Automation as a manpower reduction strategy in navy ships

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Automation as a Manpower Reduction Strategy in Navy Ships

by Roxane Powers

B.S., Electrical and Computer Engineering, Auburn University, 2006

Submitted to the Department Mechanical Engineering and

System Design and Management Program

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of Naval Engineer

and

Master of Science in Engineering and Management at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology June 2016 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

JUN 02 2016

LIBRARIES

S i

Certified by ... Certified by ... Professor of Accepted by... Ch

Signature redacted

Department of ME46ianical Engineering System Design and Management Program May 6, 2016

Qnature redacted

...

Bryan R. Moser Lecturer, System Dpsign and Man ent Progr m hebuperor.

Signature redacted

UPalrick Hale Director, System sign & Mana ent Program

Signature redacted

Joel Harbour the ractice of Naval Construction and Engineering

I-N .11Thesis Supervisor

Signature redacted

" Rohan Abeyaratne

iirman, Department Committee on Graduate Studies Department of Mechanical Engineering

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Automation as a Manpower Reduction Strategy in Navy Ships

By

Roxane Powers

Submitted to the Department of Mechanical Engineering and Engineering Systems Division on May 6,

2016 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of Naval Engineer and Master of Science

in Engineering and Management

Abstract

Since the early 2000's, the US Navy has endeavored to decrease the Total Ownership Cost

(TOC) of their ships through a decrease in Operating and Support costs. This led to a large-scale

effort by ship program managers to decrease crew size on current and prospective ships. Also during this time period, the rapid-onset improvement of technology led to the increase and complexity of automated systems and equipment installed on ships. These combining trends have caused ships to evolve from a fully manually operated system into a socio-technical system. But does increasing automation to support minimally manned ships lead to the expected

performance?

To answer this question, a thorough understanding of how the Navy currently determines its manpower requirements was obtained. The purpose was to discover the driving factors that influence manpower requirements, which are mission, installed systems, maintenance and training. Next, the process that the Navy uses to develop and manage technology was explored. The purpose was to discern the driving factors that influence technology selection, which are capability, maturity and cost. Since the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is the framework that intersects manpower requirements, technology selection and ship design, a brief overview of

DAS is given. Using key acquisition documents from DDG-51, LCS, and DDG-1000 programs,

the selection, classification and implementation of automated technology on these platforms were explored. This data was then combined with the baseline manpower model to highlight key manpower and automation strategies for each platform and then study the resulting performance.

From these case studies, it was determined that automation as a manpower reduction strategy gives mixed cost and readiness performance results. Although automation leads to lower

manpower costs, increases in maintenance, training and shore support also occur. Some of these costs were offset through the use of human system integration early in the ship design, however, the maintenance and training costs of high-degree-automation systems was higher than

estimated.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bryan R. Moser

Title: Lecturer, System Design and Management Program

Thesis Supervisor: Joel Harbour

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Disclaimer

"The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government."

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Dedication

To my husband Jon:

Prairie Dogs may be a keystone species, but they still rely on the Buffalo to guard them from danger and do the heavy lifting...

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Acknowledgements

This thesis would not happen without academic, professional and personal supporters.

I would like to express my extraordinary appreciation to my thesis advisor, Dr. Bryan R. Moser, for his mentorship and insights throughout the entire process. I also would like to thank Kathy Isgrig, Ilia Christman, Frank Pearce, Dave Ward and William Sposato for their time and expertise in this research. Any inaccuracies or shortcomings in this paper are mine alone.

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List of Figures

FIGURE 1: CAPABILITY AND M ODIFIER DESCRIPTIONS ... 11

FIGURE 2: COR 111, FULL CAPABILITY REQUIRED TO SATISFY M OB 1.1 FOR M CM -1 ... 12

FIGURE 3: PRODUCING A SM D ... 14

FIGURE 4: FM RD PROCESS AND KEY DOCUMENTS ... 16

FIGURE 5: FM RD PROCESS AND KEY PLAYERS...18

FIGURE 6: DOD TECHNOLOGY M ANAGEMENT: INVESTMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSITION ... 21

FIGURE 7: TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS...24

FIGURE 8: GENERIC ACQUISITION PHASES AND DECISION POINTS ... 25

FIGURE 9: KEY STRATEGY DOCUMENTS AND ACQUISITION PHASES ... 29

FIGURE 10: TRLS AND DEFENSE ACQUISIITION ... 29

FIGURE 11: ORGANIZATIONAL M AINTENANCE VS. MANNING... 33

FIGURE 12: INTERMEDIATE LEVEL M AINTENANCE VS. M ANNING ... 33

FIGURE 13: DEPOT LEVEL M AINTENANCE VS. M ANNNING ... 33

FIGURE 14: RM C NOTIONALS (POM -17)3...34

FIGURE 15: RM C NOTIONALS PER SHIP CLASS (POM -17) ... 35

FIGURE 16: 36-M ONTH OPERATION CYCLE FOR SURFACE COMBATANTS ... 36

FIGURE 17: DDG-51 M ANPOW ER VS. M ANNING ... 40

FIGURE 18: DDG-51 M AINTENANCE COSTS PE R SHIP ... 42

FIGURE 19: NRAC DEFINITION OF OPTIMIZED MANNING...43

FIGURE 20: DDG 51 DELIVERED 19914... 46

FIGURE 21: DDG 112, DELIVERED 20 12 ... 46

FIGURE 22: LCS-1 O&S M AINTENANCE COSTS...49

FIGURE 23: LCS-2 O&S M AINTENANCE COSTS...49

FIGURE 24: LCS M ANPOW ER VS. M ANNING ... 52

FIGURE 25: LCS SEAFRAME VARIANTS...54

FIGURE 26: DDG 10005... 59

FIGURE 27: VARIOUS TYPES OF COFFEE MAKERS...61

FIGURE 28: COFFEE M AKER LOA... 65

FIGURE 29: FUNCTION ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN HUMANS AND COMPUTERS WITH A COGNITIVE CONTINUUM ... 67

