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(1)

: : 2014 / 2015

(2)

... I ... II ... III ... IV ... ... VI ... : ... ... ... 1 : ... ... ... 2 : ... ... ... 2 : ... ... ... 9 : ... ... ... 15 : ... ... ... 22 : ... ... ... 22 : ... ... ... 27 : ... 30

(3)

: ... 47 ... 48 : ... 48 : .... 52 : ... 61 : ... 61 : ... 66 : ... 71 : ... 8 ... 93 : ... 95 : ... 96 1997 ( ... 96 : 2008 ( ... 98 : ... 104

(4)

: ... 104 : ... 111 ... ... ... 114 ... ... ... ... ... 116 ... ... ... ... ... 119 ... 125

(5)

1 31 2 36 3 37 3 38 5 50 6 2001 -2008 73 7 2008 81 8 01 -04 2008 ( 84 9 2008 . 88 10 90 11 ) 1997 -2000 ( 96 12 99

(6)

13 100

(7)

1 7 2 17 3 1970 -2006 . 53 4 54 5 59 6 60 7 63 8 90 64 9 90 65 10 1967 72 11 " 80 12 " 40 " 1988 80 13 1950 -2010 85 14 ) % PIB ( 86 15 1948 2010 . 87 16 102

(8)

17 103

(9)
(10)

. 2008 :

Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s

.

(11)

- . -. -. " "

(12)

: : .

(13)

.

(14)
(15)

100 : :

(16)

: . 1 : ( ) " " " " Les Société d’analyse de

crédit " . 1820 " Barings " "

Thomas Wrend Ward

" 1831 " " The Mercantile Agency

" 1837 1859 " " " R.G & Dun " " " "

Robert Graham Dun

" 1880 40,000 1837

(17)

1870 7,000 1900 1849 " " " J.M.Braadstreer " "

The Bradsreet Improved Commerciale Agency "

1857

" The Bradsteet Rating Book " 1 . 1868 "

Poor’s Manuals of the railroads of the United States

" . " H.V. and H.W. Poor Co " . 1906 ''

Standard Statistics Bureau '' " 5 x 7 " . 1941 . 1966 2 . 1970 " " " issuer pays " " " " investor pays " 3 . 1

Richard Sylla, “A Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Ratings”, Prepared for

conference on “The Role of Credit Reporting Systems in the International Economy", The World Bank, Washington, DC, March 1-2, 2001,p7-8.

2

Etienne Dubois,"La notation financière-une convention Au cœur turbulences", Master de Science de gouvernent comparées 2009-2010, université Pierre Mendes France, institut d’études politiques de grenoble, p19.

3

"Credit Rating Agencies, "The Sovereigne Debt Crisis and Competitition Law", on the site:

(18)

2 : " 1 . " ( ) 2 . " : - . - ." " ." . 3 : 1 " 10 2013 54 . 2

Julia Posca, «Agences de notation :Au cœur des dérives de finance »,Institut de recherche et d’Informations Socio-économiques,p3.

(19)

. 1 : : ... " " -:

1Gérard Gourguechon : « les agences de notation »,P8 document sur :

http://alternatives-economiques.fr/blogs/gadrey/files/agences-de-notation26p.pdf

(20)

- .

(21)

1 :( :

(22)

-: : : . : : -. -. -. -: . -: -: . -: . : . -: " WR" -: -: .

(23)

: . 1 : : -1 . : 2 . 2 : : . 1

Moody’s Investors Service,’’Moody’s Rating Symbols & definitions’’, New York 2008,p8, on the site :

https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbol sand%20Definitions.pd (vue le 28/02/2015)

2

(24)

10 1 . D " 2 . . : 1

Standard and poor’s, ” Souvriegn credit ratings:A primer», The McGraw-hill companies, New York, 2006,p1, on the site:

http://www.investinginbondseurope.org/uploadedFiles/Learn_About_Bonds/What_You_Should_K now/Market_and_Economic_Influences_on_Your_Bond_Investments/Sovereign%20Credit%20Rat ings%20Primer%20-%20SP.pdf (vue le 28/02/2015) ) D ( Default : 2

Fitch Ratings, ‘’Souvriegn Ratings Methodology ‘’ Fitch Ratings, new York, 2009, p2, on the site: https://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/product/sovereign_brochure.pdf

(25)

11 - . -. - . -. -. - . -. : -. -. -1 . : 2 . -: 1

Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions”, op cit, 2008, P 24, on the site:

https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbol sand%20Definitions.pdf. (vue le 28/02/2015).

