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Christopher Wellon
A thesis submitted to the School ofGraduate Studies
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MasterofArts
DepartmentofPhilosophy Memorial University of Newfoundland
December1997
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ABSTRACT
Foundationalismis •trIditioaal meupbiIosopbicapositionwhichholdsthatrea.lity canbeexpIamedmddescribedabsolutely.FOODdItioaaIistsmaintain that our questions about
<oaJilyinquire beyond the copobilities of ""'onImotylanguqeandtIw.the<efa<e.these questionsrequireabsoluteanswusthatarepInxdin •metaphpic:a/vocabulary which reaches beyoDd ordinaryIaDguaseto anabtoIuIeraJityormelDplrysicaJfoundation. I maintainthatweshould forgetfOUllllilboDalUmbecausethenotion of a metaphysical foundationisa ncedless presupposition thatresultsfromUtcoberent assumptions about the nature of languageandreference.
Inorderto make a caseagainstfoundltionalistphilosophy [ investigate its application to traditional questionsaddressedbyRichardRortyandHilaryPutnaminthe current realism/antirealism debate. Iexamineboth RaTty's and Putnam's critiques of metaphysical realism.which is aclearClWnple ofa foundationali51 approach to questions aboutreality,and I compare the kinds of nonfoundational pragmatism with which they attempt to replaceit.
Although RartyandPutnamagreethatmetaphysicalrealism is incoherent,Putnam professesthat hedoes notagreewithRorty's replacement - ethnocentric pragmatism.
However. mycomparisonofRorty's ethnocentricpragmatismwithPutnam's natural realism reveals that, despite Putnam's criticism of RoTty's position,bothpositions are remarkably similar. InhisargumentsagainstmetaphysicalrealismPutnam clearly recognizes the incoherenceoffoundationalism,butPutnam',chargeof relativism againstRonycontradicts the very arguments thatPutMmhimsdfemploysagainstmetaphysical realism. [ contend that Putnam'sdiscomfortwithRonysethnocenlrism suggeststhat Putnamhasnot quite su<:ceededin forgetting foundationalism.
The postmodem recommeod.ation to forget foundationalismisnot a new one;
Wittgenstein proposedit in hisPhilosopIdcoJ Inw.sngationsfiftyyears agoandRorty and Putnam are proposingitnow.Iam rCunriDgdisrecommendationinorder to showthatthe aiticismRorty(especially)andPutnamhavereceivedisan unwarranted and often dogmatic rdiJsaItoacceptthelimitsor philosophicalinquiry.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Iwould liketoacknowledgethe instructionandsupervisionofDr. David Thompson whosecommitmenr: to studentsandteadJiog basbeen. moTe valuable influence on my future inphilosophythan anyother.Iwoulda1soliketo acknowledgeDr.James Bradley,Dr.Brian PenroseandDr.PhilipRose.threeimportantphilosophers who are perhaps unaware of how and whytheymotivate me. I would Uke to thank the school of graduate studies for- helpfuJ financial support as-weIJ as othersinthe cleplrtmeatofpmlosophy, particulary Jennifer Dawe.
forlivelyconversation. Lastly, I would Uketothank my parents, without whom none of this would havebeenposSIble.
This thesismarkstheend of something important to me and the beginning of something more important to me; for this reason it is dedicatedto Mary.
i i i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract Acknowledgement
1.0 The Development of Foundationalist Philosophy . 1.1 Our Foundationalist History
1.2 Wittgenstein and the Problem of Reference 1.3 The Realism!Antirealism Debate 1.4 Rarty and Putnam: The Current Debate 2.0 Rarty's Ethnocentric Pragmatism
2.1 Foundationalism and the Perceptual Metaphor 2.2 A Criticism of Language·Independ enI Reality 2.3 Rorty's Nonfoundationalist Language 2.4 A Nonfoundationalist Narrative 2.5 Rorty's Ethnocentric Replacement 2.6 Conclusion .
3.0 Putnam's Pragmatism and Natural Realism 3.1 The Realism Attacked 3.2 Putnam's Natural Realism 3.3 Conclusion
4.0 Realism,. Relativism and Ethnocentric Pragmatism . 4.1 PART I: Understanding Three Contradictions 4.11 The Nature of Human Life
4.12 The Principle of Refonn 4.13 Idealized Rational Acceptability 4.14 Summary
4.2 PART n: Understanding Putnam's Pragmatism 4.21 Representation
4.22 Truth and Relativism 4.23 Realism 4.3 Conclusion .
iv
Page ii iii
\ .3 7
\6
\9 23 24 28 3\ .35 39 4\ 43 45 52 .69 . 7\
.74 74 . 75 83 89 92 94 .. 100
\04 . .. 107
5.0Coping Without Foundationalism 5.1TheFrustration ofNonfoundationalism 5.11 IustifYU>gOrdinaryLanguage 5.12Foundationa1ism andtheRelativist Menace 5.2Forgetting Foundationalism 5.3Conclusion Bibliography .
110 .111 111 11.
121 . 126 130
I take itasa fact of lifethatthere isa senseinwbicb thetaskofphilosopby is 10 overcome metaphysics and a senseinwhich itstukisto contime metaphysical discussion.Inevery philosopher thereisa partthat cries,"Thisenterpriseis vain, fiivolous.. crazy-we must say 'slOp''''anda partthatcries. "this enterprise issimplyreflection at the most general and most abstractlevel; to put a stop to it wouJdbeacrimeagainst reason."
Of
coursephilosophical problems are unsolvable; but as Stanley Cavell once remarked., "there are better and worse waysof thinkingaboutthem."HilaryPutnam,Realism With a HumanF~.p.19.
vi
CllAPTERI
THE DEVELOPMENT OF roUNDAnONALlST PHILOSOPHY
MetaphysicsismotivatedbyaprofouDd, pIWosophicalambition to undenta.ndand explain reality.This ambitionis similartotheexpluatexyaimsof scientific orhumanistic investigationsintothenatureoftbeunio.uxbo:::Iuxlikemetaphysicsthe aim oreach ofthese investigations is to provide uswitha languagethat descnbesreality. However. what distinguishesmetaphysics from these other investigations isitsjoundafionalcriteria. In one comprebensive language under whichallother descriptions of reality can be subsumed, metaphysics intends to reveal theabsolille foundationupon which all other descriptions of reality rest.
TrDtionaIiy, metaphysicalinvestigations intoreality explore
me
relationshipbetween human experienceandthe rest oftheexperiencedworld.. By examining the nature of COnsci0USDCS5and thenature ofthe causes of ourexperienceoflheworld. traditional metaphysicianshope to reveal thefuundatiooalstI'I.JCtW'eSof reality and explain whatitmeans to saythatsomethingisreal.Inour more recentpast.ho~.philosophers have placed ooosidc:rabIeemphasis on the rolc thatI.anguIgeplaysinrevealing metaphysical foundations.As a result oflhis -linguistictum-thefoundationalist intentions of traditional metaphysics since Plato have become suspectinour present historical context.' The controversy is apparentintheract that much of this century's philosophyhasbeen spenteither questioning
ISee the introduction to Richard Rorty's,TheUnguimcTumfor an explanation of why weeventually turned to an analysis oflanguagefor answers to our philosophical questions.
therelevance offoundationalist metapbysi.cs orjustifyingits continued practice. However, for those whoarecurrentlyjustifyingmetapbysics,attimesitseemsthat their desire to understand realityfoundationallyiscompromisU:lathedesirejustto understand.
Thelast tweatyyearsofquestioningthetndition of philosophy have pantyloosened the grip foundationalist metaphysicsbason thedirection of philosophical discourse.Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty have led thisrcceIIllttIckon our traditional assumptions,and theirnewpragmatistdiscourseisthesubjectofthisthesis. However, while both philosophers offer challenging.nonfoundationalist suggestionsforthefuture of philosophy, there are times when itseemsthat the challengethese suggestions pose isgreater than our desire to engage them.ForthisreasonI feelit isimportant thatweregain our perspective and learn to accept thereasonswhy fOWldationalismhasbeenunderattack for the past one hundred years. The nonfoundationalistpragmatismwithwhichRortyandPutnam attempt to renew contemporary philosophy deservesmoreentlaJsiasticconsiderationthan it hasrecently received. Therefore, my objectiveinthis thesis is to helpre--establishthis enthusiasm towards a responsible commitment toensurethat philosophyispertinent to the interests of the cultureinwhich it is practiced.