FIGURE 30: DEGREES OF AUTOMATION BASED ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR ... 67

FIGURE 31: RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HUMAN-AUTOMATION INTERACTIONS ... 73

FIGURE 32: ILLUSTRATIVE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE C OST ... 75

FIGURE 33: ANNUAL O&S COST BY CATEGORY FOR SELECT SURFACE COMBATANTS ... 77

FIGURE 34: M AINTENANCE VS. ANNUAL STEAMING HOURS UNDERWAY ... 80

FIGURE 35: TOTAL COST PER PERSON VS. SHIP W EIGHT ... 80

FIGURE 36: LEVEL OF AUTOMATION AND COST TRADEOFFS ... 81

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List of Tables

TABLE 1: M PTE ENTERPRISE ... 4

TABLE 2: OPNAV M ANPOW ER INSTRUCTIONS... 6

TABLE 3: STANDARD NAVY M ISSIONS8... 8

TABLE 4: CONDITIONS OF READINESS...11

TABLE 5: NAVY STANDARD W ORK W EEK AFLOAT...13

TABLE 6: NAVY TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION PROGRAMS ... 22

TABLE 8: DDG 51 CLASS AND VARIATIONS... 39

TABLE 9: DDG-51 PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS ... 39

TABLE 10: LCS SHIP CLASS PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS ... 47

TABLE 11: DDG 1000 SHIP CLASS PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS ... 55

TABLE 12: SHERIDAN AND VERPLANCK (1978) LOA TAXONOMY ... 62

TABLE 13: ENDSLEY'S (1987) L OA TAXONOMY ... 6 3 TABLE 14: ENDSLEY & KABER (1999) LOA TAXONOMY...64

TABLE 15: PARASURAMAN ET. AL. (2000) LOA TAXONOMY ... 65

TABLE 15: KNOW N HUMAN-AUTOMATION INTERACTION ISSUES... 69

TABLE 16: AVERAGE ANNUAL O&S COSTS ($M )...77

TABLE 17: TOTAL O&S COST PER SHIP CLASS...78

TABLE 18: TOTAL ACQUISITION COST ... 78

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Introduction

1.1 Automation Proliferation and Reduced Crews on Navy Ships

Since the early 2000's, the US Navy has endeavored to decrease Total Ownership Cost (TOC) of their ships. According to research by both the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC), the single largest factor in TOC is Operating and Support (O&S) costs, of which personnel costs are the largest. This led to a large-scale effort of ship program managers to decrease crew size on current and prospective ships. Also during this time period, the rapid onset of technology increased the amount and complexity of automated systems and equipment installed on ships. These combining trends cause ships to evolve from a fully manually operated system into socio-technical system. A socio-technical system is an action system that relies both on human and technical function carriers (Ropohl 1999). In 1999, Endsley and Kaber noted that. "The need exists for further research into how complex system performance is affected by Level of Automation as a human-centered approach to

automation"(Endsley and Kaber 1999). This suggestion was a result of a research experiment in which they studied level of automation effects on performance, situational awareness and workload in a dynamic control task. Specifically, this experiment focused not only on how humans interacted with automated equipment, but the effect of the type of automated equipment on the system as whole. To date there is little research on how US Navy ship performance has changed since the confluence of manpower reduction and automation proliferation. Therefore the intent of this thesis is to gain insight into the manpower and automation relationship on US Navy ships and their effects on system performance. The scope of this thesis is bound to US Navy surface combatants. Before the relationship could be studied a basic understanding of the creation of manpower requirements and technology development process of the US Navy was required. First, the current framework used to determine fleet manpower requirements was defined. Using a systems engineering approach, a simple diagram of the manpower model identifying stakeholders, beneficiaries, inputs, and outputs was developed. Next, a similar approach was used to identify technology development for surface ships.

Finally, using key acquisition documents from DDG-51, LCS, and DDG-1000 programs, the selection, classification and implementation of automated technology on these platforms were explored. This data was then combined with the baseline manpower model to highlight key

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manpower and automation decisions versus mission growth over time for each platform. The results will allow key decision makers to better understand the tradeoffs between automation and manpower for ship modernization or new acquisitions.

1.2 Does Increasing Automation to Support Minimally Manned Ships Lead to the Expected Performance?

The thesis is based on answering three research questions. First, what are the major variables that drive manpower requirements on US Navy Ships? Before crew size can be reduced, it is

important to understand what factors the US Navy used to determine and validate crew size. The second research question is what are the major variables that drive technology development for

US Navy Ships? The answer to this question will illuminate the criteria that engineers and

acquisition professional look for when decided what technology to develop and use. The final research question is, what decisions regarding manpower, automation and technology has the US Navy made in the last 20 years and how have those ships performed? The answer to this

question will reveal relationship between manpower and automation on US Navy ships.

By exploring and answering these three research questions, key tradeoffs decision makers should

consider when designing for reduced shipboard manning would be revealed.

1.3 Definitions to Aid the Reader

The following definitions are presented to aid the reader. A list of acronyms and abbreviations is included in pages viii-vix.

1. Automation -Device or system that accomplishes (partially or fully) a function that was previously, or conceivably could be, carried out (partially or fully) by a human operator (Raja Parasuraman, Thomas B. Sheridan, and Christopher D. Wickens 2000, 287).

2. Level of Automation -a description of the level of interaction between a human and an automated system

3. Manpower Requirement -The minimum quantitative and qualitative resource needed to perform a specific MFT which has assigned qualifiers that define the duties, tasks, and functions to be performed and the specific skills and skill level required to perform the delineated functions (Chief Of Naval Operations 2015).

