L’évolutionpsychiatrique83(2018)e37–e45
ScienceDirect
Original
article
Borderline
personality
disorder
and
lived
time
夽
Trouble
de
personnalité
borderline
et
temps
vécu
Fabian
Lo
Monte
(Psychologist)
,
Jérôme
Englebert
(Lecturer)
∗DepartmentofPsychology,universitédeLiège,quartierAgora,placedesOrateurs1(BâtB33),4000Liège,Belgium
Abstract
Objectives.–Startingfromthesemiologicalheterogeneousnessofborderlinepatients,wetrytounderstand
theeverydaylifeofsuchsubjects,andtodeterminethepsychopathologicalstructureofBorderlinePersonality
Disorder.
Method.– Thisarticle’sprincipalfocusislivedtime.Weexplorediversemeaningsofthenotionsof imme-diacyandinstantaneity,consideredaskeycomponentsofborderlinepatients’livedtime.Wealsoconsider
otherexistentialconceptsfromphenomenologicalpsychopathology,suchasspace,emotion,identity,and
thebody.
Results.–Thefragmentedselfhypothesis(Fuchs,2007)clarifiesthewayinwhichborderlinepatientsrelate
tothemainpsychicfunctions,andrevealsabeing-in-the-worldinexcessofthespatio-temporalsituation.In
addition,Kimura’snotionoftheintrafestum(1992),closelycorrelatedtothenotionsofinstantaneityand
immediacy,isputintoafruitfuldialoguewiththenotionsofthefragmentedselfandoftheexceedingofthe
spatio-temporalsituation.
Discussion.–ThegrowingprevalenceofBPD,alongwiththequalityoftheexperiencesnarratedby
border-linepatients,allowustosuggestalinkbetweenaborderlinebeing-in-the-worldandoursociety’sincessant
technologicaladvances,whichcontainthepossibilityofmodifyingthecoordinatesofspaceandtime.
Conclusion.–Thedifferentconceptsexploredinthisarticleultimatelyappeartolinkbackupwiththenotions
ofinstantaneityandimmediacy.Thesetwoterms,closelyrelatedbutcallingupondifferentpointsofview,
arecloselyconnectedwithacertainhypo-reflexivity,whoseexpressiondiffersaccordingtowhetherone
situatesit inthe“normal”ortheinthepathological.Hypo-reflexivityappearsinthecontextofasocial
worldcharacterizedbytheconstantneedforhyper-flexibility(whichnotionbringsusbacktoimmediacy
夽Anyreferencetothisarticlemustmention:LoMonteF,EnglebertJ.Troubledepersonnalitéborderlineettempsvécu.
Evolpsychiatr2018;83(4):(pages)(forthepaperversion)orURL[dateofvisit](fortheonlineversion).
∗Correspondingauthor.
E-mailaddress:[email protected](J.Englebert).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evopsy.2018.08.001
andinstantaneity).Thus,theborderlineexperienceoverlapswithourpostmodernlifestyle,whichinturn
revealsthepotentiallyadaptivedimensionsofthispersonalitydisorder.
©2018ElsevierMassonSAS.Allrightsreserved.
Keywords: Borderlinepersonalitydisorder;Psychopathology;Livedtime;Phenomenology;Mediation
Résumé
Objectifs.– Partant duconstat del’importante hétérogénéité sémiologique présentéepar lessujets
état-limite,cettecontributiontentedefaireémergerunecharpentepsychopathologiquedutroubledepersonnalité
borderlineafindemieuxcomprendrelevécudespatientsaffectésparcedernier.
Méthode.–Letempsvécu estl’angle d’attaque principalchoisidanscetarticle.La réflexions’articule
autourdesnotionsd’instantanéitéetd’immédiatetéetenexplorelesdifférentessignifications.Lesautres
coordonnéesexistentiellescommunémentinvestiguéesenpsychopathologiephénoménologique,commeles
rapportsàl’espace,àl’identité,auvécuémotionnelouaucorpssontégalementétudiées.