The next section (1.1) of this chapterwillprovide a brief account ofhow foundationalismbecame thedominating:themethroughout thehistory of philosophy. Thefirst halfofsection 1.2willshow how foundationalism culminatedinthe metaphysical realism of Ludwig Wrttgenstein's earlyTractarianphilosophy. The secondhalfof section 1.2 will show how Wittgenstein's later positionin thePhilosophical IfllIestigationsexposed the
presuppositions ofabsolutistmetaphysicsand introduceda new nonfoundationalist approach tothephilosophy oflanguage.UoderstaDdingWJttgenstein's influenceisimponantbecause both Rortyand PutnamdrawheavilyfromthelaterpositioninhisPhilosophical Investigations,and appreciatingthedepth ofWrttgeDstein's later philosophy will invoke a greater sensitivity tothe new pragmatic rccommcndItions suggestedbyPutnamand Rorty.
Section1.3of this chapterwillintroducetherealismfantirealismdebate which reflects the deep confusion causedbyfoundationalist methodology. Currently, this debate and the foundationaIist concerns that causeitare most clearly exhibited in productive exchanges betweenPutnam andRorty.Theseexchanges and the metaphilosophical issues surrounding themare the focus ofthisthesis.andtheywillbeintroducedin thelastsection of this chapter.
I I OUR FOUNDATIONAl lSI WSTORY
Thehistory of philosophy istilledwithcomplex systems and methods that exemplify thelaborsoffoundationalistanswersto the greatmetaphysicalquestions.Thesemetaphysical systems and themethodsthat havegrownout of foundational questions penneate just about every philosophical epoche. Prior to the enlightenment, metaphysical systems sought to groundtheirinquiriesin theimm.1tab1efoundationsoranabsolute or mind-independentreality onwhichabsolute certaintywasthoughttobegroundedAncientphilosophers debatedabout theproperplace of soul, fonn and matterandaboutthe relationship between these thingsin thelargercontext of nature. These debates usuallyposited somekindoffixed,absolute reality,such as Plato's world ofFonns,anditwasthought that, because this absolute reality
c:xlubited the way the worldreallyis,inorder forhumanbeliefs tobejustified or true they must confonn or accordwiththis absoluterea1ity.
Medieval philosophers turned theseanc:ic::otdebates into debates over the nature of spirit, intellect, univcrsals andpartiallarsinaDattempt to reconcile the earlier Classical philosophywiththeCODCemSofChristian theology. LikeGreekphilosophy, medieval mctapbysics grounded realityin absokttcfouadations.ItpositedGodas the absolute creator whose power governs reality, determinesthenature ofaUthingsand grounds human belief.
Inthisgeneralmanner medievalphilosophy istheChristianversion ofancientfoundationalist metaphysics.
Likehismedievalpredecessors, Rene Descartes supportedtheChristiantheology of histime,but hewasalso keenly aware of the importance thatmathematics,geometry and sciencehc1dforfoundationalist metaphysics.Cartesiandualismnecessitated thereconciliation of these two apparently exclusive approaches to absolute certainty and the mindlbody problembegan.Thisdualisminauguratedmodernphilosophy bytranslatingthe older, ancient andmedievaldebates into the language ofa modern audience who werestrugglingwiththe problems thatGalilean science posedforChristianphilosophy. The arrival ofCartesian dualism was an important foundationalist event because it moved the unknowable, otherworldly, absolute realityofancicntandmedievalpbiJosopbies intotheknowable, carth1y, inhabitable world. That is, Descartes attnbuted to philosophy an ability to attain absolute certaintyfrom within this world (as opposed to the world offonns, heaven, etc.) because he believed. that science could arrive attheseabsolutes • theexistenceof God and the
irmnona&tyofthesoul -withoutrdyiDsOIltue:hOOIlpbiIosophical criteriaa.sfaithor fear of penecution.
Tberd"ore.to themockm.inberitonofCartesian dualismfouodationalist metaphysics became morethanjwl:agrandsearchforabIoUecertainty.ThroughtheDeWscienr.i.fi<:
methods, absolute certainrybecamearatioaal,attaiDabIegoalthatdevdoped into an anthropoceotric obsession to beatndW'ealher0WIldeceptivegame.Thisgoal eventually resultedinwhat we now call the Enlightenment. DuringthisperiodnewscienceOourished a.sitproduced valued results that even the theologians ofthe time could not sensibly reject.
The enlightenedsocietiestestedthe capacitiesof human understandingwithnewscientific methods. while philosophers delibented over truth theories withthe founciationaIist convictionthat anabsolutecxpIanationofthe universewasnowinevitable. Foundalionalism had securedits placeinour philosophical bistoty.
AroundthetimeoftheEnligbtemne:n1meliDresponsetothemodern rationalistand empiricisttbeorics inspiredbyCartesiandualism.Kanr:anempted toreverse our philosophical focusandtumouranention to the rolemindsplayinconstitllting natIIre.Tha1is.priorto KantianIdealism.mostpbilosopbersinvestigatedaready-made.mind-indepeodmtwork!for foundations, but afterwardstheir~attentionturnedmostJy tothehumanmindand thepossibilitythat its capacities mightrevealfoundational structUres and absolute certainty.
Kant's reversal of philosophical focus was very important to metaphysical projects that attempt to explain the relationshipbetweenhuman thought and the world because it tBnsformedthe originalstrategy ofinvestigating theabsolute nature of a mind--independent
realityinto aninvestigationintothe~featuresofbumanmindsthat shape or constitute reality.Both rationalists andempiricists quickly bcpnto recognize the important role our mindsorbrainsplayedin theconstitutionofOUTworld.
Itmakes sense to see KantimIdealism.asthenatural foundationalist result of an increasingJyanthropocentric history.Scientistsandphilosopherswere graduallyrecognizing thepower andcontrolthatbuma:niJncrprcwionCQI't.edoverour perception of the universe.
Consideringthenewsignificanceplaced onhumaninterpretation,itis not surprising that the last major historical tuminthe world of philosophywaslinguistic. Up to the tum of this centuryversionsofKantian philosophyexaminedperception andhumanexperienceinorder to establish absolute foundations for knowledgein themind's pervading structures., but the linguistic turn translated these foundationalist investigations into examinations of the structures of language and meaning.
After Frege's distinction betweenBeudeutung(reference) andSinn(sense) many foundationalist philosophers supportedtheideathata proper analysis of language would reveaJ.metaphysicalfoundatiomandexplain therelationship between human thought and the world. The drive for absolute certaintythatmotivated foundationalist philosophy therefore turneditsinvestigation tothearea where our words 'connect' with the objects they designate (reference). The younger Wrttgenstein, for example, and other foundationalists of this traditionbelieved that bymakingtherightconnections between words and objects they would reveala6naIvocabulary thatdesaibes theworfdabsolutely. The problem of establishing this
connection between words and objectsisDOWthe'problem of reference.' and current foundationalist hopes of discovering afinalvocabularyreston its solution.
A discussion of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein is perhaps the most appropriate way to introduce theproblemof reference and the state of contemporary fOWldationalist philosophy. As I'vementioned,Putnam's and Rorty's criticisms of absolutist metaphysicsare stronglyinfluencedbyWIttgeDstc:in',work. Consequently, the force of their current~solutions to theproblemoffoundationaIist philosophywill bemore deeply appreciatedifwe understandhis critiqueofthistradition.
Wittgenstein's philosophical development: is rich, and attimesthe results are conflicting. There are two distinct stagesinhis thinking and they manifestintwo distinct approaches tocontemporaryphilosophy ofl.anguage: ideal and ordinary language philosophy In my estimation this division is evidence ofthegCIlCl1l1 state of philosophy today as an uncertaindiscipline confusedbetweenfoundaIionalistand nonfoundationalist philosophy. My central wony is that we are failing duringthisperiod of transition between modem and post modem eras to make sense at: and convince ourselves at: the critical imponance of philosophical reflection. The next sectionwill examinethe events leading up to our present confusion so that this confusion may be more clearly understood.
I 2 WIITGENSTEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE
Around the time ofWittgenstein philosophersbecameincreasingly interestedinthe poSSIbility that language couldreveaIthefoundational relationship between humans andtheir
world. Thesephilosophers of language sought to acquirecertainty by establishing an absolutely fixed connection orrefcrmc:ebetweenourwordsandthe objects to whichthey refer. Wmgenstein attempted such a project withhispicturetheoryof meaninginthe Tractahls Logico-Philosophicus.However,inbisPJrilosophicallnvestigations Wittgenstein laterrefutedthe foundationalismthatmotivated his cuIierphilosophy.Anunderstanding of hisreasons forre:jecting the picture theoryofmeanmgisaucial to understanding the current state of philosophy.
