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A unified analysis of the future as epistemic modality the view from Greek and Italian
Anastasia Giannakidou, Alda Mari
To cite this version:
Anastasia Giannakidou, Alda Mari. A unified analysis of the future as epistemic modality the view from Greek and Italian. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2018, 36 (1), pp.85-129. �10.1007/s11049-017-9366-z�. �ijn_02194772�
A unified analysis of the future as epistemic modality:
the view from Greek and Italian
Anastasia Giannkidou and Alda Mari
University of Chicago and IJN, CNRS/ENS/EHESS/PSL 2018
Natural Language and Linguistic Theory
Please, for final citation, see
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11049-017-9366-z AbstractWe offer an analysis of the Greek and Italian future morphemes as epistemic modal opera- tors. The main empirical motivation comes from the fact that future morphemes have systematic purely epistemic readings— not only in Greek and Italian, but also in Dutch, German, and En- glish
will. The existence of epistemic readings suggests that the future expressions quantify overepistemic, not metaphysical alternatives. We provide a unified analysis for epistemic and predic- tive readings as epistemic necessity, and the shift between the two is determined compositionally by the lower tense. Our account thus acknowledges a systematic interaction between modality and tense— but the future itself is a pure modal, not a mixed temporal/modal operator. We show that the modal base of the future is nonveridical, i.e. it includes
pand
¬pworlds, parallel to epistemic modals such as
must, and present arguments that future morphemes have much incommon with epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste. We identify, finally, a subclass of epistemic futures which are
ratificational, and argue thatwillis a member of this class.
Keywords: future, prediction, epistemic modality, MUST, (non)veridicality, predicates of
personal taste, tense, denial, being wrong.
1 The future: what is the nature of prediction?
The future1, as a notional category in language, has puzzled theorists since Aristotle’s famous sea battle examples (De Interpretatione, Book IX). Aristotle offers what can be thought of as the first non-deterministic analysis. He posits that, while the truth or falsity of a future sentence will be determined by how things will turn out, at the speech time the future is open. This openness of the future is both metaphysical (a future event may or may not happen), and epistemic, in the sense that one cannotknowa future event because it hasn’t happened, in contrast to past or present events.
In the literature on tense, on the other hand, future sometimes features as the dual of past tense (Prior 1967). Kissine 2008, more recently, defends a temporal analysis ofwill; but it is not at all obvious thatwillis a tense. Huddleston and Pullum 2002, in their comprehensiveCambridge Grammar of the English Languagesay that: "our knowledge of the future is inevitably much more limited than our knowledge about the past and the present, and what we say about the future will typically be perceived as having the character ofpredictionrather than an unqualified factual assertion."
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 190). Huddleston and Pullum therefore treatwill not as a tense but as a modal, and highlight thatwillis a member of the class of English modal verbs. Earlier advocates of modality ofwillare Palmer 1987, Coates 1983, Enç 1996; a more recent addition is Klecha 2013.
Enç 1996 points out that regular tenses, present and past, are deictic (Partee 1984, Heim 1994, among many others), while the future is not. The past tense inAriadne finished her homework, for instance, denotes a contextually salient time in the past where Ariadne finished her homework, butAriadne will finish her homeworkdoes not refer to a time.
As Aristotle points out, there may, ormay not, be a future timetat which Ariadne finishes her work in the actual world.
This is a significant asymmetry between past and future that prevents characterization of future as tense; Enç (ibid.) offers a number of additional asymmetries in defense of her position thatwillis a modal.
Cross-linguistically too future expressions are known to convey modality (see e.g. Bertinetto 1979; Copley 2002;
Pietrandrea 2005; Mari 2009,2015b; Giannakidou 2012; Giannakidou and Mari 2013a,b,2016a; Broekhuis and Verkuyl, 2014). It therefore appears reasonable to assume that prediction involves modality. The question then becomes: what kind of modality? The Aristotelian position is that prediction involves indeterminacy: FUTpis metaphysically unsettled or objectively nonveridical, in the sense that it is not true at the time of utterance;2 and it remains to be seen if the prejacentpwill be true at a future time (Giannakidou 1998, 2013a; Giannakidou and Zwarts 1999; Condoravdi 2002;
Copley 2002; Kaufmann 2005; McFarlane 2005; Kaufmanet al.2006; Bonomi and Del Prete 2008, Cariani and Santorio 2015, Todd forthcoming). Besides objective unsettledenss and nonveridicality, the future sentence is alsoepistemically unsettled: the speaker does not, and cannot, know whether there will be a future timetat which the prejacent will be true in the actual world.3 In other words, there are two kinds of modality that are candidates for prediction: metaphysical and epistemic modality. How do we chose?
1We have been working on various aspects of the material presented in this paper for quiet a while, and have bene- fitted from presenting it in a number of venues (the Amsterdam Colloquium, colloquia at the University of Groningen, University of Leiden, Free University of Brussels, Princeton University, École Normale Superieure, Northwestern Uni- versity, the 2015 ESSLLI Summer-school in Barcelona, and the Linguistics and Philosophy workshop at the University of Chicago. We are grateful to the audiences of these events for their feedback. We want to thank in particular Fabrizio Cariani, Bridget Copley, Jack Hoeksema, Chris Kennedy, Mikhail Kissine, Frank Veltman, and Malte Willer for their more involved comments. A special thanks is due to the three NLLT reviewers for their careful engagement with our ma- terial, and their many useful insights and encouragement. Finally, a big thank you to Henriette de Swart, who guided us through the process as handling editor and whose comments and suggestions lead to considerable improvements in both content and form. As for Alda Mari, this research was funded by ANR-10- LABX-0087 IEC and ANR-10-IDEX-0001- 02 PSL. This paper was written during my stay at the University of Chicago in 2014-2016. Alda Mari also gratefully thanks the CNRS-SMI 2015.
2We use FUT in this article to refer to expressions of future cross-linguistically, i.e. Englishwill, Italian future morpheme (calledfuturoin the Italian grammars and literature), and Greekthaare FUT. We also use FUT to indicate the semantic function: FUT in various languages are realizations of the operator FUT in this sense. In the text, it is easy to see which sense is intended, but we also clarify when necessary. Likewise, we use MUST to refer to expressions of universal epistemic modality cross-linguistically, i.e. Englishmust, Italiandovereand Greekprepiare MUST.
3There is also a deterministic view: no unsettledness, just one future but we lack knowledge of it (Kissine 2008).
That would render future morphemes tense operators. A mixed position could also be conceived, namely that future morphemes are ambiguous between modals and tenses. Such a view would stumble upon the fact that the temporal information correlates with lower tense, as we shall see. The possibility for modal and temporal ambiguity in any case should be dispreferred if an unambiguous analysis succeeds.
In this paper, we focus on the Greek and Italian future morphemes, and argue that the study of these futures allow us to make a good argument that the modality of prediction is epistemic andnotmetaphysical. To our knowledge, there is no detailed formal analysis of prediction as epistemic modality, and we are set to present such an analysis here. At the time of prediction, the speaker has knowledge that determines what she predicts, and this knowledge is the foundation (i.e. the modal base) for prediction. Crucially, in case knowledge or beliefs of the speaker conflict with what is the case, the prediction relies not on what is the case but on what the speaker believes to be the case.
