Corrections to “Scantegrity II: End-to-End
Verifiability by Voters of Optical Scan Elections
Through Confirmation Codes” [Dec 09 611-627]
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Citation
Chaum, David et al. “Corrections to "Scantegrity II:
End-to-End Verifiability by Voters of Optical Scan Elections Through
Confirmation Codes" [Dec 09 611-627.” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security 5.1 (2010): 194–194. © Copyright
2010 IEEE
As Published
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2010.2040672
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Version
Final published version
Citable link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72965
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194 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 5, NO. 1, MARCH 2010
Corrections
Corrections to “TPM Meets DRE: Reducing the Trust Base
for Electronic Voting Using Trusted Platform Modules”
Russell A. Fink, Alan T. Sherman, and Richard Carback
In the above paper [1], the fourth sentence of the Abstract contains
an error. The correct sentence is as follows.
Using the PVB with the TPM can expose unauthorized
soft-ware, ballot modifications, vote tampering, and creation of fake
election records early in the election process.
R
EFERENCES[1] R. A. Fink, A. T. Sherman, and R. Carback, “TPM meets DRE: Re-ducing the trust base for electronic voting using trusted platform mod-ules,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 628–637, Dec. 2009.
Manuscript received November 30, 2009. Current version published February 12, 2010.
R. A. Fink is with the Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD 20723 USA, and also with the Cyber Defense Lab, Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Balti-more County, BaltiBalti-more, MD 21250 USA (e-mail Russ.Fink@jhuapl.edu).
A. T. Sherman is with the Cyber Defense Lab, Department of Computer Sci-ence and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD 21250 USA, and also with the National Center for the Study of Elections, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD 21250 USA (e-mail: sherman@umbc.edu).
R. Carback is with the Cyber Defense Lab, Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Balti-more, MD 21250 USA (e-mail: carback1@umbc.edu).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2010.2040670
Corrections to “Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability
by Voters of Optical Scan Elections Through
Confirmation Codes”
David Chaum, Richard T. Carback, Jeremy Clark,
Aleksander Essex, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest,
Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, and Poorvi L. Vora
In the above paper [1], due to a production error, the affiliations of
two of the authors, Stefan Popoveniuc and Poorvi L. Vora, were listed
incorrectly. The correct affiliation is as follows.
S. Popoveniuc and P. L. Vora are with the Department of
Com-puter Science, The George Washington University, Washington,
DC 20052 USA (e-mail: poste@gwu.edu; poorvi@gwu.edu).
In addition, the name of the last author in the affiliations footnote was
printed incorrectly. The correct name is P. Y. A. Ryan.
R
EFERENCES[1] D. Chaum, R. T. Carback, J. Clark, A. Essex, S. Popoveniuc, R. L. Rivest, P. Y. A. Ryan, E. Shen, A. T. Sherman, and P. L. Vora, “Scant-egrity II: End-to-end verifiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 611–627, Dec. 2009.
Manuscript received November 23, 2009. Current version published February 12, 2010.
D. Chaum is with the Voting Systems Institute, Los Angeles, CA 90064 USA (e-mail: info@chaum.com).
R. T. Carback and A. T. Sherman are with the Department of Com-puter Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Balti-more County, BaltiBalti-more, MD 21250 USA (e-mail: carback1@umbc.edu; sherman@umbc.edu).
J. Clark is with the David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, Univer-sity of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada (e-mail: j5clark@cs.uwa-terloo.ca).
A. Essex is with the School of Information Technology and Engineering, Uni-versity of Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5, Canada (e-mail: aesse083@site.uottawa.ca). S. Popoveniuc and P. L. Vora are with the Department of Computer Sci-ence, The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052 USA (e-mail: poste@gwu.edu; poorvi@gwu.edu).
R. L. Rivest and E. Shen are with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA (e-mail: rivest@mit.edu; eshen@csail.mit.edu).
P. Y. A. Ryan is with the Faculte des Sciences, de la Techologie et de la Com-munication, University of Luxembourg, L-1359, Luxembourg (e-mail: peter. ryan@uni.lu).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2010.2040672
