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Gated communities, sustainable cities and a tragedy of

the urban commons

Renaud Le Goix, Chris Webster

To cite this version:

Renaud Le Goix, Chris Webster. Gated communities, sustainable cities and a tragedy of the urban commons. Critical Planning, UCLA / Department of Urban Planning, 2006, 13 (summer 2006), pp.41-64. �halshs-00110046�

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"#$%& '())*+,$,%-. -*-$#,+#/0% ',$,%- #+& # $1#2%&3 (4 $5% *1/#+ '())(+-

Renaud Le )oi, and -hris 1e2ster !"irst dra"t ! 01%200'(

*+,-.*. pu1lis3ed 5ersion ! 11%05%200'

8inal pu1lication ! 07%200' - ,E ./012 Renau82 an8 9:ris >( ?E@ABER( C.ate8 Eommunities2 sustainaHle Eities

an8 a trage8y oL t:e urHan Eommons(C 9ritiEal Planning2 no( 13 % Aummer 200' (200')Q A#s%rac%

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<=>>-+2;2*35 Using a theoretical approach that vie:s the private residential communit< as a EluH eEonomy= :e anal<>e ;0* L@,++2+A ,+. >,+,A2+A L1,<;2<*3 =C GDO A,;*. 1*32.*+;2,@ <=>>-+2;2*3 2+ ;0* !=3 P+A*@*3 ,1*,5 9023 2+N*3;2A,;2=+ .*>=+3;1,;*3 ;0,; L12N,;* -1?,+ A=N*1+,+<* 23 , @=<,@@B 3-3;,2+,?@* 3=@-;2=+ ;0,; >2A0; 0*@L 3;,?2@2Q* ;0* C2+,+<2+A =C -1?,+ A1=R;0( 1*.*N*@=L ,A2+A +*2A0?=10==.3( >,2+;,2+ 3=<2,@ .2N*132;B( <=+3*1N* +=+S1*+*R,?@* -1?,+ 1*3=-1<*3( ,+. *+<=-1,A* 1*2+N*3;>*+; 2+ -1?,+ 2+C1,3;1-<;-1*5 T=R*N*1( ;0*3* A,2+3 ,1* +=; >,.* R2;0=-; 3=<2,@ <=3;3 ,+. 3L2@@=N*135 71*,U2+A .=R+ >-+2<2L,@ >,+,A*>*+; 2+;= 3>,@@*1 -+2;3 >2A0; .*@2N*1 , >=1* *<=+=>2<,@@B 3-3;,2+,?@* -1?,+ 3B3;*> =+ ;0* R0=@*( ?-; =+@B ,; ;0* *ML*+3* =C >,1A2+,@2Q2+A ;0=3* *M<@-.*. C1=> ;0* <@-? *<=+=>B5 &+ ,..2;2=+( L12N,;* -1?,+ A=N*1+,+<* 23 3;2@@ .*L*+.*+; =+ 3;,;* 3-?32.B5 9023 +*R -1?,+ .B+,>2< R2@@ ?*<=>* >=1* 2>L=1;,+; ,3 L12N,;* ,33=<2,;2=+3 ,;;*>L; ;= 2+<1*,3* ;0* L-?@2< 3-?32.B =C ;0*21 ,<;2N2;2*3 ,+. >-+2<2L,@ A=N*1+>*+;3 @==U C=1 R,B3 ;= 1*.-<* ;0*21 @2,?2@2;2*3 ;01=-A0 L12N,;* 3*<;=1 L1=N2.*135

)n%roduc%ion

In the U@A= @outh ABrica= -hina= Cra>il and man< other countries= the spontaneous actions oB entrepreneurs have spa:ned a ne: ur2an product Dprivatel< governed ur2an neigh2orhoodsE that :ill have a maFor impact on the Borm and Bunction oB Buture cities. 1hether this phenomenon is economicall< and politicall< sustaina2le or not is the su2Fect oB this paper. 1

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L" $%&'( )e+aud( a+d /0ris 4. 6"789"). :$ated commu+ities( sustai+a?le cities a+d a traAedB oC t0e ur?a+ commo+s.: !"#$#%&'( )'&**#*+( +o. 13 F 8ummer GHHI JGHHIK. (

oppositio+( to t0e eCCicie+cB arAume+ts Cor Aati+A a+d priMate AoMer+a+ce( N0ic0 are ?ased o+ t0e assumptio+ t0at t0e pu?lic proMisio+ oC serMices leaMes pote+tial NelCare Aai+s u+realiOed JPoldMarB 1QQRK.

!s $et, no author has crossed these lines o2 de3ate to anal$4e the sustaina3ilit$ o2 the private cit$. In attempting this, ;e appl$ a theoretical approach that vie;s the private residential communit$ as a club economy to anal$4e t0e pla++i+A a+d ma+aAi+A practices oC G1Q Aated reside+tial commu+ities i+ t0e Los S+Aeles area <=e3ster >00>@.G 6e Cirst exami+e 0oN priMate commu+ities miA0t ?e proUsustai+a?ilitB tools. Vext( Ne co+sider N0et0er priMate AoMer+a+ce puts ur?a+ eWuili?rium at risX. Pi+allB( Ne a+alBOe 0oN priMate AoMer+a+ce miA0t i+deed lead to u+sustai+a?le local ur?a+ political eco+omies.

"#$%&'( )*++,-$'$(. &. & /#*-.,.'&$-&1$2$'3 '**2 $- +&-&4$-4 ,#1&- 4#*5'6

90is sectio+ exami+es 0oN ur?a+ territorial e+closure miA0t Bield sustai+a?le ?e+eCits to t0e citB. 90ere are seMeral u+derlBi+A 0Bpot0eses. /ompared to mu+icipalUscale AoMer+a+ce( microUscale collectiMe decisio+ maXi+A is made o+ t0e ?asis oC superior i+Cormatio+ a+d t0eoreticallB leads to a closer Cit ?etNee+ t0e dema+d Cor a+d supplB oC local pu?lic Aoods a+d serMices. 8eco+dlB( most local pu?lic Aoods are co+sumed ?B su?Usets oC t0e Nider pu?lic a+d are t0ereCore ?etter supplied as Yclu? AoodsY.3 60ere a Aood is co+sumed as part oC a Yclu?Y ?ut produced as a pu?lic Aood Cor t0e N0ole citB( co+Clicts oC i+terest Nill i+eMita?lB arise( tBpicallB leadi+A to oMer co+sumptio+. 9erritorial e+closure Ji.e. co+trolli+A accessK is a mec0a+ism Cor preMe+ti+A oMerU co+sumptio+ a+d premature deAradatio+ oC ur?a+ pu?lic Aoods. 90e alter+atiMes to territorial e+closure are reAulatio+( taxatio+( a+d i+Mestme+t( all oC N0ic0 i+cur costs a+d 0aMe side eCCects. /o+trolli+A access J+ot +ecessarilB restricti+A access( N0ic0 is diCCere+tK maB ?e a less costlB a+d more eCCectiMe mec0a+ism Cor preserMi+A reside+tial WualitB oC liCe.

90irdlB( reorAa+iOi+A a pu?lic citB i+to a citB oC clu?s maB i+crease Cu+ds Cor collectiMe Aoods. 60e+ propertB riA0ts oMer collectiMe Aoods are clearlB deCi+ed( Nit0 respo+si?ilities a+d

lia?ilities esta?lis0ed ?B laN( t0ere is a stro+Aer i+ce+tiMe to rei+Mest. $iMe+ t0e AroNt0 oC priMate commu+ities( it is clear t0at ma+B citiOe+s are Nilli+A to ?e Zdou?le taxed[ to acWuire ?etter e+Miro+me+tal co+ditio+s a+d serMices. \u+icipalities capitaliOe o+ t0is extra source oC reMe+ue ?B oCCUloadi+A respo+si?ilities to ]ome %N+ers Sssociatio+s J]%SsK. %+ t0e ot0er 0a+d( ]%Ss also attempt to capture Ae+eral tax reMe+ue Cor t0eir reside+ts.