Inhispicturetheory ofmeaning Wrttgensteinarguesfor a correspondencetheoryof truthwhich baldsthat meaningfulpropositions are picturesthatare direct symbolic copies of theworld.Since meaningful propositions are symbolic 'stand ins' for the world, truth about the real structure of the world is revealedthroughmeaningfulpropositions. According to Wittgenstein, when names are contained withinthecontext of propositions they 'reach OUI' to simpleobjects. andthefonnalstructureofthcse combinations of simple objects shapesthe logicalstruetW"eof the atomic sentences which are concatenations of the corresponding names. Thusthereare what Wittgenstcin calls atomicfacts, which are composed of concatenations of simple objects,and theseatomic facts correspond to true, meaningful atomic sentences which in tum are composed of simple names. Onthis model of representation the worldhasa formalstructurethat the logical structure oflanguage must imitate in order 10 representthe realworld accurately. Ultimately, meaningful propositions referbypicturing real state ofaffairswhose fonnalstructUreis shown through the logical
structure ofthe propositions. InthistDa:DDer,meaningfuJpropositiollSexhibitthe metaphysicalstructureof theworld.
ItisimportanttoDOtethR'lbeworid'fur"WIttgeDSteinisaworld of'&cts':"Theworld is thetotality offacts.DOtofthings.0011bisisadif6c:uItproposition,forwe ordinarilyspeaIc ofthe world as comprised ofthingsaDdDOtoffilcb.Itsee:nutlwthings arephysical,hard andrea.I,whereas&cuareinlaDgIb&eIiDpisDcreptCSaltations,ormere symbols.,oflhat reality.However, Wittgenstein'stheoryreflect!;his recognition ofthe problems associated with many correspondence theories oftruth.WhatWittgenstcin recognizedwasthat the notion of an epistemological distance between words and objects. a distance that mustbe bridgedwithreference, causes much confusion. Ultimately, Wittgenstcin arguesthat this epistemological distancebasgc:nentcd many philosophical problemsand fostered the need for foundationalist philosophytosolvethem.
Wtttgenstein'spicturetheoryofme:aningattc:rnpUto bridge thegapbetweenlanguage andtheworld byputtinglanguageand the worldindinetlogicalcorrespond~that is.
Wlttgenstein's pi<:tu.retbeoJyof meanlDgassertsthat there isnorealgapbetweenthe logic of ourlanguageandthe logic of the world. He contendsthatthe correspoodencebetween language andthe worldisnot across a distancein.spaceortimebut, rather,thatreference is fixedthroughthestructureof the worldwhichis exactly expressedinmeaningful language.
Theworld,saysWlttgenstein,existsasfactswhich showthemsdvesto us through meaningful
2 Wittgenstein,Tnx:latlLf Logico-Philosophicus,p. 31, proposition I. I.
propositions. However,inorder for an object orthing to be 'known' toexistit mustfirstbe capnaedwithinthemeaningfulstructure ofalanguage.forwecanonlyspeakcoherently of whatcanbeclearlyreferredto. Ultimatdy,WdtgeOStein"picture theory ofmeaningsupports theviewthatifweobey theuniversallogK:ofourgmnmar,which is identical to the logical spacethat orders theworld, thenwewiD havetrue pictures of the facts which comprise the world. Rorty's and Putnam's criticisms oftbcse'truepictures' will be explainedinchapters twoandthree; however, the remainder of tlUs sectionwillpresent Wittgenstein's own criticismofmsearlierphilosophy so thatPutnamand Rortywillbe more clearly understood inthese later chapters.
Not long aftcr Wiugenstein wrote theTractatushebeganto doubt the notion of an ideallanguage. Initially, Wiugenstein believed that his pictUre theory of meaning explained the absolute. mindIIanguage-indepcndcotreality that the tradition beforehimsought 10 explain.However,insharing a common goalwiththistradition, the early Wiugenstein also sharedits assumptionthat thereis a reality which canbemeaningfullyposited and explained as beingindependent of human thought. That is, Wrttgenstein assumed that an absolute language couldturnitself inside outanddescribeits underlying reality. This assumption is thecentraltarget ofRorty's and Putnam'scriticismspresentedinthe next two chapters, and Iwillbe refer[0it -and others like it - as the -foundationalist assumption.-
WtUgensteincametorealizein thePhilosophicallfIWstigations that the Tractarian model of language does not account: for theinnumerabkwaysinwhich language operates.
InthelfIWstigations Wiugenstein analyzes ordinary language and describes many ways that 10
languageworks,.illustrating thatanideallaDguagepbiJosopbywhichmaintainsone static logic simply misunderstandsthe dynamic anddiversefunctions of language.Inreference to the problemsassociated with one ideal picture of1&nguageWittgensteinwrites:
The paradox[m tbiscasethestatus ofrDCDtal events] disappears onlyifwe make a radical breakwiththe ideathat
IansuI8e
always functions in one way.J The mainpoint ofWittgenstein'scritiqueofwearlier-philosophy of language is not simply that languagebasmorethanonefunction; ratheritisthatlanguage cannot have the one function thattheTraclotusandmuch of analytic philosophy presumes it to have. That is., according tothe later Wittgenstein, the function of language cannot be to producetrue propositionswhosetruth lies intheacaJnIte representation ofa language-independent world.In theInvestigations,Wittgenstein shows that our wordsgettheir meaningsin innumerable ways which are not sireply determined by the fonnal universal structure of a language-independent worldRather,the use ofourwordsisdetermined by contingent socia- historical forces thatshapethe particular behaviors and conventions of various cultures or 'forms of life'. As Wittgenstein states, -the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominencethef8ctthaJ. thespeaJangoflanguage ispart ofan activity, or ofa fonnoflife,·~
Meaning is thereforecrealedthroughtheparticular uses oflanguagewithinan established public sphere, a 'language-game' that lays down the rules of linguistic convention through
JWittgenstein,Philosophica1lrrvestigations,p. 304.
• Wittgenstein,Philosophicalltrvestigalions,p.II,paragraph 23.
11
ordinary, practical behavior.Therearemany'formsoflife'and thereforemanylanguage- gamesandmeanings.
However, iftbereferencera.tioos betweenourwordsandobjects can change from one 1anguage-game to thenext,thenwhatbecomes ofthefixedreference relations and the one,absolute reality that our philosophicaltRditionaimsto descnbe? The assumptionthat penneates and often directsthe history ofpbiIosopby,that a mind-independent world is needed to justifY a correspondence theory of truth, suggests that there is one privileged language-game. But the grounds for determing the nature of such a privileged language cannot be disassociated from the reason used to justify those grounds. However, the metaphysica!assumption that there is a mind-independent world necessitates this incoherent disassociation in theinterestsof the privilege ofabsolutism. Anynotion of absolute uuth or metaphysicalrealityiseKcludedfromWittgenstein's investigations through his discovery that the logic oflanguage is as dynamic ashumanbehavior. This rejection of absolute concepts is the first step in the transition to a nonfoundationalist approach to philosophy. In the remainderof this section Iwillbriefly discuss what Wittgenstein means when he uses words like 'truth' and 'reality' nonfoundationally.
The foUowing passage fromthelrrvestigations may help us understand a nonfoundationallanguage:
'ButmathematicaltruthisindependentofwbetberlI.1manbeings knowitor oot1'- Certainly, the propositions 'Humanbeingsbelieve that twice two is four' and 'Twice two is four' do not meanthesame. Thelatter is a mathematical proposition; the other. ifit makes sense at all, may perhaps mean: human beings haveDI'ri\Iedatthemathematical proposition.Thetwo propositions have entirely
12
diffc:rentKS£S.-But whatwould/hismelD:'Even though everybodybelievedthat twice two wasfiveitwouldstill befaun-For whatwoulditbelike for everybody tobelievethat?-Wdl. Ic:ouId
imaaine.
forinstance,that people had a differentcalculus.or a techniquewhichweshould notcall'calculating'.But wouldit bewrong? Os a coronationWI'OItffl
Tobeings differentfromourselves it might look extremely odd.)'Despitetheabsence ofa substantial theory oftJuthinWiugenstein's later work, r see this passageasexpressingananualisticaa::ouutoftrulhintermsof contingent linguistic activities thatlack:anyreferenceto an independent CldJ'a-lioaWstic ground. That is, Wittgenst.ein asks us'towhat do we appeal when we by toimaginetruth tobedifferentfromwhat it isinour language-game"?Hesays that we mustimaginea different language-gameinwhich different 'techniques' are used. But noticethatwhenhe puts the question of the truth ofthisnew language-game to his readers Wlttgensteindoesn'task ifits propositions couldbefalse.
