Assessing accountability for carbon dioxide in the atmosphere

ASSESSING ACCOUNTABILITY

FOR CARBON DIOXIDE IN THE ATMOSPHERE

by

SUSAN SUBAK

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning In Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of Master of City Planning

at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology May 1989

Susan Subak 1989. All rights reserved

The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.

Signature of Author...Q...-... . . ...

Department of Urban Studies and May

Planning 16, 1989

Certified by

...

John Ehrenfeld Lecturer, eprmet of Urban Studies

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Donald A. Schon Director, Master of City Planning Program

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C O N T E N T S

Abstract 3

Acknowledgments 4

Chapter One: Introduction 5 Chapter Two: The Accounts 15 Chapter Three: Accountability 26 Chapter Four: Conclusion 77

Appendices:

A. Scope and Source of Data 83 B. Graphs of Accounts 86

C. CO2 Production from Coal Consumption (1860-1949) 92

D. CO2 Production from Oil Consumption (1860-1949) 96 E. CO2 Production from Gas Consumption (1910-1949) 98 F. CO2 Production from Deforestation (1860-1986) 99 G. CO2 Production from Fossil Fuels (1860-1986) 105 H. Population, GNP, Land Area, Energy Consumption, and

Current and Cumulative Carbon Production for 130 Countries 111

ASSESSING ACCOUNTABILITY

FOR CARBON DIOXIDE IN THE ATMOSPHERE by

SUSAN SUBAK

ABSTRACT

The following analysis explores ways to measure countries' production of carbon dioxide. The study offers the first data collection that includes net anthropogenic release of carbon dioxide from land clearing as well as from fossil fuel

consumption for 130 countries. The inventory is calculated for two time periods, current carbon dioxide release based on mean carbon dioxide production during the 1980s, and

cumulative release that covers carbon dioxide production since 1860.

The selected countries were ranked according to total national carbon dioxide release, per capita release, and per land area release. Countries' rank order changed markedly depending on the type of measure and the time frame of the carbon dioxide inventory considered. None of the measures ranked only industrialized countries high on the list as the largest producers.

The measures were evaluated according to how well they fulfilled a variety of criteria that might be viewed as fair or pragmatic during Law of the Atmosphere negotiations. These criteria include holding affluent countries more accountable, appearing impartial by superpower alignment, holding more accountable countries that could gain economically from

climate change, and identifying as more accountable countries that have expressed an interest in pursuing cooperative

measures to curb global warming.

Considering these criteria, the cumulative per capita measure, which takes into account historical carbon dioxide release, appears to be the fairest assessment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was completed with the help of several

people generous in time and talent. Bill Clark's inspiration, experience, and library were invaluable at every stage of the process. John Ehrenfeld and Dan Nyhart provided useful

criticism of earlier drafts. Research by Greg Marland, Ralph Rotty, J. F. Richards, and Jerry Olson lay the foundation upon which this data collection was built. Tom Braden of the

Institute for Energy Analysis assisted the flow between Oak Ridge and Cambridge. The Ford Foundation provided me with the opportunity to spend the summer exploring related subjects. Robert, Lisa, David, Rachel, and Max, abetted and inspirited.

Chapter One: Introduction

Preventing rapid change in the world's climate may only be possible if most of the world's nations, including the less

affluent countries, join together to restrict the activities that have led to an overabundance of CO2 in the atmosphere.

Developing countries now produce at least 40 percent of the net anthropogenic release of carbon dioxide (hereafter called

"carbon production"). Already, China produces more CO2 than

any other country save for the United States and the Soviet Union--and Brazil is the fifth largest producer. By the middle of the next century, developing countries may be the

source of the majority of CO2 releases.' With accelerating

development, CO2 production in the Third World could render

regional measures to curb climate change ineffective.

Some analysts have already dismissed as impossible the prospect of winning an international agreement.2

Indeed, there is no precedent for an international rationing scheme that would set limits to economic growth, and that is what a Law of the Atmosphere would entail. It is too soon, however, to despair of winning such a treaty. Already, policy makers from over a third of the world's countries have met in

international fora to recommend specific actions3, and history is not devoid of examples of global cooperation over important economic issues.

Several of the principles that were articulated in the Law of the Sea Treaty and in the negotiations that preceded

it, could gainfully be applied to the idea of drawing all the nations of the world together to devise a global strategy for

curbing climate change. While the treaty failed in the end to win the support of all the world's countries, it represents widespread recognition of the interdependence of nations and

the possibility of widespread participation in shaping the legal content of that interdependence. Among the principles derived include universality--all states should have an

opportunity to participate in the international law-making process, cooperation--countries should cooperate even when a

position of relative economic strength might support a policy of no action, and consensus--an agreement should win the

support of all countries taking part.

The atmosphere is in several ways analogous to the deep oceans. It is a global commons in which no national

jurisdiction has much meaning. Any nation can change its composition--either by intention or accident--and no nation can singly prevent its alteration. It is an international resource that is ultimately essential to the survival of the people of developing as well as industrialized countries.

in order to preserve the deep seabed minerals of the ocean from pre-emptive exploitation, concerned nations are now exploring how the balance of gases within the atmosphere can be preserved for future generations.

There are several weaknesses, however, to applying the principles articulated in the Law of the Sea Treaty to a

prospective Law of the Atmosphere. Developing countries would need to be convinced that if the wealth of countries was

considered irrelevant to the ideal of cooperation promoted in the Law of the Sea, it should be likewise irrelevant in a Law of the Atmosphere. It may be difficult, however, to appeal to the principle of cooperation in a case where there are no

goods to distribute, only costs and hardships. Theories of distributive justice have yet to explain how the

egalitarianism underpinning the Law of the Sea Treaty and the New International Economic Order could be formally applied to

the problem of distributing responsibility for avoiding the harm associated with externalities.

In order to attract developing countries to a Law of the Atmosphere regime, more will have to be done than to simply persuade countries that their participation in measures to

curb global warming would reflect the very ideals that they whole-heartedly supported in the Law of the Sea Treaty. Most

likely, industrialized countries may have to absorb some of the costs of improving energy efficiency in developing

industrialization or deforestation foregone. Several industrialized countries that rejected the redistributive

purpose of the seabed mining provisions of the Law of the Sea, may have to turn over a new leaf and agree to forego future

growth as well as compensate poorer countries to do likewise. Both the North and South will have to realize that they are on the privileged side of the generational question, burdened with the challenge of preserving the commons for the unborn and voiceless of all nations.