The discussion proceeds as follows. In section 2, we show that future morphemes cross-linguistically can be used with present or past tenses receiving purely epistemic readings. This presents our first and most central argument that future morphemes function as epistemic operators, i.e. akin to must. If epistemic modality is needed for epistemic future anyway, then the null hypothesis is that the predictive reading is also epistemic. In section 3, we offer the formal framework of modality that we will use, including the notion ofsubjective veridicalitythat is needed for truth relativized to individuals. In section 4, we consider and reject the metaphysical analysis of the future, offering additional arguments for a strong parallelism between prediction and epistemicmust. We also show that metaphysical modality is often not relevant, or makes the wrong predictions. We then lay out our epistemic analysis of prediction. In section 5, we address the role of tense in determining which reading will emerge, and we focus on how the non-past produces the predictive reading. We give a fully explicit syntax-semantics of the Greek and Italian structures containing future. In section 6, we compare our analysis to the idea ofwillas a bouletic modal, and offer more cross linguistic predictions.
In our discussion, it becomes clear thatwillis also an epistemic future, but of the particular kind we callratificational, following Mari (2015b).
2 Epistemic future as an epistemic modal
A major argument for the role of epistemic modality in the future is the existence of epistemic future(Giannakidou and Mari 2013a,b, 2016b). Epistemic future arises when future expressions are used with lower present or past tenses without making a prediction. This should not happen if future expressions were simply future tenses. Epistemic future is observed in Greek and Italian, but also in Dutch, German, English, and many other languages (see Comrie 1985, Haegeman 1983, Palmer 1987, Kush, 2011, Matthewson, 2012).4 We start with the following, well-known, English data:
(1) a. That will be the postman.
b. The French will be on holiday this week. (Palmer 1987)
These sentences do not make predictions. Rather, they seem to convey epistemic modality: given what I know and general stereotypical assumptions, the Frenchmustbe on holiday this week (see Palmer 1987 and the references above for more data and nuances). Dutch and German futures have similar use (examples from Broekhuis and Verkuyl 2014 for Dutch, Giannakidou 2014a for Dutch; Lederer 1969 for German; Tasmowski and Dendale 1989; de Saussure and Morency, 201;, Mari 2015b for French).
(2) Context: I can’t see Hein.
Hein zal (wel) in de/op zee zijn. (Dutch) HeinFUT.3SGparticle in the/ on sea be.
‘Hein must be at sea (swimming/on a boat).’
(3) Context: the speaker is wondering about the time, there is no watch:
a. Es
it wird
FUT.3SG
jetzt now 5 5
uur hour
sein.
be.
(German) b. Het
it zal
FUT.3SG
nu now
5 5
uur hour
zijn.
be.
(Dutch)
‘It must be now 5 o’ clock.’
As indicated, the Dutch and German future words zal, wirdare used as epistemic equivalents tomust. Themust statement is epistemically weaker than an unmodalized assertion (an idea that we further develop in this paper, and
4Pietrandrea (2005) uses the term ‘epistemic future’ for the first time for Italian future, but only for the epistemic use of the future. We thank Fabio Del Prete for bringing this point to our attention.
which goes back to Karttunen 1972; von Fintel and Gillies 2010 call it theMantra). As Huddleston and Pullum put it, the knowledge grounding the future sentence "is more limited" than knowledge grounding a sentence with a simple present or past. Modal particles such aswel, wohlcan also be used with the future; when alone in German, they have a similarmustequivalent use (Zimmermann 2011; Giannakidou 2014a):
(4) Max
Max ist is
wohl particle
auf on
See.
sea.
(German; example from Zimmermann 2011) Max must be at sea.
Zimmermann says that withwohl, the epistemic commitment of the speaker isweakened compared to the plain sentence, while also conveying a confidence that the proposition is likely to hold. This is the typical reading of themust sentence— and the take-home message is that we find it with the modal particles, MUST, and the future words.
Broekhuis and Verkuyl 2014 treat the Dutchzalas an epistemic modal expressing that the prejacent proposition is the result of reasoning based on information judged as ‘reliable and well-founded’, and Giannakidou 2014b (attributing the example to J. Hoeksema) further shows thatzalreceives purely epistemic reading with past, as in (5), where in the context Max is grumpy).
(5) Hij
He zal
FUT.3SG
wel particle
slecht bad
geslapen slept
hebben!
have.
(Dutch)
‘He must have slept really bad!’
(6) Ich habe meinem Freund letzte Woche einen Brief geschrieben; erwird ihn sicher schon bekommen haben.
(German)
‘I wrote a letter to my friend last week; he must surely have already received it.’ (Lederer 1969, p.98, ex. 584).
Morphologically, a present perfect appears in Dutch and German, just as in Englishmust have slept, and not a simple past
*must slept. The simple past is excluded because the modal verb takes an infinitival complement, and this necessitates the use of the auxiliary resulting in the apparent present perfect. McCawley 1988 notes that in nonfinite contexts, past tense surfaces as the perfect (for recent discussion see Arregi and Klecha 2015). Greek, on the other hand, lacks infinitives and the modal embeds a tensed clause which can be a simple past (ex. (12), (13) next)5. In section 5, we analyze the apparent perfect under FUT as a combination of a semantic PAST and PERF.6The sentences above, in any case, show that a future morpheme can combine with lower PAST, and when this happens the predictive reading disappears. The above are purely epistemic statements about a past situation the speaker considers likely to have happened.
There appears to be a generalization, then, that future morphemes cross-lingusitically are not used just to make predictions, but also asmust-equivalents. Common to future andmustis that the speaker does notknowthatpis true. If she knows thatpis true, she cannot use a modal at all (Giannakidou 1999, 2013a, Giannakidou and Mari 2016b).
For Greek and Italian, epistemic future has been known for quite a while (Bertinetto 1979, Rocci 2001, Squartini 2004, Pietrandrea 2005, Mari 2009a,b,c,2015a for Italian; Tsangalidis 1998, Giannakidou 2012, Chiou 2014 for Greek), but the data have unfortunately not featured significantly in formal theories of the future, which tend to focus onwill.
Unlikewill, which is a modal verb, the future markers in Italian and Greek are a bound morpheme and a particle (tha) respectively. In Greek, the futurethais followed always by a tensed verbal form (TP), as holds generally for all modal particles including the subjunctivena, and others that are not relevant here. The Italian pattern is not the exact parallel to Greek, but is similar in the relevant respects (section 5.3).
To understand the patterns, it is important to note that tense and aspect are always reflected morphologically on the Greek verb. The grammars describe the morphological opposition between past and non-past, and the aspectual distinction is perfective vs. imperfective. The morphological combinations create three semantic tenses (Giannakidou 2009, 2014): a present (PRES), a PAST, and a NON-PAST, which is the tense used for prediction. We illustrate the combinations below:
(7) graf-
write.IMPERF
-o.
NON-PAST.1SG.
(Greek imperfective nonpast: creates PRES)
5The past can be non-relative (Greek), or relative (Italian); see Verkuyl 2011 for more on the notion of relative past, and our discussion in section 5.
6PERF stands for the semantic perfective. From now on, we use lower case fonts to refer to the morphological components, and the capital letters for the semantic components.
I am writing (right now).
‘Write’ (generally).
The morphological imperfective non-past is semantically the present tense (PRES) in Greek (Giannakidou 2014), com- parable to English simple present and progressive. The combination of this form with FUT is fully equivalent to MUST PRESpin English (Giannakidou and Mari 2016b).
The perfective non-past is a dependent form,ungrammaticalby itself as indicated:
(8) *grap- write-
s-
PERF
o
NON-PAST.1SG. (G,)
The perfective non-past has no English equivalent, and it is in fact quite rare to find grammatical perfective non-pasts in languages (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997). Holtonet al.1997 and Giannakidou 2009 call this form theverbal dependent.