Résultats.–Lafragmentationtemporelledusoi(Fuchs,2007)quenousdécrivonspeutêtreconsidéréecomme
organisantlerapportauxprincipalesfonctionspsychiqueschezlespatientsborderline,etrévèleun
être-au-mondetendantversundépassementdelasituationspatio-temporelle.Enoutre,lafac¸ondevivreletemps
queKimura(1992)nommeintrafestum,quiestétroitementliéeauxnotionsd’instantanéitéetd’immédiateté
tellesquenouslesdéveloppons,semblesecombinerdefac¸onfructueuseaveclafragmentationtemporelle
dusoietledépassementdelasituation.
Discussion.–Lacombinaisonentrel’augmentationdelaprévalencedutroubleetlaqualitédesexpériences
rapportéesparlespatientspermetdesuggérerunlienentrel’être-au-mondeborderlineetl’évolutiondenotre
société,faited’avancéestechnologiquesincessantesà-mêmesdepermettreunemodificationdescoordonnées
spatio-temporelles.
Conclusion.–Lesdifférentesconceptionsexposéesdanscetarticlesemblentfinalementserejoindreautour
desnotionsd’instantanéitéetd’immédiateté.Cesdeuxtermes,trèsproches,maisconvoquantdespoints
devuedifférents,semblententretenirunlienétroitavecunecertainehypo-réflexivité.Celle-cis’exprime
àdesdegrésdiversselonquel’onsesituedansla«normalité»oulapathologie,etpeutêtrecomprise
enlienàuncontextesocialcaractériséparunenécessitéd’hyper-flexibilitéquotidienne(quinousramène
ànouveauàl’immédiatetéetàl’instantanéité).Ainsi,plusieurspointsdel’expérienceborderlinepeuvent
êtrerapprochésdumodedeviepostmoderne,etcelarévèlelesdimensionspotentiellementadaptativesde
cetroubledelapersonnalité.
©2018ElsevierMassonSAS.Tousdroitsr´eserv´es.
Motsclés: Troubledelapersonnalitéborderline;Psychopathologie;Phénoménologie;Tempsvécu;Médiation
1. Introduction
Borderlinepersonalitydisorder,asdefinedbythelatestversionsoftheDSM(−IVand−5)
[1,2],ischaracterizedbyitsconsiderablesemiologicalheterogeneousness.Thedifficultiesthese patients face range from interpersonal struggles(with, notably, the fear of abandonmentand extremeoscillationsintheirperceptionsofothers)toquestionsaboutidentity;self-harming behav-iors;avarietyofsubstanceuseandabusepatterns;addictivebehaviors;moodswingsandexcessive emotionality;acertainimpulsivenessandatendencytoimpatienceandtothesearchfor immedi-atesatisfaction;or,finally,transitorypseudo-psychoticsymptomssuchaspersecutorydelusions.
The descriptionandcomparative analysisofthesedifferentclinicalsignsproposedbyvarious referenceworks[3–5]givestheimpressionofanaccumulationoflargelyunrelated manifesta-tionswhoseunderlyingcoherenceisenigmaticatbest.Here,phenomenologycanbeagreathelp inidentifyingthe“psychopathologicalorganizer”ofthesediversesymptoms.The phenomeno-logicalapproach,whichconsistsinelucidatingthestructuraldimensionofapsychopathological entity–inthepresentcase,theborderlinepersonality–,providesuswithamoreintegratedvision ofthisdisorder[6,7].
The present article aims toparticipate inthisquest for understanding, byfocusing on the temporalandsubjectiveexperiences(i.e.“livedtime”)ofpeoplepresentingborderlinepersonality disorder. Our workexamines someof phenomenology’s pioneeringpropositions1 [8–14] and proposesadynamicsynthesis.Inthisarticle,wewillisolateandfocusonthetemporalvariable, evenifthisapproachissomewhatartificial,andevenifother,cardinaldimensionssuchasthe relationtospace,tothebody,ortotheemotionsarealsocentraltotheborderlineexperience. (Theseotheraspectswillbe,evidently,evokedhere.).
