Borderline personality disorder and lived time

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L’évolutionpsychiatrique83(2018)e37–e45

ScienceDirect

Original

article

Borderline

personality

disorder

and

lived

time

夽

Trouble

de

personnalité

borderline

et

temps

vécu

Fabian

Lo

Monte

(Psychologist)

,

Jérôme

Englebert

(Lecturer)

∗

DepartmentofPsychology,universitédeLiège,quartierAgora,placedesOrateurs1(BâtB33),4000Liège,Belgium

Abstract

Objectives.–Startingfromthesemiologicalheterogeneousnessofborderlinepatients,wetrytounderstand

theeverydaylifeofsuchsubjects,andtodeterminethepsychopathologicalstructureofBorderlinePersonality

Disorder.

Method.– Thisarticle’sprincipalfocusislivedtime.Weexplorediversemeaningsofthenotionsof imme-diacyandinstantaneity,consideredaskeycomponentsofborderlinepatients’livedtime.Wealsoconsider

otherexistentialconceptsfromphenomenologicalpsychopathology,suchasspace,emotion,identity,and

thebody.

Results.–Thefragmentedselfhypothesis(Fuchs,2007)clarifiesthewayinwhichborderlinepatientsrelate

tothemainpsychicfunctions,andrevealsabeing-in-the-worldinexcessofthespatio-temporalsituation.In

addition,Kimura’snotionoftheintrafestum(1992),closelycorrelatedtothenotionsofinstantaneityand

immediacy,isputintoafruitfuldialoguewiththenotionsofthefragmentedselfandoftheexceedingofthe

spatio-temporalsituation.

Discussion.–ThegrowingprevalenceofBPD,alongwiththequalityoftheexperiencesnarratedby

border-linepatients,allowustosuggestalinkbetweenaborderlinebeing-in-the-worldandoursociety’sincessant

technologicaladvances,whichcontainthepossibilityofmodifyingthecoordinatesofspaceandtime.

Conclusion.–Thedifferentconceptsexploredinthisarticleultimatelyappeartolinkbackupwiththenotions

ofinstantaneityandimmediacy.Thesetwoterms,closelyrelatedbutcallingupondifferentpointsofview,

arecloselyconnectedwithacertainhypo-reﬂexivity,whoseexpressiondiffersaccordingtowhetherone

situatesit inthe“normal”ortheinthepathological.Hypo-reflexivityappearsinthecontextofasocial

worldcharacterizedbytheconstantneedforhyper-ﬂexibility(whichnotionbringsusbacktoimmediacy

夽_Any_reference_to_this_article_must_mention:_Lo_Monte_F,_Englebert_J._Trouble_de_{personnalité}_borderline_et_temps_vécu.

Evolpsychiatr2018;83(4):(pages)(forthepaperversion)orURL[dateofvisit](fortheonlineversion).

∗_{Corresponding}_author.

E-mailaddress:[email protected](J.Englebert).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evopsy.2018.08.001

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andinstantaneity).Thus,theborderlineexperienceoverlapswithourpostmodernlifestyle,whichinturn

revealsthepotentiallyadaptivedimensionsofthispersonalitydisorder.

Keywords: Borderlinepersonalitydisorder;Psychopathology;Livedtime;Phenomenology;Mediation

Résumé

Objectifs.– Partant duconstat del’importante hétérogénéité sémiologique présentéepar lessujets

état-limite,cettecontributiontentedefaireémergerunecharpentepsychopathologiquedutroubledepersonnalité

borderlineafindemieuxcomprendrelevécudespatientsaffectésparcedernier.

Méthode.–Letempsvécu estl’angle d’attaque principalchoisidanscetarticle.La réflexions’articule

autourdesnotionsd’instantanéitéetd’immédiatetéetenexplorelesdifférentessignifications.Lesautres

coordonnéesexistentiellescommunémentinvestiguéesenpsychopathologiephénoménologique,commeles

rapportsàl’espace,àl’identité,auvécuémotionnelouaucorpssontégalementétudiées.

Résultats.–Lafragmentationtemporelledusoi(Fuchs,2007)quenousdécrivonspeutêtreconsidéréecomme

organisantlerapportauxprincipalesfonctionspsychiqueschezlespatientsborderline,etrévèleun

être-au-mondetendantversundépassementdelasituationspatio-temporelle.Enoutre,lafac¸ondevivreletemps

queKimura(1992)nommeintrafestum,quiestétroitementliéeauxnotionsd’instantanéitéetd’immédiateté

tellesquenouslesdéveloppons,semblesecombinerdefac¸onfructueuseaveclafragmentationtemporelle

dusoietledépassementdelasituation.

