Proximity analysis of inefficient practices and socio-spatial negligence: Evidence, evaluations and recommendations drawn from the construction of Chotiari reservoir in Pakistan,

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Land Use Policy

j o ur na l h o me p a g e :w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / l a n d u s e p o l

Proximity analysis of inefﬁcient practices and socio-spatial

negligence: Evidence, evaluations and recommendations drawn from the construction of Chotiari reservoir in Pakistan

Habibullah Magsi

^a,∗

, André Torre

^b

aDepartmentofAgriculturalEconomics,SindhAgricultureUniversityTandojam,Pakistan

bUMRSAD-APT,INRAAgroParisTech,16,rueClaudeBernard,75005Paris,France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Articlehistory:

Received4March2013

Receivedinrevisedform5October2013 Accepted9October2013

JELclassiﬁcation:

D74 O16 H54 Keywords:

Conﬂict

Multi-levelgovernance Proximityrelations Superpositionofuses Infrastructure Pakistan

a b s t r a c t

Inthisstudy,wehaveusedqualitativedatafromland-useconflictsforadevelopment-relatedinfra- structureprojectbasedonthecaseofChotiarireservoirinPakistan.Ourresultsprimarilyhighlightthe networksofstakeholdersinvolvedinmakingthedecisionsforthisprojectandtheiroppositiontothe desiresofthelocalpopulation,leadingtosignificanttensionsandconflictsduetothesuperpositionof land-useexpectationsintheprojectarea.Throughthisresearch,wehaveidentifiedthekeygroupsof actorsandtheirlogics,linksandbehaviorsintermsofmulti-levelgovernance(fromcommunitylevel tointernationallevel)andterritorialgovernance,thusrevealingthepositionsofstakeholdersandtheir relativesocialpower.Weshowhowpublicauthoritieshavedisregardedinternationalrulesandlaws inundertakingadevelopmentproject,andcausedgreatdamagetolocalpopulationsandenvironmen- talresources.Thisarticleaimstoprovideusefulinformationandinsightsforrecommendationstohelp preventandresolveland-useconflicts,principallyonthebasisofananalysisofproximityrelations.

Introduction

Infrastructureprojectsindevelopingcountrieshavedisplaced millions of lives (Mataram, 2008; Vainer, 2007; Cansen, 2004;

AwakulandOgunlana,2002)duetoafailuretoconsidertheneeds ofindigenouspopulations(Lama,2008;UNEP,2004).Mostly,such projectsareinitiatedinruralsettings,wherelocalpeopletendto losetheirresourcesandlivelihood.Thegrowingcurrentdebateon theirrightshasgivenrisetoreﬂectionsconcerningtheactualfoun- dationsofinfrastructureprojects,intermsofthelegitimacyofthe decisionsmadeaswellasstudiesconcerningthereactionsoflocal populations.Indeed,suchdecisionscanleadtomisunderstandings andproblematicsituationsbetweenvariousstakeholdersandgive risetotensionsandconﬂicts.

Itisbelievedthatsuchtensionsandconﬂictsarisewhensocial relations break down between the different stakeholders and

∗Correspondingauthor:AssistantProfessor,DepartmentofAgriculturalEco- nomics,SindhAgricultureUniversityTandojam,70060Hyderabad,Sindh,Pakistan.

Tel.:+923422479265.

E-mailaddresses:[email protected],habib[email protected] (H.Magsi),[email protected](A.Torre).

institutions(O’Toole,1997;Scott,1991),orwhentheirnetworks areasymmetricalandmarkedbypowerorcorruption.Walland Callister(1995)andSchelling(1960)reportedthatbalancedrela- tionsenablestakeholderstoﬁndsolutionsbytakingmeasuresto alleviatetensions.Theseremarksremindusoftheneedforgood governancestructuresandprocessesatthelocallevel,inorderto buildlocalprojectsandtoimproveparticipationofthepopulation intheplanningofinfrastructuresthatwillaffecttheirdailylives.

Therefore,thepurposeofthisarticleistostudyindetailthe typesofdecisionrelatedtoinfrastructureprojects,aswellasthe socio-spatialdisregardengenderedbyweakgovernanceprocesses, and toclassifythegovernancestructure atvariousscales(from regionaltointernational).Itisassumedthattheignoranceofsocio- spatiallawsinthecase-studyareahasledtosigniﬁcanttensions and conﬂictsbetween variousstakeholders,which have caused greatdamagetolocalpopulationsandenvironmentalresources.

Inourstudy,wewishtotestthehypothesisthatinefﬁcientgov- ernanceandsocio-spatialdisrespectleadtoland-useconﬂictsin theexecutionofinfrastructureprojects.Expertdatafromproject surveys,newspapersandavailableliteraturewereallusedtotest theresearchhypothesis.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.10.009

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governancefollow-upstructure.ThisisoneofPakistan’slargest infrastructureprojects,whichisfacingoppositioninthecountry andis heldup asanexampleof weakgovernancein theplan- ningofnewinfrastructuresindevelopingcountries.Inthisregard, wefeltthatastudyofmulti-levelgovernanceintheareaand a socio-spatialevaluationofChotiarireservoirwouldbeusefultools withaviewtorecommendingconcretepolicymeasuresandstrate- giestopreventsuchconflictsoflanduseinfutureinfrastructure projectsindevelopingcountries.Inthiscasestudy,therefore,we haveusednetworksofactorsandproximityanalyses.¹Recentcon- ceptualadvancesinnetworkanalysis(social,strategic,alliances, conflictnetworks,etc.)contributesignificantlytogainingabet- terunderstandinginthefieldofinterpersonalrelationsbetween actorsofdifferenttypesandorigins.Theuseofproximityanalysis enablesustoanalyzenotonlythelevelandnatureofcoordination byconsidering“situatedactorsorstakeholders”,²butalsotheway inwhichtheseactorsandstakeholdersarelinkedinalocal,national and/orinternationalsystemthroughproductive,commercialand innovativeactivities.

Therestofthearticleisdividedintoanumberofsections,begin- ningwithadescriptionofthecontextofthestudyareaandthe data-collectionandanalyticalmethodsused.Thesecondsection emphasizesthemainfindings,includingproblemsofsuperposition ofusesintheprojectandtheireffectsonthestructurednetworks ofstakeholdersinvolvedintheprojectandtheirrolesandrespon- sibilities,thusdemonstratingthemulti-levelgovernancesystemin placeandtheefficienciesthereof.Thissectionalsohighlightsthe violationsofrulesandlaws,basedonacarefulexaminationofcon- flictfeaturesasreportedbythemostprominentregionalpressand expertopinions.Thethirdpartofthepaperisdevotedtoanalysisof thesituationintermsofgeographicalandorganizedproximity.The finalsectionproposesacomprehensivestrategyforavoidingland- useconflicts,includingpreventivepolicyrecommendationsthat maybeappliedtosimilarinfrastructureprojects:thesestrategies arebasedontechnicalgroundsorproximity-drivenrecommenda- tions.