2. Immediacy,lackofmediation,andtheemotionalexperience
ForKimura[8],variousanomaliesintheexperienceoftimecanbefoundindifferentmental pathologies andin differentpersonality types. We shouldbegin bypointing out that patients themselvesaren’tnecessarilyconsciousofthis(livedtimeisdifferentthantheconsciousnessof time,inwhichtimebecomesthecontentoftheexperienceofconsciousness),butthatproblematic experiences oftimemanifestthemselves inpatients’ waysofthinking,ofhoping, oflivingin thepresent,ofrememberingthepast,andofprojectingthemselvesintothefuture.Inthiscase, Kimura’scentralthesisisthatborderlinepatients’wayofexperiencingtimereflectsamodeof existencegovernedbyimmediacy.Regardingthisacuteexperienceoftime,wecanalsoreferto Muscelli andStanghellini[10,11],whobuild onKimura’shypothesisandevokethe notionof
instantaneity.
Inthiscaseofthepresentarticle,thesetermsshouldnotbeunderstoodonlyaccordingtotheir habitualmeanings,thatis,thoseofbrevityorrapidity.Instead,thesetermsalsorefertothefact thatborderlinepatients’psychicexistenceischaracterizedbyanabsenceofmediation(inasmuch as,giventheculturalandlinguisticmilieuinwhicheachhumanbeingisbornanddevelops,and giventherelativelyuninterruptedcharacterofthehumanstreamofconsciousness,thismediation canbetrulysaidtobetotallyabsent).Borderlinepatientscanpresentdifficultiesinrepresenting
eventsforthemselves,inreflectinguponthem,or,inKimura’swords[8],intransformingthe eventsandemotionsexperiencedinthepresent–im-mediatelyandnoetically–intonoematic
or reflectivelyconsciouscontents.Thisiswhat leadsphenomenologiststosaythat borderline patients liveanahistorical(orcyclical)temporality,thattheyexperiencetimeasanimmediate presentinwhichpastandfutureareneverconsideredassuch[8].Indeed,ifexperiencescan’tbe represented,conceptualized,orreflectedupon,itbecomesdifficultforthepersontocreateher ownnarrativeidentity[9].Fortheborderlineperson,this“existentialframework”thatintegrates pastevents(or,rather,therepresentationsthatthepersonshouldhaveofpastevents)inorder todetermineprojectionsforthefuture(or,moreprecisely,representationsoffutureeventsthat
shouldbepresentintheformofhopes,motivations,intentions,projects,andotherpromises)is
1Seealso:EnglebertJ,FolletV.“Dudéfinitifauprovisoire...”:Psychopathologieettatouage.In:KrtolicaI,Feneuil
deficient,whichmakestheattributionofpersonalmeaningtoeventslesseffectiveandwhichcan striptheseeventsoftheirexistentialsignificance.Theborderlinepatientis“caughtup”ineach newmomentasitarrives–or,asmaybethecase,inasinglepresentmomentwithouttemporal limits,withoutarticulation–,sincethefunctionsofthoughtandoflanguagethatallowoneto experience andassimilateeventsthrough higherlevel cognitions andelaborations seemtobe inefficientand,aboveall,overwhelmedbytheimpulsesofthemoment.