It will be the challenge of the international community

to set forth restrictions on CO2 production in a way that will be broadly regarded as fair. This analysis does not purport to offer an opinion of what a fair treaty would look like. Instead, it analyzes one question that could be very

contentious during international negotiations: what is a fair way to measure countries' contribution to the climate change problem? It does not presume to answer the question of how much countries should restrict future carbon release based on how much they have produced in the past, although it suggests that the first question should have some bearing on the

second.

Ranking countries by CO2 production (hereafter called

"accountability," with countries higher on the list regarded as more "accountable") is not an objective matter. There are

several ways to count countries' contribution and nations' rank orders change drastically depending on the measure. The

measures considered here include national carbon release, per capita release, and release per unit of land area. Each of these measures is considered using two time frames, cumulative carbon production since 1860 and current production based on mean release during the 1980s.

Unfortunately, because countries' rank orders change significantly depending on the measure, it will be impossible to decide on a measure for accountability if each country

votes its own individual preferences. 4 Eschewing a

utilitarian approach, the following analysis offers a few criteria for assessing accountability that appear practical because they might be perceived as fair by many countries.

For the purpose of this analysis, this author has aspired to statelessness and timelessness in order to assume the original

position outlined by John Rawls.' (She is in fact a citizen

of a country that would be harshly assessed according to her criteria). The original condition demands that decision makers act from behind a "veil of ignorance," not aware of which nation they belong to nor, by extension, which

generation. From this position, individuals will act

conservatively to avert making any of the parties worse off in order to avoid the risk of being a slighted party once the veil is removed.

To this end, several criteria for assessing

accountability may be both practical and consistent with Rawlsian notions of justice.

-- The selection of a criteria could strive to avoid making developing countries economically worse off than

industrialized countries as a result of an agreement.

-- A criteria could be chosen that would not appear to

threaten (or advance) the security interests of one political block more than another.

-- The criteria could avoid rewarding the countries that stand to gain economically from climate change, and ideally, avoid making worse off the countries that may lose more from

expected climatic disturbances.

-- Although less consistent with a Rawlsian framework, as a practical measure aimed towards consensus building, the criteria may consider countries' environmental values, and demand somewhat greater sacrifices from countries that have been most outspoken about environmental preservation.

Of these four considerations, income disparity may be the most important. Naturally, there is a much greater gulf

between industrialized and developing countries on CO2

production than there is between centrally-planned and market economies. Whether climate change negotiations run aground due to differences over the question of how much countries

should invest in facilitating the sharing and preservation of common resources, as occurred in the final stage of the Law of the Sea negotiations, or not, may depend in part on the

understanding that develops between developing and

industrialized nations on how countries should be judged accountable.

It is difficult to judge at this stage the importance of the Cold War alliance system and East-West relations to

international environmental negotiation. There is no global precedent for negotiating among nations a matter as far-reaching in import as national energy policy. Moreover, East-West relations are in a period of transition just as Moscow is redefining its relations with its satellites in

Eastern Europe. In 1989 it looks quite possible that Eastern European countries may assume more independent positions in international fora. Nevertheless, this analysis will compare the CO2 production of Warsaw Pact countries with the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to see if they are likely to support the same criteria for holding nations accountable. At this point in time, a comprehensive accounting system tallying the costs and benefits that a country can expect from future climate change is out of reach given the high level of uncertainty of the extent and timing of future climate change.

It is difficult to assess what bearing the varying effects of climate change should have on the question of how much a

reasonable to consider expected boosts to a country's agriculture from climate change when analyzing allocative criteria or deciding how much wealthier countries should contribute towards the building of adaptive technology in developing countries.

It is likely that accounting systems that rank countries by causality will take on a new importance in environmental negotiations. In part because of the potential divisiveness of the accountability question, different accounting

frameworks should win attention in and of themselves rather than as data accompanying policy proposals."

For the first time, industrial development may be held up in an international forum as a negative rather than a positive accomplishment. This may have an impact on some of the

world's countries that have long found themselves on the bottom of the list in terms of conventional measurements of national prosperity. Countries such as Bangladesh and Guinea Bissau will find themselves at the head of the list of

countries that have managed to avoid overburdening the

atmosphere with carbon dioxide. China, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay may discover themselves viewed as exemplary in their ability to sustain a comparatively high life expectancy relative to their level of fossil fuel consumption. The

accounting framework may in some measure help all nations to see that the industrialized countries' past successes are now inverted as the West wonders what price it will have to pay'

for its current level of development.

On the other hand, efforts to assess accountability during negotiations over an atmosphere treaty could be

divisive, paralleling the controversies over force levels that have plagued arms control negotiations. Throughout much of the strategic arms limitation talks in the 1980s, the United

States advocated reducing nuclear arsenals on the basis of missile throwweight because it emphasized the Soviet Union's comparative advantage and therefore called for greater

reductions from its opponent. In the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the United States has called for a ban on mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, which are deployed only by the Soviet Union, whereas Moscow has favored placing restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles, products

of the U.S. missile modernization program.'

The problem of global climate change naturally gives rise to opportunities for similar posturing. Some countries may find it in their interest to support an inventory of carbon dioxide that takes into account historical release of the gas while others will be likely to promote an inventory that just measures the current level of release. Countries will also differ in their support for criteria formulating future

regulations. Some may advocate curbing fossil fuel use but ignoring emissions from deforestation and land clearing. Countries large in area may prefer an allocative criteria of carbon dioxide per unit of land area, whereas populous

countries would find it in their interest to advocate

regulations based on per capita carbon dioxide production. Countries may also disagree as to the relation between a

country's affluence and its responsibility to adhere to a set of regulations. Countries with a very low GNP per capita may ask to be exempted from participating in an international regulatory regime and, conversely, countries that have a high GNP relative to their carbon dioxide release, may expect to be rewarded for their "carbon dioxide efficiency." The

possibilities for rational disagreement over accountability are great indeed.