This is the form used for prediction, but also with the subjunctive and other modal particles. We analyze it as a semantic NON-PAST in section 5.
The past is marked in Greek with the presence ofe-, and we have again two options, perfective and imperfective.
The imperfective past is the typical preterite as in, e.g., Romance languages. The perfective past, on the other hand, is called theaoristand denotes a single (usually completed) event in the past. It is interpreted as a default simple past in English:
(9) e-
PAST- graf-
write.IMPERF- a.
PAST.1SG.
(Greek imperfective past)
‘I used to write.’
‘I was writing.’
(10) e-
PAST- grap- write-
s-
PERF- a.
PAST.1SG.
(Greek perfective past (aorist)) I wrote.
Futurethacombines with all of the above tenses. Notice first the combinations of FUT with the PRES (imperfective non-past in Greek, gerund plus stative in Italian):
(11) a. I
the
Ariadne Ariadne
tha
FUT
troi
eat.IMPERF.NON-PAST.3SG
tora.
now.
(Greek)
‘Ariadne must be eating now.’
b. Giacomo Giacomo
ora now
starà be.FUT.3SG
mangiando.
eat.GERUND.
(Italian)
‘Giacomo must be eating now.’
As shown above, FUT plus PRES does not have a predictive reading. In Italian, as we discuss in section 5.4, Aktionsart plays the role that aspect plays in Greek. (The role of Aktionsart in connection with modal interpretation has been studied across languages and categories, see Condoravdi, 2002; Laca, 2008; Copley, 2009; Mari 2015a,b).
Combinations of FUT with a lower PAST (an aorist in Greek), also receive epistemic non-predictive readings:
(12) a. I
the
Ariadne Ariadne
tha
FUT
itan
be.PAST.3SG
arrosti ill
xthes yesterday
(ji’afto (for-this
dhen not
irthe).
came.PERF.PAST.3SG. (Greek)
‘Ariadne must/#will have been ill yesterday (that’s why she didn’t come).’
b. Giovanni Giovanni
sarà be.FUT.3SG
stato been
malato ill
ieri yesterday
(per (for
questo this
non not
é has
venuto).
come).
(Italian)
‘Giovanni must/#will have been ill yesterday (that why he didn’t come).’
(13) a. I
the
Ariadne Ariadne
tha
FUT
efige
leave.PERF.PAST.3SG
xthes.
yesterday.
(Greek)
‘Ariadne must have left yesterday.’
b. Gianni Gianni
avrà
have.FUT.3SG
parlato spoken
ieri.
yesterday.
(Italian)
‘Gianni must/ #will have spoken yesterday.’
With PAST, then, Greek and Italian FUT receive epistemic non-predictive readings, as in Dutch and German.7 These uses, crucially, are quite common and do not feel in any way marked or exceptional.
For the sake of completeness, consider that with PAST, we do not obtain a future of a past reading in either language.
To obtain a future of a past, Italian uses the conditional, and Greek the imperfective past (Giannakidou 2012: (21)):
(14) Gianni Gianni
sarebbe be.COND.3SG
arrivato arrived
più more
tardi.
late.
‘Gianni would arrive later.’
(15) I
the
Ariadne Ariadne
tha
FUT
efevge
leave.IMPERF.PAST.3SG
argotera.
later.
Ariadne would leave later.
Thaplus imperfective past is argued to be the Greek equivalent to conditional mood (Iatridou 2000, Giannakidou 2012).
We will adopt this position here, and will not discuss the conditional further.
Mari 2009a,b,c, Giannakidou and Mari 2013a,b, 2016b observe that epistemic futures, like epistemic necessity modals, cannot be used if the speaker knowsp. This has been treated as an evidentiality constraint (Karttunen 1972, von Fintel and Gillies 2010, Giannakidou and Mari 2016b). As we see, FUT is akin to MUST, and can even co-occur with it:
(16) Context: Direct visual perception of rain, the speaker sees the rain falling a. #It must be raining.
b. #Tha
FUT
vrexi.
rain.IMPERF.NON-PAST.3SG.
(Greek) c. #Starà
be.FUT.3SG
piovendo.
rain.GERUND.
(Italian) d. #Tha
FUT
prepi must
na
SUBJ
vrexi.
IMPERF.NON-PAST.3SG. (Greek) e. #Dovrà
Must.FUT.3SG
star be
piovendo.
rain.GERUND.
(Italian)
It is odd to sayIt must be rainingwhen looking outside the window at the rain falling. Eye-sight provides a most reliable source of knowledge: when you see that it is raining, you know that it is raining. This is a strong, veridical state (a point to be further expanded in the paper). By utteringIt must be rainingthe speaker appears to either question her own knowledge, or simply saying something weaker than what is actually the case, in both cases an odd outcome.
In the inferential context, which does not imply knowledge ofp, FUT and MUST are perfectly fine:
(17) I see a wet umbrella.
a. It must be raining.
b. (Tha)
FUT/Must Prepi subjunctive
na
rain.IMPERF.NON-PAST.3SG.
vrexi. (Greek)
c. Deve
Must.PRES.3SG
star be
piovendo.
rain.gerund.
(Italian) It must be raining.
d. Starà be.FUT.3SG
piovendo.
rain.GERUND.
(Italian) It must be raining.
If I see a wet umbrella, I canassumethat it is raining, but I do notknowthat it is raining. This has been described in the literature as sensitivity of MUST to indirect knowledge, but Giannakidou and Mari (2016b) use this seeming evidential sensitivity as an argument for nonveridicality of MUST. MUST, they argue, requirespartial knowledgeonly. The crucial point here is that future and epistemic necessity modals pattern on a par in being nonveridical, thus not compatible with knowledge ofp(that direct evidence provides). Finally, FUT co-exists with MUST, as we see, and we discuss what this entails in the conclusions.
7Epistemicwillwith the past is odd, as indicated. We suggest why this is so in our discussion ofwillin section 6.3.
The predictive reading emerges with perfective non-past in Greek, and eventives in Italian:
(18) O
The Janis John
tha
FUT
ftasi
arrive.PERF.NON-PAST.3SG
avrio.
tomorrow.
(Greek)
‘John will arrive at 5pm/tomorrow.’
(19) Gianni John
arriverà arrive.FUT.3SG
domani.
tomorrow.
(Italian)
‘John will arrive tomorrow.’
This form appears with other modal particles such as the subjunctive and the optative, again with future orientation.
Recall, as shown earlier (ex. (8)), that it is ungrammatical on its own.
(20) Thelo I-want
na
SUBJ
ftasi
arrive.PERF.NON-PAST.3SG
noris early o the
Janis.
John.
(Greek) I want John to arrive early.
(21) As
OPT
ftasi
arrive.PERF.NON-PAST.3SG
noris early o the
Janis!
John.
(Greek) Let John arrive early!
The perfective non-past is semantically a NON-PAST, and we address its role in section 5. The syntax we adopt, following Giannakidou (2009), is the following:
(22)
Modal Particle P
Future
thaSubjunctive
naOptative
asTP non-past / past
We assume that Italian has the same abstract structure, but relies on Aktionsart below TP. Greek and Italian look similar to languages such as Gitksan (with prospective aspect under their modal; Matthewson, 2012), and Hindi (Kush 2011). In the rest of the paper, our goal is to give an adequate characterization of the meaning of the future markerstha and Italianfuturo. Given the basic sample of data presented here, the following generalizations emerge:
1.Thaandfuturoare not used just for prediction.
2. Tha and futurohave purely epistemic readings with present and PAST forms (including present perfects in Germanic languages and past participles in Italian).
