

As far as the interpretation is concerned, it is interesting to analyse the point of view of some users interviewed by Palmer (2007) regarding their expectations and general level of satisfaction regarding the interpreting services. Although the users did not require a word-for-word translation and could generally settle for a summary, they did consider the mistranslation and/or omission of significant material to be a risk when dealing with local interpreters. In order to overcome this, they would ask similar questions several times to see if the answer was always consistent.

2.3.3. Training

Local interpreters do not receive training when they are hired by the armies. They are therefore key players in the communication and yet remain non-professional linguists, (Fitchett, 2012) hired just because of their functional bilingualism (Baigorri-Jalón, 2011).

This lack of training would be inadvisable in any other sphere, as Gómez Amich (2013) suggests; in interpreting in conflict zones, however, the law of supply and demand applies (Baigorri- Jalón, 2011; Gómez Amich, 2013). As there is often a poor understanding of the profession amongst the users of interpreters in conflict zones (Moser-Mercer, 2015), the hiring of untrained interpreters in conflict zone is extremely widespread (Allen, 2012).

The problem of the lack of training is well known by professional interpreters who worked in conflict zones in the Middle East. In an exploratory study carried out by Ruiz Rosendo & Muñoz (2017), a group of professional interpreters with ample experience and who work mainly for international organisations were interviewed in order to learn more about the work they carried out in the field. These interpreters declared that in order to work in such multi-cultural, stressful and dangerous environment adequate training is crucial. This is particularly the case if we consider that the messages to send across are filled with cultural clues that could severely influence the negotiation, as Todorova (2016)

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explains. The interpreters interviewed by Ruiz Rosendo & Muñoz (ibid) noticed that those interpreters who work in conflict zones are rarely prepared or qualified for the job: they lack specialised knowledge in law, economy, diplomacy and human rights. Even if they had this knowledge, the general opinion of the interpreters who participated in this study is that not everyone is cut out for this job. Very few of the local interpreters have the psychological strength to work under such circumstances, and not having a code of ethics to support their work only makes it harder.

Cappelli (2014) proposes additional training that focuses on the psychological aspect:

mock interpreting sessions about testimony or reports of torture, violence etc. with actors impersonating victims. The presence of a psychological counsellor is also advised since it could help interpreters (and users) reduce their emotional involvement and start the process of emotionally dealing with the brutality of war in order to maintain impartiality.

This could be a solution to achieving the strength and professionalism necessary in such a context. The risk of not being strong enough to deal with a stressful situation is that one may not be able to control one’s emotions; the danger of not being professional, however, is that one might not be able to establish limits in order not to be used as an instrument for one of the parties (see section 2.3.7.).

Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud (2018) analysed this matter and have concluded that both parties would actually require training. In fact, not only do interpreters need to be better prepared to work with military forces, the members of the armies themselves also need to know how to deal with interpreters properly. Baker M. (2010) adds that, in order for an efficient working collaboration to occur, specific guidance is needed on how to relate with one another. Soldiers need to be told about their responsibilities towards civilians and about the needs of an interpreter in order to improve their working conditions.

2.3.4. Motivations to accept the job

We have analysed how ICZ are often lacking the necessary skills to carry out the job, a job which takes place in dangerous environments. Yet these local interpreters still appear to have enough reasons to accept the job. Many authors have looked into this matter (Ruiz Rosendo & Muñoz, 2017; Baigorri-Jalón, 2011; Baker M., 2010; Gómez Amich, 2017;

Inghilleri, 2010; Anderson, 2014) and found out that there are several reasons for this that are worth analysing.

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The main reason is financial: these interpreters, as locals, live in communities where the labour market has essentially come to a stop because of the war and even a small revenue is still an improvement in their living conditions. However, not all local interpreters believe that what they earned was enough and that it was worth the risk (see section 3.3.2.). Another frequently mentioned reason is the will to do some good: some interpreters do believe that through their actions they are doing something to improve the lives of their fellow citizens and are helping those who came from far away in order to save their nations. Finally, another reason that is often mentioned is the possibility of obtaining a VISA to leave the country. This is a common procedure for foreign armies:

they promise an “escape plan” after some years of service. This could be provided for through the attainment of a VISA permit or by granting the refugee status. Even in this case, however, the procedures are not always that quick or easy and there are several cases of interpreters being left behind (Bernabé, 2013; Carville, 2012; Anderson, 2014).