Chapter Two: The Accounts

Carbon dioxide is only one of several gases that play an important role in trapping heat near the earth's surface to create the "greenhouse effect," but as it is countable and the most prolific, it may be logical to start greenhouse gas

accounting here. The remaining greenhouse gases, methane, nitrous oxides, tropospheric ozone and chlorofluorocarbons, make up less than half of the total greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Nitrous oxides and methane are the products of a variety of agricultural activities that are difficult to

inventory. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are an important greenhouse gas, but because they originate solely from

commercial products that have been available only in the last few decades, counting them has been relatively unproblematic. Since 1985, about two dozen countries have been meeting to share information on CFC production levels.1

Thus far, very little work has been completed drawing up

inventories of CO2 production for individual countries. Data are usually aggregated to the global or regional level and used to forecast the magnitude of future warming given current production levels and trends. Greg Marland and Ralph Rotty have published careful inventories of annual CO2 production

for all countries of the world, but the scope of their data is confined to emissions from fossil fuel use since 1950.2

However, to give a reasonable estimate of countries' total anthropogenic production, it is essential to count CO2 release

from biotic sources as well as from fuel consumption, since CO2 release from land clearing comprises most of the CO2 produced by some countries (See Table 2.1)

In addition, the post-1950 time frame is too brief to adequately count countries' contribution to the problem of excess CO2 in the atmosphere because, unlike conventional

pollutants plaguing urban areas, carbon dioxide remains in the troposphere for many decades." Many countries released a

significant amount of CO2 before 1950, and for many nations

the increase in production has not been linear or predictable. Therefore, the post 1950 measure provides only a partial

picture.

The CO2 inventory offered here is the first attempt to

present an inventory of CO2 production aggregated by country

that includes CO2 emissions from land clearing and

deforestation as well as from fuel consumption. Where data are available, the accounts include countries' emissions from 1860 to 1986. Even so, the inventories cannot be considered definitive given that some of the data is spotty, particularly

in the area of carbon released from deforestation.

The cumulative carbon dioxide account provides this analyst's best estimate of the amount of carbon dioxide that

each country in the world has emitted since 1860. The decade beginning in 1860 marks a notable increase in

industrialization in Europe and in the keeping of statistics recording that industrialization. This period marked an increase in forest exploitation as well as fossil fuel

consumption as Europe experienced a boost in population and trade accompanying a general integration of the world

economy'.

The database includes carbon dioxide release from fossil fuel consumption and land clearing between 1860 and 1986 for 130 countries. Fossil fuel consumption between 1860 and 1949 was estimated by counting production and imports minus exports

for hard coal, brown coal, petroleum and natural gas. Fuels were counted in the countries where they were consumed, not where they were produced, although it could be argued that a weighted measure should be placed on fuel exporting countries

for they have enjoyed profits from other countries' fuel consumption.

This count omitted estimates of carbon dioxide release from cement production for this information was not available for this period. The source used was B.R. Mitchell's

International Historical Statisticss. Data on fossil fuel consumption in Asia and Africa during the early twentieth century is incomplete. There exist production figures but Mitchell does not include import and export levels for

Kuwait, Indonesia, and Iran--were substantial. In an attempt to adjust for this lack, petroleum consumption figures were estimated based on Marland et al's post-1950 carbon production

figures. For information on the coefficients used to convert fossil fuel consumption into carbon dioxide release, see

Appendix A. Carbon Dioxide release from fossil fuel

consumption after 1950 was based entirely on Marland et al's work. They estimate that the uncertainty of their annual

global CO2 estimates derived from the UN's energy data is

approximately 6 percent to 10 percent. Nevertheless, their data are recognized as the best estimates available.

Carbon dioxide release from land clearing was estimated by using the extensive data listed in J.F. Richards, Jerry S.

Olson, Ralph M. Rotty, "Development of a Data Base for Carbon Dioxide Releases Resulting from Conversion of Land to

Agricultural Uses."6 This estimate may underestimate carbon

release from biotic sources because it is restricted to information on land clearing for agricultural purposes, and for most European countries, with the exception of France and the United Kingdom, arable land was substantially

underreported.7 As they have included land that has reverted to forest and woodland, they list negative carbon release rates for some countries where carbon uptake from biota has been significant. Several studies include release estimates from deforestation as well as changing land-use, such as

volumes but unlike Richards et al, they are not aggregated on

the country level.8 However, Roger Revelle and Walter Munk's

estimate, which assumes a simple correlation between growth in human population and rate of deforestation, yields an estimate

very close to that of Richards et al.' For more information

on the biota data base, see Appendix A.

In order to take into account recent carbon dioxide release through deforestation and land clearing in the

tropics, a separate list was compiled based on estimates of deforestation of forest and woodland (open and closed) in the tropics from the FAO/UNEP Tropical Forest Resources Assessment Project, 1981.'0 FAO data, rather than Richards et al, was used to estimate biota release between 1978-1986 for the forty tropical countries covered in the FAO assessment. The

methodology differs from that of Richards et al in that carbon uptake through biotic sinks was not recorded. This

difference, however, should not be significant in that the forty tropical countries covered in the FAO survey have accomplished very little afforestation in the last decade.

The FAO estimate is comparable to the aggregated total reported by the 1985 International Task Force convened by the World Resources Institute, The World Bank and the United

Nations Development Program, but about 40 percent lower than Norman Myers's 1980 estimate." The deforestation data may be

regarded as conservative for many countries given that

the tropics has accelerated since 1980. For instance, the FAO estimates that 11.3 million hectares of tropical forest are

lost each year, while recent satellite data from Brazil indicates that 8 million hectares of forest were cleared in 1987 in the Brazilian Amazon alone.12 The FAO inventory was chosen because it is the most recent and comprehensive data compiled by an international organization. For more

explanation of the deforestation data, see Appendix A.

If countries accept an accounts system that includes CO2 release from land clearing as well as fossil fuel consumption, countries should develop more accurate means for assessing

area and variety of biota. A comprehensive land use

accounting system would tally all factors in stock's rate of carbon mitigation: the type of trees and plant matter; and the age and growth rate of the stock. Such improvements are envisioned by the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, which intends to use many technologies to explore the

biosphere."