Rather, he chooses to use the more explicitly normative question, 'But would itbewrong'?
Inotherwords,heis rephrasingobjective epistemologicalquestions about truth and reJativism so they have a nonnative,ethicalcontent,and,as a result,truth-values ojpropositionsare replaced withdescriptions oj contextandevaluation of at:tivities. Consequently.
Wittgenstein is not claiming thatmathematicalobjects do not exist.; rather, he is simply pointing out that their existence canaddnothing tothemeaning or the context of the propositions in which they are described.
According 10 Wittgenstein, local, nonfoundationalist truthisa language-user's endorsement of herlanguageor fonn oflife. Thisendorsement is justified through the
, Wittgenst.ein,Philosophical Investigations,p. 226.
13
grammatical rules ofthe\anguagc-ulcr'sparticularLanguage-game. However, there are inn.nnerablel.anguage-gamesand,therefore.iDoumerabIetruths.Theabove passagefromthe l17Vf!stigations suggeststhatany perspectivefromwhichweuse language mustnecessarily bea value-ladenandIanguage-dependperspective;thusthere areDOvalue-free, language- independentperspectives.BecauseweCUUlOt,saysWrttgenstein, approach other forms of lifewithout the prejudice ofour ownfonnoflifc.wecaMotthenobjectively judge them to be true or false. Wecan seethemasdifferent orwrongby the standards of our own language-game, but this isall. WittgenSteiDnotes thiswithinparenthesesinthe above quotationwhen hewrites:~Isa coronationwrong?Tobeingsdifferent from ourselves it might look extremely odd.~
Ultimately, for Wittgenstein, wecannotstand ataneutralArchimedeanpointand determinewhichtruthsare absolutelytrue.AsWm:gensteiDstates.~Whathas tobeaccepted, thegiven.is-soone couldsay-forms oflife. '"Wecanonly judge other forms of life tobe better orworseaccording to the standards of our own fonn oflife. Thus the foundationalist assumption ofone, absolute description ofacommon universe (Truth)andthemetaphysical project which endeavors to justify this assumption, overlook. the prejudice with which each culturemustviewitsworld.
InspiteofWrttgenstcin'sordinarybutprofound recommendationsinthePhilosophical Investigations,manyphilosophersstillcootimetoaskthegreat metaphysical questions. They
6Wittgenstein,Philosophicalltrllestigations, p. 226.
14
SliD wanr:confirmationofanobjective rcalitydm existsiodepcndeotJy ofbuman thought and language. Despitethe fact thatsome of the dabontemetaphysicalsystemsthat attempt to do thisare a&rayfromc:ommonscme.theseCOlllpJo:systems areinvented inthe interests ofjustifYingour commonbeliefs aDdbehaviors. Atthisstageinhistory foundationalist answe'Sarethe mostaccepted answasto questions about therelationshipbetweenlanguage and the wortd,buttheyhavebcIlXlme~diffialfttomaintain.This difficultyhasled to narrow reductionist positions like scientistic positivismandother more elaborate metaphysics.DavidLewis'system of possible worlds is one example of suspiciously abstract and complex metaphysics that can sometimes serve to discredit philosophy in the eyes of I1Onphilosopbers. But how far shouldwegoindefense offoundatiooalist convictions?Do they even need metaphysical defense? ADd sbouId we accept the notionthat our realist intuitions have been formed through a history ofwdI intended but narrow philosophical attitudesand thatweshouldnow take steps to explorenewapproaches?
1beseare some oftilequestionsthat Iie.uthebeanof the realismfantirealism debate today,especially asitis discussed byPutnamandRony.Thesequestions differfrommany previous questions inthe history of pbilosophybecausetheyare not simply questioning the detailsandarguments of a panicuJar side in the debate. RAther,theyare metapbilosophical becausetheyquestion the debate itsdf. This particular attack on the presuppositions of traditional philosophy has its origininWittgensr:ein's later critique of his ideal-language philosophyintheTractDtus,andit has cootnbuted much to the curn:nt wave of pragmatist criticismofthesame tradition. At this point Iwilldescribe the realism/antirealism debate as
15
[ seeittoday. Thiswillallow metoirdroducetheproblemofrealismasitisd.isa.wed in subsequent chapters.
I J
mE
BEALISMlANJJREALISM DEBAIEIn itsmostbasic formn::aIismisthefuuDdatiooa1ist positionthat there is an objective realitythatexistsindependeotIy ofbumaa
tbouaJbt.
For thosewho are satisfiedwiththeir abilityto make sense ofsuch aclaim.theproblemofrealism is how to demonstrateand verify thisobjective reality.Whilelhere arevaryingpositions which attempt to solve the problem, I willbeconcernedwiththe most accepted version: metapllysicaJ realism. Metaphysical ceaJism,ortraces ofit, canbefoundinmanyb~cllesofphilosophy. Various philosopllies oflogic,epistt:moIogy,ethicsandaestheticsare ooostrue:ted onthefoundationalist assumption thatthere isan independent, objective realitythatgroundsthesedisciplines.However, such foundationalist assumptions., aswesbalIsee.
require impossible justification.The position
r
amcaIlingmc:taphysicaJrealismcontainsthreetheses.Thefirstis that realobjects exist;thesecondisthat these objects existindependentlyofourexperienceof them;andthe lastisthatreal objectsbavepropc:rtic:sandfunctions whosestructures are fonned indepeodently of thoughtandlanguage.Inits epistemological guise metaphysical realismertaiIsthattruthliesinthecom:spondcnceof concepts or words torealobjects.The metaphysicalrealist,then, holdsthatweformulateconceptsaboutthe real world and that we can use these concepts to make true statement! that colTCSpond to thereal world. It has16
already beenmentionedandwillbecomemoreapparentthat formypurposes Wittgenstein's Tractatusis theparadigm piece ofmctapbysicaIrealistwork.
Metaphysicalrea1ismis contestedbyIIIti-rcaIists ofmanysorts. One version ofanti·
realismisidealism. Idealists holdthatIDCUpbysicalrealistsare mistaken aboutrealityandthe nature of truth. That is,theidealistarguesthat RlI1ity is not independent ofOUTthinking about it. for reality is at leastpartially,ifDOtwboUy,constitutedbythestnJeture of our eltperienc:e, thought or language. For example,in whathe considered tobea defence of common sense, GeorgeBerkeley argues thatall thatexists are finiteandinfinite perceivers and perceived objects. Onthis view physical objects only becomerealwhenthey are perceived because. according toBerkeley, to exist is tobeperceived. One of his famous arguments for this view is thatItis impossible to conceive of an unperceived object. for the actof conceiving must involve the sensibleideasthat comprise the actual object.
However, despite the obvious differences betweenrealistsand idealists. there is a point where both intersect. That is,bothrealists and idealists can hold that what is real is what is known. For eumple, some realists can claim that a physical reality doesexist:
independently of thought and that it exists in exactly the way that wethink it. This 'reality' maynotnecessarily be all thatdifferentfromthe one posited by certain idealists who say that realityiswhatthemind saysit is.Inbotheasesthereality descnbed is the same. but whereas therealist'sontologyisbasedon arealityin-itsel( the idealist's is based on reality as we think it. On~'stendec<':)' to side with either the metaphysical realist or the idealist ultimately dependsonwhat(Y.leconsiders tobethemostsignificantgroundfor a metaphysics. A realist
17
tendency usestherealitythatwequescioIlas itsgrouud.whereastheidealist tendency uses the human perspective fromwhichweukthequestions.
ThelatesttendeDcy inthereafismlamnalismdebate belongs to a rather unique group of philosophers who rejectrealismonquitedifferentgrounds and whomI will label 'nonfoundationalists'. Likemany reactive IDOVemenu and eras in philosophy, nonfoundatiooalism isnotdefined byanyescabtisbedsetofthesesor arguments;rather,itis best explained as a scattered attack on various fouodatiollalist presuppositions in modem philosophy. And one of thekeyforerunners ofthisanackon realism and metaphysics is Wingenstein and his later work. in the Phi/o.sophicaJ Investigations. Many contemporary postmodem critiques, especiallyinmetaphysicsand the philosophy of language, are developments ofWittgenstein's suggestionsintheInvestigations.