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4. Manning - The specific inventory of personnel at an activity in terms of numbers, grades, and occupational groups(Chief Of Naval Operations 2015).

5. Optimized Manning - is the most favorable solution that combines the variables of: total ownership cost, manning, and ship capability (Spindel et al. 2000)

6. Key Performance Parameter (KPP) -Those attributes or characteristics of a system that are considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability and those attributes that make a significant contribution to the characteristics of the future joint force as defined in the CONOPS. The JCIDS CDD and CPD KPPs are included verbatim in the acquisition program baseline (Department of the Navy 2013).

7. Key Systems Attribute (KSA) -An attribute or characteristic considered crucial in support of achieving a balanced solution or approach to a KPP or some other key performance attribute deemed necessary by the sponsor (Department of the Navy 2013).

8. Total Ownership Cost -a concept that includes the elements of life-cycle cost as well as other infrastructure or business process costs not normally attributed to the program(Department of Defense 2013).

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2 Manpower Requirements

2.1 How Does the Navy Currently Determine Manpower Requirements?

For the US Navy, total force manpower management is a complex, time consuming and oftentimes, convoluted process. Navy manpower is part of the Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPTE) enterprise. At its core this enterprise is the intersection of two regions: manpower management and human resource management. Table I lists the major functions of each system.

Table 1: MPTE Enterprise

MANPOWER PERSONNEL, TRAINING, EDUCATION

e Establish Policy/Mission/Organizations * Acquire human resources

e Determine requirements e Develop human resources

e Allocate resources - Assign human resources

e Develop authorizations (manning) e Maintain human resources e Separate/retire human resources

The manpower system is concerned with determining, validating, and documenting

requirements. These requirements are then translated into authorizations, which feed into the personnel, training, and education processes. This thesis only explores the fleet manpower process because of its application to ships and ship design. The shore manpower process governs shore activities and civilians employed by the Department of the Navy.

2.1.1 Manpower versus Manning

At this point, it is important to distinguish the difference between manpower and manning. Manpower is a wartime requirement that describes the minimum number of jobs required to accomplish a set of pre-defined missions. Manning describes how resources are allocated to assign personnel to naval activities. In other words, manpower is based on standards and rules while manning is based on budget and available resources. In an ideal scenario, the final

manpower requirement would equal the final manning number. Frequently manning is less than manpower and the difference between these two quantities is referred to as the readiness gap.

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2.1.2 Manpower Requirements: A Document Driven System

The manpower system is built around several governing instructions. These instructions are organized into three categories: Federal Law, Department of Defense, and Navy. All of the contributing instructions address both readiness reporting and determination of wartime manpower requirements.

The pertinent statements from federal law are general in nature and tend to give rules and methods for manpower and manning requirements. Below are two excerpts from United States Code Title 10, which illustrates this point:

"The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war (USC Title 10, Subtitle C, Part I, n.d.)"

"The end-strengths specified ... are the minimum strength necessary to enable the armed forces to fulfill a national defense strategy ... Successfully conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (USC Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, n.d.)".

Department of Defense instructions form the policy that manpower requirements shall be driven

by workload and shall be established at the minimum levels necessary to accomplish mission and

performance objectives (Department of Defense 2005). Navy specific instructions start with the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and then the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

(OPNAV). SECNAV Instructions sets the requirement for documentation of wartime manpower

resources as the basis for reporting a unit's wartime manpower readiness to accomplish assigned missions (SECNAVINST 5312.1OC/SECNAVINST 5010.1B). OPNAV instructions give further details about the framework and documentation of the manpower system. Since OPNAV instructions have the most detail, the following table summarizes the three main instructions.

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Table 2: OPNAV Manpower Instructions

OPNAVINST 1000.1 6L Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures

OPNAVINST C3501.2K Master Required Operational Capability/Projected

Operational Environment Instruction

OPNAVINST 1500.76C Naval Training Systems Requirements, Acquisition, and Management

Issues the policy guidance for the Navy to execute manpower determination requirements stipulated by Federal Law. Specifically, paragraph L.a. states the purpose of the

instruction is, "To implement reference (a) and provide policy guidance and procedures to develop, review, approve, and implement total force manpower requirements and

authorizations for Naval activities."

The master ROC/POE instruction, which delineates guidance on development of mission requirements for specific classes of ships and staffs. It is this document that delineates specific mission functions that are required to support the National Defense Strategy required by Title 10. The class specific ROC/POE is then used by NAVMAC to determine class specific manpower requirements required to support the defined mission function which tie directly to National Defense Strategy.

This instruction sets Navy policy for planning, determining, and documenting manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) requirements for ACAT I through IV programs of record. The purpose of this instruction is to ensure traceability of MPT requirements in new and modernized naval capabilities.

In summary, the law requires that the Navy uses a process for the determination of manpower requirements that is based on workload. It also states that US Navy ships must be manned at the minimal level required to complete wartime mission tasks.

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2.1.3 Fleet Manpower Requirements Determination (FMRD)

The FMRD process is the series of actions that the Navy uses to determine the manpower required for all Navy ships. To simplify this process so that a basic understand of system drivers could be found, a system engineer process was applied.

A systems engineering process attempts to answer the following questions (Qi D Van Eikema Hommes 2014):

1. What is the series of actions or operations that occur to reach the final goal? 2. What is the order of the actions?

3. What do these actions require and what do they generate? 4. Who will perform the actions?

5.How long does it takes to complete the actions? 6. What tools will those performing the actions employ?

The following sections summarize the order of actions that occurs to complete the FMRD process that results in updated manpower requirements and authorizations for all naval activities.

2.1.3.1 Mission Tasking

FMRD process is divided into two paths, each with its own entry point. One path determines enlisted manpower and the second officer manpower. The main difference between enlisted and officer manpower is the duties they have the capacity to perform. Enlisted personnel perform work and stand watch, while officers provide leadership, authority and stand watch.