In this accounting framework, historical releases of carbon were not discounted; in the approach used here, a ton of carbon released in 1860 counts as much as a ton released in

1986. This assumption ignores the life-cycle of carbon

molecules released from human activities. In carbon's 500+ year journey between the biosphere, atmosphere and

hydrosphere, residence in the troposphere is relatively brief compared to the time spent as dissolved carbonate in the

oceans. 14 Nonetheless, this analysis will not enter into the scientific debate over the length of carbon's atmospheric half-life.

Some analysts would favor assigning a social discount rate for past emissions irrespective of the length of the carbon half-life. The higher the discount rate, the less

accountable would be Europe and North America, which are

responsible for a higher proportion of the historical release. A social discount rate could be justified with the argument

that the current generation in a country should not be wholly responsible for the emissions of earlier generations of

citizens. On the other hand, it is common in international affairs to view other countries along an historical continuum.

The generational question of how much contemporaries are responsible for deeds of their predecessors may be no simpler in the environmental arena than it has been in the political. Economists have not yet seriously tackled the question of how, or if, to discount past CO2 release, although several are

discussing the ethics of discounting future benefits and costs. Ralph C. d'Arge, William D. Schulze, and David

Brookshire, have looked at the choice of discount rate under several ethical systems." They conclude that the market rate of return as a discount rate only holds in cases where actual compensation takes place between generations. Along this line of thinking, one might suggest that since earlier

born, for the harms they have visited on us from their CO2

release, they acted unethical, albeit unwittingly. If this is the case, one might ask why the citizens of one country should be responsible for the actions of another. In fact,

generations now living have profited from the carbon-producing activities of older and earlier generations of countrymen.

While this analysis has avoided using a discount rate, the historical fossil-fuel CO2 release data has been compiled

in decade increments so that different periods can be easily discounted. The data on CO2 release from biota will be more

difficult to discount because source data was organized into just three periods: 1860-1920, 1920-1978, and 1979-1986.

Table 2.1

Proportion of Carbon Release from Fossil Fuels (million metric tons)

Carbon

from Carbon Ratio Fossil Fuel from Biota Fuels Av. 1980s Av.1980s to Total

1 Madagascar 0.3 20.6 0.01 2 Chad 0.1 2.3 0.02 3 Eq. Guinea 0.0 0.5 0.03 4 Cambodia 0.1 3.4 0.03 5 Ivory Coast 1.2 39.7 0.03 6 Belize 0.0 1.2 0.03 7 Nicaragua 0.6 16.6 0.03 8 Zaire 0.9 24.7 0.04 9 Liberia 0.2 6.3 0.04 10 Honduras 0.5 13.0 0.04 11 Benin 0.1 2.3 0.05 12 Burkina 0.1 1.8 0.06 13 Costa Rica 0.6 8.9 0.06 14 Malawi 0.1 1.8 0.07 15 Guatemala 1.0 12.3 0.08 16 Burundi 0.0 0.5 0.08 17 C.A.R. 0.0 0.5 0.08 18 Guinea 0.3 2.7 0.09 19 Bolivia 1.1 11.9 0.09 20 Suriname 0.0 0.4 0.09 21 Ecuador 4.6 46.6 0.09 22 Togo 0.1 1.1 0.09 23 Columbia 12.1 112.3 0.10 24 Congo 0.3 3.0 0.10 25 Burma 1.6 14.0 0.10 26 Uganda 0.2 1.4 0.10 27 Sri Lanka 1.1 7.9 0.12 28 Peru 5.1 37.0 0.12 29 Cameroon 1.5 11.0 0.12 30 Ethiopia 0.5 3.1 0.14 31 Niger 0.2 1.1 0.14 32 Sudan 1.1 5.6 0.16 33 Panama 0.8 4.2 0.16

34 Papua New Guinea 0.7 3.0 0.18

35 Brazil 46.9 202.8 0.19 36 Philippines 9.3 39.9 0.19 37 Malaysia 8.2 34.0 0.19 38 Mali 0.1 0.4 0.20 39 Nigeria 11.1 41.1 0.21 40 Rwanda 0.1 0.3 0.22 41 Indonesia 24.6 82.2 0.23 42 Mozambique 0.5 1.7 0.23

Table 2.1 (continued)

Proportion of Carbon Release from Fossil Fuels (million metric tons)

Carbon from Carbon Ratio Fossil Fuel from Biota Fuels Av. 1980s Av.1980s to Total

43 Gabon 0.7 2.1 0.24 44 Tanzania 0.5 1.4 0.25 45 Thailand 11.7 33.6 0.26 46 Ghana 0.7 1.8 0.27 47 Paraguay 0.4 1.0 0.28 48 Gambia 0.0 0.1 0.30 49 Somalia 0.3 0.6 0.32 50 Botswana 0.3 0.6 0.33 51 Kenya 1.3 2.6 0.34 52 Vietnam 4.8 8.9 0.35 53 Afghanistan 0.6 1.0 0.36 54 Nepal 0.2 0.3 0.36 55 Guyana 0.4 0.7 0.36 56 El Salvador 0.5 0.7 0.42 57 Mexico 73.7 81.5 0.47 58 Fr. Guyana 0.1 0.1 0.50 59 Haiti 0.2 0.2 0.50 60 Mauritania 0.1 0.1 0.50 61 Senegal 0.6 0.6 0.51 62 Zambia 0.9 0.8 0.52 63 Pakistan 10.6 9.5 0.53 64 Chile 6.0 5.3 0.53 65 Venezuela 25.0 17.1 0.59 66 Australia 58.6 38.9 0.60 67 Sierra Leone 1.5 0.8 0.65 68 New Zealand 5.0 2.3 0.68 69 Bangladesh 2.5 1.1 0.69 70 Zimbabwe 2.8 1.2 0.70 71 Uruguay 1.2 0.5 0.70 72 Argentina 26.4 10.9 0.71 73 Hong Kong 5.7 2.3 0.71 74 Angola 7.2 1.9 0.79 75 Turkey 26.3 5.8 0.82 76 Dominican Rep. 1.9 0.4 0.82 77 Canada 108.9 19.9 0.85 78 India 117.2 19.6 0.86 79 Morocco 4.7 0.6 0.89 80 Cuba 8.8 0.9 0.91 81 Mongolia 2.0 0.2 0.91 82 Bulgaria 31.4 2.5 0.93 83 Tunisia 2.9 0.2 0.94 84 Soviet Union 942.0 51.0 0.95 85 South Africa 78.8 3.9 0.95 86 Yugoslavia 31.4 1.5 0.95

