ADORNO'S PHILOSOPHYOF MODERN MOSIC
by ChristopherJ. Dennis
A Thesis
submi tted in partial fulfilmentofth e requ irements forthe degree ofMaster of Arts
DepartmentofPh il os op h y Memorial uni versit y of Newfoundlan d
1992
1A Ki rkePlace
st.John's April 30, 1982 Dr, J,Halpas
Dean of Graduate Studies l1emori~.lUniversityof Newfoundland
Dear Dr. He Ipa s :
This letter accompa nies the library deposit au tho r-Lau t.ion format t ac h e d to co p yoneof my thesis, "Ador no' s Philoso p hyo F Hod e r nHu s i c ."
I amreq ue s t i n g a thr e e ye a r e' re s t r i c ti o n on access to the the sis because I anticipate publishing it. Preparation of on extra chapter is pla nn ed.and I al s o ",ifJh to be sure of cove ring potentialde l ay s of the kind that other authors have c xpc cicnccd with mypublisher, Edwin He ll e n Press.
Th a nk you for yourat t e n t i o n to this r equeet. Sincere ly
Chris toph erJ. De n n i s
ABI:lTRAC T
Ado rn o's Phil o s opll,yof }llodernMusic isexami ne d,and its princ ipal the me is presented : the hist oric a l demise of tonality as the basisforthe valid pra c t i ceofmusicalart.
Thi s themepr c ce e ds fromAdt'rno'sdia lectica l vi ew of rea l i t y, andfrom the ccneeque nceaof thehistor i c a l cha nge that began wit h the ascendancy of the bourge oi s ie. Tonal music constitu tes tne llIost characte r i st ic ar t fo rm of an age dominated by bourgeois ideolog y :inthe illusionof itsclosed or ga nicallydevelopi ng form, it is aesthe ticall y expe r i e nced 11!: miming the bourgeois view of the world as a ra t i on a l l y graspab l e totali ty . Howe ver, since the effect of the bourgeois ideal of enlightenment is a drive to the tota l ra t i on a li za t ion of huma n re ality , the human subject becomes alienated, reality bec omes ob jectifiad , and t.he reified SUbject loses his understa nding of reality ea involv i ng himself inthesame wayas othe r SUbjects. The r eforereality for himnolo ng e r includesthe co ll e c t i ve SUbjectivitywhich makesthe conventio nof ton ali t y possible. The illusi o nof theorg a nici t yof tonal wo rkscanno long er be sustaine d.
Re s pon se s to these cfrcuasee nc e n by the princ i pa l compos e r s oftheperi odspanacontinuum: fr om authentici ty, inackn owledgme nt of the endof mus i c a l art, achieved inthe
i i
ob j e c t i f y ing constructions of schoenbergIs twelve-tone principles; to inauthenticity,in the pretence of stravinsky's works to maintain a traditionaltonalitywhich is really dead.
rnc c nsIsc c nc y is noted in Adorno's understanding of ...·ha t tonality is, and where it actuallyapplies; this casts doubt upo n the notion oftot al ity fromwh ich itshistorical de mi s e supposedly derives. Adorno's characterization of present historicaltrendsis readasnegat i v e , and an interpretation ofth i s apparently"es sent i al i s t"position is offered.
iii
ABSTRACT CONTENTS PREFACE INTRODUCTI ON
CONTENTS
11 iv
KEYCONCEPTS c
Di al e ctic and Realit y 5
Tota lity 12
Histo ry 18
AE~ TH ETI CCONTEXT 23
Nat.u r eof Art Works 23
Authe nt icityandMode rni t y JJ
Art ,Society and Noder ni ty 43
Histo ryof Illusio n 51
PHILOSOPHYOFMODERN MUSIC 59
sta t usof Tonali ty (I) 59
TotalDevelopme nt andthe End of Musical Ar t 67 Pseudo- tona lityan d Co mmodif i c ati on 80
CRITICAL REFLECTI ONS 98
Sta t usof Tonality (II) 98
The Condi tionofMusicalAr t 112
Con clud ingComments 123
REFERENCES 130
BIBL I OGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED 146
iv
PREF10CE
Th i sis a stud y of Adorno's Philos ophyof HodernHudeas it appearsin Eng li s h in the Blomst e r and t-ll t chell Tra ns lation of 19 73 . The scope of the inves t ig a t i on is conf i ne d to English- lan gu a ge lit e r a t u r e by andabout Adorno; a sele cti on ofwh at is availab leisdocumentedinthe bibliography.
Th roughout this ex a min a tio n, I have endeavo ured to present the discu s sion couched in term s directed to the general re a de r. Adornohimsel f,althoug h he occasio nallyused musi c a l te c hn i c al terms , cons iste ntlystrovef.nhisworks to empha size the gene r alphiloso phical significan ce of musicfor humani ty. The truedifficu l tiesof hi s te xts are other tha n thos e of a technical mus i c al nature, and mysti ficat i o n by jargonwa snever oneof hisobjective s . Acc ord ingly, musical quotatio ns andtheuseof th emor eunusualtec hn i cal musica l te rms are avo i de d , inthe convictiontha t ver ba l expla natio n wil l be suf fic i entforunde rs tandi ng .
I would like to r-e c or-d my heartfelt gr atitud e to my thesis superv is or, Dr. Ja mes Bradl ey, for hi s criti cal at t e ntionand consistent inspi r a tio n, which wa s ins t rume ntal throughout the writ ing of this study. I mustalsothank Dr. cuners Tomsons fo r his very us efu l cr itical comments upo n aesthet i c and musical aspec t s of the thesis. Respo nsi bility
fo rits contentand imperf ecti on s is, forbe t t e r or worse, my own. I ac knowledge also t.heassistanceofthe Queen Elizabeth I I Li brary of Memo ri al Un i v e r s i ty in sett i ng aside the profes siona l development ti me and sabbatica l le a ve which allowe d me to comple te the pr o j e ct . Thanks , too , to my mot her , who gave merefu g e fr om the worldsoI co u l d write in peace, inaesthetic surround ings.
CD
st.John's, Apr il 1992
vi
INTRODUCTION
Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno (190)- 1969 ) is an unusual fi g urein the historyof mode r n phil osophy , in that he divi ded his accompl i shments evenl ybetween philoso ph y and music . In phil osophy , thereis agr owing consen sus th a theis one of the most import ant thinkers inthe streamofcontemporary German thoug htknown as cr itica l theory. In tho fieldof mus iche is a distingu i shedandvolumin ous commentato r on new mus i c and, to some exeent;! a composer. Music , of all the fi el d s of study, is the one most usual ly se e n as closed and self - suf ficientin relat ionto otherdisci plin es : YQt, as WQ will see, this very closur e is fo r Ad orno a feature of the philosophical signifi c an ce ithol d s for humanity. The fa c t that he ne ve r fina llychos e whichsub'[ect;topursue ove r the otheris a maasuceof theimporta nce heatta che d \.-.Jthe m bo t h : the pres e nt st udy is an attempt to indicatethe nat u r eof the co nnectionbe tw e en them in histh oug ht.
His elucidat ionof thephilos oph i c a l impo rtanc e of music (a nd of the musica l importanc e of ph il osophy) found it s fulle st exp ressi o nin Phi losop hie de r neuen Mus i k,whi c hwe s fi r s t pub lishedin 1949. Hewr o t e numero us ot h e r works on musicin German, and some have been tr an sla tedintoEng l i s h . Desp ite the increasing intere stinAdo rno inthe Ang lophone world, howev e r , the studyof Philo sophy of ModernMusic in English mus t be undertakenwarily, bec auseofthe cheguercd
hLet.or-y of the text. In it s final shape, the book is exa mi na t i o n of philosophical andsoci ol og i c a l tendencies that manifes t themselves in the contemporary music of Adorno's time. It takes the form ofacont rast, in separate Chapters, be t we en the works of Schoe nbe rg and stravinsky, which is favourable to th'.:! form er , and unfavourable to the latt e r. aov c ver , the essay on Schoenbe r g was written considerably earl i e r , in 1941, andonl yco nvertedinto a book throughthe later addition of an introduction and the chapter on st ravi nsky. WhileAdorno has beensuccessf ulin unifying its con t e nt , there is still a marked disparity between the two pri nc i pa l sections of the book , which requirescare in the unde r stan di ng of compar isonsmade betwe en the two composers.2 Nev e rt he l e s s , the effort to exa mi ne and t.ryto clarify the cent ra l themes of the boo k is worthwhile, in viaw of the importanceofaes t he ti c s for Ador no,and of the importanceof mus ic fo rAdorno' s aesthetics.