2

Fitch Ratings, “Definitions of Ratings and Other Scales”, Fitch Ratings, NY 2009, p19 ,on the site: http://media.umassp.edu/massedu/treasurer/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf (vue le28/02/2015)

(26)

12 1 . -: . : .2 -: 3 -: 4 . -: 5 . 1

Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions”, op cit, P 30. 2

Fitch Ratings, “Definitions of Ratings and Other Scales”, op cit, P 17 . 3

Moody’s Investors Service, “A Guide to Moody's Sovereign Ratings Summary”, Moody’s Investors Service, NY 2006, P5

4

Fitch Ratings, “Definitions of Ratings and Other Scales”, op cit, P 22. 5

(27)

13 3 : : : -: . -: . -. 1995 BDFI scour 90000 . 4 : : 1 : BDFI Scour Banque De France Industry Scour

1 " 19 -20 .

(28)

14 -: -: . . . . . : -. -.

(29)

15 : . 1 : : . . : 1 . 1

(30)

16 1 . . -. . . . 1

(31)

17 ) 2 ( : ”op cit, p7

“Sovereign Rating Methodology

Fitch Ratings, Source: ) 2 ( 1996 2006 .1 . 1 Ibid.

(32)

18 1 . . 2 . 3 . 4 . . 1

Standard & poor’s ,"souvreign rating : a primer" ,op cit, p10. 2

Fitch Rating, "souvereign rating methodology" , op cit, p7. 3

Standard & poor’s ,"souvreign rating : a primer" ,op cit, p11. 4

(33)

19 2 : : . 1 . 2 . . 3 . 1

Fitch Ratings, “Bank Rating Methodology”, Fitch Ratings’’, NY 2004, P5, sur le site: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1106f.pdf

2 Ibid.

3 Standard & Poor’s, “Financial Institutions Criteria: Bank Rating Analysis Methodology

Profile”, Standard & Poor’s, NY, 2004, P4, On the site:

(34)

20 1 . : : . . 1 Ibid.

(35)

21 1 . : 2 . 3 : . 1 Ibid, p5. 2

Fitch Ratings, “Bank Rating Methodology”, op cit, P .7 3

(36)

22 : : . : . 1 : . 1 . . 1

Ilanah Jospè et autre :"les failles des agences de notation"2012, p 28, document sur :http //www.infoguerre.fr/fichiers/les_failles_des_agencs_de notation__2012_pdf

(37)

23 2 : 1 : : : -. 3 : .

Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating

1Ministry of finance capital markets division,'' Report of the Committee on Comprehensive Regulation for Credit Rating Agencies'', December 2009,p18, on the site:

(38)

24 Organization " NRSRO " ) ( 05 ) AM Best Dominion Bond Rating Service

(

" Basel Committee for Banking Supervision

" 6

. SEC

Commission des

Operations de Bourse (COB)

-: -. -. -. -. Default . -. -.

(39)

25 : : -: . -: . -: - : -) -. -. -: : -.

(40)

26 -. : : Default - . -. -. - -. : -: . -: . -: : -. -.

(41)

27 . -1980 1 : . .

(42)

28 1 . 2 : . 2 . 3 : 3 : -: . 1

Gautam Sitty and Randall Dodd,”credit rating agencies:Their Impact on Capital Flows to

Devlopping Contries” Special Policy Report6, 2003,p1

2

Ibid, p14. 3

Hossein Asgharian, “Reformation of the Credit Rating Industry – Is there a need?”, Master Thesis, Lund University, Lund, Sweden, 2005, p28, on the site :

(43)

29 : . : . : 4 : . -. II .

(44)

30 -. -. -. -. -. -. : 1 – 1 -.( ) AAA BBB C D . Aa Caa 01 02 03 01 02 03 .