AsImentioned earlier, Wittgenstein's approach to the problem of realism and practicallyallfoundationalistproblem5is quite fuodamc:ntaI..He does not directly criticizethe various answers to these problems,but.instead,he offers a naturalistic description of language which shows that the problemsthemselvesare "houses of cards..1that have no sensible foundationinlanguage. Similarly, contemporary postmodern critiques of metaphysicalrealism.like the ones offer-edbyPutnamandRorty, do not directly contest realistsolutions;rather. theysimply dismiss, asunintelligible,the foundational questions that therealist(and the idealist as weD)attempts to answer and therefore do not see thesense:in
JWittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. p.48. paragraph 118.
I.
contestingtherealistanswts".Thequestionu [ am fonnu1ating it here (there are other ways of formulatingit)is.,"whatis thebUereIatioosbipbetweenthought or language and the world'!' As Iexplainedabove,themetapbysicaIrealistbolds thatthereisan objective world thatisindependentofourthinkingandtheideIIistholds that thereisnot.Putnam,Rortyand the postmodernists mentionedherearguethatit is thisquestion itself that is fundamentally mistalcen.
I 4 BORTYANDPIUNAM'THE CURRENTDEBAlE
AsIhave mentioned, thepostmodem,nonfounciationalistcriticismcontainedin WrttgenStein'sPhilosophical Investigationsbasbadremarkableinfluencesonmany thinkers.
Wingenstein'swork:stands as a crucial signpostinthedevelopment of our increasingly postmodemperspective. Thecentral focusofmy thesis istherealism/antirealismdebateas itiscurrentlytaking place withinthe works oftwophilosophers whoare very richlyinspired by Wittgenstein'sinvestigations: Richard Rortyand HilaryPutnam.
Rorty and PutnamarebothinfiuenccdbyWittgenstein's discoveries and thiscommon threadis thesourceoftheirsimiJarphilosophicalpositions. However.Putnam claimsthathis pragmatismdiffers from Rorty'sinitsform.dationoftnrthand recommendationsfor the future of philosophy. The supposeddifferencebetweenthemgoeslike this: whereas Borty sees Wittgenstein's dissolving of the language/world distinction as implying the end of the philosophical problems that are grounded in this distinction, Putnam does not. Instead, Putnam argues thatmanyof thephilosophicalproblems arestillpresent, but that we must
19
avoidusingavocabularythai:goesbeyond our ordinuy uses of words to solve them; thus for Putnamtheproblemsand their answers becomeordinary. I argue that Putnam's formulation of these philosophical problems doesnotCOlIBictwithRany's pragmatism.
This thesiswillconcentrate onbothRorty's and Putnam's argumentsagainst
~realismand contemporarybmdItiooIIismin orderto demonstrate that, whether they know it or not,theirphilosophical positioDS coincide on the question of what is real.
That is, despite Putnam's claims thathisnaturalrealism and his recommendations for the future of philosophy are at odds with Rorty's pragmatic recommendations, I will arguethat, while theirpositions take somewhat diff«enl approaches to the problem of realism, they both say the same thing about what is realandwhat philosophy should do about it.
In order toanalyzethis debateinthedepththat I consider it deserves, I have concentrated mostly on the work ofRortyandPutnam.And because this debatehas been ongoing forseveralyears nowthereisplentyof worthwhile, first·hand commentary provided bythesetwophilosophers. I do not claim to surveyaUof the philosophical developments of theirpositionsinthepastseveralyears.Itwould require more roomthanI have here just to traek: Putnam's movemem. As JamesConantwrites ofPutnaminthe introduction toRealism Wilh A Human Face:
Thus the membership of Putnam's constellation of heroes. not unlike his own substantive philosophical views, tends toexistin a condition of peflletual flux; at anygivenpointin hiscareer, onehasonlyto glance at the current membership of
20
this constellation to ascertainthe
saw=nJ.
philosophicaldirectioninwhich heis (often quite rapidly)moving.'MymainfocusisonthreeofPutDam'slatest booles:Rea/ism With a Human Face, Renewing Philosophy, andW'0I'dsandLiftuweUashis"Dewey Lectures." From these worksIhaveassembledwhatIconsider tobea pervadingposition supportedbydifferent parts of each of these texts. 011Rorty'ssideofthedebateIhave focussed mostly on Phik>sophyand 1heMirrorOjNatrue,forhispositionbasDOtclwJged greatly from itsfirst aniculation. The few revisions that havebeenmadesincethenhavebeendue,inpart. to exchanges with Putnam and these revisions. with the exception of some changes presented inObjectivity, Relativism, and Truth,areneatlypackagedinanarticlecalled "Putnam and the Relativist Menace"inthe 1994Journal ofPhilosophy.
The next chapter wiUexamineRaTty's argument that contemporary philosophy is afflictedwith a useless and unnecessary foundationalism thathasbeeninheritedfrom the history of philosophy and is exemplifiedinmetaphysical realism. Wewillsee how Rorty's nonfoundationalism leadshimto his pragmatic, naturalist answer to the question of what is rea1,whichischaracterizedbya strong linguistic convattionalism in which. there is no extra- linguistic relationship between languageandthe world and where what is real isethno- dependent.
Chapterthreewillpresent Putnam's argumentsagainstmetaphysical realism in order to reveal his natural realist answer tothequestion of what is real. Like Rorty, Putnam is
, Putnam,Realism With a Human Face,p.
xvn.
21
uncomfortablewithfoundationalism,aDd hisamanaIra1ismoffers a picture of reality that doesn't seek to grounditselfinpe:rmmmcy. Accordingto Putnam, what is real is also linguistic, where ·linguistic· means theplacewherebothfacts and values meet.
InchapterfourIwill arguetII81PutDlm's and Ratty'sargumentsagainstmetapltysical realism amount to similar positions on the nature of reality and the future of philosophy.
AlthoughPutnam'sposition appeantobelas r.:IicaIaDd a Iittie morerestrainedthanRorty's, thisis simply a matter ofthesymp4thetic vocabulary Putnam employs. However, Putnam's criticism of Rony as an inconsistent relativi.st suggests that Putnam does see a substantial difference betweenhisnatural realism and Rorty's ethnocentric pragmatism.Inchapter five
r
will argue that this difference is actually a result of a deep discomfort with Rorty's truly nonfoundationalist vocabulary. Ishowthatthis discomfort is a manifestation of a philosophical tendency that many contemporary philosophers justifY through the presupposition that our ordinary behavior needs absolute justification. My intention is to show that this presupposition is unnecessaryand,like Rony, Ithinkwe could benefit by elCp[oring other nonfoundationalist options.22
CHAPTER>
RORTY'S ETHNOCENTRIC PRAGMATISM
In Philosophy andlheMirror
of
NabinRicbatdRortyargues thatthecentral assumption of traditional philosophy isthenotionof themindas a mirror which pictures or represents amind-independent world.The picture which holds traditional philosophycaptiveisthat of themindas a great mirror. containing various representations - some accurate, some not - and capable of being studiedbypure.nonempirical methods.I
According to Rorty thisentirenotion ofamindrepreseutmga world that is independent of itdoesnotmake sense. Hearguesthat philosophers haveturnedaway from more important social issuesbynarrowlythinkingthat necessary foundations of metaphysics and epistemology couldbefoundinsuch amodelofmind.He claimsthatthese contemponuy philosophicalpursuitsareesserdiallyfonned around this model ofthe representing mind.and oncethemodelisshown tobeuseless sowillepistemology and metaphysics.
InthischapterIwiDoutlineRorty'saiticismofmetaphysicalrealism, whichheclaims presupposes this particulac epistemologicalmodel,in order to show how Rortythinksthe problemof realismshouldbeaddressed. LikethelaterWittgcnstein,Rotty does not engage the metaphysicalrealistontypicalgrounds,;thatis.hedoes not directly attack the realist's answerto the question of realism.Instead,as Wittgensteindidbefore him,Rartraises the stakesbyattacking the coherenceandutility ofthequestionitseI( thereby discrediting any
IRorty,Philosophy andtM Mirror ofNature, p. 12.
ofitsanswa'$.SimplyPIt.thequestionofrealism inquires intothe1WW'eoftherelationship between languageorthoughtandtheworld. It asksif there isanindependcnr.reality consisting ofrealwgibleobjectsthatareDOtjust maulor IiDgui.stic constructions.