The starting point for the fleet manpower process is a document titled, "Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment (ROC&POE)". The ROC&POE details the missions and operating environments for a class of ships. The ROC&POE is the document by which the Navy articulates National Defense Strategies into operational capabilities. In the ROC section, Warfare Sponsors define primary and secondary mission areas for the ship class; assign operational capabilities; and specify desired level of achievement for particular conditions. Primary missions are missions that the crew is fully capable to perform during wartime, while secondary missions are missions that the crew is expected to perform but not essential to wartime. In the POE section, Warfare Sponsors establish the desired conditions of

readiness; depict operations, which the ship must provide manning, and equipment for; and describe the most demanding operational condition. This document is critical when writing

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manpower requirements, because no requirement can exist without being matched to a pre-defined scenario in the ROC&POE. Thus, the ROC&POE becomes a filtering mechanism for manpower requirements. Table 3 is a list of the standard Navy missions that warfare sponsors can assign to a class of ships ("Critical Operational Issue Selection" 2011). Appendix B lists full descriptions for each mission.

Table 3: Standard Navy Missions

AMW Amphibious Warfare

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

AW Air Warfare

CCC Command, Control, and Communication

CON Construction

EXW Expeditionary Warfare

FHP Force Health Protection

FSO Fleet Support Operations

INT Intelligence Operation

10 Information Operations

1W Irregular Warfare

LOG Logistics

MIW Mine Warfare

MOB Mobility

MOS Mission of State

NCO Non-Combat Operations

NSW Naval Special Warfare

STS Strategic Sealift

STW Strike Warfare

SUW Surface Warfare

Once the ROC&POE is complete, ROC&POE can begin.

an estimation of the work required to fulfill the missions in the

2.1.4 Workload Standards

Workload standards describe the hours of work required to complete maintenance and conduct ship support. There are three types of maintenance attributed to a ship: planned, corrective and facilities. Ship support workload is has its own category, called Own Unit Support.

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Planned Maintenance (PM)

Planned maintenance or preventive maintenance is work completed on a piece of equipment to maintain its operational readiness. For example, a lube oil change every 3000 miles for an automobile is an example of planned maintenance. The Navy uses the 3M (Maintenance and Material Management) system to provide a standardized method for planning, scheduling, and completing preventive maintenance by a ship's crew. The governing instruction for this program is OPNAV 4790.4F, Ship's Maintenance and Material Management System Policy. The system organizes planned maintenance into time incremental categories such as Daily, Monthly,

Quarterly, and Semi-Annually. Only quarterly and below planned maintenance that is scheduled for completion when the ship is underway is included in manpower workload estimations.

Corrective Maintenance (CM)

OPNAV defines corrective maintenance as work accomplished on an unscheduled basis due to a malfunction, failure, or deterioration of a system, equipment, or component (Chief Of Naval Operations 2015). Normal practice is to assign corrective maintenance hours as a ratio of planned maintenance hours. The ratio depends on the system type. For example, for electrical systems the CM:PM ratio is 1:1; for every 1 hour of planned maintenance scheduled, a

corresponding 1 hour of corrective maintenance is anticipated.

Facilities Maintenance

Facilities maintenance is any work required to clean and preserve the ship, to include painting.

Own Unit Support

Own unit support describes the workload associated with ship administration, command, supply, medical, environmental management, and special evolutions. Although Own Unit Support policy and guidelines come from CNO, NAVSEA, and TYCOM, community managers also provide input to this policy. The data to determine how much own unit support is required for each category is drawn primarily from interviews (Operational (Op) Audits). A secondary source is staffing standards drawn from historical data.

Workload standards are a summation of maintenance workload and own unit support workload. These values are then adjusted by applying approved allowances. There are two types of approved allowances, Productive and Make Ready/Put Away.

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Allowances

Productivity Allowance is set by OPNAV (N1) and is used to adjust for fatigue, environmental effects, personal needs, and unavoidable interruptions. Productivity Allowance is applied to all corrective and facilities maintenance, and own unit support at rate between 2% and 8%. The chosen rate depends on the expected working environment and personnel hazard level. The second approved allowance is called Make Ready/Put Away. This average value is set by OPNAV (N 1) and is based on extensive activity sampling. The purpose of the Make Ready/Put Away allowance is to account for the time required in obtaining and returning necessary

instruction manuals, tools, and materials when completing maintenance; the time to transit to and from the work area; the time to complete necessary cleanup and time to conduct any research necessary to determine required parts and complete supply forms. This allowance is applied to planned maintenance at a rate between 15% and 30%.

2.1.5 Watchstation Standards

On a ship, when there is a critical system that must be monitored or operated by a human, a "watch" is assigned to that system, and this action is called watchstanding. The hours required to stand watch are called operational manning and watchstation standards are adjusted

operational manning hours. Operational manning is estimated by determining the number of hours required to operate the ship when underway (at sea). When a ship is underway, a majority of the systems are operated 24/7. Any required watchstations must conform to the designed capabilities of the ship and trace back to the mission requirements listed in the ROC&POE. Operational manning hours are based on fulfilling the minimum skill level watchstations required to support different conditions of readiness (COR).

CORs describe different states that ship can be in during its operating lifetime. Table 4 lists the five CORs used by the Navy.

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Table 4: Conditions of Readiness COR Threat Scenario Crew Operations

A threat is Crew focuses on fighting threats and/or saving the ship (damage

I imminent or _control)

present I

A threat is Crew operates in a modified, scenario-dependent manner. This is a probable flexible condition based on the threat mix that cannot be predicted.