Justas“immediacy”shouldnotbereducedtoitscommonlyacceptedmeaning,thepresent orthepresenceinquestionshouldnotbesolelyunderstoodas“thenowthatpunctuatestheaxis oftime,norasavirtualpointthatcanberepresentedastheborderofthefutureandofthepast withoutbeingexperiencedassuch”([8],p.111).Instead,thesenotionsshouldbeunderstoodas atendencytobeabsorbedbytheimmediate,bythat which“pre-dates theverbal-discernment determination”([8],p.148),andwhichallowstheborderlinepatienttotearhimselfawayfrom afeeling ofemptiness;from adysphoricmood;or fromthe feelingsof urgency,anxiety,and irritabilitythataccompanythesestates.Thistendencyissimilartotheonethatprevailsduringa party,wheretheattractiontobreakingawayfromthedailyroutine(adailyroutinethat,forthe borderlinepatient,wouldamounttoafeelingofemptinessandadepressive mood)isstronger thananythingelse–andcarrieswithittheriskoflosingoneself.Thispropensityto“fillthevoidof existencethroughmomentsofecstasy,toactouttheprinciplesoflifeanddeath”([8],p.115)–in otherwords,concretely,toforgetoneselfinexplosionsofanger,inepisodesofsubstanceabuseand otheractsofself-harm–leadsKimuratorefertotheborderlinepatient’s“intrafestum”(literally, “duringthecelebration”)modeofexistence.Indeed,thisreferencetocelebration,toecstasy,to thissortof“chaoticimmediacy”([8],p.148)makessenseifweremindourselvesofelements that occur regularly ina borderline patient’sdaily life: addiction(alcohol, drugs,gambling); disorderedeating(particularlybingeeating);compulsivespending;sexualpromiscuity;and/or violence(directedtowardsoneselfortowardsothers).Asmentionedabove,Kimuragoessofar astodescribeanexperiencewhere“theprinciplesoflifeanddeathareneitherantagonisticnor mutuallyexclusive”([8],p.148).
From anotherdisciplinarystandpoint,Duvignaud’s studyLedon durien [15]allowsusto linkananthropologicalunderstandingoffestivitytotheborderlineperson’sambivalentandoften destructiverelationaldynamic.Theparty–which,contrarytotheborderlineexperience,is tem-porarilycircumscribed– canbeunderstoodas aparadoxicalrelational actbuilt uponinutility andnothingness.Duvignaud’sposition–thatthe“gratuitous”natureofthepartyisessentialto society’sfunctioning–isentirelyreasonable;however,anexistencethatisexclusivelyfoundedon thisdimensionwillinevitablyposeaproblemintermsofthesubject’sidentityandrelationships. Whiletheborderlinepatientstrivestocreateapermanent“partyworld”,thisdoesnotmean thatshelivesinastateofabsolutebliss.Instead,theimmediatepresentofsuchpatientsalternates betweendysphoricmoodsandmomentsofangerorshame(oftenmotivatedbythesenseofurgency
provokedbydysphoria).StanghelliniandRosfort[12]evokea“dysphoria-angercomplex”in whichthedysphoricmoodisconceivedofasacentrifugalforcethat“fragmentstheborderline person’s representations of herselfand others, thus contributingto her painful experience of incoherence andinner emptiness,her threatening feeling of uncertainty andinauthenticity in interpersonalrelationships,andherexcruciatingsenseofinsignificance,futility,andtheinanity oflife”([12],p.262),andinwhichangerisacentripetalforcethat“restoresthecohesionof theself,determinesaclear-cut,unambiguousimageoftheother,anddissipatesalldoubtsand sentimentsofabsurdityatthecostofacute,thoughtransitory,persecutorydelusions”([12],p. 262). Theborderline subject mustsomehow get throughlife withoutthe feltconsistency that comesfrom thedirectandimplicitexperienceof anintegratedpastandofatrulyanticipated
future.Hemustdowithoutthe“force”thatwouldallowhimtostaythecourseandtoforgean identitythanksto“second-ordervolitions”[12,16],thatis,englobing,overarching,anddurable volitionsthat allowapersontoseizethoseopportunitiesforautonomyandself-determination that are available toeveryhumanbeing – instead of beingguidedby his impulsesand other spontaneousoutbursts(whichare,insubstance,the“first-orderdesires”mentionedbyFrankfurt
[12,16]).