Studybackgroundanddatacollection

Forthepurposesofourstudy,weselectedthecaseoftheChotiari reservoirprojectinPakistanforitsuniquecharacteristicsinterms ofland-useconﬂictsandinefﬁcienciesatvariouslevelsofmanage- mentandgovernance.Inthissection,wedescribetheempirical backgroundofourcasestudy,thesourcesandmeansofdatacol- lectionandtheanalyticalmethodsused.

Case-studydescription

TheChotiari reservoir project(see Fig.1)was designed and implemented in order to increase the storage capacity of the existinglakesintheChotiariwetlandsandenabletheirrigation of more arable land in Pakistan. The project was initiated in 1992bytheWaterandPowerDevelopmentAuthority(WAPDA) and was funded by donor agencies via the World Bank. The projectarea extends over 18,000ha of entitled and unentitled land (Government of Pakistan, 1993). The Chotiari reservoir areawas characterized as wetlands and included lakes, forest,

1 Proximityanalysiscameforthsincethebeginningof1990s,wheneconomists, sociologistsaswellasgeographershavetriedtounderstandtheroleofspaceinco- ordinationwitheconomicactivities.AfterthefoundationlaidbyFrenchscholars, itsscopehasbeenbroadenedinternationally,wherenumerouscontributionshave alsoappeared(TorreandZuindeau,2009).

2 Thepositionofactorsandstakeholderswhichshowsthathowtheyarelocated inageographicalspaceorinanetwork.

Table1

Expertsofdiversebackgrounds.

Categories Interviewees

Privateorganizations(NGOsandjournalists) 10

Researchersandlegalexperts 9

Administration(waterandirrigationsector) 7

Affectedfamilyheadsandlandlords 6

Total 32

Note:ExpertopinionsurveyconductedinNovemberandDecember2010.

swamps, irrigationchannels, agriculturalland, barren land and a rich ecosystem, which supportedthe livelihoods of thelocal populationthrough ﬁshing, agriculture, grazing and a range of othereconomicactivities(WWF,2008).

TheChotiarireservoirprojecthascreatedoppositionbetween the principal actors (ﬁshermen, farmers, livestock herders and others)ontheonehand,andstakeholdersfromthepublicadmin- istration(nationalandprovincialministries),localpoliticiansand landlordsontheother(Magsiand Torre,2012;Nauman, 2003).

More speciﬁcally, a number of factors have made the task of implementingthis projectmore complicated and controversial:

thepublic administration’s highly bureaucratic approaches and mismanagementof constructionand compensation funds;local politicians’misuseofpositionandpowerwithregardtoforceddis- placements;andlocallandlords’exerciseofpoweroverthelocal population.Furthermore,oppositiongrewwhenlocalpopulations were dispossessedof their livelihoodsand ancestral properties withoutpropercompensation.Inspiteofalltheseissues,thepub- licauthoritiescompletedandinauguratedthereservoirinFebruary 2003,ﬁveyearslaterthananticipated(Iqbal,2004).

Datacollectionandanalysis

In order toconsider the incidences of land-useconflict and explorethesituationsofmulti-levelgovernanceefficiencyinthe implementationoftheChotiarireservoirproject,dataweregath- eredfromvariousprimaryandsecondarysources.Soastogaina betterunderstandingofpublicopinionbefore,duringandafterthe completionofthereservoir,weundertookaqualitativesurveyin theformof32in-depthinterviewswithselectedexpertstoobtain theirperceptionsandinsights(seeTable1).Theseinterviewswere conductedusingsemi-plannedquestionnaires,wheresomeques- tionswereomittedaccordingtotheexpert’sposition,situationand experiences,asnotalltheexpertssharedthesameprofessional backgrounds.Theseinterviewswereconductedinordertocollect dataonanumberofkeyvariables,namely:(1)thepre-conflictsit- uationoftheareaandthepositionsofthevariousactors;(2)the behavioral approachesofinstitutionsregarding landacquisition andthecompensationprocess;and(3)theconsequences ofthe reservoirproject.

Inaddition,secondary dataweregatheredfromtheregional andnationaldailypress,³inordertoobtain,asfaraspossible,an accuratepictureofthetensionsandconflictsatplayaswellastheir causesandconsequences.Althoughthisdata-collectiontechnique is seldomusedin general,itis a vitalsource ofinformation in land-useconflictanalysesinordertoappreciatethepublicvoiceon situationsbefore,duringandafterconflicts(DarlyandTorre,2013;

MagsiandTorre,2013;Torreetal.,2010;AwakulandOgunlana, 2002;McCarthyetal.,1996;RuchtandNeidhardt,1999).Dueto thelackofdigitallibrariesoronlineaccesstoregionaldailypress, theofﬁcesofselectedregionalnewspaperswerevisitedinperson,

3Toreviewdailypresswehaveselected10regionalnewspapersoutof21,which publishesinlocallanguagesand6nationalnewspapersoutof30,whichpublishes inUrduandEnglishlanguages,since1997to2011.

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Fig.1.LocationoftheChotiariwaterreservoir.

and newspapers were also collected from the ofﬁces of local community-basedorganizations(CBOs).Newsitemspublishedin nationaldailies,ontheotherhand,werecollectedbydownloading articlesdirectlyfromonlinesources.Reviewworkforthein-depth analysisofconﬂictsfeaturedinthesenewspaperswasconducted inthelibraryofSAD-APT,INRAAgroParisTech.Duringtheanalysis, greatcarewastakentoavoidunreliableinformation. Moreover, additionalsecondarydataforthestudywerecollectedbyanalyzing publishedmaterialfromvariouspublicandprivateorganizations.

Bycross-referencingthesetwosources(interviewsandthedaily press),wehopetohaveobtainedbalancedinformationand,asfar aspossible,avoidedbiasinthedataselection.

Resultsanddiscussion

Inthissection,wehighlighttheproblemscausedbytheChotiari reservoirprojectandtheattendantdisplacementoflocalinhabi- tants.Actionsrelatedtothedecisiontoimplementthisnewproject haveledtoseveretensionsandconﬂicts.Moreover,wealsoillus- tratethewaysinwhichinternationalrulesandlaws(human,social, economic,culturalandenvironmental)havebeenviolatedinthis project.

Chotiarireservoirproject:decisionandsuperposition

Landisnotonlyaspaceforgrowingcropsorrunningfarms;itis alsoaspacethatisorganizedsocially(agriculturalunions,fishing communities,industrialists,localmarketunions,etc.)andspatially (areas for crops, fishing ponds, cattle ranches, agro-industries, warehouses, forestry,etc.),withsocio-cultural heritages,values and emotional attachments. The appearanceof theinterests of outsideactorsonagivenpieceoflandsometimescreatestensions andconflicts,witharesultantlossofsocial andculturalcontrol over aterritory.In thecase oftheChotiariproject, localactors andoutsidestakeholdershadoppositeaimsandland-useobjec- tives;thedriversofthissituationledtheprojectinacontextof

superposition(seeFig.2).Thistypeofrepresentationcommonly occurswithregardtocommon-poolresources(CPRs)indeveloping countries(OstromandNagendra,2006).