Crew operates in a 3-section watchstation rotation sufficient to Ill A threat is possible cutrppu tak

counter pop-up attacks

No threat; Crew completes extensive local training and readiness preparation

IV peacetime _{for Condition I & III} steaming

Crew completes extensive training and readiness preparation for V No threat: In-port Conditions I, Ill, & IV

Operational manning is a combination of CORs, missions, and installed systems. This combination is then adjusted based on a standard set of modifiers written in the ROC&POE. Figure I lists the possible capability modifiers and their descriptions.

MOIER | None A E CAPABILITY FULL LIMITED

Manned to design Manned to less

capacity for than design

duration of capacity for

condition duration of

condition Temporarily manned Temporarily manned

to design capacity to less than

using off-watch design capacity

personnel using off-watch

personnel Temporarily manned Temporarily manned

to design capacity to less than

using a special team design capacity

using a special team

Figure 1: Capability and Modifier Descriptions

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The best way to understand Operational Manning estimation is by answering 4 questions: .Which Condition of Readiness is trying to be satisfied?

2. Which mission is trying to be satisfied?

3.What Capability (modified or unmodified) is required to satisfy both the Condition of Readiness and Mission?

4. What is the minimum skill level required fulfill the required Capability for the Mission at the desired Condition of Readiness?

In general, the largest operational manning requirement comes from fulfilling COR 111. This is because COR III is the condition that satisfies day-to-day operations of an underway ship. As noted before, manpower requirements can only be developed for missions listed in the ship's ROC&POE. If the ROC&POE does not list a particular need at a particular condition, then a watchstation cannot simply be added without changing the ROC&POE. To illustrate this point., Figure 2 shows an excerpt from the Avenger Class (MCM 1) ROC&POE. The red boxes show that at COR Ill a 'full capability" is required to satisfy the mission of "operate ship's propulsion plant at full power".

NCN 1 Class II III IV V

MOBILITY (MOB)

MOB 1 OPERATE SHIP' S PROPULSION PLANT TO DESIGNED CAPABILITY.

MOB .i Operate ship's propulsion F F L

plant at full power.

I~

.VL) -Plan and train.

MOB 1.2 Operate ship's propulsion F F F F L

plant with split plant

operations.

V(L) - Plan and train.

MOB 1.3 Operate employing auxiliary F L L propulsion.

III, IV(L) - Plan and train. I

Figure 2: COR III, Full Capability required to Satisfy MOB 1.1 for MCM-1 (OPNAVINST 3501.164D, 13DEC2013, pg 24)

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Directed Standards

Workload and watchstation standard are not the only contributors to manpower estimation. A third category, directed standards, also contributes to manpower estimation. Directed standards are not driven by workload, but are instead specified by OPNAV directives and policies. These standards are often based on estimated crew size, the necessity for a unique skill, or requirements for a special program. Some examples include the directed requirement for a chaplain or a career counselor.

2.1.6 The Simple Equation

Once an estimation of adjusted workload standards, watchstation standards and directed

standards exists, the next step is to apply a simple equation to determine the physical number of personnel required to accomplish the estimated workloads. The simple equation states that

manpower requirements equals Workload (in hours) divided by Productive Available Time (in hours). Productive available time is a pre-defined number based on the Navy Standard

Workweek (NSWW) Afloat for watchstanders and non-watchstanders. The NSWW Afloat is meant for wartime and assumes a ship is underway in COR 111, maintaining a three-section watchstation rotation.

Table 5: Navy Standard Work Week Afloat

Days 7

Hours per Day 24

Sleep 56 Personal 14 -Messing 14 Sunday Free 3 Service Diversion 4 Training 7 Watchstander 56 Other Work 14

Total Workweek Hours 168

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A watchstander's work hours are divided into 56 hours of watch and 14 hours of work. A non-watchstander performs 70 hours of work. Thus, productive available time is 56 hours for a watchstander and 70 hours for a non-watchstander.

The results of the simple equation do not directly become the manpower requirements for a ship class. Remember, the overall goal for manpower requirements is to determine the minimum quality and quantity of manpower required to accomplish the mission. Quality is described by skill (rating and specialized training) and pay grade. Therefore, once the workload hours are estimated, the next step is to optimize the estimated workload by completing a skill versus

requirement validation. These steps are necessary because they take into account occupational skills, existing Navy billets and ship organizational structure. The results are published in a Ship Manpower Document (SMD), which lists the manpower requirements for a ship class. Figure 3 is a simplified diagram that summarizes the steps required to produce the SMD.

ROC & Policy &

POE Directives

Workload Standards Watchstation Standards Directed Standards

OM

Directed Requirements

Watcheasa

jOfficer

Requirements

Directd Skill

ComparIson

Allowances

Sum Workload and Watches by Division

Spread Requirements (Billet Spread) Validate Skils by Requirements

(Skil vs. Billet)

Produce Manpower Document Figure 3: Producing a SMD

23 Steps & QA before final signature

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How Does Manpower Become Manning?

With the completion of the SMD, the required manpower to fulfill all of the missions in the ROC&POE is known. However, these requirements still have to become manning, or the actual crew size that the Navy can afford for the entire class of ships. Manning is described by three components: Billets Authorized (BA), Personnel Assigned and the Current Onboard (muster). The process for turning manpower requirements into manning is its own system. This is the point where decisions are no longer about fulfilling specific missions of ship, but in balancing resources for the entire Navy. The basic policy is to assure that every activity has its fair share of resources. These results are published in the Navy Manning Plan (NMP), which describes the manning level for every activity in the Navy. For the individual activities (a ship is considered an activity), their authorized manning levels or BA are listed in the Activity Manpower

Document (AMD). The AMD lists, by name, the personnel assigned to each activity. Finally, Current On Board (COB) refers to a daily muster, which contains a listing of who is present on any given day, to do work. COB tends fluctuate since it is affected by a wide range of factors such as Temporary Assigned Duty (TAD), schedule delays, and personal injuries.