Ado rno ' sphilosophica l pos i t i on sinthei r salient aspects were fo rencmost part heldco nsisto ntl y throughou t hi sli f e. Hi s wo r k consistsof numerou s app roac hes to the samepr ob l e ms fro mdif f e r i ng perspectives,which isap propriate toaviewof reality whic h holds that pa rtic ul ars cannot be di rec tly graspe d byreason, but must be glimps e d"s i del on gn3as the y slip away. It is ebc r ercrenece ssa r y to lookat a broad ra nge
of Adorno' s workstounders t and clearlythepr incipalco nc e pt s unde rl yi ngany o ne of the m, si nc e the indi vidua l occur rence s ofhis ide a s. are likelyto be incomplete.
Accordingly . inthe firs t two chapte r s th is studywill proceedby drawi ng onothe r wo rks ofAdo rn oto est ab lishthe philosop h icaland aestheti cbackg roundofPhilosophy(Jf Mode rn Music. Fi r st,the keyphiloso phicalconceptswhichlie behind Adorno's ae st hetic s,namel y th e diale cti c al view of reality , total it.yandthe hi s t o ri c al na t ure of roali t yar e exa mine d. In the second chapter, the rel e v a nt fe at ure s of Adorno's ae sthe tics ar e ex pla ined in term s of these basic co ncepts : name ly the natu re of ar t in a dialectical world, the histo rica l charac ter of modern i sm in ar t, the social dimension,and the hi s t oryof the illus i onWhi chenablesart tooc c ur. The thi r d cha pt er will deal with the content of Philos ophyofMode rn MUsicitsel f, explo ring itsmai n theme in the lig ht of the s e conc epts: the endoftonal ityas a valid bas i s for musi cal art,and the philosoph ical signifi c a nc eand relat ive authentic it y of the contrast ing respons e s of Schoenbe r g and stravinsky to this histo ric a l event. The inten t is to demons t ra t e th e wide r importanc e of mus i c in Adcr n o ' s view of the wo r ld , and in pa r t i CUl a r the philo s ophi ca limplic ati ons of the cours ethat musichastak en in thepre s e nt centu ry. Th e final cha pter of fe rs a brie f
criticalreview ofAd orno' s conceptio nofmusic's significance and histo ri cal characteras itappears inPh i losophyof Mo d ern Music .
Cha pt erOne
KEY CONCEPTS Dialecticand Reality
The effort tounde r sta ndany text of Adorno, including Philosophy of Modern Musio, requires a gra s p of certain concepts that are cent ral to his thin king. The most fundamental and far-reach ing ofthe s eisusu all y re ferred to as dialecticalunderstandi ng. In theAnglophoneworldwe are heirsto a traditio nofth i nk i ng, and ind e e d a way ofre a d i ng , fromwhich dialectica l thought in the manner of Adornoand ot he r Marxis tsisa fun dame nta l de pa r tu r e. It is important, therefore, inde a ling withthe specific issues surroundinghi s treatmentof the philosophyof modern music,tore ma i n awa re of it s dialectica l characte r , soas not to be misled at the beg inn i ng by apparent contrad ict ionsand non- s e qu i t u r s.
Diale c t i c s in a ge ne r a l senseis no t especially ne w to philosophy ; Adorno points out in the pre f ac e to Negative Dialecticsthat as a gen eral phil osophica l pra ctic e it goes back to plato . 1 The tra ditiona l und e rstanding of di aloct i c s is as a form of reaso ni ng in wh i ch a pos itive re s u l t is obt ai ne dfrom th enegationof anega t i ve sta t eme nt. Inthis con tex t itisprimar ily the re c o ncili a t i o n of contradictions
as a means of producing amore sat isfactoryprogress towards truth. For theMarxisttr a di t i o n , however, it acquiresmore centra lsignificanceas par tand parcelof a fundamentalbreak wi ththe traditionofwesternphilosophy.
This break, in its essence, consists in ta king a dif f e r ent starting point for inqui ry: insteadof the rigorous efforttofindcertainty through the useofre a s o n,whic hhas its most explicit statement inthe work of Descartes, th e Marxist tradi tionbegins withthe individualhuman existence , and itsre a ::'i z a t i o n in activity. The difference between this understanc:' ingand the Cartesian"I am" is not atfi r st sight very great: both aregrou nded in the indisputable fact of self-awareness. Nevertheless there is a difference in app r oa c h which is SUbtle but in its ramifications very profound . The Car tesian "I am"is ta ke n for a certaintyand treatedas anundeniabletruthfo r reasonto build upon; the goa l is a bodyof propos itionalknowledgeabout reality. This treatment of "I am" tends to depart fro many aspect of bocoming, from time and change; the un i v e r s al i t y of truth about rea li t y isimpli c it in the goal. The Marxisttraditio n , on theotherhand , sees the exi ste nc e of theindividual human SUbjectas realizedinhis acts. "Iam"isthere f o r e a matter of becomin...., sinc eactivitymustbe sustainedif existence is notto cease. Itis also de pen dent on anobjectivonature ,
since activity cannotoccur....ithout acting on,or in some sort of relation to, something. Activity, further, imp l i e s an effecton objectivenature, and therefore, change. The result of suchan approachis a distinctive understandingof the term
"reality". When Adorno uses it , he is referring to the chara cte r ofthe interaction of the subject withobjective nature, and quite ex p lic i tly denying the metaphysical impl i c a t i on that the te rm "re a l i t y" has in traditional philosophy . "Re a l i t y" , for him, cannot lie beyond the realm of practical action,and is the r efo r e neither univo rsal nor unchanging.
The break with the philosophical tradition which is entailed by thisunders tandi ng of dialectic assumes a twofold character . In th e first place, thinking about reality becomes inevitably dialectica l inthat reality no.... must be seen to depend on the oppos ingpoles of subject and object . It cannot consist only in the subject, since the subject must act to continue to exist , and action requires nc ture (something that is othe r tha n the subject) to act upon in or derto be action. conversely,there cannot be an action- const'.ituted reality wi t h out a SUbject acti ng to create it.
For th e same re ason s , SUbject and object canno t be collapsed into a singleidentity . The object is other, that which is not th e SUbject, and, as weha ve said, is necessar yto the
possibilityof the action by which thesubject exists. since Adorno'srealityrequiresboth sucjece and object, and cannot be said to reside separately in either, and since neither aubject, nor object can be dispensed with nor can they be combined, this reality is understood as dialectical. Two opposing principles (SUbject and not~subjectl other and non- other) are both necessarily inherent in the real, yet the opposition cannot be reconciled as i t is in traditional dia l e ct i c in order to produce the positiveresultof a unity or identity. Further, a dialectical reality must be historical,in the sense that it continuouslychangesas the nat ur e of both SUbject and object evolves through the consequences of action.
I I
In the second place, important consequence of be g i nni ng with action as constituting the realization of individua l existence is to move the theatre of thought away from the usual SUbjectsof traditiona lphilosophy (understood as the effort to find certainty about reality through contemplative re a s on) , towards seeing the practical arenas of political and economicactionas primary. Marx ist thinkers havefr e q ue nt l y denounced trad it i o na l philosophy in the above sense as either idle orpernicious,because they consider it tobe anaspect of ideology.2 Thatis, it is ideologicalin
that, contrary to its pr e t e nc e of dealing with matters of universal truth beyond the concerns of practical everyday life,it arises from and serves the interests of the dominant social classes.3 It suits these social classes toperpetuate an understanding of "reality"as both transcending practicnl experience and susceptible of rational description, thereby maintainingthe dominance they have gained in anhf acorIc a f epoch whose experience is shaped by that understanding. Traditional philosophy is thus more properly consideredas a resultofco nc r e t e circumstances --that is, asaris i ng from the Marxian "reality" of action and the historical conditions whichare its current resul tM_ than as an inquiry int o a realitywhich is more fundamental than practical experience.
It might seem excessivelynarrow to define philosophy in terms of the rationalistic metaphysics of the Cartesian tradition, and indeed Adornodistinguishes at the outset of Negative Dialectics 4 between the "s c hool concept" and the
"wo rld conceptII of philosophy. The term "world concept"
denotesthe philosophy of reality considered from the most fundamental startingpoint, namely that of the ext s eence of the individual. Hi s claim is tha t modern philosophy has developedintoa dead end,the"s c hool concep t ",by which he means the pursuit of rationalistic metaphysics. It is therefore in a spirit of bringing philosophy to the world
10 concept that Adorno unde rtakes the work of Neg ative Dia lectics. His ph i los ophy of "ne ga t i ve dialectics" is negat i ve because, in contrastto wha t he imp l ies to be the traditionalundersta ndingof dialectics, no syn thesis can be made of the opposing componen ts inherent in reality, of sUbject wi t h object. We must in fact live in th i s un- tr a n s c e nd e d oppositionbetweensUbject and object at the heart of existence, andund e r s t a nd it "d i a l e c t i c al l y ".