3. Postmodernityandthefragmentationoftheself
Themodificationstothewayinwhichconsistency,commitment,andresponsibilityare expe-rienced (both implicitly and explicitly) suggest profound existential difficulties, bothfor the borderlinepatientaswellas,morebroadly,withinourpostmodernsociety.Theprocessofforging anidentityisparticularlydifficult,andsubjects’capacitiesforreflexivity2andself-determination arecompromised.Inthisarticle,ourprimaryfocusisonthetemporaldimensionofthe postmod-ernexperience,whichFuchsdiscernsinthe“accelerationofmomentaryevents,(the)mobility ofworklife,(the)futilityofcommunication”([9],p.385).Theaccelerationoftime(andofthe paceoflife)–whichcompelsthepostmodernsubjecttoexperienceeverythingthatthislifehas tooffer–bringsaboutafeelingthatMuscelliandStanghellinicallfragmentation[10].Dailylife inpostmodernityischaracterizedbythepropensitytosatisfyanimmediatedesireattheexpense ofbuildingforthefuture;theincreasingbrevityandinstantaneousnessofevents;ever-increasing mobility;andtheubiquitousandimpersonalcharacterofcommunication.Inthecontextofglobal capitalism fueledbytechnologicaladvances,thephenomenaoftotalized commodificationand hyper-consumptionencroachupontheOther;onourinterpersonalrelationships;and,ultimately, onourlives[19].Thisallowsustosuggestalinkbetweentheincreasingprevalenceofborderline personalitydisorderandoursociety’sevolution.
FollowingFuchs,we canspeakof atemporalfragmentationoftheself,ofafragmentation ofidentity,andofafragmentationofthenarrativeidentity[9].Thistemporaryfragmentationof theselfcallstomindaparticularformofintolerancefortheambiguityanduncertaintythatare part ofanylong-terminterpersonalrelationship, and,especially,arejectionof thedimensions of commitment, responsibility,andguilt that theserelationships tendtoproduce.Rather than consentingtoaminimumoftherepressionthatpersonalgrowthrequires,ratherthaneliminating (voluntarilybutalsoinvoluntarily)certainundesirablecompulsionswhilefosteringothersinorder toliveaccordingtoacodethatcoulddefinehervaluesandheridentity,theborderlinepatienthas atendencytonotchoose;sheadapts,instead,bycleavingheridentity.Insodoing,shedeprives thisidentityofitsnormaltemporaldimension,byeliminatingpastandfutureinordertoavoid objectpermanence,bonds, commitment, responsibility,andguilt –all ofwhichparticipate in anchoring subjectsinthe long-term,atleast if werefer tothe dominant socialandrelational systemthatprecededthegradualadventofpostmodernity.Insum,wecansuggestthatthistype ofpatientadoptsaresolutely“postmodern”lifestyle,inwhichthesubjectisunmooredfromthe usualcoordinatesoftimeandspace(aswewillseelateron).
2Inthecontextofthisarticle,theconceptofreflexivityisborrowedfromtheworksoftheAmericanphenomenologist
LouisSass[17,18].Reflexivity,here,referstothatwhichallowsforaconsciousnessoftheselfthroughaturningback ontheself.Itisimportanttounderstandthatthereflexiveactisnotexclusivelyvolitionalorintellectual,andthatiscan thus,paradoxically,beassociatedwithautomaticorpre-reflectiveprocesses.Theactofthinking,ofreflecting–about oneself,aboutone’sexperience,abouttheworld–formsthebaseofone’snarrativeidentity,andisthusincludedinthis conceptionofreflexivity,butthelattercannotbereducedtoasimple“actofthinking.”