2.3.5. Positionality

Local interpreters are insiders, as they belong to the local communities and share the common culture of the country where the troops are deployed. This entails, as Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud (2018) noticed, both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, they have the capacity and the knowledge to guide the users of interpreting services through the maze of cultural and social practices, they advise them on the correct behaviour when communicating and on the non-written rules of their society. On the other hand, their closeness to their own culture could also be perceived as a disadvantage if the interpreter is not capable to show objectivity or if s/he takes things for granted in a communicative situation.

Their job makes them face situations that may show the misery of their own community in need (Dragovic-Drouet, 2007). The fact that they experience the harshness of the war so closely and that they have to live through traumatic and stressful situations (Ruiz Rosendo & Muñoz, 2017) inevitably makes it hard to maintain cold professionalism for the sake of the mission (Dragovic-Drouet, 2007).

Moreover, it has to be considered that their position is also ambivalent: they are in fact insiders working for outsiders (the foreign troops), and they might, as such, build

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personal relations on both sides of the war (Baker M., 2010). They are, as Palmer (2007:

14) says, “suspended bodies between cultures and languages”.

2.3.6. Safety and security

Local interpreters live the reality of the war very closely: this makes them face a very dangerous situation where their lives are often at risk (Inghilleri & Harding, 2010). The fact that they work for military forces does not signify that they are part of these forces, as they did not receive a military training, and they do not receive the same type of protection and safety that the soldiers they work for do (Moser-Mercer, 2015).

An important factor regarding the interpreters’ protection is indubitably their uniform and/or equipment. Regarding this matter, the situation is not homogenous. In Afghanistan, as Moser-Mercer (2015) points out, non-governmental organisations and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mostly recruited local interpreters. These interpreters were not allowed to carry anything that could identify them as employed by ISAF, in order to reduce the risk of them being targeted by Taliban. However, it is unclear if this refers to them not wearing a uniform when working or to them not carrying any identifying objects or badges outside of working hours.

On the other hand, Baker C. (2010) has observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina that many interpreters were given military uniforms: this, of course, blurred the usual distinction between civilians and soldiers. However, according to an Army linguist interviewed by Baker C. (ibid), this was deemed necessary as interpreters would have been targeted if they did not look like regular soldiers. This is understandable, but one has to take into consideration that, even though they might look like soldiers, they still are not military personnel. In fact, they do not carry weapons and they are not trained to respond properly to any security threat, as a soldier would do. This entails additional security measures in order to ensure their safety since they are not capable of, nor expected to defend themselves, as any trained member of the military could do.

A fact-finding report was produced by the Danish Immigration Service (2012) to shed light on the actual situation of the asylum seekers from Afghanistan, as it is the largest single nationality among asylum seekers in Denmark. The study collected information on various issues from past asylum cases in order to provide additional information on

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typical cases (conflict with the Taliban, extramarital relations, land disputes etc.) and improve the process of granting/refusing refugee status. When analysing the case of people working or who had worked for the US military, they found out that local interpreters employed by the US army were high targets. One of the sources of this study (who asked to remain anonymous) declared that, because of this, most of them kept their jobs a secret.

Interpreters have to face many risks when working in a conflict zone: Talpas (2016), citing the work of Pah (2009), has analysed the different types of risks involved with this job.

There are three types identified: military risks, environmental risks and social risks. The military risk is due to the obvious presence of weapons, explosives and ammunition possessed by both parties at war and to the fact that interpreters often have to escort soldiers on all their missions, without enjoying the same kind of protection (Moser- Mercer, 2015).

The second type of risk is environmental: these interpreters have to work in an environment where the climatic conditions are often difficult, especially since they do not have military training and are not used to strenuous physical activity as soldiers are.