3. The lower tense fully determines the type of reading. Prediction arises with lower NON-PAST.
Given the above, it becomes clear thatthaandfuturoare not purely predictive operators. (And given what we see in typological works (e.g. Palmer, 1987), purely predictive future markers without any epistemic uses are simply hard to find.). In our earlier work (Giannakidou and Mari, 2016b), we offered an analysis of non-predictivethaandfuturoas equivalent to epistemicmust. If indeedthaandfuturoare epistemic in the non-predictive use, the null hypothesis is that they are epistemic also in the prediction. Such a simple unified theory should be preferred over an ambiguity account distinguishing between epistemic vs. metaphysicalthaandfuturo(e.g. the one we suggested in Giannakidou and Mari 2013b).
We will propose that the interaction with tense determines the type of reading; but unlike Condoravdi 2002, (a)tha andfuturoare not mixed modal/temporal operators, and (b) the tense doesn’t change the modality (i.e. the type of modal base), which remains epistemic. Prediction is epistemic reasoning, i.e. a conjecture, about an event that is not located in the present or past. In the epistemic analysis,thaandfuturoare the duals of epistemic possibilitymight, which also makes a prediction with non-past forms (see Enç 1996):
(23) Ariadne might see the movie tomorrow.
What the speaker knows at present allows her to predict that it is possible that there will be a timettomorrow when
Ariadne sees the movie. This is a predictivepossibilityreading; the future modal creates a stronger statement because it is a necessity modal:
(24) Ariadne will see the movie tomorrow.
Let us now focus on epistemic future. This will allow us to elaborate on the notions on nonveridicality and relative truth that appear to be crucial for epistemic modals and the future.
3 Epistemic modality, (non)veridicality, and truth
We assume a Kratzerian semantics where modals take modal bases and ordering sources, and add two ingredients, following Giannakidou 1998, 2012, 2013b, Mari 2009a,b and Giannakidou and Mari 2013a,b, 2016b: the first one is the Nonveridicality Axiomthat all modal bases are nonveridical (see also Beaver and Frazee 2011 for nonveridicality as a defining property of the category modality). The second addition concerns the nature of the veridicality judgement. We will talk about objective and subjective truth, the latter being truth relative to an individual’s knowledge and beliefs.
3.1 Objective Veridicality and Nonveridicality
Montague 1969 uses ‘veridicality’ to characterize perception verbs such assee. Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 1999 and Zwarts 1995 define veridicality in terms of truth entailment:8
(25) Veridicality; nonveridicality; antiveridicality (modifying Zwarts 1995, Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 1999). Let F be a unary sentential operator. The following statements hold:
(i) F is veridical iff Fp→pis logically valid;
(ii) F is nonveridical iff Fp9p;
(iii) F is antiveridical iff Fp→ ¬p.
Operators, or more broadly, functions F that have veridicality and nonveridicality are propositional.9 F is veridical iff Fpentailsp. F is nonveridical if Fpdoes not entailp, i.e. if when Fpis true,pmay or may not be true. The contrast is illustrated below with the adverbsyesterdayandallegedly:
(26) Yesterday, John flew to Paris.
(27) Allegedly, John flew to Paris.
Yesterdayis a veridical adverb becauseyesterday (John flew to Paris)entails that John flew to Paris. Butallegedlyis nonveridical becauseallegedly (John flew to Paris)doesn’t entail that John flew to Paris;allegedly (John flew to Paris) also doesn’t entail that he didn’t. Nonveridical operators are typically uncertainty operators. Modal adverbs appear to be nonveridical:10
(28) {Probably, Possibly, Maybe, Perhaps}, John flew to Paris.
Note that nonveridical operators do not entail the falsity ofp; this is a property of a subset of them such as negation which isantiveridical. Antiveridical operators are also nonveridical, since for them too the veridicality schema is not valid:¬pdoes not entailp.11
Thus far, (25) defines veridicalityobjectively— or extensively, i.e, as a truth entailment about what is the case in the real world without reference to subjective parameters such as what individuals know or believe. Nonveridicality is the absence of truth entailment. In this objective sense, veridicality and anti-veridicality correspond to metaphysical settledness: if a function F is veridical,pin Fpis metaphysically settled; ¬pis also metaphysically settled. Under a
8See Giannakidou 2013a for a formal connection between truth and existence.
9See Bernardi 2002 for type-flexible definitions.
10An anonymous reviewer points out adverbs such asevidently, clearly, unfortunately, which could be seen as veridi- cal. But these are factive adverbs; our point above is thatmodaladverbs are nonveridical, notalladverbs.
11Negation is the prototypical antiveridical operator, responsible for licensing negative polarity items (Giannakidou 1998, 1999, 2013b). Of the other logical connectives, disjunction is also nonveridical whereas conjunction is veridical.
nonveridical operator, on the other hand,pis metaphysically unsettled. Besides modal adverbs, modal verbs too are nonveridical and metaphysically unsettled.
The sentences under the veridical or nonveridical operator can be called veridical and nonveridical too. Another way to phrase the above is to say that an objectively veridical sentence refers to a fact, while a non-veridical sentence does not refer to a fact. Consider now the modal verbs:
(29) Nicholas might/must bring dessert.
(30) Nicholas might/must have brought dessert.
Modal verbs are also non-veridical; they do not entail the(f)actual truth of their prejacent p. MIGHT p → pis not logically valid, the possibility modal is thus nonveridical. EpistemicMUSTis also nonveridical, since MUSTp→pis also not logically valid. The principle T of modal logic (p→p) is only validated with aleithic modality and is invalid with epistemic and deontic modality (see Zwarts 1995, Giannakidou 1998, 1999; also Portner 2009). Non-aleithic modal functions, then, as a class (possibility and necessity modals, modal adverbs) are nonveridical in that they do not entail the truth of their prejacent;pis not a fact under a modal.
We move on to discuss nextsubjective(non)veridicality, which is the notion we need in order to talk about relativized truth and speaker commitment.
3.2 Subjective (non)veridicality: relative and objective truth
In objective terms, we talk about sentences being true or false in the world irrespective of the individuals asserting them.
This may be adequate for textbook purposes, but the truth judgement often appears to be more complex, and it is done not in isolation but relative to the speaker and hearer, who assess whether a sentence is true or not given what they know or what they believe (Giannakidou 1994, 1998, 1999, 2009; Harris and Potts 2009; de Marneffeet al. 2012). That such relativization is needed becomes particularly visible when we discuss propositional attitude verbs (know, believe, imagine, etc) and their complements (Farkas 1992, Giannakidou 1994, 1998, Mari 2016); but the role of the individual in assessing truth is apparent even in unembedded sentences, as expressed also very lucidly in Harris and Potts (2009) recent assertion thatallsentences are perspectival.
When a speaker asserts a positive unmodalized sentence in the present or past, unless she is lying, she assertsp because she knows or believes thatpis true; but when a speaker uses a modal verb, she may think thatpis possible or even likely, but she doesn’t know for sure thatpis true. When speakers make assertions or assess assertions of others, they makeveridicality judgmentsabout the truth of the sentence— and the veridicality judgement is more complex than truth assignment objectively because it depends on what speakers know and how they extract information from context (see especially Giannakidou 1998, 2013a, Mari 2005a,b, Giannakidou and Mari 2016b; de Marneffeet al.2012 confirm this complexity with corpus data).