Metapbysicalrealism isODeanswertothis question.andRorty'sattemptsto showthatthe question ofrSwnisincober"ent and~ifsuccessful.wiU havedruticconsequences for themetapbysicaI rea1ist. Itwillbecomeappare:IIt.however.thatRorty's own positionwith regard tothequestion of realismisDOtsimply oeprivecriticism. Wnhhisethnocentric pragmItismRortyseestheworldthrough a Darwinian lens and offers apositive,naturalistic account of whatisreal, suggestingthat we shouldbe more closelyattunedto the diverse, nonfoundational functions of language when consideringwhat 'reality' can mean.
Tbenea.section (2.1)willdescribeRorty'saccountofthe originsoffoundationalism whichbesaysarefoundin anoptional, optical metaphorintroducedbyPlato.Then section 22and2.3willpresentRorty's Wmgensteinian criticism of the result oCPlato's metaphor- metaphysicalrealism •andintroduceRorty'snonfoundationalistapproach tolanguage.
Sections 2.4and2.5will reviewROfty'sgenenlcriticismofthe foundationalist preoccupationsof conternpcnry philosophyandpiecetogetherapositive,ethnocenuic positionoutofRorty'snegativecritique.
2 I FOUNPADONALISM ANDJHEPERCEPII'AL METAPHOR
Rartyexplains thattheepistemological modelof the mirror is rootedintheperceptual metaphorthatPlatousedtoexplain theacquisitionof knowledge.OfPlato's metaphor Rorty writes,
24
knowing a proposition to be trueisto be identified with being caused to do somethingby an object.Theobjectwhichtheproposition is aboutimposesthe proposition's truth.1
PIa1o'sexplanation thereforecomparesIcDowingtothecausal process of perceivinginwhich tbewortd 'imposes'itselfuponthe waiting1Ilind.Plato's metaphor. says Rony, produced the ClJITentmodelofthe mindas a mirrorrdlcaing &Delrepresentingthe imposing causes, laws, and objects of natureand,from thispointillhistoryon, philosophy was mainly concerned withtheinteraction oftwodistinctrealms:theinnerworld of thought and the outer world of things.However, according toRarty,
Plato...didnotdiscoverthe distinctionbetweentwokindsofentities, eitherinner or outer. Rather,...hewasthefirstto articulate what George Pitcherhascalled the~Platonic Principle~-thatdifferencesincertainty must correspond to differencesinthe objects known.)
Plato's perceptual metaphor, says Ratty, is an optional approach 10 knowledge, for Plato could have chosen another. For example.hecould have simply decided, as Kant later did, thatthemindis afilter through which nournenaJ matter receives fonn. Or he could have decided that there were no suchthingsas minds altogether.
Rorty goes on toarguethat,becauseof Plato's choice of metaphor to explain how knowledgeworks, philosophybecame dominatedby a strong desire for foundations. Plato's metaphorsuggestedthat ifknowing is analogous to perceiving, then knowledge is justas
1Rorty,Philosophyandthe MirrOT ofNahlTe,p. 157.
) Ratty,Philosophyandthe Mirror ofNature,p.156.
25
susceptible to illusion asperception.Plato rude his cuJtureaware of this problem by making itevidentthatmuchofwhat theybelievedwasoften unfounded and sometimes clearly false.
Whattheyneeded,.according to Plato,was •systemofdetermining which beliefs were true andf8lseand whichneededfiutha"iDspectioo.Thatis..they neededa systemwhich couldlay immutableunivenalfoundationsfortheadvucementof knowledge.Thesefoundations would secure truthandallowhumanityto piece toSetberthecomplex puzzle of the universe bydiscerningthedifferencebetweentruebeliefsandtaIsebeliefs.Once certainbeliefs about theworldwereknown tobe true.philosophers could thenspeakwith absolute authority on important monUandpoliticalissues. Each~elationof truth would dispel illusion.
appearance and falsity and bring humanity closer to the true understanding of reality. For Plato the philosophical searcher for tnJth picks his waythroughthe cavernous shadows of deception in the physical worldandemerges into the illuminated realm of pure, spiritual reality or truth.
In thismanner,according toRorty,Plato's metaphor inaugurated 'philosophical thinking'bydistinguishingbetween appearanceand reality, matter and spiritandfalsity and truth.
Plato developed theideaofsuch anioteUectual(metaphysical realist}bymeans of distinctions between knowledge and opinion, and betweenappearanceand reality.·
• Rorty,Objectivity, Relativism,andTruth,p. 22.
26
Rorty contendsthatitwasthesedistiDctioosthat brougbtthe Ancients to a need forcertainty and eventuallynecessiwedthecreationofgrand pbilosopbicalsystemsand solutions that would'ground' knowledgeinimmutable fOUDdations. But,asRortyhas alreadyexplained., because Plato'smetaphor-was optional,epistr::moIogyandmetaphysics should not be the only inheritors of pbilosophy.Instead,Rortystatesthat if
we think of'rationaicertainty'u alDlttcrofvic:toryinargument ratherthan of relariontoanobject known,wesbd looktowardouriDteriocutors rather than to our faculties fortheexplanation oftbe phenomenon....Ourcertaintywill bea matter ofconversation betweenpersons. rather thana matter of interactionwith nonhuman reality.'
Thus,forRatty, thedesirefor foundations thatsti1Iaffiictscontemporary philosophybasbeen an wrlbrtunate intuitioncaniedthroughout thehistory of philosophy. This intuition, he says.
has produced unnecessary metaphysical systems whieh have interrupted the pragmatic 'conversation between persons'.
Since Rorty's main contention withthewhole of philosophy is with its insistence on immovable foundations it only seems appropriatethatI discuss his criticism of the one area of contemporary philosophy that is mostly concerned with foundations: metaphysics. and.
more precisely. metaphysical realism.Therestoflhis chapterwillreview Rony's pragmatic picture ofwhatisrealthroughhis specific critique of metaphysical realism (section 2.2)and his general aitiqueoftbe foundarionalismincontemporary philosophy (section 2.3 and 2.4).
Themetaphysicalrea1ism thatRortyattacksisdesaibcdinsection 1.4 of my chapter one, and
'Rorty,PhiJosophyandlheMirrOl'o/Nature.p. 157.
27
Rorty's criticism of it consists oCasustaiDcdWmgensr:einian attackon its central thesis: the notion ofa Iaoguage-independent reality.Theothertwo theses of metaphysical realism, the Dotion that a language-independentrealitycanbedescribedinafinaJvocabulary and the notion that knowledge of this realityisconfirmedina correspondence theory of truth, rest uponthefirstand.thus,theimpIi<:atioos:fortbese theseswill bediscussed throughout section 2,2, 2.3, and section 2.4as well.
2 2 A CRITICISM OF LANGUAGE-INDEPENDENT REALITY
According to Rorty. contemporary analytic philosophy considers language to be a medium whichrepresents or mirrorsalanguage-independent world, and linguistic analysis is responsibl.efor"inspecting.repairing.andpolishing the mirror.·' Metaphysical realists in the anaJytic tradition assume that such a polishing of languagewillendow it with a greater number of true sentenceswhichprovide a more accurate representation of the language- independentworld.Itisthisnotion ofa language-independent world that Rorty rejectsasan unfortunateassumptionhandeddown through thehistoryof philosophy. This foundationalist assumption is precisely the one Wittgenstein heldintheTracUrtuswhen he argued, with IUs picture theory ofmeaning,for an ideal language.Inthis respect the early Wittgenstein is a paradigmatic metaphysical realist.
'Rorty,Philosophyandlhe Mirror ofNatfIl'e,p. 12.
2.
AsI explainedinsection1.2,WIttgemtein'sTracti:dUsLog;co-Philosophicusargues thatpropositions arepicturesofthe&ctsofwbich the world is composed and, therefore. the meaning ofaword~istheobjectforwhichtheword stands.~1Onthismodel oflanguage we canbestunderstandourrelationship totheworldbygraspingthe idealmeaningsof our words,for this wouldmean thatwegraspthe objectitself.Inother words, Wittgensteinand theanalytictraditionhefounded -thetnIditiootbItRorty iscurrently criticizing - believe that absolute foundations (the logical structure of the world) can be revealed through logical analysis oflanguage.
In the same way that RaTty's metaphor of mirroring appears to be borrowed from Wrttgenstein's metaphor ofpicturing, RoTty's criticism of the metaphysical realism in analytic philosophy is also wellinthe spirit of Wittgenstein's later criticism of theTractarian philosophy. According to Rorty, todays metaphysical realistsfailto realize that the idea of a language-independentrealitysimply has no content; therefore, constructing a metaphysics to explain - or to even suggest the necessity of-such an absolute reality makes little sense.