Fig.2showsthattheconstructionofthereservoirhashindered traditionalactivitiesontheChotiarilandsandhasalsorestricted accessforlocaleconomicactors(MagsiandTorre,2012).Gener- ally,thelocalactorswerethecustodiansofanancientcultureand wereassimilatedintothelocalenvironment;theyusedtomanage productiveactivitiesontheland.However,thereservoirproject introducednewtypesofuses(waterstorage)tothesameareasand ledtoantagonismandopposition,andlatertoconﬂictsbetween differentstakeholders.

Therefore, the project hasbrought with it the dynamics of land-use conﬂict, which has not only contributed to changes in the territoriality of actors but also disrupted certain socio- spatial practices. This interference with socio-spatial practices involves a reaction of discontent, which has sometimes been expressed aggressively (Iqbal, 2004).Moreover, publicauthori- tieshaveinducedsocialandenvironmentalproblemsbyadversely

Fig.2. Reservoirconstruction:decisionandsuperpositionofuses.

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Phase II (2006–date)

Displacement Livelihood Social life Arable lands Ecology Outside lands Seepage due to increase in

water level in the reservoir Phase I (1997–2003)

Displacement Livelihood Social life Arable lands Ecology Chotiari water

reservoir

Chotiari water reservoir

Fig.3. ConﬂictdynamicsofChotiarireservoir.

affectingarableland,pastures,forestsaswellasthroughthecruel displacementoflocalpopulations.Whatismore,theincreasing waterlevelinthereservoirhascreatedseepage,whichisdestroying adjacentagriculturalland(seeFig.3).

Networkofactorsandgovernancestructure

Therelationshipofstakeholdersatdifferentlevels(regionalto international)formsthebasis ofhierarchiesofdecentralization, whichrevealhowstronggovernanceis,orshouldbe(HillandLynn, 2005),foragiveninfrastructureprojectinitsinitialstages.Through thiscomplexmazeofinterwoventies,actor–networktheorypro- videsinformationabouttheirinteractionsand/orconnectionsfor disparateactionsandactivities(see,forexample,ProvanandKenis, 2008;Hoffetal.,2002;PattisonandRobins,2002;Wassermanand Faust,1994;Grossetti,1992;Scott,1991;Granovetter,1973).Here, wewishtouseittoobtainaclearerpictureoflocalpopulations’

relationshipsandofpublic-sectorbehavior(see,forinstance,Raab, 2002)withregardtosubsequentconflictsituations.Whenpiecing togetheranetwork,thefirststepistoidentifythelinksbetweenthe variousactors,andthenrepresentthemgraphicallyinordertovisu- alizetheserelationships(PattisonandRobins,2002).Sometimes, difficultiesariseintherepresentationofmultipleactorswithmany existingrelationships,especiallywhentheyarenotwelldefined sociallyoradministratively(ProvanandKenis,2008).

In orderto understandconﬂictprocesses using networks, it is importanttogroup theactors structurallyaccordingto time andspace,aswellasaccordingtotheirinter-organizationalrela- tions(see,forexample,O’TooleandMeier,2004),asthiswillhelp toidentifyhow theyare linked toone anotherover time, and howtheirrelationshipschangeduringconfrontations.Essentially, networksshould bestructured onthebasis of primaryto sec- ondaryrelations,e.g.neighborhood,administration,competition, confrontation(Grossetti,1992).Inthisway,themodelwillfacilitate understandingofthedynamicsofthesocialrelationsatplay.

Fromcommunitytoregionallevel

Here,weaimtoprovidetemporaland spatialdimensionsof variousrelationsforthenetwork ofactorsinourcasestudy; it issubsequently possibletoanalyzetheway inwhich “situated actors”buildtheirrepresentationsandinterdependentnetworks.

Wepresentschoolsofthoughtbasedonexpertopinions,thedaily pressandinterviewswithaffectedhouseholdsinthestudyarea;

thissimple approach allows ustoobtainsocial representations forthedifferentcategoriesofactors.Thegraphicalrepresentation thatfollowshighlightstheinteractionsandthespatialscaleofthe

Type of relations:

Neutral Allied Conflict Regional level

Community level

Market related organizations

PFF Land Lords

Politicians

Courts

Police

Local population (farmers, herders, fishermen, etc.)

Fig.4.Actor’snetwork:beforeChotiarireservoir.

Source:Authorsrealizationbasedonexpertopinions,ﬁeldandliteraturesurvey.

actionsofdifferentactorsbeforetheannouncementoftheChotiari reservoirproject(seeFig.4).

TheresultsindicatedinFig.4arebasedonopinionsfromand interviewswithexperts,inwhichwediscoveredthatthelocalpop- ulation’srelationshipsbeforereservoirconstructionwerelimited toinﬂuentialindividuals(landlordsandpoliticians)andtheirlocal markets.Ouranalysisthusrevealsthattheserelationshipsbetween thelocalpopulationandotherstakeholderswerebasedonlyon thesurvivaloftheirlivelihood,inordertocarryonwiththeirday- to-daylifeasnormal(Iqbal,2004).Accordingtotheexperts,this limitednetworkwasprobablydueeithertothefactthatthelocal populationlivedfarfromthenearestcity(around35km/20miles away),scatteredwithinthereservoirperimeter(mostlyonsand dunes),or totheirisolated wayof life (illiteracy,unawareness, traditionalcultureand/orincomprehension).

Throughthisanalysis,wediscoveredthatinfluentiallocalindi- vidualshadantagonisticrelationshipswiththelocalpopulation, mostlyowingtodifferenteconomicactivitiesintheregion,asthe localpopulationbelongstoa rural,sociallydeprivedclass.Fur- thermore,ontheedgesof theChotiariarea, themarket-related organizationswereruneitherbyinfluentialindividualsorbypeo- plewhohadthesupportoftheseindividuals.Thesemarket-related organizationsthereforehadconflictualrelationswiththelocalpop- ulationowing tounbalanced transactions, such asselling their productsorbuying stockfor theirsmall-scalebusiness.Further resultsshowthatthemajorityofthelocalpopulationbelonged tothefishingcommunity,whichiswhytheyhavebeensupported onlybythePakistanFisherfolkForum(PFF)andotherNGOs,with nointeractionwithlocalpoliceoradministrativecourts.

Fromregionaltointernationallevel

Duetocollaborationsbetweenactorsanddifferentreputations intermsofcredibility,itisdifﬁculttocategorizethepositionofthe variousactorsatallstagesoftheproject,fromplanningthrough toconstruction.Forexample,duringthepolicy-makingprocess, someactorswereinvolvedatregionaltonationallevel,whileoth- erswereinvolvedonlytemporarilyanddidnotplayanactiverole intheadministration.Inordertounderstandthedynamicprocess oftheproject,wehavesoughttoadoptarelationalapproachtoour analysiswiththeaimofobtaininginformationregardingsocialrep- resentationsthatcorrespondtoauniverseofinterrelatedelements.