“Resilience to discomfort is an inalienable aspect of the military subjectivity” (Baker C., 2010: 143) but, as we said, interpreters are civilians, not soldiers.

The third risk is the social one: these interpreters may be seen as traitors from their own community (Baker C., 2010; Bartolini, 2009; Gómez Amich, 2013; Moser-Mercer, 2015;

Pöchhacker, 2015; Wang-Chi Wong, 2007). Because of their status as interpreters, they receive death threats (Baker C., 2010; Bernabé, 2013; Carville, 2012; Gómez Amich, 2013;

Talpas, 2016), not only directed to them but also towards their family members, as they are seen as “collaborating with the enemy” (Juvinall, 2013: 206).

2.3.7. Professional ethics

As has already been seen, ICZ do not receive training. This factor, however, does not only influence their performance and accuracy, but it also raises doubts regarding their professional ethics. Being trained as interpreters provides trainees with the tools and the skills that are necessary to interpret but also, and above all, professional ethics (Dragovic-

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Drouet, 2007). Professional ethics is crucial when dealing with crisis management in a stressful environment (Moser-Mercer & Bali, 2008).

A code of ethics set by professionals in a specific profession is important because it sets out the rules to abide by but it also provides protection to the worker (Li, Tian & Huang, 2016). The code of ethics provides guidelines that protect the integrity of a profession and dismisses individuals who, because of their unprofessional behaviour, risk endangering the profession itself and its credibility, honour and effectiveness (ibid). When a professional works knowing the code of ethics of his or her profession, it is clear to him or her how to tackle tough situations that might arise (Rok, 2014). Moreover, a code of ethics gives clear orientation on how to determine if a certain conduct is crossing the line, or if it might lead to a conflict of interests: it is easier to determine which “action or conduct is most appropriate or justified” (Kalina, 2015: 66).

Nevertheless, creating a code of ethics for ICZ is not an easy task: first of all, there is no professional association or community of interpreters in conflict zones that could enshrine these guidelines in regulations regarding professional and/or ethical conduct.

According to Fletcher (1966), this impossibility to set shared rules, gives the interpreter the right to violate rules and principles under some circumstances. This is the so-called

“situation ethics” (Fletcher, 1966). Such ethics change between wartime and peacetime and even interpreters who work in the same country during the same war, if they have different national identities and political ideologies, may have different situation ethics (Li, Tian & Huang, 2016).

It is therefore of particular interest to analyse why professional ethics and situation ethics conflict with each other when it comes to interpreting in war zones. First of all, it is due to the dual identity of the interpreters: civilians, who were born and raised in a country and who are influenced by the mainstream culture of their own society (Li, Tian & Huang, 2016), are employed by foreign armies. Their principles, values and personal beliefs are deeply rooted in them and they may come into play on a subconscious and instinctive level (Rok, 2014). However, on the same note, one might wonder if an interpreter with no bonds at all, nor any ethical or cultural attachment to the conflict, could still be considered as actually qualified for the job (ibid). Conflict interpreters are therefore meant to have an ambiguous position (Moreno Bello, 2014).

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2.3.8. Neutrality

All the characteristics that we have analysed until now can also be seen as challenges that the interpreter has to face not only related to ethics but also to neutrality (Ruiz Rosendo

& Persaud, 2016). Baker M. (2010) believes that local interpreters, because of their origins and ethnicity, can be seen by the military forces that hire them as either victims or villains, as allies that can be trusted or as potential risks. They cooperate with the foreign troops, with journalists and international organisations; they even end up building personal relationships with them, winning over “their sympathy and respect” (ibid: 217).

However, the employers do not forget that they are still locals and are afraid that the interpreters’ first allegiance may be to their own local community (Moser-Mercer, 2015):

this creates a general sense of mistrust.

Neutrality in their case is a question of violent internal conflict because the interpreter is torn between two parties: on the one hand, the native country strained by the conflict, a dangerous place where misery and atrocities abound; on the other hand, their employers who are foreign, but provide security, money and a sense of purpose (Stahuljak, 2000).