To summarize, the steps in the FMRD process are:

1. Collect the ship's missions and capabilities

2. Estimate workload standards and apply allowances

3. Estimate watchstation standards

4. Based on NSWW, convert total workload into billets using NMRS

5. Distribute billets based on existing Navy ratings and standard organizational structure

6. Assign fair share resources to activities to achieve billets authorized 7. Assign personnel to authorized billets

2.1.7 Taking a Closer Look at the FMRD Process

Because the FMRD process is a document driven process, it is useful to look at the inputs, outputs and key documents of the process. Figure 4 depicts this analysis of the FMRD process. It takes approximately 16 months for the creation of a new SMD and updated AMD.

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INPUTS ACTIONS OUTPUTS

NDS JCIDS Define Ship Missions ROC&POE

PSMD

istorical

3M System Data from NAVMAC Estimate Workload

previousStnad ships lctn mate Watchstati Standards pblity of Directed Ship Standaids Systems Policies Compute Manpower NSWW Mathematics

Ship Draft Draft

3raizational Optimize Requirements SMD NTSP

Structure

FYDP Authorize Resources

eNOOCS Assign Personnel AM

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Key Internal Documents for Manpower Requirements

Job Task Analysis

The systematic examination of what people do, how they do it, and what results they achieve by doing it. Job task analysis data defines the knowledge, skills and abilities required for ajob Job task analysis data is organized into two levels. Level I job analysis (what work is done) used for job design, position advertising, and career planning. Level 2 task analysis (how work is done) used to determine what the worker must know, identify specific equipment used, and to establish minimum performance standards.

Ship Manpower Document (SMD)

SMD lists quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements for an individual ship or class of

ships and the rational for determination of the requirements (Chief Of Naval Operations 2015). It includes an Officer Billet Summary, Manpower Summary, Enlisted Manpower Requirements, Battle Bill, and Functional Workload. It also lists the number of total billets required to operate the ship. A Preliminary SMD (PSMD) is produced by the Program Manager and approved by the Resource Sponsor (RS), prior to MS A, and around the completion of the of a ship's pre-preliminary design phase. The PSMD is reviewed by NAVMAC to ensure compliance with current manpower standards and procedures. NAVMAC validates the PSMD and begins to start work on the SMD at the start of MS B, at the completion of the Contract Design phase. The final version the SMD is published at FOC, during the Operations and Support phase.

Navy Training System Plan (NTSP)

This document identifies all training requirements including manpower, personnel, student throughput, instructors, technical training equipment, maintenance, curriculum, courseware, and

job task analysis based on the work load analysis and human systems integration (HSI)

plan (Chief Of Naval Operations 2015). The Naval Training Systems Requirements, Acquisition, and Management govern the requirements for the drafting of the NTSP

(OPNAVINST 1500.76C, 8/14/2013). A preliminary NTSP is published by the RS at MS B1 , at the completion of the Contract Design phase. The final NTSP is published at MS C at the completion of the Low Rate Followship Construction phase.

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Manpower Estimate Report

This report assesses the manpower portion of the "total cost of ownership", but is more than just a listing of manpower and costs. This report details maintenance, training, and support

requirements for the entire class of ships. IT is completed by the Program Manager, approved by the respective PEO and requires the concurrence of RSs. The final approver of the Manpower

Estimate is OPNAV (N 12). The Manpower Estimate is required at MS B, at the completion of Contract Design phase.

Activity Manning Document

It is the single official statement of organizational manning and manpower authorizations (Chief

Of Naval Operations 2015).

Another way to gain insight from the FMRD process is to identify who performs each action in the process. Figure 5 shows the key players and organizations of the FMRD process.

OPNAV

TYCOW Sposrs

NAVMAC

ACTIONS Donne Ship Misions

NAVSEA Stndad NETC Detaillrs Comput Manpoer Optimize Requirements Authorize Resources Assign Personnel

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Key Players and Organizations

OPNAV (N1) -The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO, OPNAV NI) is the final decision maker for manpower requirements for the Navy.

OPNAV (N9), (N2/N6), (N4) -These groups are responsible for setting warfare requirements for ship classes. They identify missions and communicate these missions through the ROC&POE. NAVMAC- NAVMAC is an agent of OPNAV. As an organization, they are tasked by OPNAV NI to define, compute and validate manpower requirements. They are also tasked to produce and maintain manpower documents.

OPNAV (N 12) -Director, Total Force Requirements Division

TYCOMs - Type Commanders (TYCOMs) TYCOMs provide NAVMAC with billet authorized buys for new manpower documents(Chief Of Naval Operations 2015).

NPC -Navy Personnel Command employ detailers who distribute personnel to specific activities.

NETC -Naval Education and Training Command is an organization that acts as a training agent for personnel.

NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), an organization that acts developing agent for ships and their systems.

Resource Sponsors -Resource Sponsors handle plan and budget manning as a year-to-year distributable personnel inventory. Control the total obligated authorization (TOA) for manpower.

This exploration of the FMRD process revealed that a ship class' mission or capability is the most critical piece of information to derive manpower requirements. Once a ship class' missions have been selected, then appropriate systems or equipment is designated to accomplish the required missions. These systems in turn require levels of maintenance to remain operational. The crew itself requires training to perform tasks related to mission, operate systems and perform maintenance.

There is no single entity in the Navy responsible for mission selection, ship design, manpower analysis, technology evaluation and selection, and budgeting. Instead, as Section 4 details, each organization (NAVSEA, OPNAV, PEOs, Resource Sponsors, Program Managers, Ship Design Managers) must work together within the bounds of the Defense Acquisition System to design, build and man an operational platform.