(45)

31 1 : Aaa AAA AAA 0.016% Aa1 AA+ AA+ 0.0171% Aa2 AA AA 0.0374% Aa3 0.0781% A1 A+ A+ 0.1436% A2 A A 0.2569% A3 A-0.4015% Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 0.6050% Baa2 BBB BBB 0.8690% Baa3 1.6775% Ba1 BB+ BB+ 2.9040% Ba2 BB BB 4.6265% Ba3 6.5230% B1 B+ B+ 8.8660% B2 B B 11.3905% B3 14.8775% Caa1 CCC+ CCC 19.9726% Caa2 CCC / 26.8125% Caa3 / 38.4017% Ca / / 55% C / / 100% / / DDD / / DD / D D : 1 . 1 : .

(46)

32 1 . : : 12 2 . 3 : Aaa/AAA : (Aaa/AAA) . Aa/AA : (Aa/AA) . A : (A) . Baa/BBB : (Baa/BBB) . Ba/BB : (Ba/BB) . 1

Fitch Ratings, “Definitions of Ratings and Other Scales”, op cit, P3. 2

Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions”, op cit, P8. 3

(47)

33 B : (B) . Caa/CCC : Caa/CCC) ( . Ca/CC : Ca/CC) ( . -C : ) C ( . : RD : . D : . -: 12 1 : P-1- Prime-1 . P-2 Prime-2 P-3- Prime-3 NP- . :2

1Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions”, op cit, P10. 2

(48)

34 F1- : . + ( . F2- : . F3- : . B- : . C- : Default . RD- : . D -: Default . . . -. -.

(49)

35 .1 ) 2 ( ) 2 ( : AAA F1 AA+ F1 AA F1 F1 A+ F1 F1+ A F1 F2 F1 BBB+ F2 BBB F2 f3 F2 f3 BB+ B BB B B B+ B B B B CC+ C CC C C C RD/D D

Source: Fitch Ratings, ‘’Méthodologie de Notation des Risques Souverains’’, New York, 2002,

p15 sur le site :

http://www.doyoubuzz.com/var/f/ws/KD/wsKDfbpV4OjCA6ZLtEPGqr_9v8NkM5JuSghHoml2Tn xIz7a3Qc.pdf.

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36 ) 3 ( ) 3 (: Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 Prime1 A1 A2 A3 Prime2 Baa1 Baa2 Prime3 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Not prime Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 Ca C

(51)

37 2005 B+ . 1 . : 4 : RR1 90% RR4 31-50% RR2 71-90% RR5 11-30% RR3 51-70% RR6 10 % RR1-. RR2-. RR3- RR4- RR5- RR6-: 1

(52)

38 2 : . 1 . . . 2 .

1Moody’s Investors Service, op cit, p16.

(53)

39 . : AAA BBB-. : BB+ C . -: 1 . -: 1 Ibid, p21.

(54)

40 . -: . -: N : N1 -. N-2 -. N-3 : . Aaa.Fr Aaa. Al

(55)

41 : N-4-. 1 : F1(xx ) + . F2(xx) -. F3(xx) -. B(xx) -. C(xx) -. D(xx) -. : 1

Fitch Ratings, "Definitions of Ratings and Other Scales", op cit, P25.

(xx) .

(56)

42 4 9 . : " " " " 80% . 90% 1 :

Moody’s Investors Service :

1909 " 2400 1 : -100 . -12000 . -29000 . -96000 . 3000 1000 . . 1 www.moodys.com (vue le 01/01/2015)

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43

3 : "

Standard & Poor’s

" 23 6300 150 1922 . 2008 23 " S&P500 ." 90 , 1 . 3 " : Fitch Rating " 150 2 : -105 -3212 - 2294 -1724 -9400 8000 98% 23 1 www.standardandpoors.com (vue le 01/01/2015). 2 www.fitchratings.com (vue le 01/01/2015).

(58)

44 1999 150 . .

(59)

(60)

47 : 2007 – – 2008 . ... . : :

(61)

48 : 2007 " : 1938 . FHA 1934 VA 1944 ) ( ) . (

(62)

49 . 1 .

Federal NationalMortgage Association)(FNMA)

( 1938 . 1954 . (FNMA) 1968 (Ginnie Mae) " " " Fannie Mae " . FHLMS " " " Freddie Mac " 1970 2 . : ( ) ( ) 1 410 -411 . 2 " 2007 15 -16 .

(63)

50 . .