The phj.Lcooph LceL effort of Adorno is founded per ceptionof the impasses at which traditiona l ph il os ophy has arr ived in its search for certainty, together with the practicalemphasis ofMar-xi stthoug ht . 5 In his view, ra t i o na l thoug ht is compelled tomakethe assumptionof identity:that theconcept coincides withthe thing conceived (liTothinkis toident ify,,6). This is because reason is conceptualization- - ge ne r ali z a t i on--unl es s i tis trivial. To form conceptions of objects is to reduce the m to the same currency, in a sense to make commodit i es of them by eliminating the i r parti cul a ri t y. However, in dialectica l real i ty, which is creat ed by the actions of humans, the difficulty withthe assumption of ide nt ity is tha t the objective side of th i s world is revealed as a matterof particulars, ofhi sto rical vari a bles which are uni que and not pre-determinab le. No concept can be identical with it s ob j e ct : that is a
11 consequence of thegeneralizing nature of concepts. "The name of dialecti cs says no more ... than thatobjects do notgo into th e i r concepts without leaving a remainder. that they come to contradi ct thetradi tiona l norm of adequacy.,,7
Adorno l.i at pains thr oug h out to showthat thenegat ive dialecticis not a standpoint for philosophy ,but rath era necessaryco nditio n of thoughtwhich applie s toany individual thinkerin hi s ac t s of th o u ght . 8 Toignorethi s co n d it i o n and withdrawintothe abstraction of "purerea s o n" is to pret end thatth e reis identity between objects and theirconcepts, and that proposit i onal reason doe s desc r i be reality: that is , to practice ide ology. Yet reason cannot be abandoned etener, since that would be to deny the subj e ccIve side of the activitywhichcons t i t ut e s human reality. Humannessisin its essence social ; thinki n g, reasoning, gene ra liz i n g, is the characteristic act of SUbjectivit yin a reality which includes other SUbjectsas part of the obje ctive na t u r e against which theac t takes place. We must continueto think in order to continueour existenceashuma n beings, ot he rwi se weend up as animals. !' Dia l ec t i c s isth eco n sis t e n t sense of noni dent itytl, Adorno says,9 and in reading his writ i ngs we must be consistentlyawa re of the dia l e c t i ca1 cha racterof hi sthought -- specifically , the claim that pa r tic u l a r s 10 are not
12 identical withtheirconcepts -- in orderto understand the nat ureof his claims in aes thetics .
To t a l H:y
The noti o n of to t alit y is centra l to the dia lectical thought which forms the ba ckground to Ador no '~1 work in aesthet ics , because fo r hi mit characterizes the primary feature of experience in co ntempo r a r y society. The conseque nces of the total ization of society which sig nifica nt for th i s discus s i on manifest th e ms elv e s in the charac te r of philosop hical thought , and subsequentlyin the cUltur ewi t hin whichth e individualsubject,ha s his existence.
sincehumanreal i tyisconstitut e d inits activity, and sin ce the col lective interest of the bourgeoisie lies in a world view th at al lows co mple te rat ional certainty, the history of philosophical ac tivi t y in the modern pe riod has beenadeveloping effort to subsumeall realityundertherul e of reason . The goal is the stateof affai rs that Adornoll cha racterizesas totality: a conditionof thehuma n world in whi ch al l rea l ity is sUb jec t to description in te rms of a calcul ati ng rationa l i ty based on certainty. In such a totali zed world. huma n reality is to be understood in a completel y objectiv eway, in the sense that even sUbjectsare
13 treated in termsof obj ec ts, de scribab l ethroughgene r alizod concepts . The effe ctof thistotalizi ng impuls e isto preve nt the subje ct;from unde r s t a nd i nghis own dialectic alor action- constituted rea lit y as reality. Theconseque nc e of tot ality, in otherwords, isto aliena tethesubj e ctina profound way fr o m hismeans ofse l f -re ali za t i o n ,whi c h must take place in the contex t of acti on, in relatio n to an object. The philos ophy whi chdes cribes, orse e k stodescr i be,the worldin propositiona l tern samountstoideol ogy ;that is, i t is part of the complex of idea s, norms, and other in te llectua l apparatus whi c h provides organi z ing principles and jus tifica ti on forthe efforttototallyrat iona li ze th e world.
Such a totality isregistered intheepis temolog ica l sphereby the triumph of reason as the autboritat ive descr i ptio n of reality.
II
Con s i dered inrelation to thesoc ial sphe re, AdornoIs vi'sionof tot a l ity presents theparadox tha t the ideol ogy of totality no longer so much se rv es the intere sts of a par ticular cl a ss as the per petua ti on in ge neral of the
"a d mi ni ste r ed soe ietyo n12 Inal ie nating the indivi d ua l from his own reality,the rationalid e a l pl a ceshim in a positi on of SUbmission toan external "reali ty", whI c h is manifestas a compulsionto serve Objectivecequt r eme ncsand to conformto
14 the necessities originating in the ob j e ct i ve world con ditio n which applies equally to the bourgeoisie, whose classinterest is servedby the rational ide al ,as it does to the proletariat. Totality isthe condition of asociet y in wh i c h alie nat io n of thi s kind is completely pervasive, affectingall individualswi thin it. Hi s t o ric a lly, although the ide o l ogy may originate with a dominant class, its co nsistent applicatio n in human activity takes the organiza t ionof society beyondtheinterests of that C!Il;SSto the requirement of the completely ratio na ll y organized society. In other wor ds , the idea of a totalized world entails that when alienat ion is complete in society, the dominationof theindividual is nolong e r by a class of other ind ividua ls, but by an abstract, objective society. The dominationis still a featu reof dialectica l reality, inth a t it is grounded in the individ ual's understandi n g of hi s acti ons as occurring in subject-object contact, but it neverthelessarisesfrom adeni a l of the dialectical character of re al i ty in thoseac ts. Bec au s e of itsphilosop h i ca l and aes thetic impact ,this understandingof totalityleads Adorno, in the social sphere , to be concerned mor ewith cri ticismof the "c ult ur e indus try"13 than with analysis of social phenome n a for their owneaxe;" Neve r the less , for him the central not i onof an oppressive , to t a li z e d world stil l has its roots in his Mar Kiststllrt i ng~po i nt.
15 Realityunde r stooddi a lectical l yhas a socialdimens i on. and evolv e s th r ou g hthe int eractions of euejec e s,whichare drive n by the indiv idua l sUbj ect's ne e d to ac t. Such evo l u ti onin evitablyle adsto tension betwee n thene edsofthe soci etycrea t edbythisactiv ityand thos e ofthe ind ivid uals who did the cr eati ng. This tensio n has res ulted inthe asc e n dancy of the centr al economic eenfrestecIcn of admi n i stra tive rationalit y, namely cammod!ty fe tis his m. IS The us e - v atue of the productsof labour ha s beenconvert ed int o thearbi t ra ry exc hange-v alue brought bythedi v isi on of labour as soc i l!ty became mo recomplex. Obj ects, includ i ng one's own body. have become ever .or e dista nt f rom the labourIng sucjece , as they assume the fluctuatingvalu e of mar ket pr ic es: theythus become matters of mys te ry , thei r reality ly i ng in thei r exchange- va lue, rathe r than in the immed iate parti cu larityof the sUbject 'scontactwith them.
Soc i a lintera ctionsar e governedby the rational relationsh ips ofthese exc ha nge-values,an,",si ncethe ind ividualsUbject·s surv ivaldepen ds uponthe exchange-va lues ofobjects, relllity comes tore s i de inObjects-- thatis, the ybe c omefetishe s. The total izing drive in the social sphere is to wa r d the sUbsumpt i onof allso cial phe nomena underthe rati o naliZing ruleof mark e t economics.