(

),'#$#%&'-(.#*&*%#&'(&*/(0*1#",*20*$&'(343$&#*&5#'#$6(

^e?ates a?out Aated commu+ities are more a?out local territorial AoMer+a+ce t0a+ a?out Aates. _.8. ]ome %N+ers Sssociatio+s are microUAoMer+me+ts Nit0 t0ree ?asic c0aracteristics` elected ?oards act as +eiA0?or0ood decisio+ maXers( co+tracts AoMer+ reside+t[s ?e0aMior( a+d mo+t0lB Cees Ci+a+ce local ame+ities a+d serMices. 7B GHHH( oMer 1a b oC t0e _8 0ousi+A Nas co+tai+ed Nit0i+ t0ese commo+ i+terest deMelopme+ts( a+d t0e +um?er oC u+its i+ t0ese priMatelB AoMer+ed reside+tial sc0emes rose Crom cH1(HHH i+ 1QcH to 1I.3 millio+ i+ 1QQd J\cee+Oie GHH3( GHHaa( GHHa?K. &+ GHHG t0e /ommu+itB Sssociatio+ oC Smerica estimated t0at Rc millio+ Smerica+s

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LE $%&'( Renaud( and /hris 4. 6E78TER. :$ated communities( sustainable cities and a tragedB oC the urban commons.: Critical Planning( no. 13 / 8ummer G00I JG00IK.

Lere living in G31(000 communitB associations and that N0O oC all neL homes in maPor cities belonged to communitB associations J$lasQe( FrantQ( and 6ebster G00GK.

The rapid groLth oC this phenomenon provides qualiCied support Cor the libertarian politicalU economB vieL that the public provision oC collective goods and services is ineCCicient. This vieL holds that bureaucracies create diseconomies oC scale and are LasteCul. &n part( these

ineCCiciencies are eVplained bB the lacW oC competition to checW overgroLth and the inCormation handicap bureaucracies Cace in the absence oC prices. Xs a result( cities oversupplB public goods( sWeLing their distribution toLard the most poLerCul interests. These researchers see private communities as a more politicallB and CinanciallB sustainable institution. For eVample( since 18IZ( residents on private streets in 8t. Louis have Cinanced their oLn collective goods Jtrash collection( street sLeeping( securitB( etc.K according to their perceived value. 8ince public governments must estimate inCrastructure and services demand( theB risW under or oversupplBing the marWet. Furthermore( manB oC the investments made bB [%Xs Jor in the commercial sphere( bB malls( science parWs( etc.K can be capitaliQed in land rent. \ot onlB do oLners have an

incentive to invest in their local environments( but also theB can recover investment costs Crom rents JFoldvarB 199^K.

$enerallB( scarce resources are better enclosed than unenclosed J6ebster G00NK. %pen access resources suCCer Crom overuse( and those that are LellUpreserved incur high costs J[ardin 19I8K. ^ &ndeed( a tragedB oC the urban commons is plaBed out in the public spaces( services( and

inCrastructure oC cities throughout the Lorld. This occurs Cor tLo reasons. FolloLing [ardin( resources that are governed bB shared useUrights tend to deplete through unrestrained

competition. Xs this happens( demand Cor reassigning rights structure to protect against complete resource dissipation increases J7arQel 199Z( 6ebster G003_ 6ebster and Lai G003K. These

tendencies are observed at all spatial scales and in all Winds oC resources( such as \&`7a movements( communitB groups Lho lobbB Cor sloL groLth policies( and governments Lho introduce road pricing.

Responsive and resourceCul governments attempt to manage overuse bB imposing regulations( raising the capacitB oC congested inCrastructure( and improving Cacilities and services. [oLever( as rising incomes result in higher eVpectations and increasinglB diCCerentiated tastes( even the most responsive governments have little hope oC managing citiQen demands in a LaB that avoids premature depletion. /ivic goods and services provided through taVation Lill alLaBs be

undersupplied( either through limited taV Cunds or rising eVpectations.

\ot onlB do residential clubs contribute to the Cinancial sustainabilitB oC urban governance( but also theB provide a LaB oC preserving( protecting and enhancing the burban commonsc. N The introduction oC road pricing in /entral London illustrates these trends. 6hat Las CormerlB a public good subPect to overuse and degradation Las converted overnight to a club good in Lhich the user paBs. `embership is on a paB as Bou use basis_ Cees are set to balance demand and supplB oC central area road space. 7B assigning propertB rights to road space( the municipalitB has loLered demand and increased revenues Cor road investment and management( Cactors Lhich produce a more sustainable transport sBstem landUuse pattern.I

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LE $%I', Renaud, and Chris J. WEBSTER. "$ated communities, sustainable cities and a tragedy of the urban commons." !ritical )lannin+, no. 1E F Summer GHH6 (GHH6).

$ated neighborhoods also enable public authorities to manage groMth Mith greater fiscal sustainability. Figure 1 shoMs that gating is highly correlated Mith fiscal gaps progressively experienced by local government bodies.

Rolling Qills (19E5) and Bradbury (19E8) Mere the first gated communities in Southern

California. After World War II, these Mere accompanied by MellVWnoMn developments such as Qidden Qills (195H) and the original Leisure World at Seal Beach (1946). Although there Mere 1,7HH gated housing units in the Los Angeles area by 196H, the development of enclaves such as Leisure World (1965) and Canyon LaWe (1968) resulted in 19,9HH gated units by 197H (Le $oix GHHE). Since developments after 197H Mere smaller, the groMth rate decreased: E1,HHH gated housing units existed in 198H[ 5E,HHH in 199H[ and 8H,HHH in GHHH. In GHHH, these units represented approximately 1G \ of the neM homes marWet in Southern California.7

57 1,500 4,400 12,733

Sources : database Gated Communities, 2002, UMR G ographie-cit s 8504 ; US Bureau of Census Boundary File.

R. Le Goix, 2002. 0 40 Leisure World Canyon Lake Coto de Caza Palm Springs County

Gated community (dwelling units) :

Sunlake Leisure Village

80 km

The Colony

Los Angeles San Bernardino

Riverside San Diego Orange Ventura Santa Barbara !"#$%&'()'*+&',"-&'./0'123.4"2/'25'#.4&0'3266$/"4"&,'"/'4+&'72,'8/#&1&,'.%&.)' '

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LE $%&'( Renaud( and /hris 4. 6E78TER. :$ated communities( sustaina?le cities and a tragedB oC the ur?an commons.: Critical Planning( no. 13 / 8ummer 200I J200IK.

!igure (. The diffusion of gated communities in the Los Angeles area.

The regional diCCusion oC gated communities is related to su?ur?an groLth( an endemic antiM Ciscal posture( and municipal Cragmentation JFigure 2K. These three conditions have Crustrated local planning eCCortsQ although ur?an spraLl has generated an increased need Cor inCrastructural development( propertB taR limits and Cragmentation have reduced local governmentsS Cinancial resources. 8 Us a result( gated communities( Lhich ?ring LealthB taRpaBers at minimal cost( have ?ecome the perCect cash coL Cor local municipalities JVcWenXie 1YYZK.

Table 1. A dominant market share in the fastest gro;ing areas of the Los Angeles region

!! !!

! o$ %ated encla-es amon% ne0 residential de-elopments

4ount6 7u8di-ision !"#$!%&&&! '()*!%&&&! '()*!%&&+! 7an 9ie%o :otal 4.= =.> ?,1 ,-./0!,*'*!)-.1/2! &! &! 345! 6-7/0!,*'*!)-.1/2! 8*9! :*;! <49! Bi-erside :otal ?.C ?.C 14,D '=>=7/!?1@!$=>-7/>!ABCB1D! %;*+! 3&*&! 8&4&! 7an Eernardino F,F D.> ?.C Gran%e E-/?A! 5*8! :*&! %&4%! 6-7/0!F7?1D=!)-*! +&*&! :*8! %+4<! ,-./0!F7?1D=!)-*! ;*<! :*5! %+4%! G=>/!F7?1D=!)-*! 9*8! 9*+! +94:! Los In%eles :otal C.1 1F.D 11,C ,?1!H=71?1@-!C?AA=2! %8*&! <&*&! ;&49! !! ,?1/?!)A?7B/?!I!J?1K?>/=7! %*<! %*&! <4%! Jentura :otal =.D 11.K 1D,D :otal num8er o$ de-elopments <;%! <+5! ;9+! ! Lated 4ommunities M,? =.= 1>.C

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LE $%&', Renaud, and /hris 4. 6E78TER. :$ated communities, sustainable cities and a tragedB oC the urban commons.: Critical Planning, no. 13 / 8ummer 200I J200IK.

