Reasoning About Coalitional Effectivity in
Modal Extension of Łukasiewicz Logic
Tomáš Kroupa1 Bruno Teheux2
1Institute of Information Theory and Automation of the ASCR, Czech Republic
Strategic game forms
G = hN, {Σ
i| i ∈ N}, S, oi
N = {1, . . . , n} is a set ofplayers
Σi is thestrategy setof player i ∈ N
S is a set ofoutcome states
o :Q
Measuring the power of coalitions
G = hN, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, oi
For acoalitionC ∈ PN : C stands for N \ C
σCstands for a tuple of strategies for players in C
Definition. Theeffectivity functionE[
G : PN → PPSassociated
with Gis defined by
Towards a quantitative notion of effectivity
G = hN, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, oi
N = set of countries in EU
Σi =set of economic policies that country i can adopt
o(σ) = (ri)i∈N where ri =rate of employment of country i if
strategy vector σ is applied
The limitation of E[ G
An outcome sate (ri)i∈N is composed ofquantitativeinformation
while
E[
Towards a quantitative notion of effectivity
G = hN, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, oi
N = set of countries in EU
Σi =set of economic policies that country i can adopt
o(σ) = (ri)i∈N where ri =rate of employment of country i if
strategy vector σ is applied
We define generalized effectivity functions
G = hN, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, oi
Łk := {0,k1, . . . ,k −1k ,1} is the scale
Definition. TheŁk-valued effectivity function of G
Ł
k-valued effectivity function in the EU example
EG(C, f ) = max σC min σC f (o(σCσC)) f (ri)i∈N EG(C, f ) mini∈C rithe minimum rate of employment for coun-tries in C that coalition C can enforce
‘employment sovereignty of C’
meani∈N ri
the mean country level rate of employment in EU that coalition C can enforce
The poster session
1. Examples illustrating the relevance of Łk-valued effectivity
function
2. Axiomatization of functions E : PN × ŁSk → Łk that are
playable, i.e., for which there is a G such that E = EG
F Łk-valued version ofsuperadditivity F
3. A modal language to talk about Łk-valued effectivity
functions (based on Łukasiewicz logic)
4. A Łn-valued neighborhood semantic and acompleteness