For example,theabsolute truththatiscommon to metaphysical realism is not an entirely useful concept because it has norealcontent.
The trouble withPlatonic notions(liketruth)isnotthatthey are~wrong"but that there is not agreatdeal tobesaid about them-specifically,thereis no way to
"oaturalize~themor otherwise connect them to therestof inquiry, or culture, or life.1
, Wittgenstein,PhHosophiW lm>estigations, p. 2,paragraph1.
IRotty,Philosophyandthe Mirror ofNature,p. 311.
2'
AsRortyexplains,theseemptyrealist ootions ladto •hostof philosophical problems and anempted solutionsthatare empty uweD:
Thosewhowishtogroundsolidarityinobjcc:tivity -caDthem "realists" -have to construeuuth as comspondeDce toreality. SotheyIDJ5tconstruct a metaphysics whichhasroomfor aspecial re!ationbetM:JeDbeliefsand objects whichwill differentiatetruefromfalsebelie&.Theymust:argue thatthereareprocedures of justification ofbelief whicharcIJlItUra1 IDdDOtmerelylocal. So theymust construct anepistemologywbichhasroomfor • kindofjustification which is not merely socialbutnatural.'
Similar to Wittgenstein, Rorty holdsthatlanguage is a form of life. a dynamic ethnocentricsuuctlUethat adaptsitselfto changing socio-economic demands and cannotbe senslbly separatedfromtheworld.Onthisviewthere is no reference to a mind-independent reality and ultimately no metaphysical or permanent structure is represented by language.
Thus..thereis no reason to 'construct an epistemology' with the desire to accurately refer to such a metaphysical structure.
Those
woo
wishtoreduceobjectivity to solidarity.callthem "pragmatists" • do not require either a metaphysics or an epistemology. Theyviewtruthas.
in William lames'Phrase.what is good forusto believe. So they donotneedan accountofa relationbetweenbeliefs and objectscalled'correspondence,' noran accountoflaunan cognitive abilities whichensuresthatour species is capable of entering into that relation.loRatty thereforetakesthe foundationalist content out oftenns like 'reality' and 'tnIth' inthesameway thelater Wittgensteindoes,byunderminingthe ideal picture of language that
, Rorty,Objectivity. Relativism.and Truth,p. 22.
10Rarty,Objectivity, Re/atMsm,andTruth,p. 22.
30
thecentralthesisofmetaphysical realismpresupposes.LikeWIttgensteinbefore him, Rorty arguesthatlanguagecannotrefertoextra-tiDguiItic entities and,therefore,themetaphysical realistconcept.ofa~indepc:ndentrea&tyisnotthatcoherent or useful. And since the other two secondllythesesofmetaphysical.realismrest on the first, theyareimplicatedin Rorty's criticism here aswell. Comequeotly,the Dotion that there is afinalvocabulary that can dcscnbcamiod-iDdependem:realityaDdthenotionthat knowledge ofthisrealityis achievedviaa correspondence theoryof trutharelackinginsenseandutilityalso.
2.3 RQRIT'S NONFOUNPAIIONALIST LANGUAGE
InRorty's pragmatic accunts of language, meaning or truth cannot lie fixedina Janguage-.independent worldwaitingtobediJcovc:rtdao:laccuratelyrepresented by language;
there is no language-independent worldandtherefore nothing toberepresented in this system. As Rorty writes of the realist:
He [the realist}thinksthat, deep downbeneath allthe texts, there is something whichisnot just one more text butthattowhichvarious textsaretrying to be -adequate. N The pragmatist does notthink thatthereisanything likethat.He does noteventhinkthatthereis anything isolatable as Nthe purposes which we construct vocabularies andcultures tofulfill-against which to test vocabularies and cultures.II
The real, says Rony, cannotbea fixed, language-independent world that language mirrors, for language does nOl mirror. Consequently, there is nothing tobesaid about the worldinthisregard. Language, according to Rorty, cannotbefoundational, in the sense of
IIRorty,Consequences ofPragmatism,p.
xxxvn.
31
providing us with truth asaccuratedescriptioDsof. language-independent world, because the descriptionsthatitofferswillonlyreflectthecontingent beliefstructures of theculture that usesit.
Foethe pngmatist...~Irnowledge~is,like"truth.~simplyacompliment paid to the beliefs whichwethink sowelljustified _ forthemoment, furtherjustification isnotneeded.Aninquiry intothenature ofknowfcdge
can.
on !Us view onlybe a sociobistoricaIaccountofhowvarious people havetried to reach agreement on what tobdieve.'~Ultimately, on Rorty's view nothing is representedinlanguage. A language-independent worldisnot referredtoby bits and pieces oflanguagc; rather, bits and pieces of language, as Wmgcnsteinpointsout.,areparts ofwtw:makesupourworld. The world just happened to aUot thesebitsandpiecesofitselfthe peculiar position of being very complex expressions of aculture's fonn oflife.
What thenbecomes oftnnh in such a view oflanguage? For Rorty, "there is nothing to besaidabouteithertruth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures ofjustificationwhicha givensociety. oun -usesinone or anotherareaofinquiry."u Rotty contends that,as aresult ofthechanging structures of language and convention, our use of languageandour proceduresofjustification changeaswen. For Rotty,asfor Wittgenstein, truth isanentirely contingentmanerand traditional attempts to establishatheory w!Uch uncovers metaphysical truths are misguided.
11Ratty. Objectivity, Relativism.andTruth,p.24.
URorty,Objectivity.Relativism.andTruth,p. 23.
32
According to Rorty, atruepropositionisnotone that accurately represents a Ianguage-mdepenstate ofaffilirs thatc:MISeStheproposition tobe true, because there are no language-independent statesofaffairs...Ahhougbthereatecausesof the acquisition of belie&,andreasonsfor theretentionorchangeofbdicfs,thereare nocausesfor thetruthof beliefS."I.A true proposition,then,issimplyone that a particularculture's ethnos endorses asthebestwaytothinkabout thebeliefeqJR:SICdmthe proposition. Therefore, the word
"true" is "merelyanexpression of commeodation"u thatweadd ontoourstatements to reinforcetheprejudiceof oW" fonn oflife.By claiming that certain propositions ate trUe we indicate to ourselves and to othersavalue-judgement whicb says that believing what this proposition statesatthispoint intimeismoreimportant(where'important'isdetermined by the same standards that formed thetrue proposition)thanbelieving what other propositions state about the same maner.Inother words.truthis a redundant and circulat endorsement of a form of life that gets expressedwhenweadd-is true" ontotheparticular beliefs that constitute a form of life.
Rotty's criticism of the metaphysical realism ofanaIytic philosophy, then, is that its questions do not make sense becausethey are based on misunderstandings of the way languageopera!es, According toRorty,the mindl\anguage-independent (metaphysical) reality thatthemetaphysicalrealistclaimsexists is an unnecessary postulate of a nonsensical model
14Rotty,Objectivity. Relativism.andTruth,p. 121.
ISRotty,Objectivity. Relativism,andTruth,p. 23.
33
oflanguage.LaDguage.says Rorty,doesDDtreferto language-independent objects; in fact.
language cannot refer inthatwayatall.AtRortywritesofreference:
nomatter whatDOnintentiOnalreIaion issubstitutedfor"cause"in our account of howthethingsintheCOnteDtrac:bup IDd determine thereference of the rqJmlCIItationsmakingupthesc:hc:me.OW'"theoryaboutwhattheworld is made ofwillproduce.trivially,aself-justifjiustheory about thatrelation.16
Thus, for Rorty, ourtbcoriesabouttheoatu:rcofre:ferencerelationswillalways reflect and reinforce the interests and intentions withwhichwe approachtheproblem of reference relations.
Rorty'sviewofianguagealsosuggeststhatthe referring subject that the metapttysical realist positsastheframeofthernirrorofthelanguage-independent world is a useless notion whenoneconsidersthatnothingcanbereferred to which is independent of language. Since thereisnothingindependent of languagethata linguistic subject could mirror. why preserve the notion ofthe epistemological subject? According to Rony. Plato'sperceptualmetaphor and Descartes','eyeofthemind'were based onmisleadingdistinctions that the metaphysical realist still holds dear.Ifthe realistcould seethatthesedistinctionsaretheresultsof a contingent choice of metaphor, then the split between the epistemological subject and the metaphysica1worldcouJd beclosed andrealist talk aboutsubjectsand objects replaced by talk about language and culture.