Followingthesein-depthanalyses,wesummarizedtherelation- ships,linksandlocationsoftheactorsorstakeholdersatdifferent geographicalscales(seeFig.5).

Theabovefigureshowsthatactorswithinthevariouscategories havestructuredthemselvesintermsofdefinedstrategiesandhave differentbehaviors.Moststrikingly,actorsinvolvedinmanagerial and administrative activitieshave a different representation of the reservoir area, appearing unified (Government of Pakistan, 1993,1998),butinrealitynotcaringaboutnaturalelementssuch

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Ministry of Irrigation

Planning commission

of Pakistan

SFD International level

National level

Regional level Provincial level

World Bank Saudi Fund for

Development

WWF

SIDA WAPDA

EPA

SWMB

SEPA

CRA SANGI (NGO)

SAFWCO PFF

Landlords

Politicians Courts

Police Local

population Type of relations:

Neutral Allied Supportive Conflict

Interest (corruption) Cooperation Admin. loyalty Opponents Abbreviations:

SWMB: Sindh Wildlife Management Board SFD: Sindh Forest Department SEPA: Sindh Environmental Protection Agency CRA: Chotiari Resettlement Agency SIDA: Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority EPA: Environmental Protection Agency WAPDA: Water & Power Development Authority PFF: Pakistan Fisher-folk Forum SAFWCO: Sindh Agricultural Forestry & Workers Coordination Organization

Fig.5. Networkofactorsandstakeholdersduringthereservoirconstruction(1997-2003).

Source:Authorsrealizationbasedonexpertopinions,ﬁeldandliteraturesurvey.

aswetlands,arableland,forests,ﬂoraandfauna;inotherwords, theyareinalliancewithlocalpoliticiansandlandlords,buthave nopositiverelationswithlocalactorsuptograssrootslevel(Magsi andTorre,2012).Ontheotherhand,thelocalpopulation,withthe supportofvariousNGOs,hasopposedconstructionofthereservoir andprotestedinordertoprotectthenaturalresourcesofthepre- ciouswetlandsofChotiari.Thelimitedsupportfor,andcoverage of,thelocalpopulation’sopposition,protestsandmobilizationhas meantthattheiractionshavenothadconclusiveresults.

Accordingtotheexperts,localstakeholders’cooperationwith administrativeactorsatnationaltointernationallevelswasbased toa certainextentoncorruptionand favoritism.Ingeneral,the institutionalizedconsultationprocessesdonotnecessaryleadto decisions,butinsteadaimtofacilitatetheacceptanceofadevel- opmentplan,suchastheconstructionofareservoir.Inthecase ofChotiari,theconsultingﬁrmsEuroConsultantsandSirMcDon- aldandPartnersLtd.andaSriLankanresettlementspecialistwere appointedtopreparetheEnvironmentalImpactAssessment(EIA) reportfortheproject,andtocoordinatepolicyandimplementa- tionissues,buttheexpertshaveexpresseddoubtsconcerningthe resultsofthiswork.

On the otherhand, inﬂuential actors(politicians and feudal lords),incooperationwiththeChotiariResettlementAgency(CRA), forcedlocalpopulationsorindividualfamilyheadstoacceptthe decisioninfavorofthereservoir.Theresultisthatthereservoir (afteritsinauguration)hasbeenoccupied(illegally)bysomeof

thoseinfluential actors,asdisplaced populationshavenot been allowedtoaccessthereservoirtoearntheirlivelihoodbyfishing, etc.AshighlightedbyNauman(2003),thiscooperativelobbying network hasmanagedto direct over 80%of compensation dis- bursementstofictitiousowners(individualswhomtheysupport).

Moreover,thegovernmentitselfhasacceptedthattherewasmas- sivecorruptionintheChotiarireservoirproject(Iqbal,2004),butno accountabilityhasbeenestablishedtodate.Here,wewouldliketo quotearemarkableresponsefromoneoftheexperts,whoreported thatthe“WAPDAhasagaininitiatedconstructionoftheDiamer- Bhashadaminthenorthofthecountry,whichwillalsobeﬁnanced bytheWorldBank;thus,iftheWorldBankhasnoproblemgiving moremoney forcorruptionandthedisplacementofrurallives, thenourgovernmentshouldsolvetheseconﬂictsandgivemoney tolocalpeople.”

While analyzing the land-use governance of Chotiari reservoir,wefoundthatthereason forsomestakeholders’presence inpowerrelationshipswastheirlonginvolvementintheproject.

For example, from the management network’s standpoint, we can distinguish two main subsets of stakeholders, namely the decision-making body and the advisory and technical com- mittees. Furthermore,these subsets include multiplenetworks.

Thedecision-making processismanagedjointlybyassociations and internationalandstateinstitutions,while theadvisoryand technical committeesbringtogetherrepresentativesfrom asso- ciations, professional organizations, government agencies and

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non-governmentagencies.Someactorshaveconnectionsoutside ofthecommitteesaspublicauthorities,whileothershavebeen linkedtothepoliticiansandlandlords.Itisaninterdependentnet- work,especiallyasitincludesonlyafewpeople.Ingeneralterms, allstakeholderscouldintheorycometogetherandconsultonthe actiontobetakeninordertoestablishagivenproject,butthispro- cesscanbedisregardedinthecaseofChotiarireservoir(Nauman etal.,2001).Withthisinmind,eachandeveryspacefordialogis aspecialplacewheremultipleactorsmeetwithdivergentinter- estsandwithmultipleroles,havingbeeninvolvedinallactions fromconstruction tothedisplacementoflocalpopulations,and fromﬁllingthereservoirtowaterloggingandseepage(seeFig.3).

In addition,thepublicauthorities were obliged tomonitorthe managementandresettlementplansinrelationtoboththephysi- calaspects(maintenanceofwetlands,ecologicalinventories,etc.) andhumanaspects(regulationofconflicts).Moreover,asthefig- ureaboveshows,law-enforcementinstitutions(thecourtsandthe police)areperipheralandseemtohavemoreofasuppressiverole ratherthanenjoyinganyparticularinfluenceontheadministra- tion.Inthiscontext,marginalizedpopulationssurelyhavenohope ofconflictresolution.