The interpreter’s neutrality could be called into question, as he appears to be duplicitous and neither the armies nor the locals know if they can trust the interpreter (Inghilleri &

Harding, 2010). However, it must be considered that even if interpreters are (like any other human being) embedded in or raised by one specific culture, they can still be capable of working without being influenced by it (Baker M., 2009). This means that proper training could lead to them respecting the neutrality of the profession, without letting their origins or beliefs influence their work.

Another aspect that could influence the interpreter’s neutrality is witnessing abuse of human rights and other atrocities, something that is a possibility given the environment in which they work. According to Salama Carr (2007), untrained interpreters could see their capacity to act in a detached manner shattered after bearing witness to acts of violence and abuse. Moreover, their ability to observe strict impartiality and unobtrusiveness could be undermined by the harshness of war. Cappelli (2014) interviewed interpreters and translators in conflict zones (both military and civilian interpreters/translators) and found out that 21% of interpreters and translators

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recognised that sympathy for victims might have biased their performance, even though only two of them actually admitted it happened.

2.3.9. Trustworthiness

When an interpreter does not abide to a code of ethics and has no professional training, one could wonder if s/he can be trusted or not. Of course, there is no general rule, but only different opinions on the matter. According to the testimonies collected by Palmer (2007), the users trusted their interpreters with their own lives. Similarly, as reported by Baker M. (2010) who interviewed soldiers who worked with interpreters in Iraq, most of the members of the army she spoke to affirmed that they trusted their interpreters with no reservations. Nevertheless, this is not always the case. Interpreters in Roman times were often suspected of being spies (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016). Nowadays, things have not changed much: they are often accused of being double agents, (Inghilleri, 2010) or seen as potential enemies (Baigorri-Jalón, 2011) who could feed the soldiers false information (Palmer, 2007) and are not to be trusted (Baker M., 2010).

Gaining the trust of their employers is not the only battle they have to win, however. The relationship with the local communities is also very complicated for these interpreters. It can be difficult for them to come back to their own community, to be accepted again by their own compatriots. As Gómez Amich (2013) highlights, they have helped and served foreign troops who, according to the locals, are the ones responsible for the bombing and killing of their own people, friends and families. The locals see the soldiers as men with inacceptable values. Any interpreter who helps them is someone who is now using their own language as a weapon to be used against them, making demands for the enemies (Baker M., 2010). These interpreters may also be the subject of envy (Bartolini, 2009;

Fitchett, 2010) from the local communities because of the financial advantages and privileges they receive for the job they carry out. Being perceived in this way along with the risks that come naturally with being involved in military operations or being close to military targets, increases the danger of being personally injured (Bartolini, 2009).

2.3.10. The employer’s duty to protection

According to Fitchett (2010), between 2003 and 2008, amongst the interpreters that worked for the U.S. troops in Iraq, 360 were killed and 1200 were injured. These numbers

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clearly reveal that these interpreters do not receive adequate protection even if they should, because the employer has the duty to protect its employees, and in this case protect interpreters who play such a crucial role for the army every day (ibid).

The first kind of protection would be a regular contract that would move them out of the informal economy (Bartolini, 2009; Moser-Mercer, 2015; Pöchhacker, 2015) and of course professionalisation through training (Pöchhacker, 2015). However, legally speaking, as Bartolini (2009) points out, interpreters are not really protected: The Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention (art. 79) of 1977 protects journalists but does not include interpreters (even though they could be included in the category mentioned in this Additional Protocol of “associated personnel”). This lack of mention in International Law and the fact that these interpreters work in zones where, most often, the Rule of Law has been suspended, often leaves them in a legal vacuum (Moser-Mercer, 2015).

It is clear that conflict interpreters who have to work in a high-risk environment need special protection: not only during the conflict, but also after (Fitchett, 2012). General Bias, former Major General of the Italian Army, has declared that local interpreters may even be subject to an even greater risk when they are left behind the troops they once helped (Fitchett, 2010).