Ls Table 1 shoMs, gated communities noM represent a maOor share oC the marPet in the Castest groMing parts oC the Los Lngeles region, especiallB in %range and Riverside counties Mhere the population has boomed since the 1RI0s. 8ince 1RR0, the groMth rate has remained high,

averaging 1ST betMeen 1RR0 and 2000. 7B providing their oMn securitB, inCrastructure and services, these developments reduce public Cinancial responsibilitB. Ls compensation,

homeoMners are granted exclusive access to their neighborhoods, a condition Mhich enhances location rent and positivelB aCCects propertB values JLacour-Little and WalpeXXi 2001Y Le $oix 2002K. Thus, these developments are instrumental in transCerring the cost oC urban spraMl Crom public authorities to private developers and homeoMners.

Llso, to the extent that gating increases propertB values, a municipalitBZs propertB tax revenues also increase. [ot onlB are cities exempt Crom paBing Cor most oC private communitiesZ securitB, service and inCrastructure, but also rising propertB values increases Cunds to paB Cor enhanced public programs and goods. This illustrates the point Me have alreadB made – that the club neighborhood is an institution that can help sustain citB groMth bB unlocPing more resources Cor collective goods and services. This maB cease to be the case iC club residents Mere able to opt out oC certain tax municipal obligations, but even then, theB maB be Milling to paB more Cor private urban governance than Cor public urban governance, Oust as private some Camilies are Milling to paB more Cor private education than state education. R

&n /alabasas JMest oC Los LngelesK, Mhere 30T oC the housing stocP is locPed behind gates, the /itB reinvests 13T oC its operational budget in landscaping and leisure centers, such as a public golC course. Lll oC these Cacilities are Mithin the vicinitB oC /alabasas ParP, the main gated area. This represents a complex sBnergB in Mhich the municipal government derives Ciscal beneCit Crom private enclaves Mhile subsidiXing the provision oC leisure amenities to enclave residents JLe $oix 200^K. Public oCCicials and developers acPnoMledge not onlB the Ciscal quid-pro-quos oC private neighborhoods, but also the beneCits oC increased densitB, Mhich preserves open space and enables architectural diversitB J7en-4oseph 200SK.

Llthough some developers are able to maintain proCits Mhile producing environmentallB sustainable and aCCordable developments, the vast maOoritB perceive that planning regulations, such as re_uirements Cor open space, land dedications, and Mater sBstems laBout and hooPup Cees, are excessive JWc`enXie 2003Y 7en-4oseph 200SK. &ndeed, private communities proliCerate under several interesting dBnamics, involving on one hand, public governments enlarging their tax-base and on the other hand, developers seePing to oCCset the burden oC public planning regulations through Clexible design Mithin private subdivisions J7en-4oseph 200SK.

Economic sustainability 7 the functional integration factor

6hen a high-income gated communitB Mas built next to a poor s_uatter communitB on the outsPirts oC 8antiago, /hile a CeM Bears ago, loMer-income residents Melcomed their neM neighbors as sources oC emploBment. The neM development also brought trunP Mater, seMerage and other utilities to the location, services that the s_uatters had lobbBing Cor unsuccessCullB Cor Bears J8alcedo and Torres 200SK. &n turn, the Mealthier residents valued their poorer neighbors, Mho supplied essential trades and services. 8urprisinglB, this ethnographic studB documented that inter-communitB relations Mere much healthier than the intra-gated communitB relations

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!" $%&'( )en,ud( ,nd /0ris 4. 6"789"). :$,ted co>>unities( sust,in,?@e cities ,nd , tr,AedB of t0e ur?,n co>>ons.: !ritical )lanning( no. DE F 8u>>er 2HHI J2HHIK.

JA,ted residents did not ,@L,Bs spe,N Le@@ of e,c0 ot0er ?ut spoNe Le@@ of t0eir poorer neiA0?orsK.

&t ,@so is possi?@e t0,t A,tinA( ?B cre,tinA , c@oser proOi>itB of inco>e Aroups( incre,ses tr,des in so>e ur?,n ,re,s P especi,@@B in >unicip,@ities Lit0 0iA0 @eQe@s of inco>e seAreA,tion. 90us( A,tinA >,B >,Ne , citB >ore econo>ic,@@B sust,in,?@e ?B reducinA tr,Qe@ dist,nce. Ror inst,nce( >,nB co>p@eOes in Sort0ern 8,n Rern,ndo T,@@eB Jne,r 8B@>,r( Sort0 Ui@@s ,nd V,nor,>, /itBK ,nd ,au.man 0 1roadWs sc0e>es in Sort0ern %r,nAe countB J!ori !,ne in $,rden $roQe ,nd 8toneA,te in Xn,0ei>( deQe@oped in 2HHHK ,re s>,@@ infi@@ deQe@op>ents of @ess t0,n YH units or se>iZdet,c0ed residenti,@ co>p@eOes retrofitted Lit0 A,tes in ,re,s L0ere propertB Q,@ues ,re 0iA0@B Q,ried. 90ese ,re >ost@B in Uisp,nic or Xsi,n neiA0?or0oods( 0e,Qi@B ur?,ni[ed durinA t0e >idZD\IHs( ,nd deQe@opers noL use A,tes ,nd U%Xs ,s , reneL,@ too@ Jsee RiAure EK. XccordinA to re,@Zest,te ,Aents in !oriZ!,ne ,nd 8toneA,te( t0ese ,re ]eOecutiQe co>>unities^ ,ppe,@inA to t0e ]sno? Q,@ue^ of prospectiQe ?uBers. 90eB Lere oriAin,@@B t,rAeted ,t et0nic nic0es in t0e 0ousinA >,rNet ,nd >iA0t 0e@p to Neep Le,@t0ier residents in t0ese cities. &f t0is 0,ppens( t0eB >,B incre,se @oc,@ _o? opportunities for eOistinA residents ,s 0iA0er inco>e oLners de>,nd >ore s0ops ,nd serQices( , process ,@re,dB o?serQed in !ondonWs inner citB 7orouA0s.

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LE $%I', Renaud, and /hris 4. 6E7STER. :$ated communities, sustaina?le cities and a tragedB oC the ur?an commons.: Critical Planning, no. 13 / Summer 2006 J2006K.

!"#$%&'()*+*#"*),&$-&"*./&

Ls eMplored a?ove, a citB oC clu?s maB ?e more sustaina?le than a pu?lic citB. PoQever, there are manB QellRCounded arguments against private neigh?orhoods as Qell. In this section Qe consider Qhether preRemptive neigh?orhood protection carries risSs Cor other citB residents, Cactors Qhich potentiallB maB render ur?an areas unsta?le and chaotic.

/ities are landRuse sBstems consisting oC interpenetrating private and pu?lic spaces governed ?B compleM patterns oC propertB rights JScott 1T80K. The production oC ur?an space ?B oQners oC capital Jdevelopers, manuCacturers, homeoQnersK means individuallB optimal, su?Vective

decisions have a social cost. Private transactions generate spillover eCCects, such as material and auditorB pollution, road congestion, and underused land. From one point oC vieQ, these

eMternalities are marSet Cailures: since marSet ?ased transactions Cail to give them a price, third parties ineCCicientlB ?ear the costs. Zeigh?orhood clu??ing is a private, preRemptive solution to marSet Cailure. PoQever, although it supplies residents Qith greater poQer to reduce spillovers, it also imposes eMternalities on its neigh?ors.