OnthebasisofexperiencesfromtheChotiarireservoirproject, wesuggest thatthere isa needtobuilda strongparticipatory, communitycapacityforconsultation,negotiationandpromotion in favor of collectiveaction (Petit, 2002). Collective action has beenwidelyrecognizedasamechanismforallocatingresources and as an effective alternative in the field of planning and decision-making, but it can also bea difficult, painstaking and time-consumingtask,asitisonlypossiblewherethelocalinsti- tutionsarestrongenough (Yasmi etal., 2011).Furthermore, in order to conform to international regulations, there is a need tobuilda commonconditionor agenda,which shouldencour- agethesharingofdifferentinterestsandperspectivesaswellas buildconfidenceand trust amongtheresource users.Through- out theanalysis of this case study, we consistently found that thepublicauthoritiesdidnotupholdinternationalrulesorlaws for those affected by the project or to resolve disagreements amongthelocalpopulationandtheircollatednetworks.Rather, withregardtoconflictresolution,thestakeholdershavedictated to the local population throughout the implementation of the project.

Ananalysisintermsofproximitydynamics

Theanalysisofproximityrelations(Boschma,2005)provesto beavaluablefieldofresearchinvariousdisciplinesaswellasfor topicssuchasinnovationandenvironmentalrelations,orland-use conflicts.Weshalluseitheretoanalyzetherelationsbetweendif- ferentcategoriesofstakeholdersintheland-useconflictoverthe Chotiarireservoir.

Basicﬁndings

We consider the distinction between two main categories ofproximity– geographicalproximityand organizedproximity (TorreandRallet,2005)–inexplainingtherelationsetsofstake- holders,boundaries,clusters,etc.Thesenotionsofproximityrefer, aboveall,topotentialitiesgiventoindividuals,groupsandhuman actionsingeneral,intheirtechnicalandinstitutionaldimensions.

Thesetypesofproximityhavenomoralvalueandtheirexistence constitutesneitheranadvantagenoradisadvantage.Itisactivation throughhumanactionthatgivesthispotentialitssigniﬁcanceand value.

Geographicalproximity

Geographicalproximityisaboveallaboutdistance.Initssim- plest deﬁnition, it is thenumber of meters or kilometers that separatetwoentities.Butitisrelativeinthreeways:

•interms ofthemorphological characteristicsofthespaces in whichactivitiestakeplace;

•intermsoftheavailabilityoftransportinfrastructure;

•intermsof theﬁnancialresourcesoftheindividualswho use thesetransportinfrastructures.

Geographicalproximityisneutralinessence.Itisthehuman actionsandperceptionsthatgiveitamoreorlesspositiveornega- tivedimensionaswellasacertainusefulness.Itisthewayinwhich actorsuseitthatmatters.Thus,thefactthattwoactorsarelocated inproximitytoeachothermayormaynotbeasourceofinter- action:thesetwoentitiesmayremainindifferenttoeachotheror theymaychoosetointeract;inthis lattercase,wetalkabouta mobilizationofthepotentialitiesofgeographicalproximity.

Undesirable and desirable geographical proximity.. Land-use and neighborhoodconﬂictsandtensionscanbecloselyrelatedtogeo- graphical proximity (Torre and Zuindeau, 2009). The approach hereisbasedonafundamentaldistinctionbetweenundesirable orunwelcomegeographicalproximityanddesirablegeographical proximity.

Geographicalproximityisundesirablewhendifferentlandusers disagreeastowhat thelandtheyoccupyshouldbeusedfor – forexample,somewantingthelandtobeusedforrecreational purposesand otherswantingtouseitfor productionpurposes.

Geographicalproximitycanalsobeunwelcomewhentherearedis- agreementsaboutwhatcategory(orcategories)ofusersshouldor shouldnothaveaccesstoagivenarea.Itcanresultinaconstraint ofproximityduetothreetypesofinterference:

•superposition:twoormorelandusersuse,orwishtouse,apiece oflandfordifferentpurposes;

•contiguity:individuals orgroups ofindividuals locatedsideby sidedisagreeastowheretheboundarybetweentheirrespective propertieslies;

•neighborhood:situationsinwhichtheundesirableeffectsofcer- tainactivitiesarediffusedbyair,waterorundertheeffectof gravitytoactorslocatedinproximity.

Theother,opposite,situationdiscussedinliteratureisthatof desirableorsought-aftergeographicalproximity.Inthiscase,land usersseekproximitytoothersocialoreconomicactors,orevento naturalorartiﬁcialresourcesortoareasthatpresent(humanand spatial)characteristicsassociatedwithalowpopulationdensity.It canbeoftwotypesdependingwhetheroneneedspermanentor temporaryproximity.

Geographicalproximitycanbeactivatedormobilizedbythe actionsofeconomicandsocialactors.Dependingontheirstrate- giesorstrategicchoices,oraccordingtotheirperceptionsoftheir environment,thebehaviorsandattitudesoftheseactorsvary,and theymobilizeGeographicalProximitydifferently.

Organizedproximity

Organizedproximity,too,isapotentialthatcanbeactivatedor mobilized.Organizedproximityreferstothedifferentwaysofbeing closetootheractors,regardlessofthedegreeofgeographicalprox- imitybetweenindividuals,thequaliﬁer“organized”referringtothe arrangednatureofhumanactivities(andnottothefactthatone

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maybelongtoanyorganizationinparticular⁴).Organizedproxim- ityisbasedontwomainlogics,whichdonotnecessarilycontradict eachother,andwhichweshallcallthe“logicofbelonging”andthe

“logicofsimilarity”.

Thelogicofbelongingreferstothefactthattwoormoreactors belongtothesamerelationshipgraphoreventothesamesocial network,whethertheirrelationisdirectorintermediated.Itcan dependonthesectorin whichtheyareoperating;inthis case, theysharecommoncreativeorinnovationcapital.Itcanbemea- suredintermsofdegreesofconnectivity,reﬂectinggreaterorlesser degreesoforganizedproximityandthereforeagreaterorlesser potentialforinteractionorcommonaction.Thedevelopmentof interactionsbetweentwoactorswillbefacilitatedbytheirbelong- ingtothesametennisclub,for instance,orInternetknowledge network.Similarly,cooperationwill,apriori,developmoreeasily betweenresearchersandengineerswhobelongtothesameﬁrm, thesametechnologicalconsortiumorthesameinnovationnet- work.Thisincludesthecommonorganizationalcultureamongthe membersofateam,forexample.

Thelogic ofsimilarity correspondstoa mental adherenceto commoncategories;itmanifestsitselfinsmallcognitivedistances betweencertainindividuals. Theymaybepeoplewhoare con- nectedtooneanotherthroughcommonprojects,orwhosharethe sameculturalorreligious(etc.)valuesorsymbols.Socialnorms and commonlanguages, for instance,partakeof this organized proximity.Itmayalso,however,correspondtoabondthatsome- timesemergesbetweenindividualswithoutthemhavinghadto talkin order toget toknow one another.It facilitatesinterac- tionsbetweenpeoplewhodidnotknowoneanotherbeforebut whosharesimilarreferences.Thus,collaborationisalltheeasier whenitinvolvesindividualswhosharethesameculture.Similarly, researcherswhobelongtothesamescientiﬁccommunityarelikely tocooperatemore easilybecausetheysharenotonlythesame language,butalsothesamesystemofinterpretationoftextsand results.