16 III
Inthe total i ty that Adorn o call s "admi niste redsoc iety"
-- na me ly, ourco nsum er soc iet y -- ev e rything is valu ed by ma rke t standards,and th e philos ophy ofreas o nisenlistedto serve 3S id eol ogy: its function is to he lp jus tify and ma in t a inthe commodi t y character of th esociety. The re sul t isove rwhe lmingpre s sureon the ind i vidual tocon f ormto the demands ofthemarket ,as itextendsi tsrea chtoanove r more completedomi nat ionot' al l oftheva l ue s andactivitiesof the individual in society. sinc e the human asp e ct of the ind i vid u al 's rea l ity Is social in that it consists in hi s re lat ions withotherindi vidual SUbje cts ,thiscon st itu tesan oppressivede humanis a tion oftheindividual's exi ster•ce byII syst emtha t ignoresthat as pect of ind i v idual re a lity (the pa rt ic Ularityof the sUbj e~-object interdction) which does not go into univ e rsal iz ing concepts. The lot of the indi vidual SUbject isto suffe r in thecon flict be tween, on th e one hand,thenatur eofhisown reality inwh i c h exi stence is in th econtext of SUb ject - o bj e ct interaction, andon the other th edemand at the so ciety tor his con torm itywith the ration ali s t i c idealsofthetot a lized,«orId: tha t is,for the denia l of the reality of his own existence, ex cept as a detached object and non-pa rticular inst anc e of a category.
The in dividual is alien atedal ike froluhis ownrea lit y and
17 tromthe contac t withother sUb jects that constit ute s the basi sofhishUlIan i ty.
For Ador n o the centra l point he re isthat th~totalityof administer ed society transcends theis s ueofclas sstructure st udiedbythe Marxists . Heis notconcernedwithid eo logy as serving the spe cial Iateresee of anysocial cla s s,butrat h er its driv eto 'Iratlo nali ze" societyas a vhole. Although he would allow that the rational id e al was or i ginat ed by tho bourgeoisieto serve the irparticular cla s sne e ds,Adornoae e s it as havinginII.senseescaped, its ver ysuccessas ideology having resultedin the crea tio n of the totall yadmin istered society whi ch has, so to sp e a k , ta ken ona life of its own.
Tothe exte nt that theneedsof this society tomaintai n its in teg rit y and control are ful filled over the needs of individ u al SUbjects toact in creat ing the i r ownexistence , thesocie ty re pr....se s thos e indiv i d ualSUbj e c t s;andthe more total thepenetrati o nofthema r k e teccncetcorganiz a t i on into thesoci e ty , the ecce repres sive it is.
Ad o r no'sviewof thetotali zi ng cha r acte r ofco n t e mpo rary soc i e ty is absolutelyce ntralto hi s conc eptionof both tho nature and function of art. Indeed , it would not be an exaggeration to sa y that in some ways it is an underlying foundat ionor motor of all ofhis philo s ophi c al wor k. YE'.tat
rs the same time, it is not so much a description of society as of the role of society in the reality experienced by the individual and in the nature of ere;" More specifically, his work is a description of the impact of universallY applied market economicson tho nature of art and on the philosophical underpinnings of human values. The word "cuilure", which oftenoccurs in Adorno'swritings,is probably a more accurate name for What interests him than "society" as SUCh.
disti nctionhas to be made and borne in mind whenstudyinghi s work, between society in its own right as a collection of individuals, and culture, as the totality of practices and valuesin that society; i tis re a ll y the latter that Adorno has in mind when he writesof society.
His tory
In many repects, Adorno·s thought is an essentially his'..orical accountof the evolution of the relationshipof culture , and especially art, to human reality. Adorno is explai ni ng th~ current situation , the character of philosophical inquiry and the nature of art, as a development of what has gone before. We noted at the outset, in discussing dialectic,that a"r e al i t y" which is constituted in contact betwe e n SUbject and object in activity must necessarily be constantlybecoming. since activity must have
19 an obje c t i v e effecti fitis to beac tiv it y, it followstha t the objective wor ld is consta ntlybei ngaltered by activity , and re a lit y, which is constituted in the int e r a c t i o n of eub'[ect;and ob jec t , is essentiallyhi st or ical inna t ure . In the epistemologicalrealm,th i sis manifestin thehi sto ry of the cent r a l is su es of trad !tional philosophy. For Adornal1 this history has takenthefo rm of anevolutiontowards the complet e de s c r i pti on of the worldas objective, in ter ms of conceptsrela t e dbyreas o n. As weha ve seen ,howeve r,be c a us e of the negative dialectic inherent in the condi tio ns of thoug ht, such a descrip tio nof theworl d asa totality fails to satisfythe "t radi t iona l norms of adequacy"of reason. The st rivi ng towa r d there alizati o n of this to t a li t y entails an evermore intensepolariza tionof SUbje ct and Object , with the latterbecoldng incr e a s i ng l y remotefro m andfe tishize d by the re ifi e d consciou snessof the forn er. Hi st orical mov e men t is drivenby the dialecticaltensio n betwe en, on the one hand, thetota li zingneed of rationalitytoru lenat u r e, and on the othe r , there s i st an c e of theindividualObject as apaz-t Icul ar- tobeing subsumedinthe universa lizingsystemof concepts.
20 I I
With rega rd to the future ev ol uti o n of th i s ten si on, Adorn,)partscompan y withLUk~cslaandth eMa r x i s t tradition, whosevision foreseesagrea t historical changetaki ng pla c e, are v ol utio n which wi llmanlfest itself inthe epist emo logica l sphereby the reconciliationof subjectand objectin human con s c i ous ne s s throug h theself-realizationof the proletaria t . Ador no, in cont rast , sees only the cont i nuing need of a human i t y , impaled on the ho r ns of an inherentlydialectical re al ity, to suffer and strive for understanding in an inc r e a s i ngl y totalized worldwhose futurecannot bepredicted.
From the perspectives of both LukacsandAdorno,however,the pressureon philosophy to function as ideologyiscre a t e d by the dr i ve to a tota li ze d worl d. Th e effectofth i s pr e s su r e isillu s t r ated by the ahisto ricalcharacter ofth etr a d i ti onal approach:the efforts ofreason are alwaysdirected toward a re a li t y that is eterna l. In a dialecti ca l accoun t of the wo r ld, however, if authe nt icity is to be achieved, it must re late to the process of SUbject -object interaction, and the re i n to a reality whic h is constantly changing . For Adorno, the pre s e nt real ity in al l its dimens ions is to be unde r stood as der i v i ng fr omthe pastac tivi tyofhuman i t y , and thepr e s en t contex t of act i o n, and understanding, ashav ing bee ncreatedbytha t pas t activity.
21 The present context of action is social in that the ind i vid ual subjec-...·s humani t y re s i de s in his relations with other individual subjec ts: Adornois principallyconcerned withthe looming presenceof to t a liz i ngso c i ety asthe agent tidyinghistorica lchang einthecult u r al and aesth e ticfields that affe c t (lind reflec t ) theindiv idual'ssocia l fate.\9 He thus holdsthe prese nt pha s e of histo ry tohav e begunwi t h the triumph of the ide a lsof the bourgeo i s revo l ut ion, and the re s h a pingof soc iet yand its ideology in accorda nc e with the nee ds ofthebourg e oisieas rUling class. Thisre shap inghas resul te": in the totalizing impul s e which ha s drive n the subsequen t changes in cul t ure to....ards tha t of toda yIs co ns umer i s m-orie nte d mass "administe red "soci e t y, andbeyond theinterestsof anyindivi du a lsor cla s sofindividuals . The allena tionand rationa lism.thathavebe endescribedund er the hea di ng of totalityare , inotherwo rds , the characte ristic social features of the objec tivA side of re a lity for the cont empo ra ry ind i v i d ual sUbjec t. Theyaffect thechara cter of that realityinthe SUbj ect-obj e ctintera cti o n;equally, the y are the produ c t of objective histo rical changes. These are the conditio ns under which authentic di a l e c tical unders tanding of the cu r ren t , though co ns t a nt l y changIng, reality mus t be achIeved; the history ofart, and especially mus ic, is for Ado rnothehistory of the developI ngimpactof
22 alienat i on and rati on a l iza ti o n on the basic characte r of ae stheti c practice,anactivitywhichhas special significance incurre ntreality.
Chapter Two
AESTHETICCONTEXT Nature of Art Works
Bearing in mind the dialecticalnature of Adorno'sbasic outlook , and his conceptionof history as a movement toward th e totalization of human life, we can now pr oc e e d to the fie l d of aesthetics, which is of central imp o rta nc eas much for his understandi ng of the world as for the philosophy of moder nmusicwhich he elaboratesout of that understanding.