Long.term system stability: status exhibition vs. segregation

Resident Ciltering occurs Qhen restrictive covenants and propertB values limit potential

candidates Cor homeoQnership. The result is neigh?orhood homogeni[ation ?B Qealth, age, race and status. 6hether the homogeni[ing eCCects oC privatelB governed communities are greater than those oC conventional neigh?orhoods is an empirical question, the ansQer to Qhich depends on local conteMt. MarSetRdriven cities tend to Cilter people ?B income or race into QellRdeCined areas. Micro regulation through private covenants and eMclusionarB [oning Curther increases segregation. ^et Los Lngeles gated communities are availa?le Qithin everB marSet segment JFigure 3K. 6hile the maVoritB is located Qithin upperR or middleRclass Qhite areas, 20_ oC the surveBed communities Qere located Qithin middleR and loQerRincome Lsian or Pispanic neigh?orhoods, Qhich proliCerate in the northern parts oC %range /ountB and San Fernando `alleB JLe $oiM 2003, 2002K. This illustrates the diversitB oC the gated communitB phenomenon, as Sanche[ and Lang also document J2003, 200aK using a nationQide sample oC census data. /ontrarB to popular conceptions, gated communities are not solelB composed oC QealthB, Qhite and retired residentsb ?uBers oC various classes seeS to purchase homes in clu??ed

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!"#$%& () *+,&- ./00$1","&2 "1 ,3&"% 2/."/4&./1/0". &15"%/10&1,)

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!" $%&', Rena-d, and /hris 45 W"78T"R5 :$ated co>>-nities, s-stainable cities and a traAedB oC the -rban co>>ons5: !ritical Planning, no5 D3 F 8->>er 200I J200IK5

this >aB not alLaBs be possible, and Lhere the Aated develop>ent is larAe eno-Ah, the area eCCect >aB not act as a disincentive to b-Bers5 &n addition, it is >ore liOelB that a larAe, hiAhPend /&Q develop>ent Lo-ld locate near loLerPinco>e neiAhbors than -pperPclass sinAlePCa>ilB ho>es5 R-nicipalities oCten enco-raAe these AentriCBinA actions, Lhich increase the local taS base5 /onseT-entlB, Aated develop>ents have a poLerC-l abilitB to sort people into preCerenceP related Aro-ps and to intensiCB inco>ePrelated and stat-s diCCerentiation5

Qata Cro> the 2000 /ens-s shoLs that AatinA increases social and econo>ic seAreAation J!e $oiS 2005K5 The co>bined eCCects oC propertB val-es and co>>-nitB socioPecono>ic str-ct-re create D5V ti>es >ore seAreAation betLeen Aated develop>entsW blocO Aro-ps and ab-ttinA areas than in nonPAated neiAhborhoods5 8econdlB, Aated co>>-nities are 25V ti>es >ore liOelB to be seAreAated bB aAe Cro> adXacent areas than other neiAhborhoods5 &ndeed, Aated develop>ents attract >iddlePaAed people and seniors, Lho desire to protect the liCeti>e invest>ent capitalized in their ho>e5 ZinallB, the eCCect oC race or ethnicitB >-st be analBzed careC-llB: CindinAs shoL that Aated co>>-nities do not AenerallB create \Lorlds apartW5 ]ll else beinA eT-al, Aated co>>-nities are 255 ti>es less liOelB to be seAreAated bB race or ethnicitB than other reAions oC the citB J!e $oiS 2005K5 ^evertheless, ZiA-re 3 shoLs that >anB Aated co>>-nities locate Lithin ethnicallB ho>oAeneo-s neiAhborhoods5 RanB developers, concerned that diversitB >aB deter potential b-Bers, intentionallB locate in these areas5

&n s->, the evidence on the seAreAation eCCects oC Aated co>>-nities is >iSed5 While in so>e circ->stances theB >aB enco-raAe invest>ent in poor neiAhborhoods and Cacilitate the

C-nctional econo>ic inteAration betLeen inco>e Aro-ps, in others theB >aB reinCorce historic seAreAation patterns5

Local interaction e//ects

&n theorB and practice, the spillover eCCects oC p-blicPprivate transactions oCten Cavors Aated co>>-nitB residents and their propertB val-es at the eSpense oC adXacent, nonPAated

neiAhborhoods5

7B phBsicallB blocOinA an area, AatinA >aB increase conAestion and noise on neiAhborinA streets J7-rOe and 8ebalB 200DK5 &n addition, internal propertB and ho>eoLner behavior reA-lations >aB create propertB pre>i->s Lithin Aated develop>ents Lhile red-cinA the val-e oC nonPAated, adXacent properties J7ible and _sieh 200D` !aco-rP!ittle and Ralpezzi 200D` !e $oiS 2002K5 _oLever, neiAhborinA properties >aB also enXoB increased prestiAe and val-e5 ThereCore Le s-AAest ca-tion once aAain abo-t Aeneralizations in this respect5 R-ch depends on eSternal, reAional Cactors, s-ch as the nat-re oC the local ho-sinA >arOet5 Where there is an eScess oC >iddlePinco>e ho-sinA, Cor eSa>ple, an e>erAent Aated neiAhborhood >arOet >aB deClate the val-es oC neiAhborinA, >iddlePclass ho>es5 This is also evident in Laves oC ho-se or oCCice b-ildinA and is not necessarilB a pec-liar eCCect oC AatinA5 %n the other hand, iC >iddle inco>e ho>es are in short s-pplB, a Aated develop>ent in a deterioratinA neiAhborhood >aB Lell -pliCt the val-e oC nonPAated properties, brinAinA the> into >ore val-able -se5

$ated co>>-nities >aB also divert cri>e onto neiAhborinA properties5 ]s LidelB disc-ssed, Aated co>>-nities proliCerate Lithin a cli>ate oC AroLinA sec-ritB concerns5 &n ]rAentina,

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!" $%&'( )*+,-.( ,+. /0123 45 6"789")5 :$,;*. <=>>-+2;2*3( 3-3;,2+,?@* <2;2*3 ,+. , ;1,A*.B =C ;0* -1?,+ <=>>=+35: Critical Planning( +=5 DE F 8->>*1 GHHI JGHHIK5

71,L2@( ;0* M585( N*O2<= ,+. "-1=P*( A,;2+A 23 ,33=<2,;*. Q2;0 , @,<R =C <=+C2.*+<* 2+ P-?@2< @,Q *+C=1<*>*+; J/,@.*21, GHHHS T-*112*+ ,+. !,33,U* DVVVS ,+. !=Q GHHDK5 90* ;0*=1B =C A,;2+A ,3 .*C*+32?@* 3P,<* Q,3 .*U*@=P*. ?B W*Q>,+ JDVXGK ,+. ;0* Institute 0or Community Design Analysis5 90*3* P1,<;2<*3 ,1* +=Q <=>>=+@B <,@@*. Crime Pre6ention through Urban Design ,+. ,1* 2+;*+.*. ;= 2+<1*,3* 3,C*;B 2+ 1*32.*+;2,@ ,1*,3 ?B <0,+A2+A 3P,;2,@ P*1<*P;2=+( <=+;1=@@2+A P-?@2< <21<-@,;2=+( ,+. 2+<1*,32+A P12U,;* =Q+*1302P5 90* *1*<;2=+ =C 3;1**; ?,112*13 2+ 1*;1=C2;;*. 1*32.*+;2,@ +*2A0?=10==.3 23 , Q,B ;= *+C=1<* P-?@2< 3,C*;B ,+. <=+;1=@ A,+A ,<;2U2;2*35 N,+,A*13 ,+. .*U*@=P*13 0,U* *>P@=B*. ;0*3* P1,<;2<*3 2+ 3*U*1,@ @=QY2+<=>* ,+. P-?@2< 0=-32+A

3-?.2U232=+3( 3-<0 ,3 N,1 Z23;, $,1.*+3 ,+. &>P*12,@ /=-1;3 2+ 8=-;0 /*+;1,@ !=3 [+A*@*3 J!*,U2;; ,+. !=-R,2;=-Y82.*123 DVV\K5

!""#$%&'() +,-.#(-'/'"'&',- %(0 "'%/'"'&',-

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`K5 9023 1*P1*3*+;3 , ;1,+32;2=+ 2+ -1?,+ >2O*.Y>,1R*; <2;2*3 C1=> >-+2<2P,@ ;= <@-? A=U*1+,+<*5 90* 1*>,2+2+A P,1; =C =-1 .23<-332=+ 2+ ;023 3*<;2=+ ,..1*33*3 Q0*;0*1 P12U,;* A=U*1+,+<* >2A0; ,@3= @*,. ;= ,+ -+3-3;,2+,?@* @=<,@ -1?,+ P=@2;2<,@ *<=+=>B5 &; 23 ?,3*. =+ , <,3* 3;-.B =C ;0* <2;B =C !,A-+, 6==.3( ,5R5,5 !*23-1* 6=1@.( , DVI\ .*U*@=P>*+; =C DV(`HH 1*32.*+;3 ,A*. `` B*,13 =1 =@.*15