Butoncewe dropthenotion of"consciousness"thereis no hann in continuing to speakofadistinctentitycaned"theself"whichconsists ofthe mental states of the
I'
Rony,Objectivity. Re/atMsm.andTruth,p. 295.34
hwnanbeing:herbeliefs,desires,moocls,etc. Theimportantthing isto think of thecoIlectionofthose thingsas beingtheselfrabcr thanassomethingwhichthe selfhas.The latter notion is a leftowroftbetraditional Western temptation to modelthinIcingon vision,andto postulate an "inner eye" which inspects inner states.lJ
As Rorty'sviewofianguagesuggests,DOthiDgexistsindependentlyof language. including truth.Oncethis isrea1ized, thesubject/objectsplit issealedwithinthe confines of language, and the realist does Dotneedanepistemologyor a system of representation to explain the relationshipbetweenthem. Like W"rttgenstein, Ratty simply urges us to inspect our traditionalphilosophicalquestions for linguistic errorssothat we can reveal any incoherence thatmayresultfrom an inappropriate use of1anguageand discontinue askiDg those questions that areincoherent.
2.4 A NONFOUNPATIQNALIST NAR.R.ATIVE
Ultimately, thefundamental pointunderlying much of RoTty's criticism of the metaphysical realisminanalytic philosophy is thatrealismis motivated byanunnecessary foundationalismthathasseepedinto contemporary philosophy of language from the modern period.Thelinsuistictum did notqueUtheKantian needforabsolute certainty,and instead of leaving foundationalism and modem problems behind, it mistook language as the source ofthiscertainty. Rorty points outthatthe metaphysical and epistemological reactions • realismandidealism - totheproblems ofmodemphilosophyhave beenmistakenlytransferred
11Rarty,Objectivity, Relativism,andTruth,p. 123.
35
to contemporary philosophy of1angulputhesame problemsdifferently stated. But for Rorty,
"plilosophy"isnota name for adiIcipIiDewhichconfronts permanent issues. and unfortunately keepsmisstating them,or attackingthemwithclumsy dialectical instruments. Rather,itis acuIIuralgenre.a"voicein the conversation of mankind"(to useMichaelOakesbott's phrase),whichcenters on one topic rather than another at some giventimeDOtbydialectical oecessity but as a result of variousthingshappeningeIsewbereinthe cooversaJion... or of individual men of geniuswho thinkof somethingDeW•••orperbaps oftheresultant of several such forces. Interesting philosophicalchange...oocun notwhena new way is found todealwith an old problem but when anewset of problems emerges and the old onesbegin to fade away.Thetemptation...istothinkthatthe new problematic is the old one rightly seen.II
Adoptingthisposition,then,wouJdaIIowtbecoot.empOrarymetaphysical realist to stand back fromtheproblem ofthe externalworldandrealizethatthe problem is not one that is relevant to (or it is Dot one that makes sensein)thepresentculture.
Rorty's pragmatic project showsthatthe metaphysical realism in analytic philosophy, as a consequence ofWittgenstein's earlier metaphysical realism, is the unfortunate result of thefoundationalismthatdevelopedthroughoutthehistory of philosophy. He points outthat becauseanalytic philosophy presupposestheepistemological subject, a language-independent reality, and a system ofrepresenration which can accunteIy explain the relationship betWeen the subject and a language.independent reality, it assumes the same unnecessary foundationalist conception of knowledge as the rest of philosophy. Through his method of historical narrative Rorty showsthat theincreasingly dogmatic need of philosophers to
IIRorty,Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, p. 264.
36
establishfirmfoundations forknowledgeiskeepingphilosophers from addressing the concerns oftheconJenrpot"tl1YcuJtureODwhose behalfitoperates.
Rortypointsoutthatatthecommcocemeatofthetwentiethcenturythe demands of Husserl andRusseUfora'rigorous'IOd 'sciedtific'methodof pbilosophy brought the secularization ofculturethatbegaDwith
DeIcIrtcs.
LockeandKant to a point where:thescientistshad becomeas remote&om mostintellectuals as had the theologians....The resultwas thattbemore-1Cieatific- and"rigorous" philosophy became, the lessithadto do with therestof cultureandthe more absurd its traditional pretensions seemed."
ConsideringthattheworkofWmgenstein,andotherslike HeideggerandDewey,are pivotal rejections of the kind of foundationalism presupposed in modem philosophy, it is not surprising that Rorty feels astronglcinshipwiththese philosophers. They abandon representationalist epistemologyandtheCartesianmodelof mind from which it began and replacethem with whatRoTtycalls therapeutic or edifYing philosophy. According to Rorty they revolutionize philosophy
by introducing new maps of theterrain(viz.,of the whole panorama of human aaivities)whichsimplydo notincludethose features which previously seemed to dominate.»
Similarly, Rony's attempts to expose the presumptions ofcontemporary analytic philosophy and, more specifically, metaphysical realism, operate within the same revOlutionary, postmodemtradition ofWrttgenstein,Heidegga" andDewey. Like these philosophers, Rorty
19RaTty,Philosophy andtheMirrorojNatIm,p.5.
mRorty, Philosophy and/heMirror ojNatIm,p.7.
37
does ootsimply ClIUtioothemetapbysic:aIrealistagainstbel"foundationalist pROCCUpaOons but, rather, beexposesher"usumptioasIDd, i:Ddeed,bcrentireproject, as fundamentally a>nfus<danduItmweIyddpoable.
ForRorty, the foundationalist.uitude ofmetapbysical realism narrowsthe minds of philosopherswithatunnel.visionthai:exdudesthecסן0rfuiiybumanelements from philosophy.JustasFeucrbachbadaiticiz:cdHesd'sidealistphilosophy ofreligjonas an abstract,spo::ulativemetaphysicalsystemthatwas aIicnto the material world.,
Ranf
criticizes the scientistic foundationalism of analytic philosophy's metaphysical systems as a useless assumptionwhichbasa1ienat:ec1phiIosopbyfrom itsculture.Andto make matters worse, this foundationalism is borrowed from a bygone tndition that evoked it to dealwithits own unique problems. Acc;ording toRanf,
epistemologicalandmetaphysical problems are no longer problems for our preserlta.utuR:.
We have quite different probl.emsthatrequire differentsolutions. Whereas Feuerbacb'svisionwas a 'philosophy ofthe future' that did not includethe absuactedrational theok>gyof.spccu.1ative metaphysics. RaTty's is apost.philosopbic:alculturewhichdoes notincludethefoundationalism thathas confused modem plWosophy.Throughthe~offuundabo0a6on, ..ys Rorty,·'Philosophy' became, fortheintellectuals.,a substitute forreligion.·11Hethenpointsoutthatjust as religionwas an optional explanatory approach to the relationship between human thoughtandthe world, so too is philosophy. Thus, becauseRortybelievesthefoundationalist questions addressed
11Rorty,PhiloscphyandJhtt Mirror ofNatun,p.4.
3B
by analytic philosophy are Dotrdevaottooutpresc:ntculture.he can,ingood conscience., urgeus to chooseanotheroption.
2 S WRITS ErnNOCENTRICREPLACF.MENT
Atthis point onemightbepuzzledwba:I considering what Rorty means by 'reality'.
Althoughhis pragmatism islargelyanegativeproject meant to discredit foundationalist uses for words like 'reality'and'truth,'thesewordsstillexist, and theycanmakesenseonce they are drained of their foundationalism. Rorty describes humanbeings inDarwinian termsand thcr"cforedescribes languageasanaturalisticphenomenon, a tool that helpsus copewith the world.Thisapproach is DonfoundatiolUlibecause it doesnot profess toexpress atruth that correspondsto the way the worldreaUyis.Wtcad,Rortyisofferingamore coherent picture thantheonc foundationalists propose.And with this coherent picture wecan
think.of beliefsastools forbandli.ng reality,determinations of how to actin responseto certaincontingencies,I'8tho" thanasrepresentations of reality.Onthis view, we no longer have to worry about, e.g., the question"Doesphysics correspondtothe structure oftht worldasit is,. or merely to thest:nLetureof the worldasit appearstous'r'because:'WCceasetothinkof physicsascOITesponding toanything.Zl
On this view, words and sentences are nothing morethan'marks and noises' that have no privileged relationship to the world; ultimately, language is simply one part of the natural world Butthenis the natural worldreal?For Rortyitis,.becausethe consensus in the fonn
22Rorty,Objectivity, Relativism,andTruth, p. 118.
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