Table 2.1 (continued)

Proportion of Carbon Release from Fossil Fuels (million metric tons)

Carbon from Carbon Fossil Fuel from Biota

Av. 1980s Av.1980s Ratio Fuels to Total 87 Algeria 11.3 0.5 0.96 88 China 467.0 19.3 0.96 89 Iraq 7.5 0.3 0.96 90 Portugal 7.8 0.3 0.96 91 Albania 2.8 0.1 0.97 92 Greece 15.0 0.5 0.97 93 Finland 12.7 0.4 0.97 94 Poland 118.7 3.1 0.97 95 United States 1192.6 21.8 0.98 96 Iran 29.6 0.5 0.98 97 Syria 6.8 0.1 0.99 98 Libya 7.0 0.1 0.99 99 Norway 8.3 0.1 0.99 100 Egypt 16.3 0.1 0.99 101 Romania 54.3 0.3 0.99 102 Spain 52.6 0.2 1.00 103 United Kingdom 151.6 0.1 1.00 104 Kuwait 6.6 0.0 1.00 105 Trin./To. 4.3 0.0 1.00 106 East Germany 86.8 -0.0 1.00 107 Singapore 8.2 0.0 1.00 108 Israel 6.6 0.0 1.00 109 North Korea 31.6 0.0 1.00 110 Hungary 22.2 0.0 1.00 111 Switzerland 10.8 0.0 1.00 112 Jordan 2.0 0.0 1.00 113 South Korea 39.7 - 0.0 1.00 114 Jamaica 1.7 0.0 1.00 115 UAR 5.3 0.0 1.00 116 Netherlands 33.8 0.0 1.00 117 Guinea Bissau 0.0 0.0 1.00 118 Iceland 0.5 0.0 1.00 119 Japan 252.6 -0.1 1.00 120 West Germany 190.4 -0.1 1.00 121 Czechoslovakia 65.7 -0.1 1.00 122 Saudi Arabia 26.5 -0.1 1.00 123 Denmark 15.8 -0.1 1.01 124 Belgium 29.2 -0.2 1.01 125 Italy 97.1 -1.0 1.01 126 Austria 14.6 -0.2 1.01 127 Ireland 7.0 -0.1 1.01 128 France 111.5 -1.9 1.02 130 Puerto Rico 3.7 -0.1 1.03 131 Sweden 16.8 -0.5 1.03

Chapter Three: Accountability

The analysis considers three allocative criteria for assessing accountability for net anthropogenic release of carbon (hereafter called carbon production): total national carbon release, per capita release, and release per unit of land area. These criteria are considered for two time frames, cumulative release from 1860 and current release based on mean production during the 1980s.

Denominator

Numerator Nation Capita Area

Co2 (current) a c e

Co2, (cumulative) b d f

a. Current CO2 production (mean 1980s) b. Cumulative CO2 production (1860-1986)

c. Per capita CO2 release based on current production

d. Per capita CO2 release based on cumulative production,

current population

e. Per land area CO2 release based on current production

f. Per land area CO2 release based on cumulative production

and current boundaries

NATIONAL PRODUCTION

The national release criteria, which measures countries' total carbon released through human activities, is an

countries that produce the most carbon dioxide in absolute terms. Many countries may expect the largest countries to reduce the most, even if these countries do not have the

greatest per capita release. On problems ranging from nuclear proliferation to transboundary pollution, many countries have

called for the largest producers to take the first steps to curb a problem before asking the rest of the world to accept restrictions. Such was the case in the Treaty on the Long Range Transport of Air Pollution when several countries with small relative emissions announced that they would not take part while large countries such as the United Kingdom do not act.'

The national release criteria, however, is limited and arguably unfair. Since several of the greatest producers are not the top producers according to a per capita or per area criteria, the assessment would tend to discriminate against citizens of the largest producing countries. If the

steepest reductions must come from the chief producers, the United States and the Soviet Union, Americans and Soviets will be held to a higher standard, because their per capita and per area consumption is actually lower than that of many nations.

PER CAPITA PRODUCTION

An egalitarian model for assessing accountability may seek to assign restrictions to countries such that citizens of each nation are treated equitably. The most obvious

alternative is a

per capita assessment.

Such a criteria

was in fact used in the Montreal Protocol to Protect the

Stratospheric Ozone Layer. A per capita test was used to set

national emission limits of .3 kilograms chlorofluorocarbons

(CFCs) per person in developing countries. Analysts are

already suggesting a per capita carbon criteria as an

appropriate measure for assigning responsibility for future

reductions.2

PER AREA PRODUCTION

An alternative to the per capita criteria, a carbon

dioxide per land area criteria for setting reduction limits

might at first appear to be an unconventional, if not

outlandish, alternative but it is one worthy of consideration.

While there are no precedents for holding countries or states

responsible for any pollutant based on the relation between

emission level and the area of their jurisdiction, the land

area criteria should be given careful consideration.

For

one, carbon dioxide is not released just through industrial

activities, but the land gives rise to carbon dioxide through

deforestation and land clearing. In this respect, the global

warming problem is different from other pollution concerns

that stem from the residuals of industrial activities.

Several of the major emitters of CO2 during this century, such

as Colombia, have been countries with vast tropical forests

but little industry. Nineteen percent of the net

anthropogenic release of carbon dioxide released during the 1980s resulted from land clearing and deforestation rather than fossil fuel consumption (See Table 2.1).

Statistical analysis reveals that land area is actually more closely correlated with carbon dioxide release than is population on a current as well as cumulative basis (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2). This is not to suggest that there is a significant correlation between land and CO2 on a unit basis. Indeed, the comparison does not account for other significant factors; it may be that land area correlates with carbon

dioxide because the countries with larger land areas also tend to be more affluent and have a larger industrial base.

Nevertheless, the fact that the larger, rather than more populous countries tend to produce relatively more CO2, and

the smaller countries relatively less, may suggest that a baseline land-based CO2 target could be set and the countries

at the extremes of high and low-CO₂ per land area would not be as distant from the target limit as would occur under a CO2 per capita criteria. A look at the range of ratios for land area versus population does affirm that there is a slightly narrower range for land area than population ratios

(carbon/land, population/land).