(64)

51 5 : 1 ) 1 ( % ) 1 ( ) 2 ( (%) 2 ( % 80 25 7.9 0.69 60 25 2.2 0.31 80 20 1.9 0.34 60 25 3.6 0.57 83 30 57.7 0.1 0.82 75 17 2.6 0.49 80 15 1.6 1 0.23 75 25 3.6 0.2 0.28 75 17 6.2 0.35 70 20 4 6.6 0.39 15 50 4.7 0.26 80 25 4.7 0.39 90 30 0.7 4.6 0.71 17 14 0.59 70 20 11.1 5.7 0.40 80 25 10.1 0.9 0.66 75 25 0.9 6.4 0.58 80 30 20.1 0.98 " 2008 107 .

(65)

52 1 : 2003 . 2 : 2003 -2006 . ) 4 ( 80 % 30 1 : 2006 1995 ) 1995 -2006 ( ) 22300 ( 15 . ) 2000 -2002 ( 1 . 1 " -" 2012 -2013 148 .

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53 3 : 1970 -2006 . : 48 . 2002

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54 4 : : 149 . 2000 -2006 ( 60 % 2007 . " " " 1 ( 1975 .

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55 1970 . 2 : -1929 -1933 1 ) 1945 .( . . 2 . -3 : 1 2009 137 . 2 2004 145 -146 . 3 139 .

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56 -1 : -) -20 30 1 147 .

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57 2 : 1 . 2 . . . ( . . 1 421 . 2 16 .

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58 1 . . 2 . 3 2 . . . . MortgageBacked Securities(MBS) . 1 425 -426 . 2 426 .

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59 5 : 436 . 1981 " " " " (

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60 6 : : 439 . 1 . 1 439 .

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61 : . : 2008 1 . (Traditional Model) . " ". 1 " 2012 187 .

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62 "Sub-Prime Model" . . . 2006 20 % " (ARM) 80 % .

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63 7 :

Source : René RICOL, Rapport sur la crise financière, Mission confiée par le Président de la république dans le contexte de la présidence française de l’Union européenne 2008, P25.

http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/084000587/0000.pdf. (vu le25/03/2015).

2006 . . .

(77)

64 8 : 90

source : Jean-Christophe Duplate, la crise des subprimes est-elle finie !?, sur le site :

70449326.html -finie -elle -st e -immobiliere -crise -la -blog.com/article -http://portofino.over . Vue le 25 /03/2015. . SBS .

(78)

65 9 : 90

source : Jean-Christophe Duplate, la crise des subprimes est-elle finie !?op cit.

SBS CDS AIG . AIG 45 2008 2006 " " 2008 9,2 %

(79)

66 14,4 % 2009 -. 700 180 AIG . .) 2 .( : 1 : 1 : -2007 : ( . -2007 : -2007 . : -22 2008 ( : 3.50 % 2 % 2008 . 1 http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/98AFF91D-83F0-4658-8DD2-16DBDA6F67A9.html//

(80)

67 -17 2008 ." " : -11 2008 : -16 2008 " : " " " -07 2008 : 200 -15 2008 " " : ." " 70 -16 2008 " " : " AIG " 85 79.9 % -17 2008 : -18 2008 " " " " : 700 -19 2008 " " : -23 2008 : .

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68 -26 2008 " : " " " " " -28 2008 : " " ." " -29 2008 : -01 2008 : ( ) 700 . . " " " .

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69 . 2 : . 2007 . . 1 . . 1 " 1 -2 2010 10 .

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70 1 . 1 " 45 2 2008 16 .

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71 -1 . 14 % 2 . . : 1 : . -3 : 1 14 . 2 4 . 3 286 .

(85)

72 -1971 2006 761.7 10 : 1967 ) Source :http://www.crisedusiecle.fr/usa-solde-commerciale.html : ) . 2008 410 209 % -4.3 1990 8.4 2003 8.9 2007 64 % . 9.2 6.6 18.4 36

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73 6 : 2001 -2008 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 PIB 10 10 11 11 12 13 14 14 PIB /HAB 35871 36765 38143 40267 42494 44630 46434 47186 PIB 1.1 1.8 2.5 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.1 0.4 % PIB ( 54.4 56.7 60.1 61.1 61.3 60.8 61.8 70 (%) 2.8 1.6 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.8 (%) 4.7 5.8 6 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8

Source : Panorama des statistiques de l'OCDE 2010.

http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/profil-statistique-par-pays-etats-unis_2075227x table-usa . vue le 10/01/2015.