Justlikegeographicalproximity,organizedproximityreferstoa potentialthatisneutralinessence.Itistheperceptionsandactions ofindividualsthatgiveitamoreorlesspositiveornegativedimen- sion,andthereforeacertainusefulness.Beingconnectedbyalogic ofbelongingisnota guaranteethatinteractionswilloccur,and evenlessaguaranteeofthequalityoftheseinteractions.Interms ofthelogicofsimilarity,acommonprojecthasasmuchchanceof leadingtoasharedsuccessasofendinginfailure,resultinginheavy lossesforthepartiesinvolved.Finally,thelogicsofsimilarityandof belongingcanalsofacilitatecollaborationsthatmightbeimmoral intheirmotivations.Forexample,maﬁaorganizationsoftenfeed onboththelogicofsimilarity(ethnicorigins)andonthelogicof belonging(strongconnectionwithinanetworkofactors),which maybeconsideredethicallyimmoral.

ProximitydynamicsinthecaseofChotiarireservoir

Proximityanalysisisavaluabletoolforqualifyingthedifferent dynamicsatstakeintheland-useconﬂictprocess.Ithelpsiniden- tifyingthemaingroupsofactors,theirlogicsandtheirlinks,aswell asthebasisoftheircooperativeoropposedbehaviors.Moreover, itprovideshelpfulinsightsandinformationforrecommendations intermsofland-useconﬂictpreventionandresolution.

Geographicalproximity

InthecaseofChotiarireservoir,wequicklyfoundthatgeograph- icalproximityplayedacoreroleintheconﬂictprocesses,intwo

4Onemaybeorganizedoronemayorganizeanactivitywithoutnecessarilyrefer toorbelongtoanorganization,inthestrictsenseoftheterm.

differentways.First,withregardtounwantedproximityinterac- tions,itisobviousthatgeographicalproximitybetweenvarious localstakeholders(localpopulation,landlords,andpublicauthor- ities)hasledtoconﬂictualrelationshipsandmisunderstandings.

Moreover,we identified a case of superposition ofuses, which ledtotensionsandultimatelytoconflictsafterthedisplacement ofthelocalpopulationoffarmersandfishermen.Clearly,apro- portionof thetraditionaloccupants wished tousethelandfor productiveactivities,whereasotherstakeholders(landlordsand publicauthorities) wished touseit for water storage or other, moreprofitablegoals.In thisrespect,thisbringsusbacktothe generalsituationwhere usinga pieceofland fordifferentpur- posesprovesdifficultorevenimpossiblebecauseofincompatible land-useexpectations(MagsiandTorre,2012).

Second,geographicalproximityalsoplayedaroleinthesetting- upof localnetworks ofopponents.The traditional usersof the Chotiariland(farmers,ﬁshermen,herdersandothers),whendis- placed,usedtocollaborateinordertoprotestagainstthisnewland useandtodemandremediationinthecourtsandbeforethepublic authorities.Fromourinterviewsandourconsultationofthelocal press,wededucedthatthecontextanddynamicsofthesenetworks oflocalopponentswerebasedupon theirpreviouslocationand theircommonrootsinlocallandandterritories.

Organizedproximity

Thelackofgeneralizedorganizedproximityisoneofthemain causesoftheChotiaridisaster.These eventsshouldnever have occurredinacasewheregeneralizedorganizedproximityrelations existedbetweenlocalstakeholders,aslocalpublicauthoritiesor feudallandlordsshouldnotbeinapositiontoactagainstthevital interestsofthelocalpopulation.Theyshouldhavebeenforcedto discusswiththemandjointlyestablishlocalarrangements,instead oftakingactionattheexpenseoflocalfarmersandﬁshermen.

However,intra-grouporganizedproximityplayedakeyrolein thesetting-upandstructuringofnetworks.AsFig.5shows,itis obviousthatmostofthenetworksofopponentsextendbeyond thelocallevel.Suchnetworkscanevengrowtonationalorinter- nationallevel,andareallbasedonorganizedproximityrelations.

Tobemoreprecise,thelogicofsimilarityisatstakeinmostofthe networks:theopponentsbelongtothesamecommunityofpeople, theysharethesamevalues,ortheybelongtothesamefamiliesor ethnicgroups.Thisisparticularlytrueinthecaseoflocalpopula- tionsofdisplacedpeople,orintheBaradari(orBîradrî)system,both ofwhicharebasedonstronglyrootedorganizedproximities.Butit isalsotruefornetworksatlocaltoregionalornationallevelwhich transcendthegeographicallogic,suchasthe“administrative”network,involvingpeoplefromdifferentorigins,butwhoarealllinked bytheiradherencetocommonadministrativerulesandknow-how.

Thelogicofbelonginghasalsoplayedanincreasinglyimportant roleduringthedifferentstagesoftheconﬂict:peoplestartedto takejointactiononthebasisofinteractiveexchanges,andcontin- uedtobuildrelationshipswithoneanotheronthisbasis.Overtime, thelinksbecamestrongerwithinandbetweendifferentgroupsof opponents.Theylearned toworktogether,andcooperativeand trust-basedrelationshipsdevelopedamonggroupsofopponents, onthebasisoftheseexisting,successfulinterrelationships.

Land-useconﬂictpreventionrecommendationsin developingcountries

Onthebasisofourcase-studyanalyses,weshallnowpropose anumberofrecommendationsforpreventingland-useconﬂicts withregardtoinfrastructuredevelopmentprojectsindeveloping countries.Moreover,inthefollowingsubsections,weshallelab- orateuponthedifferentpossibilitiesforlandusearoundChotiari

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reservoirinordertoresolveconﬂictsandensureeconomicdevel- opment;thesesolutionsareprincipallybasedonthemobilization ofproximityrelations,betheygeographicalororganized.

Land-useconﬂictresolutionmeasures:casestudy

Itisobviousthatnotallstrategiesaresuitableforresolvingall conflicts,norcanconflictsalwaysberesolvedusingasinglereso- lutionstrategy(Youngetal.,2005).Sofar,theconflictscreatedby Chotiarireservoirhavebeendeeplyrootedininefficienciesingov- ernance,legalinstitutionsandlocalpowerconfigurations,suchas corruptionandmismanagementoffunds,andtheforceddisplace- mentoflocalpopulations.Thesemovementsoflocalpopulations haveexacerbatedtensionsandledtoconflictfollowingthecredi- blecommitment(legalaction,violence,mediacoverage,andaccess restrictions)oftheactorswhofeelthreatenedordisadvantaged.

Toimprovethemanagement structureof theChotiarireservoir projectandpreventconﬂictsrelatingtoitsuse,weproposethefol- lowingmeasures,basedonananalysisofnetworksandproximity relations.

Consultationandfollow-upprocedure

Oneofthechallengesoftheconsultationprocessisregulating objectionssothatprojectscansucceedandbeacceptedbymostof theactorsinvolved.Thisprocessofparticipatorydemocracygives indigenouspeoplethe righttoexpresstheirwishesandneeds.