TIME FRAME OF PRODUCTION

In addition to the allocative criteria, an important component of accountability is the time frame of carbon

release. The rankings change markedly when considering cumulative (1860-1986) rather than current (mean 1980s)

release. Either choice is bound to be controversial.

The list of fifteen top carbon dioxide producers in the 1980s includes the nine largest countries in land area and the ten most populous countries (See Table 3.3). Few European countries appear on the list. West Germany, in the sixth position, has the highest output of the European countries. The United States, the Soviet Union and China, which head the list, are the world's largest coal producers.

The fifteen largest producers, considering cumulative release, represent the great powers of the mid-twentieth

century, including all of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The list includes all of the

largest countries in land area and GNP (See Table 3.4). It varies from the current index in that the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Australia move down several notches while

Brazil, China and Japan move up (For rankings of countries by current/cumulative production ratios, see Table 3.5).

Proponents of a current CO2 account may argue that

countries should not be held accountable for activities that preceded widespread scientific agreement over the Greenhouse Effect hypothesis. They may cite the scientific debate over the half-life of carbon in the atmosphere to justify

discounting or dismissing historical CO2 releases. In

their citizens should not be unduly burdened with the debt of previous generations. They could argue that most of the

countries that rank high on the cumulative account have slowed their rate of population growth and the current generation

should not have to carry a greater burden because it reduced its rate of growth. For example, Great Britain, which is currently the eighth greatest producer of carbon dioxide, is the third ranking country on the cumulative index. As it is nearing zero population growth, the current generation would have to compensate for past production relatively more than would, for example, Brazil and Mexico, which have burgeoning population growth.

In addition, some developing countries could oppose being held accountable for historic CO2 releases because many

developing countries were earlier under colonial authority. Several developing countries, including India, Zimbabwe, and Zaire, produced relatively more CO2 earlier in the century

than they do presently. A number of countries could argue that they should not be held accountable for carbon dioxide releases from land clearing that was overseen by colonial powers to provide exports for European markets.

Proponents of a cumulative CO2 count could argue that

historical contributions are sizable and countries that profited by the industrialization that accompanied those releases should be held accountable for them. A cumulative release index holds the industrialized world, particularly the

more ecologically-conscious nations (The Greens), more

accountable. It does not appear to change the rank order of centrally-planned Europe in relation to the western

democracies, nor does it change the ordering of Canada and the Soviet Union, the two countries that stand to gain from

climate change.

Groups' Share of Global Release

Current Cumulative

Release Release

Developing Countries 39 % 30 %

Centrally Planned Europe 22 % 19 %

Greens 49 % 63 %

Winners (USSR & Canada) 18 % 19 %

The cumulative time frame, therefore, fulfills the

fairness criteria for three of the four categories. It holds the more affluent and environmentally-conscious countries more accountable while not giving any significant advantage to East or West.

Considering the allocative indices--per capita and per area release--along with the two time frames makes for more interesting results. The four criteria can be evaluated for each of the four fairness criteria.

NORTH--SOUTH RELATIONS

The index that holds the South less accountable is the cumulative per capita account. Developing countries, defined

here as countries with less than $4,000 GNP per capita, have produced less carbon on a cumulative per capita basis than they have by any of the other measures (See Tables 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9). They have produced only 35 percent of the mean cumulative per capita release rate. Developing countries' proportion of production on the cumulative per capita index contrasts with 47 percent by the cumulative per area index, 49 percent of the mean per capita of current release, and 66

percent of the carbon currently released per area.' This

broad-based analysis is confirmed by looking at the top ranked countries for each criteria: few developing countries appear

towards the top of the cumulative per capita list while a number of Latin American and African countries dominate the

current per capita list.

While the cumulative per capita index holds developing countries less accountable overall, this index should not be uniformly popular in the developing world. While sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, Asia are least accountable by

this index, Middle Eastern and North African countries should prefer an area criteria based on current release rates.

Generally, the larger more sparsely populated countries would support a land-based criteria and the densely populated

countries would support a population-based criteria. Most countries, however, would have the same allocative preference regardless of whether current or cumulative emissions are considered.

While GNP per capita has been used as the measure of

affluence in this analysis, GNP is not an ideal measurement of a nation's prosperity. Many development economists believe that GNP is an inadequate measure of a nation's affluence since it does not measure the distribution of resources or investment in necessities such as nutrition and health care. One might expect that life expectancy would increase with the activities that accompany carbon dioxide

production--industrialization and land clearing. Instead, a comparison of CO2 production and life expectancy reveals that there is very

little relation between longevity and carbon dioxide

production. The coefficient for correlation between CO2 and

life expectancy is lower than it is for the other statistics--energy, GNP, population and land area. Individuals might find this tendency disturbing; longevity is highly valued by most people. As the threat of global climate change may usher in an extensive debate over the ultimate benefits of

industrialization, it may be appropriate to recall that industrialization brings an assortment of health problems. Several industrialized countries have experienced a decline in life expectancy during the last decade, and it is not known if the younger generations that have grown up in the heavily

polluted regions of the world will live as long as the current retirement generation.

Even so, life expectancy is unlikely to emerge as an

usually of major concern to the policy maker. Government

leaders are held accountable for the rise and fall of GNP, the trade balance and the consumer price index, but rarely fail to stay in office because of stagnant life expectancy. They will probably not welcome, for example, increased health care aid

or sanitation facilities from industrialized countries in return for cutting fossil fuel consumption or preserving tropical forests.

Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that life expectancy would be accepted as a test during climate change

negotiations. It may not be fair to use longevity, rather than GNP per capita, as an affluence measure by requiring

countries with a longer life expectancy to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions by a larger amount than demanded of the

countries with a lower life expectancy.

EAST--WEST RELATIONS

Of the four accounts, the two current indices hold the East roughly as accountable as the West. Under these

measures, which compare individuals' mean carbon production within the blocs with that of the rest of the world, the Soviet Union and its chief allies produce proportionately about the same as the western countries., In contrast, when considering cumulative carbon production under the area and capita criteria, the East is accountable at about half the

between the time frames, not because the East's output relative to the rest of the world has changed a great deal during the century, but because the West's relative

contribution has declined by so much.