It makes sense, then, to talk aboutobjectiveandrelativeveridicality for all sentences;12 for some sentences, in fact, we can only have relative truth, i.e. for sentences with predicates of personal taste (Lasersohn, 2005; Stephenson, 2007). In relative veridicality, the individual making the judgement is theindividual anchor(Farkas 1992, Giannakidou 1994, 1998, et sequ.), or thejudge(Lasersohn 2005), andpis assertable if the speaker knows or believesp. Another way to phrase this is to say that the speaker is committed top. If the speaker doesn’t know or believep, she is said to not be committed top(Smirnova’s 2013 notion ofepistemic commitment). Moore paradoxical sentences #pand I do not know thatpare thought to be infelicitous because the assertion ofprequires that the speaker knows thatp. In this framework, objective truth is truth irrespective of the individual anchor, relative truth is truth relative to the anchor (see also discussion in Giannakidou and Mari 2016a,b).
Giannakidou relativizes truth by making the veridicality judgement relative to individual anchors and their epistemic states. The truth of a sentence is now anchored to the individual asserting it. In main clauses the anchor is by default the speaker.13 Models of evaluationare defined to describe the information states of anchors (see Giannakidou 2013a for updated discussion). These models are sets of worlds, relative toi, corresponding to whatibelieves or knows.14We call
12We are grateful to the reviewers of this paper for prompting questions to this end.
13Individual anchoring of truth should be seen on a par with other kinds of anchoring of propositional content, i.e.
temporal anchoring, or event anchoring (e.g. Hacquard 2006, 2010).
14The difference between knowledge and belief is not important for our purposes here, and in many other cases, e.g.
for mood choice, it doesn’t matter—- as verbs of knowledge and belief both select the indicative in many languages (Giannakidou and Mari, 2016b). Mari 2016 however refines the typology of non-epistemic and fictional attitudes and
these models epistemic states in our definition below:
(31) Epistemic state of an individual anchori(Giannakidou 1999: (45))
An epistemic state M(i) is a set of worlds associated with an individualirepresenting worlds compatible with whatiknows or believes.
We use the term correct to indicate a matching relation between the truth value ofpsubjectively, i.e. wrt an epistemic state, and objectively. iis correct if the value of psubjectively in M(i) is the same as the valuation ofp objectively.iis said to be wrong if the value ofpin M(i) is not the same as the valuation ofpobjectively. These will be useful when we consider the judgments about future sentences and epistemic modals in section 4.
Given M(i), we now identify (non)veridicality subjectively as a property of functions F:
(32) Subjective veridicality(for functions)
A function F that takes a propositionpas its argument is subjectively veridical with respect to an individual anchoriand an epistemic state M(i) iffF pentails thatiknows or believesp: iff∀w0[w0∈M(i)→p(w0)].
Subjective veridicality reflects knowledge as in the classical treatment of Hintikka (1969), andhomogeneity.Veridical functions require that the individual anchor is in an epistemic state that fully supportsp, regardless of whetherpis ac- tually (i.e. objectively) true. For instance,Nicholas believes that Ariadne is a doctorreflects a veridical epistemic state, but the sentenceAriadne is a doctorcan be objectively false.
(33) [[Nicholas believes thatp]]is true inwwith respect to M(N icholas)iff:
∀w0[w0∈M(N icholas)→p(w0)]
The truth condition of thebelievesentence does not entail actual truth, butbelieveis subjectively veridical,15 because the whole M(N icholas) supportsp:
(34) Support of a proposition p
LetX be a set of worlds.X supports a propositionpiff all worlds inXarep-worlds.
The verbknow, of course, also reflects such a homogenous epistemic state, it is therefore also subjectively veridical.
When all worlds in M(i) arepworlds,pisepistemicallysettled in M(i). This is a state of subjective veridicality: full epistemic commitment. The epistemic state is a homogenousp-space. For unembedded sentences, subjective veridicality and epistemic settledness are conditions on the assertability of the sentence:
(35) Flavio is a doctoris true wrt the speakeriiff∀w0[w0 ∈M(i)→doctor(F lavio)(w0)].
In other words, an unmodalized, unembedded sentence is subjectively veridical in expressing the speaker’s belief or knowledge thatp. A negative sentence, in a parallel manner, expresses the speaker’s belief or knowledge thatnot p, it is therefore also epistemically settled, i.e., a homogenous space of¬pworlds:
(36) Flavio is not a doctoris true wrt the speakeriiff∀w0[w0∈M(i)→ ¬doctor(F lavio)(w0)].
Hence subjective veridicality can homogeneity are not identical: a negative sentence conveys a homogenous state which is not veridical because the speaker does not know or believep.
We can understand the effect of affirmation vs. negation better in defining epistemic settledness as follows:
(37) Epistemic settledness of M(i)
M(i) is epistemically settled aboutpiff(∀w0∈M(i)p(w0))∨(∀w0∈M(i)¬p(w0))
A settled epistemic state is homogeneous and contains either onlypworlds (the state is positively epistemically settled) or only¬pworlds (the state is negatively epistemically settled). Subjective veridicality arises whenpis positively settled;
shows that there is a systematic ambiguity betweenexpressive-belief (the classical Hintikkean belief) andinquisitive- belief (the subjunctive trigger for languages in which mood is parametric to the status ofpin the common ground).
These differences do not matter here, and we only focus on the Hintikkean interpretation of belief.
15See, however, Mari 2016 for the distinction betweenexpressiveandinquisitivebelief, based on mood distribution in Italian.
¬preveals a subjectively antiveridical state. Summarizing, we define subjective veridicality as a property of states as follows:
(38) Subjective veridicality and antiveridicality (as properties of states).
a. An epistemic state M(i) is subjectively veridical about piff it is epistemically settled positively: i.e
∀w0∈M(i) :p(w0)
b. An epistemic state M(i) is subjectively antiveridical aboutpiff it is epistemically settled negatively: i.e
∀w0∈M(i) :¬p(w0)
In contrast to veridicality and anti-veridicality, subjective nonveridicality imposes non-homogeneity on M(i). The individual anchoridoes not know or believep:
(39) Subjective nonveridicality(for functions)
A functionFthat takes a propositionpas its argument is subjectively nonveridical with respect to an individual anchorian epistemic stateM(i)iffF pdoes not entail thatiknows or believesp: iff∃w0 ∈M(i) :¬p(w0)∧
∃w00∈M(i) :p(w00).
A subjectively nonveridical function, e.g., possibly creates uncertainty and epistemic unsettledness in M(i). i does not know that p, and does not know that not peither. The epistemic space is partitioned into apand a¬pspace.
Giannakidou 2013a calls subjectively non-veridical operators, for this reason,inquisitive; questions, the prototypical inquisitive expressions are partitioned spaces therefore nonveridical.
We can once again move from nonveridicality as a property of functions to nonveridicality as a property of states.
(40) Epistemic unsettledness
M(i) is epistemically unsettled aboutpiff∃w0∈M(i) :¬p(w0)∧ ∃w00∈M(i) :p(w00) (41) Subjective nonveridicality and epistemic unsettledness
An epistemic state M(i) is subjectively nonveridical aboutpiff it is epistemically unsettled.
With subjective nonveridicality, M(i) as a whole does not supportp: there is a subset of M(i) that supportsp, maybe the subset that best complies with knowledge or evidence ofi, but there is a complement set that doesn’t support p.
Nonveridical epistemic states are thusweakerthan veridical ones because veridical states fully supportpbut nonveridical states only partially do so.
Modal verbs cannot be used when the speaker knowsp, they reflect nonveridical states:
(42) Epistemic modal verbs are subjectively nonveridical
MAY/MUSTpcan be defined relative to an epistemic stateM(i)if and only if∃w0∈M(i) :¬p(w0)∧ ∃w00∈ M(i) :p(w00).