Some interpreters give up their linguistic activity once their work for the army is over (Baigorri- Jalón, 2011); however, this does not mean that the risks for them are over too.

According to Inghilleri (2010), once they relinquish their role, they are even more exposed to dangers and, as Bartolini (2009) points out, to the possibility of retaliation as well. This is why many of them seek asylum abroad or in the same countries they interpreted for (Anderson, 2014; Bartolini, 2009; Bernabé, 2013; Carville, 2012; Fitchett, 2010; Gómez Amich, 2013; Inghilleri, 2010; Moser-Mercer, 2015) in order to escape their own communities who do not accept them anymore. Some of them, thanks to the personal bond that they had built with soldiers, as Baker (2010) references, received help when it came to the process of obtaining a VISA: when soldiers came back from Iraq and Afghanistan they pressured their governments and expedited the process in order to make it easier for their former interpreters to escape their country of origin.

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Unfortunately, this is not always the case: many interpreters are left behind and do not manage to receive a VISA to leave their own countries (Anderson, 2014; Bernabé, 2013).

Carville (2012), who interviewed some Afghan interpreters who worked for the New Zealand Army, reported that they felt that they had been used and then abandoned “to certain death” by the New Zealand army (ibid).

However, interpreters have to face the same difficulties that many asylum seekers encounter when seeking protection, as obtaining a VISA is not always an easy matter. As Bartolini (2009) carefully highlights, a VISA can be granted only to those who can physically reach the host country. As Anderson (2014) has reported in his interviews with Afghan interpreters, this is not always possible: some of them said that going to Europe illegally, for example, is extremely dangerous, and, according to them, taking an illegal ship to reach the European shores meant a 50% chance of dying during the journey. Some others said that even the legal way, by airplane or other means of transport, was not feasible, as it could cost up to $25,000, an amount that they did not have.

Moreover, Bartolini (2009) adds that those requesting a VISA are subject to standard legal requirements to obtain such permission and they also need to prove if and how they are victims of persecution or violence in their own country (ibid). This type of proof is not always easy to find and therefore many interpreters often see their VISA request refused.

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3. Interpreting in Afghanistan

Before analysing what it means to be an interpreter in Afghanistan, it is important for the reader to understand the social composition of this landlocked and troubled country, its population and its recent history: from the Soviet invasion, through the Taliban’s rise to power until the appearance of IS (Islamic State). Being aware of a country’s social background will give the reader the right perspective when it comes to analysing the interpreters’ profile, their connection with the Afghan tribes and the importance of the mediation between the Afghan culture and the Westerners’ culture. Knowing about Afghan history and Afghanistan’s current situation will shed light on the risks that interpreters have had to face when they were working there.

3.1. Afghan Population

The Afghan population is divided into tribal or ethnic groups, also known as qawm. Every person is loyal primarily to his or her own kin and then to their village tribe or ethnic group. There are many qawm in Afghanistan, the same term is actually very flexible and expandable, but if one had to outline the most principal gawms they would be Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Aimaqs. Ethnic groups are not fixed nationalities:

they are based on different criteria (lineage, place of origin, common language etc.). In order to differentiate one ethnic group from the other, Barfield (2010) suggests considering this rule of thumb: one group remains distinct from another as long as its members have an “identity that outsiders recognise and respond to” (ibid: 21): in other words, if people identify themselves as belonging to a specific qawm and their neighbours agree, then they belong to that qawm.

Geographically, these ethnic groups are not bound to specific areas, but can be found dispersed throughout the country living amongst other ethnic groups. However, some ethnic groups live in isolation from others due to geographical boundaries, such as steep valleys and hillsides, and therefore have minimal or no contact with other ethnic groups.

An important feature of some of these groups is tribalism. Some of them, in fact, define their membership through the unilineal descent from a common ancestor, real or assumed, through the male line. In a tribal group the clan name is defined by lineage so it

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is usually inherited. These are to be considered as the tribal groups. By contrast, nontribal ethnic groups make no claim of genealogical relationship among their members.