It is arguable whether the current indices, which measure equivalent production in both East and West, identify a fair measure given that Soviet bloc countries have lower GNPs than the western nations. At the same time, however, it may not seem reasonable to use the cumulative indices to deem the Soviet bloc countries only half as accountable as the West.

Ironically, it would be in both superpowers' interest, since they are sparsely settled, to support an area-based criteria whereas their respective European allies should prefer a per capita assessment. A Soviet area-preference would be magnified if Moscow worried about major

industrialization in China, for any population based criteria could give China ample room to expand its fossil fuel

consumption. As noted above, however, the choice between an area or a population based criteria should not be contentious for superpower relations as either criteria holds both blocs similarly accountable.

GREENS' ACCOUNTABILITY

The cumulative CO2 per capita measure holds most

accountable those countries whose leaders have been the most outspoken in advocating international measures to curb climate

change or that have the strongest environmental movement.5 By this criteria, citizens of the fifteen nations here defined as

"Green" countries produce almost five times more carbon than the global mean. Ranking highest (five of the top seven

producers) are the United Kingdom and her closest allies (and largest former colonies)--the United States, Canada, New

Zealand and Australia. The current per capita criteria also measures high production levels for these countries, with the two area criteria falling to third and fourth place.

The Greens, particularly Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all expressed a willingness to take part in international negotiations. The United States is considering unilateral measures, proposing debt-for-nature swaps to prevent deforestation, and investing

resources in research. The climate change issue is also receiving attention at the highest level of British

government, with Margaret Thatcher seeking to play an international leadership role. Australia has devoted

considerable resources to research on potential impacts of global warming on that region. Canada has also taken a strong

interest in international environmental issues, providing leadership at UNEP and hosting negotiations preceding the stratospheric ozone treaty.

WINNERS' ACCOUNTABILITY

international fora which countries may stand to lose the most from rising sea levels or changing weather patterns. This may be sensible in light of the great uncertainty associated with

forecasting future costs of climate change, and the potential divisiveness of the subject. Nevertheless, it may be useful

to consider the relative accountability of the two countries that the rest of the world may view as standing to gain from climate change. Canada and the Soviet Union, where warming may extend the growing season in the northern reaches, are the

only countries that are expected to enjoy tangible economic benefits from climate change. Canada sits at the top of the list of the cumulative per capita index and the Soviet Union is also among the major producers at position thirteen.

ACCOUNTS SUMMARY

The four allocative criteria can be assessed across the board by using the four fairness criteria to compare each groups' accountability relative to the global mean.6

Mean CO2 Production by Group and Measure

Current Cumulative

Capita Area Capita Area

Developing Countries .49 .66 .35 .47

Centrally Planned Europe 2.68 1.17 2.24 .95

Greens 3.09 1.49 4.72 2.16

Fairness of Measures by Group (1 = most fair, 4 = least fair)

---North--South (bias) 3 4 1 2

East--West (lack of bias) 1 1 2 2

Greens 2 4 1 3

Winners 1 2 1 2

-- - -- -- -- - - -- - - --- - -- ----

-Totals: 7 11 5 9

The "Winners" and "East--West" categories were only ranked from 1 to 2 because for two categories there was no significant difference in accountability. Scaling down the rankings in these cases also served to give more weight to the affluence criteria, which distinguishes the developing

countries from the rest of the world. Of course, policy

makers may choose to give these criteria different weights, or substitute different criteria altogether. In any case, these objective rankings provide a simple means to evaluate these groups' accountability.

In the beginning of the chapter, the efficacy of holding accountable the largest carbon producers was discussed. Now that more egalitarian criteria--per capita and per area

measures--have been evaluated, it may be useful to see how the allocative criteria order the largest producers.

The cumulative per capita criteria does the best job of holding more accountable the larger producers. The top

account for two thirds of the carbon that has been released since 1860. The top producers in the current per capita index account for less than one half, while both area criteria

yielded less than a quarter of total carbon release for the top fifteen producers.

Percentage of Total

Released by Fifteen Highest Ranking Countries

---- ---Current Cumulative ---Nation 73 % 79 % ---Capita 46 % 66 % Area 16 % 23 % PRODUCTIVITY

The analysis so far has concentrated on identifying

measures of accountability that appear fair according to a number of criteria. It identified a per capita criteria

based on cumulative carbon release as the superior choice by most of the fairness criteria. In the process, the accounting

framework neglected the economists' foremost objective--efficiency.

To examine the relation between CO2 productivity and the

allocative criteria, the high and low rankings in each

allocative category were considered ("productivity" applies to the level of output that has been attained with each unit of CO2 produced). While this analysis is limited to only forty

developing and twenty industrialized countries. First,

carbon/GNP was examined for the ten countries that produce the most carbon dioxide on a per capita basis. Then, carbon/GNP was analyzed for the ten countries that produce the most

carbon dioxide on a per land area basis. These relations were considered separately for cumulative and current carbon

production (See Tables 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 for rankings by C0₂/energy and C0₂/GNP). It was found that, taking into account cumulative carbon release, those countries that would theoretically favor a population-based criteria tend to have higher levels of CO2 productivity. They have a higher level

of national output relative to the amount of carbon dioxide that they produce. Therefore, a population-based criteria would tend to reward those countries that have a higher GNP per unit of CO2 produced. This pattern holds true for

developing countries as well as industrialized countries. The results were more ambiguous when current carbon

production was considered. In this case, the capita criteria similarly held the less productive developing countries more accountable but in contrast to the cumulative criteria, the industrialized countries held most accountable were equally as productive as the least accountable countries.