Thecooperationandinvolvementofallstakeholdersintheimple- mentationoftheprojectcanhelpchangeand adapttheproject accordingto theinterests ofall. Thisdoes not meanobtaining unanimousagreement,butratherensuringthateveryonehasthe opportunitytobeheard.Ingeneral,unanticipatedobjectionsmay ariseduringtheprocedure;thesehelptostimulatediscussion.The consultationproceduresthereforegenerallylastseveralyearsand sometimesleadtounexpectedresultsintermsoftheregulationof conﬂicts.

Theﬁndingsofthisresearchexplorethefactthattheattitudes oftheprojectstakeholderstowardtheprincipalactorssetthem apartfromtheothergroupsandcreatedtensionsandconﬂicts.The stakeholders’negativeattitudesareshownclearlyinFigs.2and3.

Inlightofthis,oneoftheoptionsforresolvingconﬂictsinlarge infrastructureprojectsisthereforetopayattentiontothevoice ofreason(i.e.thelocalpopulation).Consequently,itisvitaltobe awareoftheimpactsofdevelopmentprojectsonsocialandenvi- ronmentalnorms.Inthisregard,goodgovernancewithfollow-up proceduresduringtheprojectconstructionphasecharacterizesthe socialandenvironmentalneedsoftheprojectarea.Inparticular, theenvironmentalimpactassessment(EIA)canbeacrucialtool forachievingenvironmentalsustainability.Although,inthecase ofChotiarireservoir,thistoolhasnotbeenfollowedup,theEIA forthisprojectwasatleastcarriedout(GovernmentofPakistan, 1993);fromthis,we canconcludethattheprocessneedstobe administeredmoreefﬁcientlyandinamoresystematicfashion.All stakeholders,especiallythelocalpopulation,shouldhavetheright toparticipateinthefollow-upproceduresofplanning,decision- makingandconstructionoperations.Moreover,theinvolvement oflocalpopulations canbebased upon themobilizationofthe proximitylogicsofbelonging–jointexpectationssharedbypeo- plebelongingtothesameethnic,familyorsituatedgroups–orof similarity–peoplebelongingtothesamenetworksofworkersor professionalrelations.

Expropriation,compensationandaccountability

Theresettlement andrelocationofthelocalpopulationisan inescapablecompanionofinfrastructuredevelopmentprojectslike Chotiari reservoir. Almost all the use of land for project con- structionentailstheexpropriationofhomes,businessesandother

Table2

LanduseoptionsotherthanChotiarireservoir:suggestionsfromtheexperts.

Option Explanation

Fishfarming Thereservoircanbeusedforﬁshfarming,asthelakes wereusedforﬁshingtolocalcommunitiesbeforethe reservoirconstruction

Industry Tourism:canbepromotedintheChotiariarea,asthe regionisnaturallybeautifulandcharacterizedashome ofcrocodiles

Hotels:byfollowingtourismthedemandforhotels andmarriagehallsforpublicuseonrentwillincrease, whichwillgiveasufﬁcientlivelihoodtolocal population

Milkindustry:beforereservoirtherewasamilk processingfactorywhichisnowclosedduetoreduced sizeofherds(milk).Thusthelandcanbeusedfor manufacturingandprocessingunitsofmilkandmilk products,byincreasinggrazinggroundsonthefringes ofthelakes

Nationalpark Landcanbereservedasnationalparkby domesticatingthedamagedfaunaandﬂoras, restorationofnaturalforestlifeandcrocodiles Others Agriculture,grazingandhunting(despiteofincreasing

waterlevelthereislesspossibilitytousethelandfor agriculture,butthefringesofthereservoirandthe dunescanbeuseasgrazinggroundstopromotecattle farming)

Source:Expertopinionsurveyendof2010.

productiveresources.Duringaproject’sinitiationphase,localpeo- plemustbecounseledbythemanagementauthorities,whether theyagree withthe construction and voluntarily displacement ornot;however,this wasnotthecase withtheChotiarireser- voirproject(Iqbal, 2004).The involuntaryresettlement and its impactsonlocalinhabitantshavebecomethemostcontentiousof thesocio-economicandenvironmentalissuesatstake.Theques- tionofresettlingandrelocatinglocalpopulationsshouldbegiven paramountimportance.

Withthisin mind,a systemtoredressgrievancesrelatedto land acquisition,compensation and resettlement shouldclearly beestablishedandmadeknownpublicly.Thecompensationand resettlementofferedshouldensurethatthoseaffectedwillregain thesameorimprovedstandardsofliving.Werecommendthatrep- resentativesoftheaffectedpopulationbeselectedasmembersof thecompensationevaluationcommitteeinordertohelpresolve conflicts.Givingcompensationmoneytotheaffectedfamiliesalone wouldnotsuffice;instead,considerationshouldbegiventoprovid- ingthemwithalternativeemployment,housingandamenities.A realisticactionplanshouldbepreparedsoastogivethoseaffected anopportunitytobecomephysicallyestablishedandeconomically self-sustainingwithintheshortestpossibleperiodoftime.Itssuc- cess,however,willalwaysdependonefficientimplementation.

Differentpossibleland-useoptions,otherthanareservoir

Thereisnodoubtthat land-usechangecanbeeconomically viableandsociallyfeasibleifitisbasedontheconceptofeconomic returnsfrompresentandalternativeactivitiesonthelandinques- tion(Segersonetal.,2006).Forthis,weneedtoknowwhatthe expertssuggestintermsofalternativeoptionsinordertoresolve theland-useconﬂictinthecaseofChotiarireservoir.Accordingly, inthecontextofourresearch,weaskedtheexpertsthefollowing questions:Whataretheoptionsavailableforthisland,andwhichof theseoptionswouldensuresocialandeconomicviabilitythrough collectiveinterests?Fewoftheexpertswerefoundtobeinsupport ofthereservoir,andthemajorityofthemwereoftheopinionthat thelandcouldstillbeusedforotheractivitiesthanthereservoir (seeTable2).

Table2indicatesthepossibleoptionsforlanduseontheChotiari reservoir site. Accordingto the experts, nosigniﬁcant changes

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would be required to extend the agricultural land around the reservoir.Thisisbecausetheauthoritiescannotstoremorewater becauseofthepoorqualityoftheearthworksinconstructingits embankments(Nauman, 2003).However,arablelandinsidethe reservoirperimeterhasbeenﬂooded,andarablelandoutsidethis perimeterhasbeendamaged bywaterloggingand seepage.The expertsalsoarguethat ifthegovernment weretoconsiderthe aboveoptions,thechangeinlandusecouldensureprosperityin theregion.

Recommendationsforpreventingland-useconﬂictsin infrastructureprojectsindevelopingcountries

Theunpredictableandriskynatureofland-useconﬂictreso- lutioniswhathasmotivatedthesearchforpreventionsolutions.