The concerns of Adorno in aesthetics resolve themselves for our purposes intothree interrelatedareas, whichare best discussed in sequence. They are: first, the natureof art works ,considered in a negative-dialecticalworld;second, the aut henticity of art works; and third, their relationshipto society. Allthree of theseareas of concern relatetothe philosophy of art of the present time , as an historical phenomenon rather tha nas an unchanging metaphysicalissue, anda grasp of all threeis necessary to understand Adorno's conceptionof the history of illusion in musical art. It is th e historical loss of the tenability of the illusion of to na lit y in music whichforms the centra l theme in Philosophy of .MadernMusic.
24 The question of the natur e of artwo r k s is fo r Adorno intimately co nne c t e d with the negativedialectic whichrenders identity think ing problematic. Like the concept of the ordinary empir icalobject, "theco nc e pt of art balks at being defined, ,,1be c a u s e individual ar t works cannotbe completely subsumed undera co nc ept . Moreover, the conc ep t of art is itself prob l ema tic , because art work s do not hav e the same kind of existen c ethat empirical ob j ectsha ve, as parts of na t u r e over aqe Lnat; whichhuman activ itytakes plac e .
For Adorno, in a totalizingsociety ,the ob j e c t i v i t y of objects, one can say, becomes extreme1 they take on an appear an ce of independence, inthe sense of havingana t ure which does not depend on the sUbjectiv.:. compone nt of the sub.ject-ob jectinteraction. This is the objectiveaspect of theirfe ti sh iza t ion by the alienate d sUbj ec t. Further, for the alienated subject; the particularity of ob j ect s also disappears, because in the i r fet i s h charac ter they are subsumed under theirrationalconcepts as commodi t i e s , rather than hav ingind ividua l ~ealityinthe immediatesUbject-object interact ion. Thenature of art works, ncvever, is such that they cannot be separated fromthe subjectin this way .
In the fir st place -- and One reason why art and Aest he t i csco ns t i t ut e such an important feature of experience
25 for Ado rn o -- the re a lity of art lie s in the dialec t ical rela tio ns hip between sUbject and ob j e c t, ra ther than wi t h either compo nentsepar ately . Art in itses s e ntialcha r a c te r is not ame reobject,but hassi g nific a nc e.th atis :
Actually, art works , no t ablythos eof the highest calibre, are wai t i ng to be inte r preted . Ifone accept e d the asser tion that there is no th i ng to int e rpr et in ar t and that ar t merelyhasbeing,one would expunge th e line of de marcatio n tha t se parate s ar t fr omno n- art.2
Art is ta k en by Adornotobe a ma t t e r of inte rp r et a ti on : the lineof dema r cat ion tha t se p a ra tes art fro mnon-ar t l ies in ar t 'swaiting tobe int erp r eted. Ar t, tha t is, isart onlyin sofar as i tis inte rpr et ed.3 The immed i ate pr es e nce of the subject in the SUbj ect-object intera ct i on is the r efor e a ne c e ssaryas pe ct of theeventof anapp r eh e nsion of awork of art. Ina dialectical account of the wo r l d, it shouldbe remembered,thi s eve nt const itu testhe onl yreal ity ofanart work: itdepe nd s onthecircumstanc e s sur rou ndi ngitwhether the subj e ct is the artis t or the listener (i nthe cas e of musi c), or bo t h . In the sec ond pl a c e , the activ ity of interpre tat ion is also an inf usi o n of SUbje c t ivi t y , of chara cteri s ticswhichca n onlyhaveimmediat ere ality fo r th e SUb jec t as deriving from the sid e of the sub j e ct, in away that the mere production of a commodity canno t be. The as s embl yof el emen ts,the"sy s temoftho ught" of an artwork , isthecont ri bution of SUbj ectivity.
26 I I
To insiston the aub'[eotiLve as a constitutiveas pe c t of art , howe ve r , is not tode ny the objectivi t y of art wo r k s. The na t ur e of artworksfor Adorno is per haps be stco nv e yedby the me t a p h o r of a conste l lation,'or a rebus.S As an object , an art work Is an ass emblage of disparate elements whose significancecannot be seenas objectively constituted by,or deriving objectively from,thesignificancesof its individua l par ts. The separate me an i ngs ofthe elements are fused in the unde rstandingof thewhole, even though they are necessary to cons titutethe meaning of the whole inthe first place. 6 A re bu s, for example, is apu z zl e consistingof anarrangement of pictures and other cluesthat suggest syllab lesor letters of it s solution, which is somet hi ngcompletelyunre latedto the separate contexts of the original pict n res and clues. Similarly,a constell a tion (ofst a r s ) has being only <'IS the inte r p r e t e d shape, as forinsta nce with the Great Bear. The separate constituent st a rsdo not bear any relation to one ano ther beyond the interpreted one , even thou ghI
interpr e t e d, the shape is objectivelythere . Ar t works are saidto be mediatedby the SUbject becausethe y have the i r be i ng th r oug h the ac t of interp reta tion; as unme d iate d ob jects , they are metre aeeencteqee," SUbjectivity the r e by bec ome s integral tothear t work, in tha t the art work,eve n
27 thoughit is anobje c t i v e phenomenon, is interpretableonly through theaub'jec t.
Th ro ug houtthese cons idera tions adistinctionisimplicit between conc r ete realitie s, whic harethoseconce i vedbythe sUb j e ct as objective and immedi ate in the subjecl:-object inte r a cti on , and the re a l ity ofar t worksWhich, altho ughthey have the reality of Ob j ect, re qu i re con sc iou s interpre t ation by the subjec t in thei r appreh en s i on . Fo r Adornott.c meani ng f u l nessof theconstellati on of el e me nts of which an art-work is constituted lies partly in its relationsh ipto aconc re t e re ality,which he characterize sas its "other ."s Th i s relation ship is art ' smime t icaspect, the way inwhichitge s t ur e s towa r ds conc r ete ,exis t ingcon di t ions and their "r es t r ai nt s, contradictions and potenti alities.,,0;>
The analogy Ador no uses is fr om a high-school physic s experiment , therelat i o ns hip betweena magnetandasca t t e ri ng of iron filings on a piece of paper over the mag net . The filingspr od uce anout lineof'che magnetic fieldon the paper , illuminati ng, or miming, an aspect of the reality of the ma g ne t.'o Simi larly , the co ns tel latio n of Ursa Major mimes a greatbear . Adornowould wishto insist thatthe concep t of mimesisisnotto be unde rs t o od as a simple repres entationin thesenseof animage , as in a photograph or representational painting.1' Thi s wouldbe to add objective meaning to the
2.
work which isnot inherent1n its own structure. Mimesis must be interpretedas inherent in an object, as a"g e s t u r e" which re s u lts from its structure: an art work is undexntioodas a real object that contains that "mome nt of unreality" as an aspect of its objective character. The "moment of unreality "
isAd o r noI 5term for tha tcharacte risticof art which does not partake in the concrete reality of artworks, yet is the necessary componentof theiraestheticnature .12 Art, then, is seenbyAdorno as dia lectical in this mimeticaspect;while mimesis can only be understood as an objectivefeature ,yetit is inevitably a result of SUbjectivemediation, and requires th e subject; for itsrealization.
Under currentconditions , however, the collectiveaspect of the reality th at used to reside in the SUbject-object inte ractiondisappears, because i t is no long e r possible for the SUbject to participa te in that realityas a part of it , and thus as part of a reality including other SUbjects. Th e world of objects from which the individual subject is ali e n a t e d , and which appearsunder conditions of totalityto be exclusively real, also Incnuees all other humans.