90* ?1*,R2+A .=Q+ =C >-+2<2P,@ >,+,A*>*+; 2+;= 3>,@@*1 -+2;3 >2A0; 2+ ;0* *+. .*@2U*1 , >=1* 3-3;,2+,?@* -1?,+ P=@2;2<,@ *<=+=>B =+ ;0* Q0=@*( ?-; =+@B ,; ;0* *OP*+3* =C >,1A2+,@2L2+A ;0=3* *O<@-.*. C1=> ;0* a<@-? *<=+=>2*3b 2+ minimal cities JN2@@*1 DVcDK5 ^=Q 3-3;,2+,?@* ;023 23 .*P*+.3 =+ ;0* Q*,@;0 1*.23;12?-;2=+ 2+3;2;-;2=+3 ;0,; ,123* 2+ ;0* a<@-? <2;2*35b /&d3 ,1* ?=;0 P-?@2< ,<;=13 ,+. P12U,;* A=U*1+>*+;35 90* .*U*@=P*1 ,+. ;0* 3-?3*]-*+; 0=>*=Q+*1

,33=<2,;2=+ 3-?3;2;-;* C=1 ;0* P-?@2< ,-;0=12;B ,+. P12U,;*@B P1=U2.* , P-?@2< 3*1U2<* Je*++*.B DVV`S N<e*+L2* DVV\K5 7-; 3=>* A,;*. <=>>-+2;2*3 ,@3= ;1,+3C=1> 2+;= P-?@2< *+;2;2*3 ?B 2+<=1P=1,;2+A 2+;= ,-;=+=>=-3 <2;2*3 =1 ;,R2+A P,1; 2+ , ?1=,.*1 2+<=1P=1,;2=+ P1=<*335 9023 233-* 23 2>P=1;,+; 2+ -+.*13;,+.2+A ;0* +,;-1* =C ;0* +*Q ;*112;=12,@ >,P3 ?-2@; ?B A,;*. *+<@,U*35 &+<=1P=1,;*. A,;*. <=>>-+2;2*3 2+<@-.* 71,.?-1B ,+. )=@@2+A ^2@@3 JDV`XKS ^2..*+ ^2@@3

JDVIDKS /,+B=+ !,R* JDVVDKS ,+. !*23-1* 6=1@. JDVVVK5 "+<@,U*3 2+<=1P=1,;2+A ,3 P,1; =C , +*Q <2;B Q0*1* , 3-?3;,+;2,@ P,1; =C 32+A@*YC,>2@B 0=-32+A .*U*@=P>*+;3 23 A,;*. 2+<@-.* d,+, f=2+; JDVcVKS /,@,?,3,3 JDVVDKS ,+. d=U* /,+B=+ J2+<=1P=1,;*. Q2;0 ),+<0= 8,+;, N,1A,12;, 2+ GHHHK5 &+<=1P=1,;2=+3 0,PP*+ C=1 ;Q= P12>,1B 1*,3=+35 %+ ;0* =+* 0,+.( ;0*B ,2> ;= P1*U*+; , P=;*+;2,@ ,++*O,;2=+ ?B , @*33 ,CC@-*+; <=>>-+2;B @==R2+A C=1 ,+ *O;*+.*. ;,O ?,3* J)=@@2+A ^2@@3( ^2..*+ ^2@@3( C=1 2+3;,+<*( =1 ),+<0= N21,A* ,+. &+.2,+ 6*@@3 2+ ;0* f,@> 8P12+A3 ,1*,K5 %+ ;0* =;0*1( ;0*B ,2> ;= P1=;*<; @=<,@ @2C*3;B@*3( U,@-*3( ,+. P@,++2+A <=+;1=@ J!*23-1* 6=1@.( /,+B=+ !,R*( d,+, f=2+;( /,@,?,3,3K J!* $=2O GHH`K5 [C;*1 2+<=1P=1,;2=+( @=<,@ ,CC,213 ,1* 30,1*. Q2;0 P12U,;* 0=>*=Q+*13 ,33=<2,;2=+3( Q02<0 ;,R* <0,1A* =C 1=,. >,2+;*+,+<*( 3*<-12;B

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!" $%&', )ena-., an. /0ris 4. 6"789"). :$ate. comm-nities, s-staina?le cities an. a traAe.B of t0e -r?an commons.: !ritical Planning, no. D3 F 8-mmer 2HHI J2HHIK.

an. compliance Mit0 lan. -se reA-lations an. restrictiNe coNenants. 90ese minimal cities also re.-ce operation costs ?B contractinA Mit0 t0e co-ntB an. ot0er p-?lic aAencies to s-pplB p-?lic serNices, s-c0 as police, Mater, seMers an. fire JOiller DPQDK. &nstea. of actinA as a separate entitB, minimal cities are extensions of t0eir S%Ts.

90e incorporation of t0e Aate. comm-nitB of !eis-re 6orl. as t0e /itB of !aA-na 6oo.s is a pec-liar case. Ts t0e larAest Aate. retirement comm-nitB of t0e 6est /oast, incorporation Mas necessarB ?eca-se of t0e lacU of actiNe resi.ent inNolNement in t0e operations of t0e 0olden Rain Foundation Jt0e master association of t0e comm-nitBK. 8eNeral reAeneration proVects 0a. ?een consi.ere. since DPIW, ?-t Mere neNer passe.. Tfter %ranAe /o-ntB force. its ?anUr-ptcB in DPPQ, t0e sit-ation c0anAe. ra.icallB. 90e /o-ntB enco-raAe. -r?aniXe. areas to incorporate an. propose. t0at neM minimal cities s0o-l. -se t0e local taxY?ase to s-pplB t0e resi.ents Mit0 improNe. p-?lic serNices, contractinA Mit0 t0e /o-ntB for ?asic serNices. !eis-re 6orl. 0a. seNeral options. %ne Mas a Voint incorporation Mit0 near?B comm-nities 0o-sinA Bo-nAer pop-lations in !aA-na Sills or Oission ZieVo. 90is option Mas reVecte. ?eca-se of t0e o?Nio-s .iNerAence of interest ?etMeen a Bo-nA pop-lation intereste. in p-?lic e.-cation an. a retirement comm-nitB. Tnot0er option Mas to ?e annexe. ?B t0e larAe m-nicipalitB of &rNine, ?-t t0is AaNe rise to anot0er conflict t0at 0elpe. to maUe t0e .ecision. &rNine s-pporte. a proVect for an international airport, ?-t t0e approac0 pat0 Mo-l. 0aNe crosse. oNer !eis-re 6orl.. Tccor.inA to )o?ert )inA, resi.ents felt incorporation ?B itself Y t0e t0ir. option Y co-l. ?e -se. to fiA0t t0e &nternational Tirport proVect in "l 9oro. &ncorporation also alloMe. t0e priNate AoNernment ?etter access to rentYseeUinA strateAies.DH 9a?le 2 analBXes some of t0ese in recentlB incorporate. !os TnAeles area m-nicipalities t0at are pre.ominatelB compose. of Aate. comm-nities. &t s-AAests t0at ?B incorporatinA, local lea.ers seeU [

Y to preNent t0eir -pscale fiscal ?asis from ?einA re.istri?-te. in ot0er JpoorerK areas, a common Aoal in incorporation .riNen ?B -pscale \.8. .eNelopments JO&!!") DPQDK]

Y to leAallB transfer p-?lic reso-rces an. assets for t0e profit of excl-siNe an. enclose. neiA0?or0oo.s ]

Y to leAallB o?tain p-?lic infrastr-ct-re financinA Mit0in Aate. areas J!" $%&' 2HH^K.