Since asking about clan membership is prohibited when taking the census, it is impossible to have concrete data to determine the exact number in each tribal group. Nevertheless, Pashtuns are believed to be the most predominant tribe, even if this claim often came from Pashtun dominated governments. It is estimated that this group represents forty percent of the Afghan population (Blood et al., 2001). Historically, the word ‘Afghan’ was actually synonymous with Pashtun and ‘Afghanistan’ could both be translated as land of the Afghans or as land of the Pashtuns. Only more recently, Afghanistan has acquired a more national character, especially because of the outside world that labels the people living in the Afghan territory as Afghani, regardless of their ethnic origin. The common ancestor of Pashtun is Qais. Its lineages unite into larger clans grouped in four maximal-descent units:

Durrani, Ghilzais, Gurghusht and Karlanri. In addition to descent, the Pashtuns define themselves by their code of conduct, the Pashtunwaly, and their ability to speak Pashto.

Most of them are subsistence farmers, but a minority of them are nomads.

The second ethnic group, representing thirty percent of the Afghan population, are the Tajiks. They are a nontribal Persian-speaking group of Sunni Muslims. They live mainly in the northern part of the country: its population is spread in Kabul, Herat and Mazar but also in the mountains of the northeast. They mainly speak Dari, however not every speaker of Dari can be automatically considered a member of this ethnic group (Blood et al, 2001). They practice subsistence farming but those who live in cities have historically been merchants, bureaucrats and members of an educated clergy. They are literate in Persian, which is the language used by the government administration and when establishing or fostering foreign relations. This gave them a powerful role, no matter who was ruling the country.

The third group is the Hazaras. They constitute fifteen percent of the Afghan population.

Their homeland is in the central range of the Hindu Kush, the Hazarajat. They are Shia Muslims who engage in alpine subsistence agriculture and livestock breeding. Their language is a dialect of Persian but they descend from the Mongol armies that conquered Iran, and they therefore often display strong Mongoloid features. Historically, they have been victims of prejudice on religious and racial grounds and social mobility for them has

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always proven to be very difficult. They rank at the bottom of Afghanistan’s ethnic hierarchy and were systematically excluded from almost all government positions and educational opportunities by the Pashtuns-dominated governments. They were particularly targets of persecutions by the Taliban and only recently have they achieved parity with other groups under the 2004¹ constitution, which specifically recognised the legitimacy of Shia legal practices.

Another ten percent of the country’s population is represented by Uzbeks and Turkmen, Sunni Turkish-speaking groups that descend from nomadic tribal confederations that arrived in a series of different waves from central Asia. The Uzbeks in Afghanistan are an extension of the Uzbek population across the border in Uzbekistan. A large number of them fled from there to Afghanistan after the Russian revolution and later during the Stalinist period. The related Turkmen tribes are found in the northwest on the borders with Turkmenistan and Iran. They remained much more nomadic than the Uzbeks and often raided northern Iran and northern Afghanistan for slaves and other loot. This continued until the nineteenth century, when the Russian conquest of Khiva and Merv ended their autonomy. A number of Turkmen groups moved to the Afghan territory after this, particularly following the establishment of the Soviet Union. They are closely related to the larger Turkmen population in Turkmenistan and Iran. They play an important economic role because they produce Afghanistan’s famed carpets and karakul sheepskins, both of which are major export earners. After being an invisible minority, especially during the Soviet war period and the civil war, they regained considerable autonomy and once again became a political force in the north.

A smaller group is represented by the Aimaqs, a tribally organised Sunni Muslim group who makes up for five per cent of the population. They speak Persian but are sometimes said to be of Turkish descent. Historically they occupied the mountainous territory east of Herat and west of Hazarajat, the ancient territory of Ghor. The term aimaq is actually a generic Turkish idiom for tribe. In rural areas, they are seminomadic and they practice pastoralism.

1 The constitutive process started on October 5, 2002 when President Karzai appointed a Drafting commission to produce a preliminary draft constitution. This process ended in 2004 when the Constitution finally saw the light. In Chapter One, the country is defined as the “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”: an independent state where official religion was Islam. Nevertheless, it also stated that non-Muslim Afghans were allowed to practice their religions. (Norchi, 2004)

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The remaining ethic groups represent only three per cent of the country’s population.