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74 1 : . . . 2 . . . . 1 " 2009 296 . 2 299 .

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75 ) . 12 15 600 48 . -: : . " " 2004 1,3 2007 2007 . " " " " % 70 " " " " " "

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76 . . 1 : -. -. -. . 1 " 2008 11 .

(90)

77 1 . : ) . 2 . -2 " . " " " " . 1 2009 66 . 2 67 .

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78 . 1 . -: . . 2 : 2008 -16 2008 " 25 2008 1 5 -6 2009 16

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79 300 6.9 . 10 40 % 116 1 . 121.6 -2008 4.2 2.7 3.1 . " " " 40 " 1 318 -319 .

(93)

80 11 " : Source :http://www.world-crisis.net 12 " : 40 " 1988 Source : http://France-inflation.com/graph_cac40

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81 2008 ) 14 -15 2008 ( 90 %

(95)

82 7 : 2008 36 % 46 % 41 % 34 % 34 % 42 % 50 % . 50 % 7 % . 49 % . 33 % 66 % 50 % 10 % 6 % 42 % . 53 % 40 % 36 % 42 % 20 44 % 65 % 2001 75 .

(96)

83 %34 %50 %33 %66 . . : . – – : -2008 . : 2008

(97)

84 8 : 01 -04 2008 ( 01 04 2.5 % 1 % 60 % %4.5 2.5 % 44.44 % 0.5 % 0.3 % 40 % 5 % 2 % 60 % 7.47 % 5.58 % 25.30 % 5.25 % 4 % 23.80 % 2.75 % 1 % 63.63 % 4.5 % 2 % 55.56 % 8.25 % 5 % 39.39 % 7.25 % 4.25 % 41.38 % : 8 . 63.63 % 60 % 25.30 % 1951 1 . . 2008 "FED" 0,25 % " " . 1 76 .

(98)

85 . 1 . 2005 : 13 : 1950 -2010

Source :http://portofino.over-blog.com/article-29618909.html. vue le 01-04-215

2000 2010 : 1 333 .

(99)

86 14 ) : % PIB (

Source :http://www.gaullisme.fr/58sapir_crise_financiere.htm , vue le01/04/2015

40 % 45 % PIB 1960 1970 1984 2001 100 % PIB 2007 0 % PIB

(100)

87 -: 2008 2 7 % 29 15 : 1948 2010 . Source :http://www.crisedusiecle.fr/usa-emploi-taux-chomage-trimestriele-depuis-1984.html ,vue le 01/04/2015. 2007 2008 5.1 % 2005 51000 2008 2008 6.5 % 8.75 909000 29 322 .

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88 2010 2009 10 % 2010. 2011 9% 9,4 % 14, 82 . " " 2008 3.8 % 30 . 9 : 2008 . 2008 (% ) (%) 2008 (%) 7.5 2.1 2 4.8 1.2 1.5 7.4 1.8 0.5 1.8 6.2 / " 48 -49 2009 / 2010 19 . : 30 " 46 2009 41 .

(102)

89 1 : 31 : 2008 2008 . ) 2% . 700 . 31 2009 250 350 . 700 . . : 100 250 . - 100 . 31 338 .

(103)

90 2 : 12 2008 " . 200 32 . 10 : ) 640 - 47 . - 321 . - 256 . 480 80 . - 400 360 40 . - 320 . 200 20 . - 180 . 100 100 . 20 - 2008 " 2009 8 .

32Flaurence Samson, « l’ombre de 1929 plane en cette année2009 »,édition l’harmattan , paris,

(104)

91 3 : 25 2008 45 27 60 % . : - . - . - . - . - . - . 4 : (G20) 15 2008 90 % 80 %

(105)

92 -33 . 33 354 .

(106)

93 . 2007 . . .

(107)
(108)

94 . : : .

(109)

95 : 1997 : 1997 1997 1997 (Thai baht) 14 % (peso) (Ringitt) (Rupee) . . 1998 1999 1999 12 . 12 .