Int erpreta t i on , which us e d to be an aspect of the collective re alit y when that realitywas experienced as incl udi ng the SUbject,nowlo s e s the sha redcharacter it had, and becomesa functionof the individual, alienatedSUbject.U Sin ce the
'9
col lective is no longe r immediate in the current reality exp erienc ed by the subject, it nolo nge r conferswhat wasan objective character onthe act of interpretation. Becausethe sUbject apprehe nding art is unavoidablysingular in a worl d where to be a subject is to be alienated,the process of the consti tutionofthe art workas a constellation of objective elements is mediated by the singular SUb j e c t , rather than throughthe more objective chara cterof the colle ct ive.14
III
If,in terms of the SUbject-object po l a r i t y , mimesisin its dialectical na t ur e represents the di ale c t i c of art in respect of its objective aspects, the SUbject ive side is on th e other hand represented by expressi on. The expressive aspect of art is thewa yin whichit is the sedimentationin objectivity of the SUbjective side of experience. While mimesis dependson an objective concretereality,its "other ", to which it is assimi lated in interpreta tion, expression in ar t isthe objectificat ionof the SUbjective side of reali ty, tha t is , of the non- objec tive .15 Withrespect to expression, art is subjeo t; to a separate dialectic, between the object whichit is and the SUbject whichit is the expression of:
•••the objectification of expression, which coincides wit h ar t , cannot do without a SUbject that produces expression and thereby , to use a bourgeois phrase, gainfU lly employs hi s mimetic impUlses. Art isexpressive when a SUbjectively
30 me d i a ted , object i ve quality rais e s its voice to speak: sadness, st reng t h,year ni ng.16
This at first night sugg e s t th at expr ession Is a ma t t e r of sUbj ect i ve te eling s, suchas sadness, stre ng th . or ye arni ng.
in the wa y that an ima g i ne d naive ~ub j ectiv ist woul d understandart. However, Adornowould not wish to accept that formulation, sinceifit were correct, itwoul dnot allow for th e objecti ve exIst e nc e of artwork",. As he puts it, "If express ionweremorelya dup l icateofsUb jec t ive feelings , it wou l d no t amount to anythi ng." That Is, the Ob j e ct i v e characte r of i3rt works would be di I"'in i shed, and therefo re would notbe capa b l eof beingdiscuss ed. InE't,~ad ,expression sho uld be undez-ati c od "in te rms of or di nary things and situations in 'Whi c h historical proc e sse s and functions have beensedi mented, endowing themwi t h the potent ial to spea k"t7 The SUbjective side of real ity is not so llIuch a set of feelingsasthe aggreg a t eof thesi ngul ar sUbjectt s conditions otexistence inthe curren t 'World,asthe yman i f est themsel ves inthe realityof his experience. Thisiswha t Adorno means Whenhe refers to the "histo ricalprocesses and functions"
whichhave beense d i me nte d in expression . "o rdinarythIngs andsit ua tio ns"are ob jects; th e y are the objectificationof thenon-o b j e c t i ve ,and the yar e expressiveinthepoten tial to speak with which the y have been endowed . The latter characte rizationpres e rve s the objectiv ity of ar tworks, which
Jl
is nec e s saryif they are to be unders toodas real phenomena.
There is a di alectic in the nature of art wo rk s : betwe en mimesi s, whic h place s the cna rec te r of art works in the objectiveworld , and whIchis a neces s ary aspectofthem1and expre s s i on, which represents their necessarily subjec t ive character .
A fur t h er diale c tic a l tensi on is see n by A.dorno to charac te rize the r-eLatiLcnshfpof the subjectto the natureof theart work. Thi sexists bet weenexpre s siononthe one hand and the need, on the other , fo r co ns tructi v e ac ti v ity to assemblethe elementsof the constellati onwhich is the art work . Cons truc tio n is an inhe r e nt ly ra tio nal act ivity, becausei tmustemployconc ep ts ,whicharethe hallmarkof the use of reas on, and which inherently impl y a general applic at ion. Thelabour of producing a st r uc tu re (that is , construc t i on ) , req u ire s planning,whi ch inturn ne ed stoha v e a project framed in the abstract , that is, inconcept s . The piu t icuIZIrityof an ar t wo rk, like tha t of any Objec t, only oc curswithit s realizationin thesubj e c t - obj e c t inte r a cti on.
There can be no art work, no interpretable mimeti c constellatio n ,without construction:yet subj e c tive med iat i on, alsoa necessarypartof the con stitut ionofan artwo r k , is inherently a resul t of the no n-rational , of the SUb jec t's singular.l.cy that ca nno t be avo ide d whe n rea lity inc l ud es
J2 interp r e t at i on. Th i s particu la r dialectical ten s i on , as willsee, becomessig nificantforAdo r n o in his explanationot Schoenberg'simportance tothehi s t o r y ofmusic.
In the contempo rarysi t uatio n. the fundamental tens i o ns in the na t u r e of ar t , betwe en it s objective characte r as co nstellatio nand its SUbj ective interpretability on the one hand, and between the rationalizingtendency of construct ion and the singula ri ty of expre s s ion on the other, interacti ng with themor e generalhistorical de velo pme ntof humanaffairs , placethe futurepossibilityof art in doubt forAd o rn o. As society becomes commod i ty-oriented, and human conscious nessmorer'eLfLed, the delicatebalanceswhichthese tensions sustain are placed under great strain . The tota li z i ng dynaraic of soc ietycreates great pressure for art works to be understoodas simple objects, in the same way as objectswhich are not ar t works--that is,to haveadi stant, nlysterious existe nc eind ependentofthe SUbject. However, the aspects of interpret a t ionandexpress ion, whichwe saw to be essent i a l fei'!t uresof art works, ca nnot be complete lysubsumed und er the conceptsof arati ona l i z e d and administe redworld, beca us e of the irunavo idab lypa rticularnatu re . Art insists on a re a lity which is pa rt i c ular because it requires the sub j e c t i v e side of SUbj e ct-obj e ct inte rac t ion in orde r to exist. Tothe extent tha t ar t cont inuestohappe n at all, it
3J
is in resistance to the dominatio n of human exis te nce by rel fy i ngconsciousness, becauseof itses s e nt ialincl us i o n of the non-rationa l (that is, particu lar). Howev e r , giventhe pra c t i c e of ar t, the pressureplaced on it by to t a l i za ti on pushe sittoward s the ob j e c t i f y i ngte nde nc i e s of construction, and away fromth e in divid ua l sUbjectivitywhichexp ression represents. It isthe waythatart is practisedin res po ns e to these pressures th at interests Ado r no , and prov i de s him witha measureof itsint e g r i t y when older standardsha vebe e n rende r e d invalidby the progress of history.
Authentioityand Modernity
The notion of authen ticity is intimate ly connected in Ado r no' s aesthetics wi ththa t of modernity. Theword"mod e rn"
inthi s contextisapplied to art inwhichthe new, understood interms ofth e di sloc a tingl y unfamiliar, is an essential feature. For Adorno mode r n ityisnow thedefiningcriterio n of ar tis ticaut hentic i ty.
The reaso n forart'sco nc e rn withthe newisth e cha nge in the na t u r eof therealit y whichart must mime ,namely the progressivealiena ti o nof the SUbject fro m theobject by the ra tio nalization oftheworld : the realitynolong e r ex i s t s in which subject andobject ar e both unde r s t ood to be present in
J4 a context of interact ion . The essential feature of newnessis tha t it is unknown: inthe presence of th e new, there is an ele me nt of distance be t we e n the SUbject and anob j e c t because the subject does not full y grasp the object. The new is mysteriousto the SUb ject. The subject is ther eby alienated inthepresenc e of the new. This is wha tAdo r nois gettin gat whenhe writes, "The new isne c e s s a ri l y abstract. YoU do not know whatit is ••••".16
No w, in contemporary society, mimesis itself has been pla c e dunde r differen t conditions. For in a totalized world the SUbjective aspect which we saw wa s necessary to th e possibil ityof mimesi s has been re move d from the realit yto wh ich mimesis shou ld be l o ng , that of objects. Sowhat is mimed is in a way un-mimeable, since it is a realitywhich doe s not includeinter pretability, the SUbjective componentof mimesis. Art , in its nec e s s ary moment of mi met icbehaviou r, the reforefinds it s elf compelled to seek the new. Thisis the only wa y of crea ti ngobjecti vitywiththe necessaryimma nent SUbjectivity (in the form of interpretability) on the one hand , and is alsothe onlyway ofmimingan alien a t e dre a l i t y , the tr ue current real i ty, on the other. cor relatively, to emphasizecontin uity withtrad i t ion is for Adornoprecisely to de nythe mimet icsucce ssof a work of art. For ina re a l ity of re i f i e d consc iousness, the experienceof re aLacy which is
J5 to be mimed Is that of the alienation ot the subject;, The refore, what Aclorno ta kes to be the most valid mimetic behaviour is to negate th e connect ion bet....een subjec t and object implie d in theconcept ofparticipationin atradit i o n:
"The concept of moder nismis privative, indic a t i ngfi n l y that something ought tobenegated,and what it isthat ought to be negated1 modern ism is not apositive5109<1n.1I19
It follows th a t com;er vatism, which in ter ms of the prac ticalpurs u itof ar t isadhere nce to previoussta nda r d sor compos i t ionand to norms la i d downby tradi t i on, become s in its refusal ofthe new anes s en tia l den ial of the natu r e of reality, of art ls "other." The refo re it def eats the mimetic impu lseand the essential lyinte rp re ted natu reof art. The prefe re nce for "tradi tional " works, and the exclusive acce pta nc e of the sta ndard sof the art ofth e past,arefor Adorno a pretence whIc h betrays the reificati on of the co nsciousnessofart: art wor ks are reg ~rd edsimply as Objects like any other, wi th the ir own fe tish i zed existence inde pend en tofthevi9wingsubjec t;, Art worksarethere to be co ns ume d, or regarded with wo nde r, just li ke any other objects.20 Ar t as behaviour -- that is , with an imma ne nt SUbjectivecompo ne nt to i ts ob j e c tiv i ty-- di s appea rs , sinc e th e subj e ctiv e compo ne nt of thes e works is in the pa st, together with the reality which the y re fl ect . sinc e the
"
adv entof the totalizi ng dr i v e of commodity fetishism, of the
"a d mini s t e r e d society " , true, authentic , art has only been possible as"mod e r n" art.