Itisdifficultfortheborderlinepatienttodistancehimselffromhisexperiences;heisincapable of mediatingtheminasatisfactorymanner.The borderline patienthasatendencytoidentify witheach momentas ithappens; sheiscompletely immerged ineach instant.The borderline relationshiptospaceismarkedbyubiquity[13],inthesensethat“thenow-experienceandthe personareone”([12],p.273).Thereisnothingseparatingthepresentmomentandtheself;present momentandselfare“fused”together,andthepersonis“onlywhattheyareexperiencingatthe moment”([9],p.381).Thesafetymarginthattypicallyseparatesusfromeventsismissing[12].In consequence,manyeventstakeonanexaggeratedimportanceforthepatient.Aperfectexample canbefoundinborderlinepatients’characteristicinterpersonalinstability,dueinparttothemany “anodyne”eventsthatareinterpretedasveritablebetrayals.Borderlinepatientshavedifficulty indistancingthemselvesfromtheirimmediateexperiencesandinadoptingametapositionthat couldhelpthemobserveandanalyzewhatisatstakeinsituationsinwhichtheyfeelthemselves entangled,ifnotoutrighttrapped.
ForMeares[12,20],thefacttheborderlinepatientsexperiencesuchrapidmoodswingsisjust oneoftheelementsthatcorroboratestheideathattheyliveinakindofpermanentpresent;thatthey areconstantlyabsorbedbythethingitself,theimmediatemoment,theinstantaneousemotion–and thatsecond-ordervolitionsdon’tsufficientlymoderatetheseimmediateexperiencesandmotions. Mearesalsoobservesthatinterviewswithborderlinepatientsoftenconsistofa“catalogofrecent events”rarelyaccompaniedbytakingastepbacktoputthingsinperspective,asifthesepatients wereincessantlycaughtupintheinternalandexternalstimulithattheyareunabletoignore.
Inhiswork,Mearesreferstoa“traumatic(memory)system”:insteadofrememberingevents
asmemories,borderlinepatientsseemtorelivememoriesasiftheywereonceagainhappening inthepresent. Thisphenomenon couldalso potentiallyexplaintheperceptual distortionsand otherpseudo-psychoticsymptomsthatoccasionallyoccur.Heattributesthepathogenesisofthis “traumaticsystem”toaninvalidatingenvironment,and,moreprecisely,toalackofrecognition ininterpersonalrelationshipsthatresultsinalackofintimacy–inthesenseofthefeelingofbeing someone,ofbeingoneself,basedonasharedintimateexperiencewithsomeoneelse.Duringthe constructionofthesubject’sidentity,Mearesargues,thiscomplexhindersthedevelopmentofan adequate“internallistener”.Whenallgoeswell,thisinteriorpartnerindialogue,thisinteriorized andsecureinterlocutor,givesaconcreteformtowhatKimuracallsaïda, byallowingfor the emergenceofthefeelingofhavinganidentity.Andthisthankstothefactthattheinternallistener representsbothafigureofalteritythatimpliesthatthereisanothertotalkto(theself,asadistinct entity,andthusendowedwithanidentity),andafigureofthefundamentalintersubjectivityand collectivitythatgivesrisetotheveryconceptofindividuality.
4. (Dis)embodiedandemotionaltemporality
Throughoutthisarticle,we havenoticedjusthowcentraltheoscillationsandintensitiesof emotionalexperiencesaretotheborderlineexperience.Itwouldseemuseful,then,toclarifythe phenomenologicaldefinitionofanemotion.Inphenomenology,emotionsare,firstly,conceived ofas “kinetic,dynamic forcesthatdriveusinourongoinginteractionswiththeenvironment” ([12],p.261).Onecouldevensuggest,asSartredoes[21],thatanemotionisaconditionsine quanonoftheinteractionsbetweenanindividualandhisenvironment.
The Latinroots of the word“emotion” (e-motio, e-movere) underscorethe importance of movement. Likewise, emotionalexperiences are tendencies to action;they motivate andcan bringabouttheproductionofmovement.Theyaretheorganizersofourbeing-in-the-world;of ourrelationshiptotime,tospace,totheself, andtoothers–inthat theysituatethepersonin
the world,and“allow himtoperceivethe thingsthat surroundhim asdisclosingcertain(and notother)possibilities”([12],p.262).Emotionalexperiencesarealsounderstoodas“embodied intentionality” ([12],p. 262),sincetheyformthe basisof ourattention andcontributetoour feelingofbeinginvolvedintheworld,toourrepresentationsofthings,tothemeaningwefind inthem,andtoourpre-reflectiveunderstandingofothers’behavior.Forallofthesereasons(and becauseofthebodilysensationsthattheyproduce),emotionsareunderstoodasfundamentally
corporeal[22,23].