(110)

96 11 : ) 1997 -2000 ( 1997 A 1997 BBB 1997 B+ 1997 A+ 1998 B+ 4 1998 1998 2000 BB 2002 B 1997 A2 Ba1 5-1997 A1 Ba1 1997 Baa3 B3 1997 A1 Baa2 1998 Ba2 B3 1998 Ba2 B2 1998 Ba3 B3 2002 Ba3 B3 ”, IMF,

“Sovereign Credit Ratings Methodology: an Evaluation

: Ashok Vir Bhatia,

Source WP/02/170, Washington, D.C., 2002, P. 40. Sur: . http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02170.pdf 1997 2002 1 : - . -.

1Marwan Elkhoury, “Credit Rating Agencies and their Potential Impact on Developing Countries”, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2009, p100 sur: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20081_en.pdf

(111)

97 -. . . . -. -. - . -. -. ) Ferri, Stiglitz, Liu

( 1999 1997 . : -: .

(112)

98 : 2008 . . 1 . 1 2 : Structured Finance

Residential Mortgage-backed Securities

Collateralized Debt Obligations

.

1Siegfried Utzig, “The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: A European Banking Perspective”, NY. 188, 2010, P1, le site:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592834

ABC= Asset Backd Securities :

CDO = Ccollateralized Debt Obligation

RMBS=Residential Mortgage-Backed Securieties

Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis”, Financial

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “

2 Inquiry Commission Crisis '' : sur le site , Washington, D.C., 2010, P. 3 (vue le 15/05/2015) https://books.google.dz/books?isbn=1616405422

(113)

99 -. -2007 . 2 : Residential Mortgage-backed Securities 2007 Lehman Brothers 2007 . (11) : 12 : 15/09/2008 A2 A A+ AIG 16/09/2008 85 A2 A 23/11/2008 20 Aa3 14/09/2008 bank of America A2 A A+ 16/03/2008 JPMorgane Baa1 BBB BBB

Source:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis”,

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Washington, D.C., 2010, P,39.

(114)

100 . Securities and Exchange Commission . 3 : 2008 11 35% AAA 2007 2008 2008 13 : . ABS CDOs RMBS ACA Capital 11/8/2007 1,700 ... ... ... 1,700 AIG 11/10/2008 33,190 … … 33,753 66,943 Ambac 11/5/2008 11,136 360 1,046 219 12,761 MBIA 5/12/2008 3,500 1,600 ... 1,800 6,900 Prudential 7/30/2008 3,410 … … … 3,410 Bank of America 1/16/2009 9,089 932 2,834 12,855 Bear Stearns 1/29/2008 2,300 … … … 2,300 Citigroup 10/16/2008 34,106 4,053 1,319 15,904 55,382 Goldman Sachs 9/16/2008 … 4,100 1,700 1,400 7,200 JP Morgan Chase 1/15/2009 1,300 5,467 5,305 … 12,072 Lehman Brothers 6/16/2008 200 1 300 4,100 3,400 9,000

(115)

101

Source: Efraim Benmelech & Jinnefer Dlugos,’’the credit rating crisis’’, april 2010. Sur le site:

http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11794. (vue le 01-05-2015) AAA Merrill Lynch 10/16/2008 26,100 2,845 12,998 13,125 55,068 Morgan Stanley 12/17/2008 7,800 3,810 3,781 1,992 17,383 Credit Suisse 10/23/2008 3,427 3,057 530 2,523 9,537 Deutsche Bank 10/30/2008 2,092 5,820 3,386 3,677 14,975 Fortis Bank 8/4/2008 4,359 3,660 144 … 8,163 ING 11/12/2008 565 … 8,028 25 8,618 Royal Bank of Scotland 11/4/2008 3,609 1,849 2,566 4,122 12,146 UBS 8/12/2008 21,870 348 1,716 13,871 37,805 Aozora Bank 5/15/2008 510.0 … … … 510.0 Mitsubishi UFJ 8/13/2008 359.5 2,348 921 11 3,640 Mizuho 11/13/2008 3,898 629 2,539 584 7,650 National Australia Bank 10/21/2008 669.5 … … … 669.5 Sumitomo Mitsui 11/19/2007 561.7 … … … 561.7 84,319 23,702 42,272 59,011 209,304 63,464 18,579 26,423 62,634 171,100 9,358 4,724 5,728 3,743 23,553 218,215 53,325 84,809 163,735 520,084

(116)

102 . – (MBS) AAA BBB 2007 AAA (CDO) . AAA 2007 . 16 : . -16 .