I I
However, for Adornomodernism carries wit hitth e seeds of itsown destruction. At onelevel, one mightsee art which is defined as modern thr e a t ene d bythe popularly conceived con u ndr umof origina1 1 ty : as moreand more techn iquesare us e d andbecome nolo nger new, they are denied to artis tswho need th e new i fthey are to keeptheir integrity. Ar t would progressively become more circumscribed, even tually running outof new things to do. Howeve r,this is not the t;omplete extent of the crisis tha t Adorno sees for modern clrt, for th e r eisno t for him anynecessary limit on the originalityof human activ ity. Rat her, the commodification of society and consciousnessdrivesart through itsmimetic ne c e s s i tytoward s a denial of its essence , that is, towa r d a den i al of interpretabilit yandth e sUbject ivecomponent. The demand on art is to prod uce feti shes , Objects which have the same remotenessfrom the subject as ordinary concreteobjects in cur rent reality. Now this is indeed accomplished thro ug h moder nism . But the mo r e successful the mim·<!sis of current reality, the more art works become objects, and thus ext i nguishtheirchara c te r as art. At the sameti me , howe v er ,
J7 the prac tice of art , and the ve ry nature of art works repre sentforAdo r no aprotest against,and a negation01,the reality wh i c h is mimed, si nce art is behaviour in which subjectivi tyand objectivityare recon ciledand inext ricably inte rtwine d , eventhough in there a litywhich is aimed the y atenot. Byexisting , tha tis,ar tworksden ythe rat ionali ty of the tot a li zed wor ld , and with itthe aut he nticit yof tha t which theymirna, and fromWh i ch ,inmimingit,theydraw tho i r es s ential natu r e asart. In ord e r to be ar t , ar t works a r-e caught in a sit ua t i o n where th e y mus t both deny cu rre nt reality andmime it.
A further aspect of the threa t to the fu ture of ar t, at t en danton present hIstorI c a l conditions , is manifestin a sharpening of the te ns i onbe twee n theesse nti a l mo me nt s of constru ctio n and exp ressio n in art. The progressing rati o na li z a t i on of the re al itylIi me dby art , requ i r e s ever grea t ercontrol of elements bythe artist, inorder to mastet"
theparti c u l arit yof the wor k , tha t is , toprodu c ea qr e a t er ins inua t ion ofre a sonedform intothe: wor ksothatit be c ome s more of an or d i na r y concrete object whos e reality is subs umab l e underconcepts. Modern wo r ks are oft e n marked by a degreeof integ ra t i o nand comple xitynot see n previously ; construct i on ha s becomemor e importa nt. converse l y , cont r o l bytheartist isalsoa markof thenecessit yof exp r ess i o n ,
38 theins e rtio n of the sUbjectinto the object,whichaswe saw is botha pr o t e st at, and a ne gat i o n of, the realitywhich drives the dynamic of co n s truction.
The way in wt.rchthe confl ictbetween const ructio n and expression threa tens the futureof artis linkedby Ado rno tilth the cont.ro j, of the work bythe ar tist , and wit h the notion ofmod e rn i s m. Tho new, tobe ne w, ne ed s to be as yet unkn o wn. The great e r the de g r e e of cont r o l by the ar tist, the mor e the reasonedinteg rat ionof his materials, thele s s the work is a surprise . Thedistance between theSUbject and the object iveartwork, whi ch mimesalienated re a li ty, and which newnesscrea tes , isdim in i s he dby thegreaterpred ictab i lity that this control bringsabout. Ye tnot toatte mptto control the work is to abando n the task of expression, that is, to imbu ethework withthe immanen tsubjective moment whichgi ve s itthe real i tyof a workof art. Theeffort tobe authe ntic, in other words,le adsto the los s of aut henticit y; thedrive to greater ar tist i c inte g r at i on and cont rol leads to the resul t thatthe elemen t of tru thin art, thene w, is negated, bec au s e suchcont rol remove s itsunknownness. Artappears to be headed for a vanishing point. Ever-inc reasing accomplishmentsoccurinthe integrationandcontrolofworks, inre s pons e tothe need tor expressio n inopposition tothe obje ct if i ca ti onof theworld ; yet those veryaccomplish ments
39 of rationa litytend to vitiatethe possibilit yof thenewupon which th e possibilityof art depends. Thevan i s h ing poi ntis totality: the point at which the eucject; is completely abolished from all aspects of re ality, including art which thus couldno longer occur.
III
To describe, in this or anyotherfashion, how art works auther.tic is to imply that they ca n be inauthe r.dc,and certai nlyfor Adorno the latter Is true: Ph i losop h yof Hodern Music is about trendsof authenti city and inauthenticity in musical art. We described (page 35 &ff.) Adorno's understand ingof the falsenessof conservatismas consi sting in the pretencetha t by followingthe rulesand prescrip tions of previous times,there al i t y of the pre sent canbe genuinely mi me d, and tha tsuchworksconstituteart at the presentti me. However, it isimpo rta nt to distinguishworks that are of the pa s t , preservedby technical means beyond the time of their actual reality as art ,21 from contemporary works which are createdin oppositionto newness,and whichat tempt to achieve su c c e s s inco nformi tywit h the standardsof the past. 22 Both are prizedby tho reifled consciousne ss , which sees them as pl e asur a b l e objectsto be consumed, or used. In both cases such consciousness is inc ap a ble of the SUbjective inte rpre tationof a conste llationof elementswhichwouldbe
40 in dica t iveof gen uine ly aesthetic behavi our.be c ause itca nnot unde r stand itsel!and it s subjectivityas par t of the reality of the work. The ins istence on thewo r ks ofthepastas the exclusivemodelsof ar t is symptomatic of the assump tionthat rea lit y isobjective and unchanging, and that th o se wo rks confo rm to the concep tsof thatre ality . U
However, thedifferencebetwe e nthe s e twocas e s isthat while, to besu re, the worksof thepa s t may well onceha ve be enauthe nti c inmi mi ng thereality of the past , int.oday's worldofarat i onaltota lity , theynolo nge r ar e. BecaUS A we do not live in the pas t. but in thBpresent, aut hentic artistic activity Is now modernis t, its moment of truth re s id i ng in the new: and works of the past ha vebecome raere ob jectsin so far asthe y en du r eat al l. That is,theycanbe apprec i ated onlyas art obj ects bya cons c i o u sn es s that is alienated and under s tands real i ty as being inde pendently object ive and enduring, an das inclu d i nq no aspec t of the SUbject i veandparticular. Howe ver, the realitythat ismimed inwor ks of the pa s t no lo n geroccu rs . As pa r t of aneffort to understandthe art in thoseworks ,asit werevi c arious ly, tha t past real itymightbe pa r ti allyima g in ed as ahi stor i cal exercise, but suchartwor k s canno tre f l ectcurrent reality.
The onlylIay inwhichthey could is underthe as s umpt i onthat rea lit ydoc snotchange:thatis, under the assumptio nmade by
41 relf i ed consciousness. That iswh yinsi s ti ngthat suchworks constitute art for th e pre s ent day is IlIYll1ptomlltic of tha t stateof reific a t ion .