Land-useconflictpreventioncanbeavaluabletoolforreducing futuretensionsandpreventingtheemergenceofconflictsrelat- ing to divergentuses or anticipated uses of land. The Chotiari caseshowsthatitisvitaltobeawareofconflictpreventioncon- cepts(BercivitchandJackson,2009;Burton,1993)andthatcertain actions have tobe implemented beforenew projects are initiated,otherwiseunderlyingcharacteristicscouldcreatedifficulties (MannandJeanneaux,2009).

Therefore,onthebasisoftheresultsobtainedinourcasestudy, weproposethatthefollowingmeasuresbeappliedinordertohelp preventland-useconﬂictsininfrastructureprojectsindeveloping countries.Thesemeasuresarepartlybasedonthemobilizationof existingproximitiesbetweenactors,betheygeographicalororganized.

Howtomobilizevirtuousproximitiesandavoidnegativeeffects First,werecommend enforcingand followingupa statutory requirementthatallnewdevelopmentprojectproposalsandcon- structionsshouldbeprecededbyanassessmentofthelocalcontext, perspectivesandapplicablerightsbyacarefullyselectedmultidis- ciplinaryteam.Thisshouldbefollowedbyanopenandﬂexible processwithmeaningfulpublicparticipation,directedatdevel- opingalong-term,sharedvisionfortheprojectareainquestion that involves the localpopulation. We also recommend that a socialsafeguardpolicybeimplemented,thatrightsbeguaranteed toaminimumstandardwithinthecoremandateoftheprojects, andthatkeyperformanceindicatorsbeestablishedformonitor- ingauthorities;suchindicatorswerenotformulatedinthecaseof Chotiarireservoir(MagsiandTorre,2012)andotherinfrastructure projects(Mataram,2008;AwakulandOgunlana,2002).

Theseassessmentsmustfirstofallevaluatethegeographical proximitybetweenlocalstakeholders,whichcanbeatthecauseof land-useconflicts,whetherintermsofsuperpositionofuses,con- tiguityorneighborhood.Next,theparticipationandinvolvement ofthelocalpopulationmustbeensuredbymobilizingorganized proximities,inparticularviathelogicofbelonging:localstakeholders,especiallythepoorestandmostactiveday-to-dayusersof thelandandnaturalresources(herders,fishermen,andfarmers), havetobeinformedandincludedinthedecision-makingprocess, onthebasisoftheircommoninterestsandfutureexpectations.

Finally,asuccessfulprocessofterritorialgovernanceshouldlead tothebuildingofsolidnetworksoflocalandnon-localactorsof variousorigins.Thesharingofcommongoalsintermsofterritorial developmentshould,inthissituation,bebasedontheinteractive buildingofproximitylogicsofbelonging.

Second,weidentiﬁedtheneedtoestablishagovernancebody fortheprotectionofnaturalresources,whichshouldprovidepos- sibleformsofmediationbetweensocio-economicandecological objectives.Whileitshouldbetheauthorities’aimtoberecognized asaprimeentityinthemanagementoflivelihoodsandbiodiversity throughmutuallybeneﬁcialcooperationwithlocalcommunities

andotherstakeholders,thistaskwouldneedtobeundertakenby aneutralparty,notjustduringtheinitialplanningprocessbutalso inthelongterm.

Themobilizationofbothtypesofproximitiesshouldbesought duringthisprocess.Desiredandundesiredproximitiesofnatural resourcessuchaslakes, forestsand rich soilsontheone hand, andpollutedareasandinfertilelandontheotherhand,mustbe assessedinordertomapanddeﬁnetheperimetersofprotectedor exploitableresourceareas,withregardtotheneedsoflocalpopu- lations.Then,thoseinchargeofthegovernancestructureshould trytodeveloporganizedproximitiesbetweenvariouslocalstake- holders,fromdifferentcommunities,inordertohelpthembuild commonprojectsandfutureprospectstogether.

Technicaltoolsandmeasures

Largeconstructionprojectsareresponsibleforland-usechanges wherelocationisakeyfactorfordevelopment.Theprojectlocation shouldbedeterminedaccordingtosocial,economicandtechnical criteria,aswellasenvironmentalconsiderations,incontextswhere carefulland-useplanningisnecessarytoavoidconﬂictsbetween landusers.Theuseoflocalhistoricalrecords,benchmarkingpro- cedures,territorialdiagnoses,interviewsandpeer-groupmeetings isstronglyrecommended.

Weshouldalsoliketoemphasizethenecessitytoguarantee,for eachcommunity,accesstoandtheexerciseoflegalrightsthrough astate-sponsoredbody,inordertoovercometheasymmetriesof powerthattypicallyprevailandtoensureopportunitiesfortheir optimizedgainfulemployment.Thesearebasicruleswhichmay entailimplementingvirtuousgovernanceprocesses attheterri- toriallevelandfulﬁllingtheminimumrequirementsofthelocal population(TorreandTraversac,2011).

Conclusion

Thisresearchconcernsmulti-levelgovernanceandsocio-spatial evaluationsoftheChotiarireservoirprojectinPakistan.Theproject has affectedand damaged economic, social and environmental resources.Intermsofresults,thedivergencesinland-useobjec- tivesbetweenpublicandprivatedecision-makersontheonehand andlocalpopulationsontheotherhavegenerated variouscon- ﬂictsamongstakeholdersinthearea.Inthecourseofthisresearch, wehaveexploredthedynamicsofstakeholders’relationshipsat scalesranging fromthelocalcommunity tointernationallevel, ﬁrst using anapproach based onnetworks of actors,and then intermsofproximityanalysis,bothgeographicalandorganized.

Bothof these methods highlightedthe lackof appropriate ter- ritorial governance, which shouldhave played a crucial role in anticipatingand/ormitigatingland-useconﬂicts.Throughmulti- levelgovernanceanalyses,wehaveexposedinstitutionalpowers andbehaviorstotheindigenouspopulations,aswellasrevealing managementpracticesimplementedinPakistan.

Theresultsshowhowthepublicauthoritieshaveignoredinter- nationallaws,aswellasthelocalpopulations’rights,inundertaking a majordevelopmentproject. Thisisseenas partofa trendin territorialdecision-makingindevelopingcountriestoday,butwe claimthatthissituationcouldbechangedbymobilizingdifferent proximitiestoencourageterritorialdevelopmentinlesssensitive areas. Reconciling theconﬂictingrelationships betweenproject stakeholdersisamajorchallengeinPakistan,butthisisa mat- terwhichrequiresextensivedebateinotherdevelopingcountries aswell.Stronggovernanceisessentialtotheconﬂictprevention process,particularlyintermsofbuildingcapacityforstrongnego- tiationsbetweenkeystakeholdersinordertoobtaincommitments tosustainableandequitablenaturalresourceuseandecosystem management. Thus, onthebasis ofourcase-study analysis,we