(117)

103 16 : . 16 . ABX . .1 40 % 50 % 2008 . 2 .

1D’ARVESTM Philippe '' retour sur la crise financière '' Bulletin édité par les Etudes

Economiques – BNP Paribas -Conjoncture Avril 2008 - p21. Le site : www.bnpparibas.net

2 329 -330 .

(118)

104 : 1 : 90 % :

Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor`s

1929

(119)

105 1 . %10 90 % 2 . 90 % 2011 Moody’s 39 % Standard & Poor`s

43 % Fitch 58% 3 1

Maurice Mullard : « the credit rating agencies and their contribution to the Financial crisis », The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 1, January–March 2012, p80

2John Patrick Hunt : « credit rating agencies and the worldwide credit crisis », Columbia

Business Law Review, Vol. 2009, No. 1 , p32

3Gérard Gourguechon : « les agences de notation » , p8, document sur :

(120)

106 2008 1 . -: 30 2 . 3 . 1

Maurice Mullard : op-cit, p93 2

Partnoy, Frank :"How and why credit rating agencies are not like Otcher gatekeepers" , Brookings Institution.2006, p. 13, sur le site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Partnoy 3

Jonathan Katz, and others : ''Credit Rating Agencies, no easy regulatory solutions '', the world bank , October 2009,p3 ,sur le site: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/8684/1/md-priebe-2012-thesis.pdf

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107 1 . : 90 % – _ AAA 8 ) AAA ( . . . 1

(122)

108 . 1 . -: 50,000 150,000 . 10 1997 20 2002 . 62 93 6.1 4.6 4.3 2002 . . 1

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109 1 . -: . . . 2 . : . . 1 Ibid ,p 44-45. 2 Ibid, 45-46.

(124)

110 . . . . : . 150 06 SEC NRSRO 03 90% . 1 . : -. -. - . -. 1

(125)

111 2 : : 1 : : 1 : -IOSCO ( . 2 : 1www.albaitalkuwaiti.wordpress.com/2009573/10/10/ (consulté le 05/05/2015) .

(126)

112 . " " . " ." -: . . . - -. . . " " .

(127)

113 . . : " :( : . : ) CIBAFI (

(128)

114 2008 . .

(129)
(130)

116 : . ) ( : -

(131)

117 2008 . . . -. -. -.

(132)

118 -." " " " -.

(133)
(134)

119

-: 1 -2009 . 2 " 2004 . 3 -2009 . 4 -" 2012 . 5 -.

6 - " . 7 -" -" 2012 -2013 .

8 -" 48 -49 2009 / 2010 .

(135)

120 9 - " 2007 10 - " 45 2 2008 11 - " 2008 . 12 - " 2008 13 -" 10 2013 14 -" 46 2009 . 15 -5 -6 2009 . 16 -" 1 -2 2010 .

-A-LES LIVRES :

17- Flaurence Samson, « l’ombre de 1929 plane en cette année2009 »,édition l’harmattan , paris, 2009.

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121

B-les sites internet :

18- Etienne Dubois,"La notation financière-une convention Au cœur turbulences", Master de Science de gouvernent comparées 20092010, université Pierre Mendes -France, institut d’études politiques de grenoble.sur le site :

http://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-00826328/document

19-Gérard Gourguechon : « les agences de notation »,P8 document sur :

http://alternatives-economiques.fr/blogs/gadrey/files/agences-de-notation26p.pdf http://iris-recherche.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/publication/file/Brochure-Notation-web.pdf

20-Ilanah Jospè et autre :"les failles des agences de notation"2012, document sur :http //www.infoguerre.fr/fichiers/les_failles_des_agencs_de notation__2012_pdf 21-Julia Posca, «Agences de notation :Au cœur des dérives de finance »,Institut de recherche et d’Informations Socio-économiques

-

A-web site :

23- Richard Sylla, “A Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Ratings”, Prepared for conference on “The Role of Credit Reporting Systems in the

International Economy", The World Bank, Washington, DC, March 1-2, 2001; on the site: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/Historical_Primer.pdf