Table 2. Private Community Incorporation : sharing responsibilities and liabilities <

!"#$%&$%'()$"* $, &%)-'(. #$//0")().* 1 *2'%)"3 %.*&$"*)4)5)().* '"6 5)'4)5)().* 7

8.%-)#.* '"6 '/.")().* (%'"*,.%%.6 ,%$/ (2. 9:; ($ (2. /0")#)&'5)(< ',(.% )"#$%&$%'()$"= >)*#.55'".$0* #$*(* '"6 5)'4)5)().* (%'"*,.%%.6 ($ (2. /0")#)&'5)().* ?'(.6 @$//0")(< "development date- @)(< ".ncorporation date- A4 2$0*)"3 0")(* )" ?@* B $, ?@ 2$0*)"3 )" #)(<= E"ternali*ation o- services -ormerl2 operated b2 P78 9e: services provided b2 municipalities 2olling 4ills 678 "1:;<- =it> o? 2olling 4ills "1:@A- <;< 1BBC Duilding permits. Grash collectionI rec>cling program

J J 6ropert> o? leisure ?acilitiesI let to the 678 ?or a nominal ?ee. J .nstrumental in implementing eKclusionar> Loning. 4idden 4ills 678 "1:@B- =it> o? 4idden 4ills "1:<1- @:2 1BBC

Duilding permits J J .nstrumental in implementing eKclusionar> Loning. "paid N 1 million to prevent the development o? puOlic housing-

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LE GOI', )enaud, and Chris J. 6EBS9E). "Gated communities, sustainable cities and a tragedy of the urban commons." Critical )lannin+, no. 13 F Summer 2006 (2006).

!ndian 'ells + Eldorado P0A (1956) City o; !ndian 'ells (19<6) =,1?5 5<@ DeBelopment o; municipal hiHh-end amenities :

!"e %olf )esort,

ColleHe, Kecreational Center. Canyon Lake P0A (19<O) City o; Canyon Lake (inc. 1991) P,QP6 1QQ@ RuildinH permits, trans;er o; property o; parks, Hreens, access roads aSuttinH the Hated community

Touths SerBices !nstrumental in implementinH sloV-HroVth policy : planned to acquire undeBeloped Xederal Land to aBoid ;urther deBelopment. CalaSasas Park (196O) City o; CalaSasas (1991) =,==O ?Q@ Creation o; puSlic parks and a Hol; (1?@ du SudHet) close to priBate enclaBes.

Ke;inancinH Sy the municipality o; a Y ?Q millions deSt preBiously paid Sy CalaSasas Park HomeoVners ;or landscapinH and streets

improBements (Community Xacility District) Leisure 'orld -[olden Kain Xoundation (19<P) City o; LaHuna 'oods (1999) 1=,6?< 1QQ@ RuildinH permits \ trans;er o; property and maintenance o; parks, Hreens, access roads and ramps aSuttinH the Hated community !mproBed police serBice (] ?Q@ manpoVer)

Pro^ect o; trans;errinH seVer and trash collections (municipal Sids). _unicipal Hrants ;or the Senior Center (Y1QQ,QQQ+year) to orHani`e eBents accommodatinH residents

Pelican Hills (=QQQ) -- .// units 3uilt in 4//5 6 7/// forecast in 4/5/ Annexation Sy beVport Reach (1.1.=QQ=) 1,69Q (in =QQQ) P,O Xree trash remoBal, trans;er o; property and maintenance o; parks, Hreens, access roads and ramps aSuttinH the Hated community RuildinH o; a Community Center, a Hymnasium and a liSrary (total : Y 6 millions). !mproBed security and police serBices (] = Behicles).

Ke;inancinH Sy the municipality o; a Y1O millions deSt preBiously paid Sy Pelican Hillsc homeoVners (Sy the means o; a Community Xacility District)+

Sources : =QQQ Census, 1999-=QQ= Authorcs surBey and dataSase [ated.Communities d K. Le [oix, 1999-=QQ5 e 0rdinary trans;ers o; ^urisdiction ;rom the county to the incorporated municipalities are : police and ;ire department, planninH and SuildinH permits.

At the end of the 1990s, Leisure 6orld's obsolescence had reached a critical levelP it needed a long-term renewal strategy. For example, according to a 2001 report to the POA11, W6X of the housing units did not fit the safety requirements for heating and electrical systems and Z2X did not provide enough square footage compared to contemporary standards. Electrical, water, telephone and sewage systems were between 2[ and 36 years old and needed to be replaced. Shifts in Leisure 6orld\s property values also indicated its decline. Although during the 19W0s average annual change was 1[.1X, a rate equivalent to adjacent tracts, during the 1990s values depreciated. In this context, homeowners were unable to pay to maintain the gates, sewage system, lighting, and walls--improvements totaling over 31 million dollars (more than five million dollars over their annual budget). In this case, private governance provided public goods far less efficiently than standard non-gated developments in the vicinity. 9he club economy failed, demonstrating that gated communities often require public sector subsidy or must become incorporated cities to subsist. Indeed, in 1999 Leisure 6orld incorporated as the city of Laguna

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LE GOI'( R*+,-.( ,+. C0123 4. 6E78TER. :G,;*. <=>>-+2;2*3( 3-3;,2+,?@* <2;2*3 ,+. , ;1,A*.B =C ;0* -1?,+ <=>>=+3.: !"#$#%&'( )'&**#*+( +=. 1E F 8->>*1 GHHI JGHHIK. (

6==.3( L2;0 M-?@2< 3-?32.2N2+A 3*L*1 ,+. ;1,+3M=1;,;2=+ -MA1,.2+A JL* G=2O GHHEP L* G=2O GHHQK.

(

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a*; 2+ 1*3M=+32R* M=@2;2<,@ *<=+=>2*3( A=R*1+>*+; @*A23@,;2=+ L2@@ *R=@R* ,+. >,Z* ;0*3* M1=?@*>3 @*33 @2Z*@B ;= =<<-1 2+ ;0* C-;-1*. C=+.=>2+2-> ,+. =;0*1 C=1>3 =C <=T=L+*1302M @,L3 ,1* 1,M2.@B *R=@R2+A( M-;;2+A 2+ 3,C*A-,1.3 ,+. A1,.-,@@B 1*.*C2+2+A ;0* ?=-+.,1B ?*;L**+ M-?@2< ,+. M12R,;* -1?,+ A=R*1+,+<* J8** C0*+ ,+. 6*?3;*1 GHHb ,+. 6*?3;*1 ,+. L* G=2O GHHQK. T0* 3-3;,2+,?2@2;B =C <@-??*. <2;2*3 1*3;3 2+ ;0* <=+;*O; =C ;0* 302C;2+A ?=-+.,12*3 ?*;L**+ M-?@2< ,+. M12R,;* =L+*1302M ,+. @2,?2@2;B C=1 <=@@*<;2R* ,CC,213.

!"#$%&'("#

[12R,;* -1?,+ A=R*1+,+<* 0,3 ;0* M=;*+;2,@ ;= 3;,?2@2N* ;0* C2+,+<2+A =C -1?,+ A1=L;0( 1*.*R*@=M ,A2+A +*2A0?=10==.3( >,2+;,2+ 3=<2,@ .2R*132;B( @=<,@2N* .*<232=+ >,Z2+A( M1=;*<; +=+T1*+*L,?@* -1?,+ 1*3=-1<*3( 1,23* <2;B >,2+;*+,+<* 1*R*+-*3( ,+. C=3;*1 <1=33T2+<=>* ;1,.* ,+. 2+;*A1,;2=+. 7-; ;0*3* A,2+3 ,1* +=; >,.* L2;0=-; 3=<2,@ <=3;3 ,+. 3M2@@=R*13. A@;0=-A0 3=>* ,1* ;12R2,@( =;0*13 ,1* <12;2<,@ C=1 -1?,+ 3-3;,2+,?2@2;B. [12R,;* +*2A0?=10==. >,1Z*;3 >,B 3=@R* 3=>* =C ;0*3* M1=?@*>3 L* 0,R* +=;*.. ]=1 2+3;,+<*( *+;1*M1*+*-13 =C;*+ -3* +*L ;*<0+=@=A2*3 ,+. @*A,@

(16)

LE $%&'( Renaud( and /hris 4. 6E78TER. :$ated communities( sustaina?le cities and a tragedB oC the ur?an commons.: !"#$#%&' )'&**#*+( no. 13 / 8ummer 200I J200IK.

innovations to turn eMternalities into marNets. Oet Pithout state intervention( theB Pill ignore conseQuences ?eBond their paB?acN period. %n the other hand( through overregulation( localities maB lose the Ceatures oC private neigh?orhoods that maB help maNe cities more sustaina?le. Private ur?an governance is dependent on pu?lic su?sidB and national laPs. 6ithout these conditions( it Pill degenerate under costlB competition Cought out in pu?lic and private courts. &t also needs to coordinate Pith pu?lic government in the provision oC higher level civic goods and services. The alternative is Cor small private neigh?orhoods to Cederate( ?ut this leads to an outcome resem?ling pu?lic government ?B incorporation. Tt the heart oC the issue is the sustaina?le division oC responsi?ilities ?etPeen private and pu?lic governments. U%T contracts are inevita?lB incomplete and reQuire pu?lic underPriting. LaPmaNers and policB maNers Pill have to manage risNs ?B mitigating social costs and contri?uting to redistri?utive taMation( thus shaping a more eQuita?le outcome.