However,thefragmentationoftimeandofidentitythatwehaveexploredinthisarticlecanalso befoundintherelationshiptothebody.Borderlinepatientsoftenexperienceterribledifficultiesin feelinglikeaperson–thisisafrequentreasonforseekingtherapy–,andmanyalsoreportafeeling ofdistancefromtheirownbody,asifthebodywas“lyingsomewherebetweenselfandnon-self” ([12],p.271),somewherebetweenselfandother.Borderlinepatientscanstruggletocontroltheir emotions;inthesameway,theyoftenspeakoftheirbodyasbeingoutoftheircontrol.Allofthe logicalpremisesthatfoundourjudgment(thejudgmentthatmediatesourdailyexperience),such astheprinciplesofidentity,ofnon-contradiction,oroftheexcludedthird,canbereducedtothe principleofindividuation:eachperson“hasonlyonebodilylifetolive”([8],p.147),andeach personisuniqueandself-contained.Theabsence ofmediation–thismissing“psychicforce”
[9,12]thatleadstoa“chronicfeelingofemptiness”–isintimatelylinkedtothefeelingthatone’s identityisvagueatbestandtothewaythatanindividualexperiencesherownbody.Here,wecan thinkofborderlinepatients’frequent,spectacularactsofself-harmthatregularlybringthebodily
dimensionintoplay. Manyauthorshavepointedoutthatwhentheseactsarenotsuicidal(e.g. cuttingandself-inflictedburns),theyresembleemotionalregulationstrategiesthataffordacertain relief,anexperienceof“discharge”[24].Theregulationofemotionsthroughthebodilymedium
cantakedifferentforms,accordingtowhattheyrepresentforeachindividual[24]:givingphysical formtopsychicpain[25];punishingoneselforregulatingone’sdysphoria;communicatingwith one’sentourage;rememberingcertaineventsbyleavingatrace(ascar);orfeelingmoreactive
(inthesenseofbeingtheagentof one’sexperiences,insteadofexperiencingthempassively). In general,theseactions on andby the bodyseem particularlyrelevant to ourreflections on immediacy.Wecan,forexample,imaginethat thebodilymedium“replaces”aninsufficiently mediatingreflectivecapacity.Wecouldalsopositaphenomenonof hypo-reflexivity– which, from apsychopathological pointof view, couldbeopposedtoschizophrenichyper-reflexivity
[17,18,26,27].Lastly,wecouldnotethatifsomepatientsclaimnottoexperienceanyphysical painduring theseacts,othersseemdrawntothem preciselyfor thisreason.Wecanthinkof physical painas asubstitute for apsychicpainthat cannotbe mediated[25].The borderline patient’sfrequentattractiontotattooscanalsobeinterpretedinlightofthesehypotheses3[14]. Bringing thebodyinto playis aparadoxicalremedy,ameansofovercoming thedistressthat characterizesaparticularformofrelationshipbetweenthebodyandtheself.