24-Ashok Vir Bhatia, “Sovereign Credit Ratings Methodology: an Evaluation”, IMF, WP/02/170, Washington, D.C., 2002, on the site:

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02170.pdf

25-Credit Rating Agencies, "The Sovereigne Debt Crisis and Competitition Law" sur le site: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909910

26-Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis”,

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission'', Washington, DC, 2010,on the site:

http://www.fcic.law.stanford.edu/resource/reports.pdf

27-Fitch Ratings, ‘’Méthodologie de Notation des Risques Souverains’’, New York, 2002, on the site :

http://www.doyoubuzz.com/var/f/ws/KD/wsKDfbpV4OjCA6ZLtEPGqr_9v8NkM5Ju SghHoml2TnxIz7a3Qc.pdf.

28-Fitch Ratings, ‘’Souvriegn Ratings Methodology ‘’ Fitch Ratings, new York, 2009, , on the site:

https://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/product/sovereign_brochure.pdf

29-Fitch Ratings, “Bank Rating Methodology”, Fitch Ratings’’, NY 2004, , on the site: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1106f.pdf

30-Gautam Sitty and Randall Dodd,”credit rating agencies:Their Impact on

Capital Flows to Devlopping Contries” Special Policy Report6, 2003 on the site:

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122

31-Hossein Asgharian, “Reformation of the Credit Rating Industry – Is there a

need?”, Master Thesis, Lund University, Lund, Sweden, 2005, on the site :

https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/mchartwall6956.pdf

32-Jonathan Katz, and others : ''Credit Rating Agencies, no easy regulatory

solutions '', the world bank , October 2009, on the site:

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-1303327122200/Note8.pdf

33-Maurice Mullard : « the credit rating agencies and their contribution to the

Financial crisis », The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 1, January–March 2012, on

the site: http://www.fc.law.stanford.edu/resource/reports

34-Ministry of finance capital markets division,'' Report of the Committee on

Comprehensive Regulation for Credit Rating Agencies'', December 2009,p18, on

the site: http://rmi.nus.edu.sg/gcr/files/02%20GCR%20vol%201.pdf

35-Moody’s Investors Service, “A Guide to Moody's Sovereign Ratings

Summary”, Moody’s Investors Service, NY 2006, ,on the site:

http://economix.fr/docs/19/Whither_ratings_regulation.pdf

36-Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions”, op cit, 2008, , on the site:

https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysR atingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.

37-Fitch Ratings, “Definitions of Ratings and Other Scales”, Fitch Ratings, NY 2009, ,on the site:

http://media.umassp.edu/massedu/treasurer/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf

38-Moody’s Investors Service,’’Moody’s Rating Symbols & definitions’’, New York 2008,on the site :

https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysR atingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pd

39-Partnoy, Frank :"How and why credit rating agencies are not like Otcher

gatekeepers" , Brookings Institution.2006, 13,on the site:

http://lamfin.arizona.edu/fixi/creditmod/Portnoy.pdf

40-Siegfried Utzig, “The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating

Agencies: A European Banking Perspective”, No. 188, 2010, on the site:

http://www.fd.uc.pt/~pgon/PDF/aulas/REGULATIONOFRATINGAGENCIES.pdf 41-Standard & Poor’s, “Financial Institutions Criteria: Bank Rating Analysis

Methodology Profile”, Standard & Poor’s, NY, 2004, P4. On the site:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/idUKWNA295920110706

42-www.albaitalkuwaiti.wordpress.com/2009573/10/10/ 43-www.fitchratings.com

44-www.moodys.com

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123

46-Marwan Elkhoury, “Credit Rating Agencies and their Potential Impact on

Developing Countries”, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2009, p100 on the site:

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20081_en.pdf

http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/Historical_Primer.pdf

47-Standard and poor’s, ” Souvriegn credit ratings:A primer», The McGraw-hill companies, New York, 2006 on the site:

http://www.investinginbondseurope.org/uploadedFiles/Learn_About_Bonds/What_Y ou_Should_Know/Market_and_Economic_Influences_on_Your_Bond_Investments/S overeign%20Credit%20Ratings%20Primer%20-%20SP.pdf

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125 1 : .

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126 2 :

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