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2.2 The Driving Factors that Influence Manpower Requirements

Manpower requirements are directly tied to a ship's workload and watchstation standards. Workload is a function of ship systems, their associated maintenance and maintenance of the ship. Watchstation standards are a function of mission, crew quality and installed systems. Thus the drivers of manpower requirements are:

1. Ship Mission and Capabilities 2. Ship Systems and Equipment 3. Maintenance

4. Training

Missions refer to specific capabilities of the ship. Ship manpower requirements must be capable of fulfilling all assigned missions and tasks, not just daily workload. Missions are a function of a ship's Concept of Operations and are listed in the ROC&POE. Once established, ship missions are difficult to change. Ship systems are akin to the tools required to accomplish the mission. Ship systems are dictated by the Technology Development process, which is detailed in Section 0.

Maintenance is required to keep the ship and its installed systems operational. Manpower requirements only include the maintenance completed by the crew, also called organizational maintenance. However, a ship's maintenance strategy encompasses other maintenance levels (intermediate, and depot), which have large effects on ship performance. Section 5.1 details the maintenance and modernization process of the Navy.

Training is needed for humans to complete a mission, operate equipment, perform maintenance, and stand watch. As systems become more complex, more and higher quality training is generally required.

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3 Developing and Managing Technology

3.1 Selecting Technology to Meet Mission Requirements

Technology ought to serve some useful end (Feigley et al. 2004, 13). The operational community dictates mission. The acquisition community matures, selects, and invests in technology. The

science and technology community discovers, invents, and researches new technology. Thus there are 3 organizations that contribute to the development, selection and management of

technology for the Navy.

According to research completed by Feigley et al., to achieve mission success all constituent communities must work together seamlessly (2004). In other words, the warfighters should publish requirements that cause the acquisition personnel to contract for matching technology. If the technology desired does not exist, then the science and technology engineers should research and develop new technology based on the requests from the acquisition community. Figure 6 shows the path that technology travels from initial discovery to being operational on a ship.

echnol investment Technology development Technology transition

/Market research

Technology

Capability Prio ritized ntegrated Into

needs _projects -'acquisition _program

S&T resources

Technology sht ved,

Figure 6: DOD Technology Management: Investment, Development, and Transition

("Defense Technology Development: Technology Transition Programs Support Military Users, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Measurement of Outcomes" 201 -3, 4)

In their 2013 report, the GAO identified 20 technology transition programs, managed by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military departments, that provide structured

mechanisms and funding to facilitate technology transition ("Defense Technology Development:

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Pr-Technology Transition Programs Support Military Users, but Opportunities Exist to Improve

Measurement of Outcomes" 2013, 5).

Table 6 lists the Navy specific technology transition programs and the associated timeframe for each.

Table 6: Navy Technology Transition Programs Program Typical Completion

ManTech Varies

SBIR 42 months or less FNC 3-5 years

RTT 24 months or less TS 12 months or less TIPS 24 months or less

The Navy's Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program is directed towards key acquisition programs such as DDG 51 and CVN 68. The ManTech program aids in achieving reduced acquisition and total ownership costs by developing, maturing, and transitioning key

manufacturing technologies and processes (ONR 2016). Examples of recent projects include "Additive Manufacturing for Shipboard Applications" and "Shape Cutting and Welding Automation."

The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is a federally funded program that assists small businesses in competing in defense research and development. For example, Advanced Cerametrics, Inc. (ACI) developed a technique that produces flexible piezoelectric fibers, suitable for high performance sensor and actuator application (ONR 2007, 5) . Under the SBIR program, ACI was able to use this technology for the DDG 1000 self-powered health monitoring system.

Initiated by the Department of the Navy in 2002, the Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) program is a science and technology (S&T) program designed to develop and transition cutting-edge

technology products to acquisition managers within a three-to five-year timeframe (ONR 2013). Single Coat Ship Tank Coatings is an example of a FNC developed technology.

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The Rapid Technology Transition (RTT) program addresses emergent or urgent naval needs. The High Gain Broadband (Graywing) Shipboard 10 Antenna is an example of an RTT technology.

The TechSolutions (TS) program is a unique rapid prototyping program in that it receives project requests directly from active duty sailors and marines online.

The Technology Insertion Program for Savings (TIPS) completes rapid technology transitions with the intent to reduce operations and support costs. An example TIPS product is the Composite Patch Technology.

Although each technology transition program has different sources and timeframes, the overall goal for each is the same: reduce technology and life cycle cost risk.

3.2 Balancing Maturity and Risk

In his research, H. Jiang identifies 10 key variables that describe technology: level of

complexity, implementation rate, automation level, reliability, upgradeability, lifespan, maturity, safety, compatibility, affordability (2013). Of these variables, the most heavily considered when selecting new technology for ships is maturity and affordability. In their report, Defense

Technology Development: Technology Transition Programs Support Military Users, but

Opportunities Exist to Improve Measurement of Outcomes, the GAO noted that "beyond funding

availability and technology turnaround times, technology maturation plays a key role in technology transition (2013). The Navy uses Technology Readiness Levels to describe the maturity of technology programs. Figure 7 lists the standard technology readiness levels and their descriptions. The program manager is responsible for planning and conducting technology readiness assessment of their program's critical technologies, usually after Milestone A.

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Technology

Readiness Level Description

1. Basic principles observed and reported. Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into technology's basic properties. Examples might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties. 2. Technology concept and/or application Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented. The formulated. application is speculative and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.

Examples are still limited to paper studies.

3. Analytical and experimental critical function Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to and/or characteristic proof of concept. physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples

include components that are not yet integrated or representative.

4. Component and/or breadboard validation in Basic technological components are integrated to establish that the piece will work together. This is laboratory environment. relatively "low fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad

hoc" hardware in a laboratory.

5. Component and/or breadboard validation in Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological components are relevant environment. integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in

simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory integration of components.

6. System/subsystem model or prototype Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the breadboard tested for level 5, is demonstration in a relevant environment. tested in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated

readiness. Examples include a prototype in a high fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment.