5. Conclusion:instantaneityandimmediacy
Inthisway,thetwomaindefinitionsoftheword“immediacy”revealtheircontinuity. Imme-diacy–inthesenseofanabsenceofmediation,inthesenseofafailuretobehaveinaccordance withsecond-ordervolitionsthatallowfor theevaluationandselectionof different“first-order
3EnglebertJ,FolletV.“Dudéfinitifauprovisoire...”:Psychopathologieettatouage.In:KrtolicaI,FeneuilA(Eds.), L’expériencedel’éternité.Paris:Hermann;2018.Inpress.
desires”–binds theborderlinepersontothepresentmoment,totheimmediate,followingthe secondacceptationoftheword.Theborderlinepatientpursuesasuccessionofdesiresandseems tocompletelyandunquestioningly adaptto“eachnow”inaquasi-randomway.Ifimmediacy does,indeed,refertosomethingdirect,itwouldbemoreprecisetosaythatthisnotionreflectsa kindofsuccessionwithoutlinks,withoutarticulation.Theimmediatefollowsorprecedeswithout apause.Thereisscarcelyanyroomformediationinthiswayofrelatingtotime,noristherea placeforanintermediary–whetherintheformofasubject-agentofmediationorofthesocial environment,the latter being unabletotake onthe role of moderator,of intermediary in the personalexperienceoftime.
Becauseofthisdeficitofmediation,theborderlinesubjectpossessesacertainflexibility.This subject,whomcertainauthorsconsidertobethestandard-bearer(fromapsychopathologicalpoint ofview)ofpostmodernity’sarchetypal“(normally)flexiblepersonality”[9],presentsapathology thatcouldthusbeconsideredahyper-flexiblesyndrome,viewedthroughthelensofcontemporary socialtendencies,whereanexcessofmediationmightinduceexistentialconsequencesunlikely tohelpsubjectsbetteradapt ortocontributetotheirwell-being.Indeed,thisflexibility,rather thanmediation,isperhapsaresponsetothepostmodernsocietalevolutiondescribedabove.And here,thehypothesisofanambienthyper-adaptationpresentinborderlinepatientsisperhapsless absurdthanitmightseematfirstglance.
Instantaneity,asa“transcendentalmatrixofthepostmodernhumancondition”([11],p.245), seemstohaveinvadedtheborderlinesubject’smodeofexistence.Thisdevotiontothe instan-taneousrepresentsthetriumph of thefragmentandof rawemotion,as wellas theerasureof long-lastingsocialrelationships,thatonecanobserveinnumerousphenomena,suchasonsocial media.Baumanreferstoourcontemporarysocietyasa“liquid”one[28,29],thereby differen-tiatingitfrommodern,“solid”societies.Today,emotionalandsocialphenomenaseemlessapt toallowthesubjecttoforgeastableandwell-definedidentityforherself(whetherimplicitlyor explicitly)–identityinthesenseofthepossibilityofexperiencingasubjectivityturned simulta-neouslytowardsapastmadeupofgenuinelyelaboratedpsychicexperiencesandtowardsafuture madeupofrealprojects.Thehumanmindcannotmatchthepaceofinstantaneousdailylife– whichhasflourishedthankstoincessanttechnologicalevolution–withoutfallingintoemptiness andexistentialsuffering.Logically,then,theborderlinepersonwouldbethe“hyperbole”ofan era characterizedbyfragmentation[10,11]– anoffspring,or the shrapnel,of postmodernity4
[13,14]–and,inthissense,perfectlyadaptedtothisregime.
Asafinalobservation,wemightremarkthattheconceptsofimmediacyandinstantaneousness
dealwiththesamephenomenonbutconsiderdifferentaspectsofit.Thefocusonthemedium
revealsa relational logic(the relationof the borderline individual totimeandtoothers) and suggestsamore“spatial”problematizationoflivedtime(theplaceofthesubjectsandofothers inthe process).Focusingonthe dimension of theinstantintroduces, instead,anarrativeand intrapsychicproblematicinthesubject’srelationshipstopast,present,andfuture,andallowsfor thedevelopmentofamore“temporal”argumentconcerninganintimatelivedexperienceoftime.
Disclosureofinterest
Theauthorsdeclarethattheyhavenocompetinginterest.
4 EnglebertJ,FolletV.“Dudéfinitifauprovisoire...”:Psychopathologieettatouage.In:KrtolicaI,FeneuilA(Eds.), L’expériencedel’éternité.Paris:Hermann;2018.Inpress.
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