Theca seis differentforcontea poraryworks wh i c hoppose modernit y. They carry into re ality an Illlman e nt.fals ene s s, sincein refusing the ess entialalienationof newness, the y pretendtobemere ob jects and co nspire,asAdo rno might put it, in the eliminat ion ofthe SUbje c t from re a l it y al tog e ther . In thi sway theseconte mporarywor ksdenytheir nat ureas ar t, In re fusing to ackno wledge the int e r pre tive cha r a cter, the SUbjective as p ect, of the cons t ellatio n of elemen ts wh ich would co n s ti tute the work as art. Instead of miming the alienat e d real i ty in whIch the modernSUbject find s itself, suchwork s pretendtobe Objectsthems el ve s. Truthinart, filS we sa w, lie s inits m.imetic relation to present re a l i t y. and art whic h refu s estore c og n iz e the character of that re ality refuses its fundamental nature and task. The disti ncti o n bet weensuc h wo r kandmodernar t iscle a r-c ut:
The mode rn i tyof art l ies in its mimt1ti c relati on to a petr ifi ed andali enate d re ality . This, and not thedenial of that mute rea lity,iswhatmakes art speak . Oneconseq u e nceofthis isthat mo dern art does not tole r ate any thing that sma cks of innocuous compromi se.24
Present re ality is pe tri f i edan d alienated; trut h in art thereforelies inmode rni s m, andany sug gestionof compr omi s e
42 isimmedia telyto deny the na tureof pr e s e nt reality and by doing so to cease to be moder n.
It wi l l be noted that both the authe ntic and the inauthentic inar t indicate the like lihoodthat in the futu re art ma y no lo nger be possible. In ei t her case thepo int of impossibil i tyistha tof tot a l i t y where al l of human exis te nce has been rationalised, and th e alienation of SUbject from Object iscomplet e . Action in the human sense is no longer possible in a completely totalizedworld, because su ch action consists in interaction between SUbject and object. The SUbj e c t, who s e social existencecanno longerbe realized in activi ty, must suffer on in a condition of complete alienati on , denied its means of beinghuman. similarly, in ar t , the opport uni ty for activity in the form of the interpretation of works of art is denied at the point of total i ty. The contact wi t h re ality in th e form of sUbject - object interaction canno lon gerbe mimed. Onthe one hand , int e gration and contro l of the element s of art wi l l have reac hedthe limi t of co mpl ete objectification, and rendered expression (andwith it theimmanen t SUbjectivenoaent; in art and the ir own drivinq force ) imposs ible . Onthe other, in the re fu s a l ofthe attemp t tomime reality, by prete ndi ng to bean objec t,ar t will have become no longerart, but trivia lity .
43 Art, societyand Modern! ty
The threatened condition in which art finds itself clearlyhas a social dimension for Adorno. The reality to which art bears itsmimetic relation cannot avoid being a social one, because the experience of reality is of sUbject and others. Subjective experience without others, withits objectivefeaturesshorn away, is reduced to a "point"I which has no capabiHty of the interaction with objects that constitutesits reality. That is, by itself, the subject does notha v e reality--real ityis constituted inthe interaction of subject and object -- the SUbject is only a necessaryand not a sufficient aspect of reality. The alienation whichis thedomi na t i ng feature of contemporary societyha s a similar effect: as objectsare seen to be the onlythingsthat are real, so the SUbject loses all of the objective dimensionsof its ownpossible reality, whichis to say the social ones.
Social reality ta ke s the form of what Adorno calls convention.
To theextenttha t thatre ality is constituted for the subjec t ininte r a c t i o n with the other, it is understood as shared with other SUbjects ,as beingthe same as for other SUbjects,and as proceedingfrom aco ll e ct i v e subjectivity that shares an exper ience of reality. Howev er , convention loses its real characterand becomes instr ume nt of controlas total iz atio n proceedsandthe SUbject be c o me s alienated fr om the Ob jective
..
aspect s of his exis tence . In a tota lizing world what pre vi ously expressions ofa collect iveSUbjecti v i ty beccae metamo rp hosed intopurportedl yobj ectivela ws, fUl f i lli n gan id eo l og i cal func t i on for what Adorno calls th e "cul ture indus t ry.,,25
The dil emma forced onart takes on a furth e r soc ia l aspect inlightofthe requireme ntfor mode rnity. Aswe ha ve seen, inorder tomi methe aliena ted re a lit y of thesubject, ar t is forc ed to wa rd s abstracti on in the fo rm of the uncompromi s i ngly new, and so towards purging its elf of the not ne w;wh ichamou nts to purgingits e lf of the object ivein the ton of conventions (cond itions la id downbythe other, tha t is ,soc i e ty ). Thealternati ve, to avoid II disappea rance into t riv iality ,istoretainconve nt i o n, andeeap ecatsemodern i ty.
Anext r emeins tance of the denial of the objective and so cial side of reality is illus trated in the path tak e nby the expressionists . Ad o rn oex plains the fate of expres sionismas anar t i stic movement:
••• expre s s i oni s m•• • complete lycu rtailed thedomain of the acces sible; it repres entedatotalref usal and finally termina t ed in somethi ng utterly trivi al, like the screams orhelp less gest ures of Dada fame. The activ ists of the movemen t were .. .admitting to the impos sibil i ty of those ar tistic objec tificati ons, which are postUlated wi l ly-nilly by every ar t i s t icexpressio n.26
45 Expressionismcarr ied radical mode r n ity toits extreme, and exting uisheditself as art whentheobjective inits artwas removed , because the r e was no conve nti on left in it, and thereby no"oth e r "aga i nstwh i c h to const itutea reality, the exper ienceofwhi chcould be mimed. Ar t ca n only survive as long as there is a r-as Ldue of conventi on in the social dimension ofex p e rienc e which isge n u i ne l y real ; aslong,that is, as totality and these pa r a tion of sub jectandobject Is notyet co mp let e.
I I
Even if art cannot avoid its own natu r e as a social prcduc t , i t is nev e r t he l ess under threat fr om another di r e c t i on for the veryreas on that it isa socia l product. Artwo r ks have their potential beingea artwo r ks by virtueof their waiting tobe interpreted, and they therebyassume an audience, whichAdornoimplicitlyviews asan audi e nc e of more than one. Ar t in its ver y nature is a fu nc t i o n of th e collective subjectivity, becausethe SUb j e c tivi t y which is expre s s e d in it s form as s ume s a sUbjectivity which will interpret it. conversely , the express ion of subjectivityis as s ume d in the act of interpretation. Because an art work assumes an audien c eof many, the ide aof the reproductionof its elfis also , as he puts it , "inh e r e nt in arttramitsvery
46 beginning.,,27 Art in its objective characte r repr esents the use of techn iqueto acn Ie ve such rep roduc t ion.
Tech n olog y, in Adornoas intrad!tionalMarxistana lys i s , is a fo rce of prod uc tion: it is a tho r oug h l y social phenome non, rep r e s en t ing the effect of th e collective sUbjectivi t y on natu re inthe activity of producing. "Th e concep t of productive for c e s...at the deepest level of technologica l processes isthe sl'I-Jject itself. Te chn ol ogyis congea led subjectivit y. " L8 Productive forces are by their na tu re forces for cha n gi ng real ity;theyre p r e s entth e actin g force behi nd the actio n in whichreality is co nst i tuted , in thesUbject-objectinterac t ion. Technolog:r, becauseit isthe constantlyevolving way in whichactivity manifests itself , recresenes a force in tha t it drivesth e producti on of new forms of re;,lity. Ar t, too , is production;a.rdas suchitis al s o ma ni ':ested intec hnological means.
Howe ve r , fo r Adorno the aesthet i c useofte c hnolog ical means has specia l conseque nces.29 At the present stage in hist ory , tec hnol og yinar t,by repre s e nt i ng an eve r - i ncreasing mediationby"c o ngea led"col l e c t ive sUbjectivi ty,andthrough its concen tratio n on rationally orga nized means, creates a tendency tosepara t e thesub jec t fr omit s ex pe r ienceof the rea l i t yof art ,that isto say,to objectify th a t reality . In
'7
a commodified society, technology, in art as in industry, produces objects: which is to say that it works to dissolve the collective sUbjectivity in which it has its origin. This objectifyingtendency of technology is the manifestation in th e social sphere of the rationalizing tendency produced by th e aubj eckt s efforts towa r d greater contro l of the materia ls of art. Thatrational iz ingtendencyeffectsthe alienationof the sUbject from social (conventional) reality through its employmentof technology. Art assumes the characteristics of object because of the separation of collective sUbjectiv ity, as an aspect of the reality min-,ed, from the experienceof the individual subject in the apprehension of the wor k. This has the fu rthe rconsequence that novelty in techni que is a necessary aspect of modernity, since it is the manifestation of the drive for the alienating new which modernity represents.
Adorno takes technology in general to be a productive force which originates in sUbjectivity. In its social character representing the effect of collective sUbjectiv i ty, however, he sees it as constricted 111 the prese ntage of tota l rationalization. The separatio nof the indiv idua l subject from the objective side inhi s experience ofreali t y has the consequence thatcollective sUbj e ctivity, which was made possibl e by the imme diate interact ion of