!c#no&ledgment .

!"#"$%&' )$*"%+$,# $-./* 0./*'"%1 2$,+3.%1+$ $%" 4%$51 3%.) !6 7" 8.+9:# 4.&*.%$, *'"#+#; 3/14"4 -< *'" 2=!0 >?@! 8".A%$B'+"C&+*"# DEFG; H$%+#I; *'" J%"1&'CK)"%+&$1 J./14$*+.1 >L.&M/"N+,," J",,.5#'+B; OFFFPFQI; $14 *'" J%"1&'CK)"%+&$1 2.))+##+.1 >J/,-%+A'* !"#"$%&' 0&'.,$%#'+B; ?27K; OFFOPFRI; 5'+&' $%" A%$*"3/,,< $&S1.5,"4A"46

Re#erences

Ttlas( Randall( and 6illiam $. Le7lanc. 1VVW. The impact on /rime oC 8treets /losures and 7arricadesX T Florida /ase 8tudB. ,-%."#$/ 01."*&' ZX1W0[1WZ.

7ar\el( Ooram 1VV]. 2%1*13#% 4*&'/5#5 16 )"17-"$/ 8#+9$5: /am?ridge( ^TX /am?ridge UniversitB Press. 7en[4oseph( Eran. 200W. Land Use and Design &nnovations in Private /ommunities. ;&*< ;#*-5 JWK(

httpX//PPP.lincolninst.edu/pu?s/pu?[detail.aspaidbV]1.

7i?le( Douglas 8. and /henghi Usieh. 2001. $ated /ommunities and Residential PropertB calues. 477"&#5&'

01."*&' IV J2KX 1W0.

7laNelB( EdPard .4.( and ^arB $ail 8nBder. 1VV]. =1"$"-55 43-"#%&> ?&$-< !133.*#$#-5 @* A9- B*#$-< ,$&$-5: 6ashington D./.( /am?ridge( ^.T.X 7rooNings &nstitution Press d Lincoln &nstitute oC Land PolicB. 7urNe( ^attheP( and /hristian 8e?alB. 2001. LocNing in the Pedestriana The privati\ed 8treets oC $ated

/ommunities. C1"'< A"&*571"$&$#1* )1'#%/ &*< )"&%$#%- ] JWKXI][]W.

/aldeira( Teresa P.R. 2000. !#$/ 16 C&''5D !"#3-> ,-+"-+&$#1*> &*< !#$#E-*59#7 #* ,&1 )&.'1. 7erNeleB( /TX UniversitB oC /aliCornia Press.

/arvalho( ^aBra( R. carNNi $eorge( and eathrBn U. TnthonB. 1VV]. Residential 8atisCaction in /ondominios EMclusivos J$ate $uarded feigh?orhoodsK in 7ra\il. 2*F#"1*3-*$ &*< G-9&F#1" 2V JIKX]3W[]I8.

/hen( 8imon /hien[Ouan and /hris 6e?ster. 200Z. UomeoPners associations( collective action and rent seeNing.

H1.5#*+ ,$.<#-5 20J2KX 20Z[220.

Davis( ^iNe. 1VV0. !#$/ 16 I.&"$E> 2J%&F&$#*+ $9- =.$."- 16 ;15 4*+-'-5. LondonX cerso Jcoll. The UaBmarNet 8eriesK.

hhh. 1VV8. 2%1'1+/ 16 =-&"D ;15 4*+-'-5 &*< $9- #3&+#*&$#1* 16 <#5&5$-". feP OorNX U. Uolt.

Dear( ^ichael( and 8teven FlustB. 1VV8. Postmodern ur?anism. 4**&'5 16 $9- 4551%#&$#1* 16 43-"#%&* +-1+"&79-"5 88 J4anuarB 1VV8KX Z0[]2.

FlustB( 8teven. 1VVW. G.#'<#*+ )&"&*1#&D A9- )"1'#6-"&$#1* 16 @*$-"<#%$1"/ ,7&%- &*< $9- 2"15#1* 16 ,7&$#&' 0.5$#%-. 6est UollBPood( /TX Los Tngeles Forum Cor Trchitecture and Ur?an Design.

FoldvarB( Fred 1VVW. ).K'#% ?11<5 &*< )"#F&$- !133.*#$#-5D $9- L&"M-$ )"1F#5#1* 16 ,1%#&' ,-"F#%-5. TldershotX EdPard Elgar.

$las\e( $eorg( elau\ Frant\( and /hris 4. 6e?ster. 2002. The glo?al spread oC gated communities. 2*F#"1*3-*$ &*<

)'&**#*+ GD )'&**#*+ &*< N-5#+* 2V J3KX 31Z[320.

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LE G%&', )enaud, and /hris 4. 6E789E). :Gated co>>unities, sustainable cities and a tragedB of the urban co>>ons.: !ri$i%al )lannin+, no. 13 F 8u>>er GHHI (GHHI).

LelsleB, )obert 6. and 6illia> /. 8trange. 1999. Gated /o>>unities and the Econo>ic GeographB of /ri>e.

,-.rnal -f 0r1an 2%-n-3i%4 (4I): QH-1H5.

TennedB, Uaniel 4. 1995. )esidential Associations as 8tate Actors: )egulating the &>pact of Gated /o>>unities on Won>e>bers. 5ale 7a8 ,-.rnal 1H5 (3): 7I1-793.

Lacour-Little, Michael and 8tephen MalpeZZi. GHH1. Gated /o>>unities and PropertB \alues. Madison, 6&: 6ells Fargo Lo>e Mortgage and Uepart>ent of )eal Estate and ^rban Land Econo>ics - ^ni_ersitB of

6isconsin.

Lea_itt, 4ac`ueline, and Anastasia Louaaitou-8ideris. 1994. 8afe and 8ecure: Public Lousing )esidents in Los Angeles Uefine the &ssues. Paper read at Future and \isions : ^rban Public Lousing, Wo_e>ber. /incinnati, %L.

Le Goix, )enaud. GHHG. Les gated co>>unities en /alifornie du 8ud, un produit i>>obilier pas tout c fait co>>e les autres. 7924:a%e ;é-+ra:=i>.e 31 (4): 3GQ-344.

ddd. GHH3. Les gated co>>unities aux Etats-^nis. Morceaux de _illes ou territoires c part entière fGated co>>unities githin the citB in the ^8: ^rban neighborhoods, or territories aparthi. Paris: Uepart>ent of GeographB, ^ni_ersité Paris 1 Panthéon k 8orbonne, Uoctorate 9hesis. A_ailable on the internet at: http:FFtel.ccsd.cnrs.frFdocu>entsFarchi_esHFHHFHHF41F41Findex!fr.ht>l.

ddd. GHH5. Gated co>>unities as predators of public resources: the outco>es of fading boundaries betgeen pri_ate >anage>ent and public authorities in 8outhern /alifornia. &n )riva$e @ei+=1-.r=--A4: ;l-1al anA

l-%al :er4:e%$ive4, edited bB Georg GlasZe, /hris 4. 6ebster and Tlaus FrantZ: London l Weg mora:

)outledge, 9aBlor and Francis: 7I-91.

ddd. GHH5. Gated /o>>unities: 8pragl and 8ocial 8egregation in 8outhern /alifornia. C-.4in+ D$.Aie4 GH (G): 3G3-344.

Lee, 8hin and /hris 4. 6ebster. GHHI. Enclosure of the urban co>>ons. ;e-,-.rnal I3 (in press).

Log, 8etha M. GHH1. 9he Edge and the /enter: Gated /o>>unities and the Uiscourse of ^rban Fear. A3eri%an

An$=r-:-l-+i4$ 1H3(1): 45-5Q.

ddd. GHH3. Fe=inA $=e +a$e4 : lifeG 4e%.ri$HG anA $=e :.r4.i$ -f =a::ine44 in f-r$re44 A3eri%a. Weg mora: )outledge.