With modal verbs generally, and epistemic modals in particular, M(i) is partitioned. Modal statements are therefore epistemically weaker than unmodalized assertions, as we noted several times. This explains why when the speaker knowsp(as in the earlier context of direct perception of rain), it is not felicitous to modalize the sentence.
Hence, modal sentences are weaker than unmodalized sentences both objectively and subjectively. There is a distinc- tion between an unmodalized past and present assertions, which impose homogenous epistemic states fully supporting p(or¬pif the sentence is negative), and modal sentences which are nonveridical and only partially supportpinM(i) (or the modal base).16 Modalization creates a non-veridical epistemic state, which is a space partitioned intopand¬p worlds. A portioned epistemic space creates a weaker statement than a non-partitioned one.
Here are, finally, veridicality and nonveridicality as properties of modal spaces— as might be needed also for modal bases of non-epistemic modals:
(43) Veridical, nonveridical modal spaces (sets of worlds)
a. A modal space M isveridicalwith respect to a propositionpiff
∀w0(w0∈M →p(w0))
b. A modal space M isnonveridicalwith respect to a propositionpiff
∃w0, w00∈M(w06=w00∧(p(w0)∧ ¬p(w00))
16We thank two anonymous reviewers for their insights that led to this discussion.
c. A modal space M isantiveridicalwith respect to a propositionpiff M∩p=∅.
It becomes obvious that modal bases in a Kratzerian semantics are nonveridical spaces, or as Condoravdi 2002 puts it, diverse. We propose that nonveridicality be a precondition on modalities, as can be seen inNonveridicality Axiom below:
(44) Nonveridicality Axiom of modals
MODAL (M) (p) can be defined only if the modal base M is nonveridical, i.e. only if M containspand non-p worlds.
Nonveridicality is a presupposition of all modals. The nonveridicality axiom guarantees that the modal base M be partitioned into a set of worlds wherepis true (the positive set) and its complement wherepis not true (the negative set).
This partition is crucial: MODALpwill not entailpsince there are¬pworlds in M, and the actual world may be in¬p.
Non-aleithic modals (possibility and necessity, epistemic, deontic, bouletic, etc) obey this principle, and therefore come with partitioned modal bases; consequently, they do not entailp.17
3.3 Epistemic future as epistemic must
For the analysis of epistemic future, Giannakidou and Mari (2016b) adopt the analysis of epistemicmust(Kratzer 1991;
Giorgi and Pianesi 1997, Portner 2009). Like Italiandovereand Greekprepi,thaandfuturoassociate with an epistemic modal base M(i) which is the set of propositions known by the speakeriattu(the utterance time). w0is the world of evaluation.
(45) M(i) (tu) =λw.0w0is compatible with what is known by the speakeriinw0attu.18
The epistemic modality is by defaultsubjective(Lyons 1977), and knowledge changes with time. Epistemic modality is therefore parametric to knowledge at tu, as is often acknowledged in the literature (see Portner (2009), Hacquard (2006,2010)). For us here,tuis a parameter of evaluation for FUT/MUST, and this has implications that we discuss further in section 5.
Given what the speaker knows, the modal base of epistemic FUT and MUST is nonveridical and contains bothpand
¬pworlds. pis true in the subset of M(i) that complies with the ordering source. We use a normative ordering source S. Normality conditions have most notably been discussed in relation with genericity (see Asher and Morreau 1995) and progressives (Dowty 1979; Landman 1992; Portner 1998)— and are known under the term normality (Asher and Morreau,ibid.), inertia (Dowty,ibid.) stereotypicality (Portner, 2009) reasonability (Landmanibid., Portner 1998; Mari 2014). Our ordering sourceShere ranks as Best those worlds in whichstrange things do not happen, and is stereotypical (à la Portner 2009). The output BestSis a subset of the modal base. Consider (46), for instance. If a child had red cheeks and sneezing nose, then, under stereotypical circumstances, she has the flu. However, circumstances are not necessarily stereotypical. In such non-stereotypical circumstances these symptoms are indicative of a potentially worse disease.
(46) I
the
Ariadne Ariadne
tha
FUT
ixe
have.PAST.IMPERF.3SG
gripi flu.
(Greek)
‘Ariadne must have had the flu.’
(47) Giacomo Giacomo
avrà
have.FUT.3SG
avuto
have.PAST.PART
l’influenza.
the-flu.
(Italian)
‘Giacomo must have had the flu.’
17There are two exceptions to the Nonveridicality axiom, and both result in trivialization of modality. The first exception is the actuality entailment of an ability modal, in which case the modal is trivialized (see Mari forthcoming-a).
The second is with aleithic modality, as in1 + 1 must equal 2. Giannakidou and Mari (2016b) treat similar deductive contexts withmustas involving aleithic modality, thus maintaining the nonveridicality axiom (and therefore the so- calledweaknessof the modal (Karttunen (1972). With both aleithic modality and actuality entailment, the distinction between modal and non modal statement is lost.
18It should be clear that our notation M(i) corresponds to the Kratzerian notation using set intersection
∩fepistemic(w0, i), where this returns the set of worlds compatible with what it is known inw0byi.
The modal base is partitioned into a positive set (pworlds) and a negative set (¬pworlds); FUT universally quantifies over Best worlds (its restrictor) and relates the worlds in the Best set top(the nuclear scope). The positive set relates to Portner’s (2009) Best. The Best worlds are the ideal worlds, the ones best conforming to knowledge, rules, or goals (depending on the nature of modality). Ordering of worlds is defined in (48):
(48) Ordering of worlds- Portner, 2009, p.65.
For any set of propositionsX and worldsw, v:w6Xviff for allp∈X, ifv∈p, thenw∈p.
Given an epistemic modal base M(i)(tu), we can rewrite Best as a function over M(i)(tu), still in the spirit of Portner 2009. LetSbe the normative ordering source.
(49) BestS(M(i)(tu)) ={w0∈M(i)(tu) :∀q∈ S(w0∈q)}
So defined, BestS delivers the worlds in the epistemic modal base in which all the propositions inS are true.19 What the quantifier demands is that those worlds are in the support set ofpin M(i). The set BestS is also parametric to time.
Unless otherwise stated, we consider that BestS is determined at the utterance time (this will be indeed always the case in the reminder of the paper).
The Greek future markertha, the Italianfuturo, and the English modalmusthave the same denotation in the epis- temic reading. When combined with PAST, as we mentioned earlier (see discussion surrounding (12) sqq.), FUT takes high scope, and we do not obtain a future in the past but an epistemic interpretation (we use the symbols≺andfor temporal precedence and succession, respectively):
(50) [[FUT/tha/futuro/MUST (PAST (p))]]M,i,S,tuwill be defined only if the modal base M(i)(tu) is nonveridical; if defined,
[[FUT/tha/futuro/MUST (PAST (p))]]M,i,S,tu= 1 iff∀w0∈BestS :∃t0≺tu∧p(w0, t0)
(The present reading embeds a PRES, but since this case is discussed extensively in Giannakidou and Mari 2016b we omit consideration here). The truth conditions derive both objective and subjective nonveridicality: FUT/MUST (PASTp) and FUT/MUST (PRESp) do not entailp, or thatiknowsp. FUT/MUST, in this analysis, are both strong (because of quantification over a homogeneous space of worlds ranked as Best) and epistemically weaker (because of nonveridicality) than unmodalized positive assertions in the simple past or present, which convey veridical epistemic states.20
We proceed now to the predictive reading. Given the epistemic analysis ofthaandfuturo, the null hypothesis is to extend it to prediction. However, recent analyses (including our own Giannakidou and Mari 2013a,b) use metaphysical modality, we will thus first consider this option.