7. System prototype demonstration in an Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major step up from level 6, requiring operational environment. the demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment. Examples

include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft.

8. Actual system completed and qualified through Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In almost all test and demonstration. cases, this level represents the end of true system development. Examples include

developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if it meets specification requirements.

9. Actual system proven through successful Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as those mission operations, encountered in operational test and evaluation. Examples include using the system under

operational mission conditions.

Figure 7: Technology Readiness Levels

(Naval Sea Systems Command 2012)

Technology that is at TRL 6 or higher is generally considered mature enough to transition. However, sometimes technology in the Navy's FNC program may transition at TRL 3-4, because there is more time in the ship acquisition process for the program manager to develop the

technology.

The 2004 NRAC study observes that the acquisition community is "risk averse" when it comes to technology selection. The acquisition community does not want to accept immature or unproven technology from the S&T community because it adds cost risk. This cost is either paid for under the original budget estimates or the program must request additional funding through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). The request for additional funding is not ideal, because it could take up to 2 years to secure.

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4 Manpower & Technology within the Defense Acquisition System

4.1 Defense Acquisition Management System

Section 2.1 specifies the key players and documents in the FMRD process. Since manpower requirements and manning involve budget allocation, it is important to understand how the FMRD process interacts with the Defense Acquisition Management System. The DOD 5000 series details the system acquisition framework used by the Defense Acquisition Management System. This system is an event-based process, where acquisition programs proceed through a series of milestone reviews and other decision points that may authorize entry into a significant new program phase. The generic phases and decision points are shown in Figure 8.

Need Identification

(DoD: Material Development Decision)

Solution Analysis

Risk Reduction Decision (DoD: Milestone A)

Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction

Requirmens Decision Point (DoD: CDD Validation)

A

Development Development RFP Release Decisions

A

Development Contract Award (DoD: Milestone B)

Development

initial Production or Fielding (DoD: Milestone C)

Low-Rate Initial Production or

Legend: Production Limited Deployment and Operational Test

A - Decision Point Decisions Full-Rate Production/ CDD - Capability Development Document Full Deployment RFP n Request For Proposal

Production, Deployment, and Sustainment

Figure 2 Illustrates the sequence of decision events In a generic program.

-It is not intended to reflect the time dedicated to associated phase activity. Disposal

Figure 8: Generic Acquisition Phases and Decision Points (DOD 5000.02, 2015)

A short summary of the basic flow the Defense Acquisition Management System follows. First, a need is identified that prompts the decision to acquire a new product. Once this Material Development Decision (MDD) is made, various activities will perform an Analysis of

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the Material Solution Analysis Phase. Next a series of risk reduction actions are applied to the new product. The beginning of this series is marked by Milestone A (MS A), which formalizes an investment decision to pursue a multiple design concepts, and mature needed technologies to support these design concepts. This is called the Technology Development phase. Next

resources are committed to the new design for manufacturing and fielding. This is called the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, and is broken into 3 decision points. The first decision point is a Capabilities Development Document (CDD) validation that ensures the concept design meets the customer requirements. The second decision point culminates in a Request For Proposal (RFP), in which prime contractors formally bid on the proposed contract. The final decision point, also called Milestone B (MS B), occurs when the development contract is aware to the selected prime contractor. This is also the point in which a program's resources, budget, schedule, and suppliers are selected. Once a contract has been awarded, development and testing begins. The decision to enter production follows development and testing, also called the Production and Deployment phase. There are two key events in this phase, the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) or Milestone C (MS C), and the Full-Rate Production. The final phase is the Operations and Support phase, in which sustainment and disposal of the new product occurs. Similar to the FMRD process, there are a series of documents required to enter and exit

p I. UUUI~I~w~d -I Ive-~LLf J

each phase. The documents are rive by statutory and regulatory requirements.

Since Defense Acquisition Management Process applies to the entire Department of Defense, it covers a large and varied portfolio that includes acquisition of aircraft, computer systems, weapons and ships.

Drezner et al. argued that ships have several characteristics that separate them from other defense acquisition programs, such as (2011):

- Length of time to design and build * Importance of industrial/political factors " Concurrency of design and build

- Complexity

- Low quantity/production rate " High unit cost

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Additionally, the Ship Design Manager and System Integration Manager Manual (2012, 2-3), list the following "Uniqueness of Ship Acquisition" challenges:

a. Very low quantities, high unit costs, and a long development cycle

b. First ship must be fully operational. Full ship prototyping is rare, but when a prototype is acquired, it must be a fully operational ship.

c. Evolving requirements definition

d. Combat systems/weapons systems development and technology changes - development cycle of 18 months or less must be synchronized with the ship development cycle e. Integration of warfighting capability with supporting functions such as mobility, training,

and damage control

f. The broad scope of Human Systems Integration (HSI) considerations including Habitability, Human Factors Engineering (HFE), Manpower, Personnel, Training, Personnel Survivability, Safety and Occupational Health

g. Interoperability considerations for command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR); aviation; hull, mechanical, networks and electrical; and other systems

h. Extremely high parts count - on the order of 10 million on a complex program i. Industrial base considerations: availability, capability, and capacity

It takes anywhere from 10 to 20 years for a ship acquisition program to proceed from concept design to completed construction and testing of the first ship in the class. Therefore ship program executive officers (PEOs) and managers have the latitude to tailor the generic

acquisition phases and decision points to match the timeline of ship acquisition. However, it is important to note that statutory and regulatory requirements cannot be altered. In 2011, the National Defense Research Institute, completed a study called, "Are Ships Different?" in which they compared the general acquisition phases and milestones to ship acquisition phases and milestones (Jeffrey A. Drezner et al. 2011). The results of this study showed that some of key adjustments made for ship acquisition are:

a. Shipbuilding programs can be formally initiated at MS A instead of MS B

b. Ship programs tend to have somewhat more concurrency of technology development and system design activities