They are the Nuristanis, the Pashai, the Qizilbash, the Baluch, the Arabs, the Pamiris, the Jugis, the Jats, the Kirghiz and the non-Muslims. They are still important to mention because Afghan rulers frequently followed an old political strategy of appointing members of small ethnic minorities to high positions in the government and military. It was believed that they would be more loyal because they had no political base of their own within the larger population and were therefore less likely to betray their masters (Barfield, 2010).

3.2. Recent Afghan history

Because of its position in the heart of Asia, Afghanistan has always been a crossroads for different populations and a “gateway for invaders spilling out of Iran and central Asia and into India” (Barfield, 2010: 1): Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan, for example. There have been many wars fought in Afghanistan; just as many were the external powers that were fighting them, often in a wider context of regional and international strategic polarization (Centlivres-Demont & Roy, 2015). However, despite the civil war that broke out in 1929, Afghanistan managed to remain mostly peaceful and neutral, even between the two world wars.

In the second half of the twentieth century, Afghanistan was transformed into the stage of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States. During the 1960s, Afghanistan was very unstable and the regime that was loyal to the Soviets was on the verge of collapsing under the attacks of the resistance. This is why the Soviets decided to begin their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Within two days, they had secured Kabul (Blood et al, 2001). At the same time, the United States under the Carter presidency were trying to improve relations with Pakistan by offering aid in exchange of their help in the struggle against communism. Pakistani president Zia ul-Haq refused Carter’s aid at first, but then accepted a larger offer from the Reagan administration. As the civil war in Afghanistan went on between the communist controlled regimes and the mujahidin, forcing people to flee their country and finding refuge in Pakistan and Iran, the Pakistani government proposed “proximity talks” in June 1982, in an attempt to find a solution to the situation. These talks also included the Soviet Union and the United States and

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resulted in an agreement on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (ibid). The soviets left the country in 1989, but the situation was no better than before the invasion.

When the communist regime finally collapsed in 1992, the country was left alone while the mujahedeen resistance factions started to wage war on themselves in a deadly struggle for power. These internal divisions combined with the dependency of all Afghan governments on outside aid (Barfield, 2010) left Afghanistan defenceless.

In this vacuum, regional ethnic powers became stronger and Islamist groups took advantage of the situation. The Taliban movement was already popular in the south of Afghanistan: their success was based on the fact that they promised security of life, law and order in a region where they were distinctly lacking. As Malay describes (1997), the Taliban ideology revolves around three cornerstones: fundamentalism, traditionalism and totalitarianism. They see the sacred text “as the ultimate source of guidance on social and political matters” (Malay, 1997: 102) and they deeply depend on the authoritative figure of their spiritual guide, who at the time was Mullah Mohammad Omar. Taliban should be considered as a traditionalist movement, in fact they reintroduced the recrudescence of “modes of behaviour that have existed for centuries in rural Afghanistan” (Malay, 1997: 102). This explains the support they often received, especially in rural areas. Finally, Maley (2007) describes the Taliban Movement also as a totalitarian one: their intent was to “monopolize the political sphere and to assimilate all of social life into it” (ibid: 103).

Since there was no opposition of any central government or any coherent military force, (Barfield, 2010) the Afghan Taliban, with the help of foreign jihadists and Pakistan, grew stronger and took Kabul in 1996. However, as they never managed to build a real government, Afghanistan became a failed state. The country under the control of Taliban also became the refuge of Osama bin Laden, a major commander of al Qaeda. According to Rubin (1998), bin Laden came to Afghanistan early in the jihad, around 1979. He then left for Saudi Arabia and then returned permanently in 1996. Because of their alliance with al Qaeda and the protection they provided to bin Laden, the Afghan Taliban were considered as a direct target by the US Government immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York and Washington DC. The Taliban, in fact, were protecting a large number of jihadists in their territory, and when they refused to expel bin Laden and al

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Qaeda, the military operations began: U.S. jets struck the Taliban from the sky while their Northern Alliance allies moved against them on the ground.