4 Prediction as epistemic modality with tha and futuro
The existence of epistemic future by itself, as we said at the beginning, is a major challenge to a metaphysical view of the future. If FUT is an epistemic modal in this use already, the simplest thing to assume is that FUT is also epistemic in the predictive use— any other assumption would be essentially an ambiguity analysis. In this section, we present specific challenges for the metaphysical view illustrating that (a) prediction does not depend on what will actually be the case, and (b) the predictive reading of the future is parallel to epistemic modals.
4.1 A shot at the metaphysical analysis: the future criterion
The metaphysical unsettledness of the future is typically captured with branching time models (Thomason, 1984).
Thomason himself provides a supervaluationist theory, according to which a future sentence is true if and only if in all branches opening up at the time of the utterance there is a time at whichpis true, and it is false if and only if in all branches opening up at the time of the utterance there is a time at whichpis false. Put this way, a negative future
19Since only those worlds are considered in whichallthe propositions inSare true, the function Best determines a cut-off point.
20On how our account differs from von Fintel and Gillies (2010), see Giannakidou and Mari, 2016b. We further say there that MUST and FUT arebiasedtowardspbecause the Best worlds are in thepset.
sentence likeThere won’t be a sea battle tomorrowdoes not mean that not all the worlds are sea-battle worlds, but that all worlds are non-sea battle worlds. Copley 2002 asks the question of how we can be so certain when we talk about the future while the future is open. She adds ordering sources. It is possible, then, to defend an account of metaphysical alternatives with epistemic ordering sources added. Here is what such an analysis ofthaandfuturocould look like (see Mari, 2009c, Giannakidou and Mari, 2013b).
Let us start with the standardW ×T forward-branching structure. A three-place relation'onT ×W ×W is defined such that (i) for allt∈T,'tis an equivalence relation; (ii) for anyw, w0∈W andt, t0 ∈T, ifw0 't0 wandt precedest0, thenw0'tw. In words,wandw0are historical alternatives at least up tot0and thus differ only, if at all, in what is future tot0. For any given time, a world belongs to an equivalence class comprising worlds with identical pasts but possibly different futures. Letw0be the actual world.
For any timet∈T, we define the set of historical alternatives (I) as the set of worlds that are identical to the actual worldw0at least up to and includingt(Thomason, 1984).
(51) I(t) :={w|w'tw0}
In the case depicted in Figure 1, the set of historical alternatives attis the set given in (52).
(52) I(t) ={w1, w2, w0, w3, w4}
w
0t
w
1w
2w
3w
4Figure 1: I(t)
I(t)represents the modal base fixed att. One can impose that the modal base be non-veridical, and thus require that it be partitioned intopand¬pworlds.
(53) For any timet,I(t)is nonveridical.
Now, given this metaphysical structure, what a speaker knows or believes at the time of prediction still plays a key role: two different people can make two different predictions, depending on what they know. Consider the case in which Mary and Susan are waiting for Gianni. Mary utters (54):
(54) Gianni John
arriverà arrive.FUT.3SG
alle at
4.
4.
(Italian)
‘John will arrive at 4.’
(55) O
the Janis John
tha
FUT
ftasi
arrive.PERF.NON-PAST.3SG
stis at
4.
4.
(Greek)
‘John will arrive at 4.’
In making the prediction, Mary is using her knowledge. She knows facts as well as generalizations based on personal experience, and rules of thumb about traffic conditions. She knows that around 4 pm it is typically not yet rush hour, that the traffic is easy outside rush hour. She also knows that if you travel outside rush hour the trip from Hyde Park to Lakeview will take 20 minutes. We will call the set of propositions, following Giannakidou and Mari 2013b, thefuture criterion, and useEto refer to it. Mary’s future criterion is the following set of propositions:
(56) Mary’s future criterionEM ary ={‘around 4 it is not yet rush hour’, ‘the traffic is easy outside rush hour’, ‘if you travel outside rush hour the trip from Hyde Park to Lakeview will be take 20 minutes’}
Now, imagine that Susan knows something more. Her future criterion includes the set Mary’s does, but also the proposition that there is construction going on that day on the Lake Shore Drive.
(57) Susan’s future criterionESusan={‘around 4 it is not yet rush hour’, ‘the traffic is easy outside rush hour’, ‘if you travel outside rush hour the trip from Hyde park to Lakeview will be take 20 minutes’, ‘there is construction going on on the Lake Shore Drive’, ‘when there is construction on the road, traffic slows down’}
Given (57), Susan disagrees with Mary and utters (58).
(58) No.
No Gianni John
arriverà arrive.FUT.3SG
alle at
5.
5.
(Italian)
‘No; John will arrive at 5.’
(59) Oxi.
No.
O the
Janis John
tha
FUT
ftasi
arrive.PERF.NON-PAST.3SG
stis at
5.
5.
(Greek)
‘No. John will arrive at 5.’
BecauseESusancontains the construction information, her prediction about Gianni’s arrival is for a later time, differing from Mary’s. Clearly, then, what one knows affects what one predicts. Susan and Mary are in a state of disagreement, reminiscent of disagreement observed with epistemic modals (a.o. Lasersohn, 2005; Stephenson, 2007; Papafragou, 2009). The prediction is therefore subjective, anchored to the knowledge of the individual making it.
One could use the future criterion as an ordering source, and the more propositions a world satisfies, the better it is.
We could then define the set Best, relatively to the orderingEi. (60) Best worlds as perEi.
BestEi:{w0∈ I(tu) :∀q∈ Ei(w0∈q)}.
One must add also stereotypicality conditions— and this would complicate the matter rendering FUT a modal with two ordering sources. As we show next, no matter how many and which ordering sources are added, the metaphysical modal base is simply not appropriate to begin with.
The future criterion, in any case, would end up carving the space of metaphysical possibilities into those that are pworlds and those that are not, and FUT would universally quantify over the Best set returned by the future criterion.
That would look like the following:
(61) Truth conditions for predictive FUT with a metaphysical modal base (to be rejected)
[[FUT/tha/futuro(NON-PAST (p))]]I,E,i,tu will be defined only if the metaphysical modal baseI(tu)is non- veridical; if defined,
[[FUT/tha/futuro(NON-PAST (p))]]I,E,i,tu is 1 iff∀w0∈BestEi:∃t0 ∈(tu,∞)∧p(w0, t0)
This analysis says thatpis true only in the metaphysical alternatives that are consistent with current knowledge ofi. The worlds are metaphysical, i.e. they are versions of reality out there, and we expect thatpis true in a non-singleton subset of them.
4.2 FUT and epistemic modals: problems with the metaphysical view
The main problem with the metaphysical analysis above is that FUTpcan be true even if the metaphysical spaceI(tu)is anti-veridical. This implies that metaphysics is irrelevant for the truth of prediction, which seems to rely solely on what the speaker knows or believes at the time of making it.21 This conclusion is further supported by parallelisms between FUT in the predictive reading and epistemic modals— and which, to our knowledge, have not been discussed before. In addition, we highlight the categoryindeterminatepredictions, also hardly featured in the relevant literature. It becomes clear that we pursue a relativistic stance on the epistemic nature of predictions.
21We are grateful to the reviewers for their useful feedback on these central points.
4.2.1 Predictive future, epistemic modality and relative truth
A speakerican make a prediction aboutpeven if there arenometaphysical branches that makeptrue. We call this an antiveridical metaphysical modal base. Imagine that, sadly, Susan had a car accident and died on the spot. Mary does not know that Susan died, and utters (62):
(62) Incontrerò Meet.FUT.1SG
Susan Susan
domani.
tomorrow.