Productivity of Most Accountable Countries (Top Ten Carbon Producers)

Current Cumulative

Capita Area Capita Area Developing

Countries 2 1 2 1

Industrialized

Countries * * 2 1

Productivity of Least Accountable Countries (Bottom Ten Carbon Producers)

Current Cumulative

Capita Area Capita Area Developing

Countries 1 2 1 2

Industrialized

Countries * * 1 2

---*

= no distinction between criteria 1 = more productive countries

2 = less productive countries

It shall be left up to policy makers to decide whether the "CO2 productive" countries should be rewarded for their efficiency when assessing CO2 accountability, or if they

should be taxed or regulated more heavily for possessing the advantage of productivity. A third approach is to refrain from using productivity measures in setting policy guidelines and to instead analyze the productivity coefficients simply as a measure of countries' progress towards using labor,

Table 3.1 Correlation: Current Carbon Release

Variables

Energy Use--CO2 Release

GNP--C02 Release

Land Area--CO2 Release Energy Use (per

capita)--CO2 Release (per capita)

GNP (per capita)--C02 (per capita)

Population--CO₂

Life Expectancy--CO2 (per capita)

r 2 .98 .85 .60 .44 .32 .26 .24 Number of Observations 130 133 134 119 102 119 128

Table 3.2 Correlation: Cumulative Carbon Release (1860-1986)

Number of

Variables r2 Observations

Energy Use--CO2 Release .92 128

Energy Use (per

capita)--CO2 Release (per capita) .47 126

GNP--CO₂ .46 127

Land Area--CO2 .41 128

Life Expectancy--CO2 (per capita) .25 125 Life Expectancy--CO2 Release from

Fuels (per capita) .34 127

(All C02 statistics are historical; all others are 1986 figures)

Table 3.3 Rankings by Current Carbon Release (Average 1980s Release) Carbon Release million tons Running Total 1 United States 1214.39 0.20 2 Soviet Union 992.96 0.36 3 China 486.29 0.43 4 Japan 252.49 0.47 5 Brazil 249.70 0.52 6 West Germany 190.33 0.55 7 Mexico 155.21 0.57 8 United Kingdom 151.66 0.60 9 India 136.81 0.62 10 Canada 128.83 0.64 11 Columbia 124.37 0.66 12 Poland 121.84 0.68 13 France 109.60 0.70 14 Indonesia 106.83 0.71 15 Australia 97.53 0.73 16 Italy 96.14 0.74 17 East Germany 86.84 0.76 18 South Africa 82.74 0.77 19 Czechoslovakia 65.61 0.78 20 Romania 54.63 0.79 21 Spain 52.79 0.80 22 Nigeria 52.20 0.81 23 Ecuador 51.16 0.82 24 Philippines 49.21 0.82 25 Thailand 45.30 0.83 26 Malaysia 42.21 0.84 27 Venezuela 42.11 0.84 28 Peru 42.06 0.85 29 Ivory Coast 40.87 0.86 30 South Korea 39.73 0.86 31 Argentina 37.27 0.87 32 Bulgaria 33.93 0.88 33 Netherlands 33.80 0.88 34 Yugoslavia 32.93 0.89 35 Turkey 32.11 0.89 36 North Korea 31.63 0.90 37 Iran 30.13 0.90 38 Belgium 29.01 0.91 39 Saudi Arabia 26.44 0.91 40 Zaire 25.64 0.91 41 Hungary 22.17 0.92 42 Madagascar 20.87 0.92 43 Pakistan 20.11 0.92 44 Nicaragua 17.20 0.93 45 Egypt 16.41 0.93

Table 3.3 Rankings by Current Carbon Release (Average 1980s Release)

---Carbon Release Running million tons Total %

---47 Denmark 15.71 0.94 48 Burma 15.57 0.94 49 Greece 15.46 0.94 50 Austria 14.36 0.94 51 Vietnam 13.74 0.94 52 Honduras 13.51 0.95 53 Guatemala 13.34 0.95 54 Finland 13.07 0.95 55 Bolivia 13.04 0.95 56 Cameroon 12.53 0.96 57 Algeria 11.76 0.96 58 Chile 11.29 0.96 59 Switzerland 10.79 0.96 60 Cuba 9.69 0.96 61 Costa Rica 9.47 0.96 62 Angola 9.07 0.97 63 Sri Lanka 8.97 0.97 64 Norway 8.40 0.97 65 Singapore 8.17 0.97 66 Portugal 8.14 0.97 67 Hong Kong 8.03 0.97 68 Iraq 7.80 0.97 69 New Zealand 7.29 0.97 70 Libya 7.07 0.98 71 Ireland 6.87 0.98 72 Syria 6.86 0.98 73 Sudan 6.69 0.98 74 Israel 6.61 0.98 75 Kuwait 6.57 0.98 76 Liberia 6.54 0.98 77 Morocco 5.33 0.98 78 UAR 5.31 0.98 79 Panama 5.01 0.98 80 Trin./Tobago 4.26 0.99 81 Zimbabwe 3.97 0.99 82 Kenya 3.94 0.99

83 Papua New Guinea 3.66 0.99

84 Ethiopia 3.61 0.99 85 Puerto Rico 3.59 0.99 86 Bangladesh 3.56 0.99 87 Cambodia 3.50 0.99 88 Congo 3.33 0.99 89 Tunisia 3.13 0.99 90 Guinea 2.96 0.99 91 Albania 2.89 0.99 92 Gabon 2.76 0.99

Table 3.3 Rankings by Current Carbon Release (Average 1980s Release)

Running Carbon Release Total

million tons _% 94 Benin 2.41 0.99 95 Chad 2.36 0.99 96 Sierra Leone 2.27 0.99 97 Dominican Republic 2.26 0.99 98 Mozambique 2.23 0.99 99 Mongolia 2.16 0.99 100 Jordan 1.96 1.00 101 Malawi 1.94 1.00 102 Burkina 1.91 1.00 103 Tanzania 1.87 1.00 104 Jamaica 1.74 1.00 105 Zambia 1.67 1.00 106 Uruguay 1.66 1.00 107 Afghanistan 1.56 1.00 108 Uganda 1.56 1.00 109 Paraguay 1.39 1.00 110 Niger 1.29 1.00 111 Belize 1.24 1.00 112 Togo 1.21 1.00 113 Senegal 1.21 1.00 114 El Salvador 1.20 1.00 115 Guyana 1.10 1.00 117 Botswana 0.90 1.00 118 Somalia 0.89 1.00 120 C.A.R. 0.54 1.00 121 Burundi 0.54 1.00 122 Eq. Guinea 0.51 1.00 123 Mali 0.50 1.00 124 Suriname 0.49 1.00 125 Nepal 0.47 1.00 126 Iceland 0.46 1.00 127 Haiti 0.40 1.00 128 Rwanda 0.39 1.00 129 Mauritania 0.29 1.00 130 Fr. Guyana 0.20 1.00 131 Gambia 0.14 1.00 132 Guinea Bissau 0.01 1.00 Total: 6204.56