Malea, Wor Malina GHHG. An inve4$i+a$ive 4$.AH -f %l.1 %-33.ni$ie4 in IalaH4ia. /ardiff: /ardiff ^ni_ersitB, 8chool of /itB and )egional Planning, ^npublished PhU thesis.

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ddd. GHH5a. /onstructing the Po>eriu> in Las \egas: A /ase 8tudB of E>erging 9rends in A>erican Gated /o>>unities. C-.4in+ D$.Aie4 GH:1Q7-GH3.

ddd. GHH5b. 9he dBna>ics of pri_atopia: pri_ate residential go_ernance in the ^8A. &n )riva$e !i$ie4: 7-%al anA

;l-1al )er4:e%$ive4, edited bB Georg GlasZe, /hris 4. 6ebster and Tlaus FrantZ: London: )outledge: 9-3H.

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8ancheZ, 9ho>as, )obert E. Lang, and Uagn Uha_ale. GHH3. 8ecuritB _ersus 8tatush A First looa at the /ensusos Gated /o>>unities data. Alexandria, \A: Metropolitan &nstitute, \irginia 9ech.

8ancheZ, 9ho>as, and )obert E. Lang. GHH5. 8ecuritB _s. 8tatus h A First Looa at the /ensuso Gated /o>>unities Uata. ,-.rnal -f )lannin+ 2A.%a$i-n anA Ke4ear%= G4 (3): GQ1-G91.

8alcedo, )odrego, and Ala_aro 9orres. GHH4. Gated /o>>unities in 8antiago: 6all or Frontierh Qn$erna$i-nal

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LE $%&'( Renaud( and /hris 4. 6E78TER. :$ated communities( sustaina?le cities and a tragedB oC the ur?an commons.: Critical Planning( no. 13 / 8ummer G00I JG00IK.

6e?ster( /hris 4. G00G. PropertB Rights and the Pu?lic RealmN $ates( $reen 7elts( and $emeinschaCt. Environment

and Planning B: Planning and Design GO J3KN 3OPQR1G.

SSS. G003. The nature oC the neigh?ourhood. 6rban Studies R0 J13KN GTO1QGI1G.

SSS. G00T. TerritorB( /ontrol and Enclosure JUeBnote addressK. Paper read at &nternational 8Bmposium :TerritorB( /ontrol and Enclosure:( at Pretoria( Rep. oC 8outh VCrica( Fe? G8QYarch G( G00T. 6e?ster( /hris 4.( and LaZrence 6aiQ/hung Lai. G00G. Property <ights, Planning and Markets: Managing

Spontaneous CitiesN /heltenham UU and \orthampton YV( U8VN EdZard Elgar.

6e?ster( /hris 4.( Fulong 6u and ]an^ing _hao. G00T. /hina`s modern Zalled cities. &n Private cities: local and

global perspectives( edited ?B $eorg $lasae( /hris 4. 6e?ster and Ulaus FrantaN London b \eZ ]orcN

Routledge( TaBlor and FrancisN 1T3Q1IO.

6e?ster( /hris 4 and Renaud Le $oid. G00T. Planning ?B commonhold. Economic Affairs. GTJRKN 1OQG3.

1 Unless otherZise noted( ?B sustaina?ilitB( Ze mean political( Cinancial and environmental sustaina?ilitB. This is indeed the usual meaning Cound in reports and researches on cities and sustaina?le development( U\ /onCerence on fuman 8ettlements fa?itat &&( 1OOIb $lo?al /onCerence on the ur?an Cuture UR7V\ G1( G000. For Curther reCerenceN httpN//ZZZ.sustaina?leQ cities.org.

G The data?ase is ?ased on a set oC G1O gated communities ?uilt ?eCore G000 and located in P counties oC the Los Vngeles area JLos Vngeles( Riverside( %range( gentura( 8an 7ernardino( 8anta 7ar?ara and 8an DiegoK. This data?ase is derived Crom the same sources that a prospective home?uBer Zould use Jrealtors` listings( advertisementsK and Zas supplemented Zith materials Crom intervieZs Zith local oCCicials( as Zell as data Crom assessment maps and the G000 /ensus.

3 V clu? good is a categorB oC good Jor service or resourceK distinguished in the economics literature Crom a private good on the one hand and a pu?lic good on the other. &t is similar to the idea oC a local pu?lic good and the terms overlap in meaning. /lu? goods are collectivelB consumed( lice pu?lic goods( ?ut ?B a Cinite set oC consumers. TheoreticallB( a pu?lic good is capa?le oC ?eing consumed Zithout congestion ?B an inCinite set oC coQconsumers. Vn economic clu? Jan organiaation supplBing a clu? goodK maB ?e organiaed ?B an entrepreneur or government. 6here distance or culture create ?arriers to consumption( clu?s maB Corm spontaneouslB Jhere is the overlap Zith the idea oC local pu?lic goodsK. The ?ig thing a?out clu?s is that theB permit coQ consumed goods to ?e supplied eCCicientlB – ?B the organiaers edercising control over JaK the num?er oC consumers and J?K the juantitB and jualitB oC the good. /lu?s edercise such control via mem?ership rules and Cees. 8ee /ornes R and 8anders T J1OOIK The theorB oC edternalities( pu?lic goods and clu? goods. /am?ridgeN /UP( Cor a heavB dutB introduction to the economic theorB oC clu?s and 6e?ster / and Lai L6/ JG003K PropertB rights( planning and marcets( \orthampton YV and /heltenham UUN EdZard Elgar( Cor an application to ur?an theorB

R 7iologist $arrett fardin suggested in his seminal 1OI8 article on the tragedB oC the commons( that kVs a rational ?eing( each herdsman seecs to madimise his gain. EdplicitlB or implicitlB( more or less consciouslB( he ascs( k6hat is the utilitB to me oC adding one more animal to mB herdlm This utilitB has one negative and one positive component. 1. The positive component is a Cunction oC the increment oC one animal. 8ince the herdsman receives all the proceeds Crom the sale oC the additional animal( the positive utilitB is nearlB n1. G. The negative component is a Cunction oC the additional overgraaing created ?B one more animal. 8ince( hoZever( the eCCects oC overgraaing are shared ?B all the herdsmen( the negative utilitB Cor anB particular decisionQmacing

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!" $%&'( )*+,-.( ,+. /0123 45 6"789")5 :$,;*. <=>>-+2;2*3( 3-3;,2+,?@* <2;2*3 ,+. , ;1,A*.B =C ;0* -1?,+ <=>>=+35: !"#$#%&' )'&**#*+( +=5 1E F 8->>*1 200I J200IK5

0*1.3>,+ 23 =+@B , C1,<;2=+ =C L1M JN,1.2+( 19I8( Q511RK5 N23 Q=2+; S,3 ;0,; <=>>=+0=@. 1*3=-1<*3 ;*+. ;= .*Q@*;* ?*<,-3* *,<0 <=+3->*1 *+T=B3 100U =C ;0* ?*+*C2; =C <=+3->2+A ,+ *V;1, -+2; ?-; ?*,13 =+@B , C1,<;2=+ =C ;0* <=3; W S02<0 23 30,1*. S2;0 =;0*135

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(20)

LE $%&'( Renaud( and /hris 4. 6E78TER. :$ated communities( sustaina?le cities and a tragedB oC the ur?an commons.: Critical )lannin+( no. 13 / 8ummer G00I JG00IK.

10 LRent seeMingN reCers to ?ehavior Phere?B an individual( Cirm or government seeMs to o?tain ?eneCit ?B manipulating the economic and political environment rather than through productive Pealth creation and trade.

11 Ring R. G001. Leisure 6orld Rousing. Laguna 6oodsS 8enior /itiTens UdvisorB /ouncil( Fe?. Gd( G001W Leisure 6orld 8taCC Report Dec. Yth( G000 W Leisure 6orld / Laguna 6oods. $olden Rain Foundation 1ZZZ[G000 Progress Report JG000K.

Figure

Table 1. A dominant market share in the fastest gro;ing areas of the Los Angeles region
Table 2. Private Community Incorporation : sharing responsibilities and liabilities &lt;

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