(Italian)
‘I will meet Susan tomorrow.’
(63) Tha
FUT
dho
meet.PERF.NONPAST.1SG
ti the
Susan Susan
avrio.
tomorrow.
(Greek)
‘I will meet Susan tomorrow.’
Mary makes a prediction (FUTp) based on her state of knowledge. The fact that objectively the propositionSusan meets Mary tomorrowcannot be true appears to be irrelevant for FUTp. This means that Mary’s prediction is true or false in a relativistic manner (see Lasersohn, 2005; Stephenson, 2007). Given what she knows (e.g. that Susan called her yesterday providing a place and time for the meeting), Mary will meet Susan tomorrow. The prediction FUTpthus solely depends on what Mary knows attu, and this holds for all three languages— Greek, Italian, and English.
It is helpful at this point to offer some comments on what it means for a prediction to be true relativistically, from now ontruei. A trueiprediction, as we just showed, is relative toimaking it, and in our system of subjective veridicality (section 3), the speaker is always a parameter of evaluation akin to Lasersohn’s judge (see also Stephensonibid.). The similarity with predicates of personal taste and epistemic modality is immediate:
(64) a. Mary: Fish is tasty.
b. Susan: No, fish is not tasty.
The propositionFish is tastyis trueifor Mary but falseifor Susan, the two are in a classic case of faultless disagreement.
Importantly, with predicates of personal taste this disagreement can never be objectively resolved, since there is no matter of fact that fish is or is not tasty (see Stephenson,ibid.). The truth is therefore fully determined by the individual anchor only; predicates of personal taste only have relative truth.22
As we saw above, the individual anchor is crucial in determining the basis of knowledge for forming the prediction—
but as Aristotle already noted (see also McFarlane, 2005), therewillbe a matter of fact forp. Setting aside for a moment the case in which we have an antiveridical metaphysics, in the other cases, the predicted sentencepwill receive a truth value objectively (trueoor falseo), albeit at a later time. Hence, objectively, the complement sentencepof FUT, unlike a sentence with a predicate of personal taste, indeed gets resolved.23 However, just as with personal taste, the matter is not resolved at the time of the prediction.
Notice also the parallelism with epistemic modals in present and past:
(65) a. For all I know, Mary must be at home right now.
b. For all I know, Mary must have been at home this morning.
Just as with predictions, the individual anchor determines the basis of knowledge for epistemic MUST p(see also Papafragou, 2006). Unlike with predicates of personal taste, with epistemic modals there is a matter of fact (Stephenson, ibid.): pis/was or is not/was not true. With epistemic modals the matter is settled attu— but with predictions, aside from the cases of antiveridical metaphysics, it will be settled at a later time. In this respect, predictions stand in between predicates of personal taste and epistemic modals:pmay be objectively settled (as with epistemic modals), but it is not yet objectively settled at the time of utterance (as with predicates of personal taste).
In the specific case of predictions and antiveridical metaphysics, the matterissettled objectively attu: given that Susan is dead, the sentenceSusan meets Mary tomorrowis objectively false attu. In other words, FUTp(the prediction) is true relative to the speaker, butpis false objectively.
22The individual anchor for us is always a parameter of evaluation, and may (embedding with propositional attitudes) or may not be syntactically present (as in unembedded sentences).
23Note that, for McFarlane (2005) the future sentences cannot be assigned a truth value at the time of utterance. For us, it is assigned a truth value, it is true/false, parametrically toi.
Regardless of whether the matter can be objectively settled or not, sentences with predicates of personal taste and epistemic modals have been claimed to be truei/falsei at the time of utterance (Lasersohn, ibid, Stephenson, ibid.), regardless of the objective status ofp, if any. Our claim here is that predictions are also equally truei/falseiat the time of utterance, regardless of whetherpwill turn out to be objectively true or false.24
As we just saw, with epistemic modals, objectively,phas a truth value; but for the MUSTpsentence to be true, the objective value ofpis irrelevant. It may be the case that I have the wrong information and Mary is not in fact home. My information at the time of utterance was such that it supportedpin the Best worlds, and this forms the sole basis for my assessment. I therefore made a trueiassessment given my knowledge. In other words, the epistemic assessment (MUST p) is true relative to the speaker, but the prejacentpmay turn out to be false objectively. Likewise, FUTpis true in a relativistic manner. At the time of utterance the assessment is not falseiifpis false unbeknownst to the speaker. MUST pis falseiif the speaker knows thatpis not true and still asserts MUSTp. Likewise, the prediction is falseiif the speaker knows that Susan is dead and still uttersI will meet Susan tomorrow. In both cases, in fact, we claim that the speaker is lying.
To sum up: predictions and assessments with MUST/FUTpare truei or falsei (i.e. subjectively) relative to the individual anchor’siknowledge, whilephas a truth value objectively depending on what is/was/will be the case. The objective value ofpdoes not matter for the truthiof predictions, just as it does not matter for epistemic modals and for predicates of personal taste. In all cases, truth conditions are assigned independently of the objective status ofp.
4.2.2 Indeterminate predictions: far into the future
What we call nextindeterminatepredictions also plead for treating future as epistemic. Imagine utterances like the following:
(66) a. O
the Janis John
tha
FUT
pandrefti
marry.PERF.NON-PAST.3SG
tin the
Mary Mary
kapja some
mera.
day.
(Greek) John will marry Mary some day.
b. Giacomo Giacomo
parlerà talk.FUT.3SG
come as
giornalista journalist
alla on-the
televisione television
un one
giorno.
day.
(Italian)
‘Giacomo will talk as a journalist on TV some day.’
These are indeterminate predictions— a common kind of prediction often reinforced by indefinite adverbs such assome daywhich create temporal distance between the time of prediction and the time of (possible) fact. The speaker again relies on knowledge at the present time, i.e., for (66-b), that Giacomo is very charming, talented and communicative, he dreams of becoming a journalist etc., as well as stereotypical assumptions that unless something bizarre happens, one fulfills her dreams. How the actual world will turn out to be is too far into the future to assume reasonably that it plays a role when making the prediction. The speaker makes her prediction even though the actual world to be is, from the perspective of now, hard to access. Normalcy conditions will also have to be relaxed, thus rendering these predictions a bit weaker. Overall, indeterminate prediction suggests that the speaker reasons with what she knows, and projects that knowledge into an expectation about the future.
24An anonymous reviewer points to us the following excerpt from McFarlane (2014).
Suppose you are standing in a coffee line, and you overhear Sally and George discussing a mutual ac- quaintance, Joe. SALLY says: Joe might be in China. I didn’t see him today. GEORGE: No, he can’t be in China. He doesn’t have his visa yet. SALLY: Oh, really? Then I guess I was wrong. It seems that George is contradicting Sally and rejecting her claim. It also seems that, having learned something from George, Sally concedes that she was wrong. Finally, it seems appropriate for her to retract her original claim, rather than continuing to stand by it. Think how odd it would be were she to respond: SALLY: Oh, really? # Still, I was right when I said ‘Joe might be in China,’ and I stand by my claim.
Extending the argument for epistemic Englishmightto Italian and Greek future, we would claim that those who judge epistemic/future claims to be false when the prejacent is false are looking at the bare propositional content excluding the speaker index. Those who judge such claims to be true even when the prejacent is false are looking at the final truth value including the speaker index. For clarity we are glossing truth/falsity as truthi/falsityi to highlight those cases in which the speaker index is taken into account. We thank the reviewer for providing this material.