According to a United Front commander interviewed by Barfield (2010), U.S. and other foreign troops did not encounter a strong opposition from the population because they came “from a distant land that did not border the country” (ibid: 276) and therefore felt as safer allies. Therefore, and despite the usual mistrust against foreigners, every region and every ethnic group (including the Pashtuns) turned against the Taliban, welcoming foreign troops. The Taliban, who were initially lauded for bringing “peace and security to the regions they captured” (ibid: 261), became more and more unpopular because of their religious and social policies. Taliban, in fact, banned all forms of entertainment, the veneration of saints, shrines and images of living things. Misogynist decrees were passed against women (Maass, 1998): they could not participate in public events, could not receive an education and were forced to cover their bodies and heads. Lawbreakers, even of minor crimes (ibid) were punished through violence and murder.

The Taliban regime fell almost immediately: first the north and the west collapsed and then Kabul fell in November 2001. However, questions regarding the process of re- building the failed state remained. In Afghan history, this process was usually controlled by elites who would seize the power and centralise it, but this time there was no political elite left to do it.

The most prominent personalities of the Afghan opposition met at the UN and signed the Bonn Agreement on the 5^th December 2001. This agreement gave presidency of the country to Hamid Karzai, scion of a prominent aristocratic tribal family (Centlivres- Demont & Roy, 2015), for the transitional time between the signing of the agreement and the elections that were to be held in 2004. Moreover, the Security Council of the United Nations authorised (Resolution 1286) the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist Afghan armed forces and train them.

Despite the considerable diplomatic effort, Karzai’s government was weak in terms of leadership, functionality and legitimacy (Barfield, 2010). Hamid Karzai was seen as weak and passive. He decentralised power, encouraging corruption, maladministration and

“warlordism” (Donini, 2004: 178). Moreover, it was also the stigma of foreign imposition that undermined his authority.

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Despite the difficult situation and the weakness of the centre, no faction tried to divide the country while three million refugees were returning home from exile in 2003. Therefore, although, on the one hand, international aid and troops had actually ended the civil war, on the other, Afghanistan did not have the means to improve the low standard of living of its population. That said, the first signs of improvement still came through, thanks to the democratic efforts of the government.

The international community backed Afghanistan’s efforts to write a new constitution and followed closely the presidential election held in October 2004. The 2004 constitution, although it did not mention the Sharia (religious law), clearly stated that “Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic” (Article 1) and that no law may be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islam (Article 3). However, as Centlivres-Demont (2004) points out, Islam is indicated as state religion but non-Muslims were and are still free to practice their faiths in the limits of the law. In the preamble, the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are cited, showing the will to start a new path free of oppression, atrocities, violence and discrimination. The constitution gave women the possibility to sit both in the National Assembly and in the senate and Article 22 gives men and women equal rights. This constitution was seen by the US and the UN as a victory (ibid).

After the constitution, it was time for the elections: for the international community a fair election was the clear sign of a rightful government in a functioning state, but for the Afghans, Karzai still had to prove himself after winning the elections. Before the parliamentary election of 2005, Karzai tried to weaken the legitimacy of this institution and claimed that parties were associated with Communists; he forced the candidates to run without a party, just as individuals. Despite his attempt, the parliament became a strong opponent to his administration, forcing him to accept several reforms: for example, judicial reform, with the appointment of a Western-trained technocrat instead of a conservative Islamic cleric who had no higher education.

Despite some advancements, Afghanistan was still in need of international aid. Firstly, there was the need of military assistance in order to improve security and diminish local warlords’ power in all the major country’s regions. Secondly, considerable investments in the agricultural sector were needed, since the Afghan economy is essentially based on

Interpreting in conflict zones: the users&#039; point of view. A case study

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Interpreting in conflict zones: the users' point of view. A case study

Interpreting in conflict zones: the users’ point of view.

A case study.

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Interpreting in conflict zones: the users' point of view. A case study