Discussion.–Lacombinaisonentrel’augmentationdelaprévalencedutroubleetlaqualitédesexpériences

rapportéesparlespatientspermetdesuggérerunlienentrel’être-au-mondeborderlineetl’évolutiondenotre

société,faited’avancéestechnologiquesincessantesà-mêmesdepermettreunemodificationdescoordonnées

spatio-temporelles.

Conclusion.–Lesdifférentesconceptionsexposéesdanscetarticlesemblentfinalementserejoindreautour

desnotionsd’instantanéitéetd’immédiateté.Cesdeuxtermes,trèsproches,maisconvoquantdespoints

devuedifférents,semblententretenirunlienétroitavecunecertainehypo-réﬂexivité.Celle-cis’exprime

àdesdegrésdiversselonquel’onsesituedansla«normalité»oulapathologie,etpeutêtrecomprise

enlienàuncontextesocialcaractériséparunenécessitéd’hyper-ﬂexibilitéquotidienne(quinousramène

ànouveauàl’immédiatetéetàl’instantanéité).Ainsi,plusieurspointsdel’expérienceborderlinepeuvent

êtrerapprochésdumodedeviepostmoderne,etcelarévèlelesdimensionspotentiellementadaptativesde

cetroubledelapersonnalité.

Motsclés: Troubledelapersonnalitéborderline;Psychopathologie;Phénoménologie;Tempsvécu;Médiation

1. Introduction

Borderlinepersonalitydisorder,asdefinedbythelatestversionsoftheDSM(−IVand−5)

[1,2],ischaracterizedbyitsconsiderablesemiologicalheterogeneousness.Thedifficultiesthese patients face range from interpersonal struggles(with, notably, the fear of abandonmentand extremeoscillationsintheirperceptionsofothers)toquestionsaboutidentity;self-harming behav-iors;avarietyofsubstanceuseandabusepatterns;addictivebehaviors;moodswingsandexcessive emotionality;acertainimpulsivenessandatendencytoimpatienceandtothesearchfor immedi-atesatisfaction;or,finally,transitorypseudo-psychoticsymptomssuchaspersecutorydelusions.

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The descriptionandcomparative analysisofthesedifferentclinicalsignsproposedbyvarious referenceworks[3–5]givestheimpressionofanaccumulationoflargelyunrelated manifesta-tionswhoseunderlyingcoherenceisenigmaticatbest.Here,phenomenologycanbeagreathelp inidentifyingthe“psychopathologicalorganizer”ofthesediversesymptoms.The phenomeno-logicalapproach,whichconsistsinelucidatingthestructuraldimensionofapsychopathological entity–inthepresentcase,theborderlinepersonality–,providesuswithamoreintegratedvision ofthisdisorder[6,7].

The present article aims toparticipate inthisquest for understanding, byfocusing on the temporalandsubjectiveexperiences(i.e.“livedtime”)ofpeoplepresentingborderlinepersonality disorder. Our workexamines someof phenomenology’s pioneeringpropositions1 [8–14] and proposesadynamicsynthesis.Inthisarticle,wewillisolateandfocusonthetemporalvariable, evenifthisapproachissomewhatartificial,andevenifother,cardinaldimensionssuchasthe relationtospace,tothebody,ortotheemotionsarealsocentraltotheborderlineexperience. (Theseotheraspectswillbe,evidently,evokedhere.).

2. Immediacy,lackofmediation,andtheemotionalexperience

ForKimura[8],variousanomaliesintheexperienceoftimecanbefoundindifferentmental pathologies andin differentpersonality types. We shouldbegin bypointing out that patients themselvesaren’tnecessarilyconsciousofthis(livedtimeisdifferentthantheconsciousnessof time,inwhichtimebecomesthecontentoftheexperienceofconsciousness),butthatproblematic experiences oftimemanifestthemselves inpatients’ waysofthinking,ofhoping, oflivingin thepresent,ofrememberingthepast,andofprojectingthemselvesintothefuture.Inthiscase, Kimura’scentralthesisisthatborderlinepatients’wayofexperiencingtimereflectsamodeof existencegovernedbyimmediacy.Regardingthisacuteexperienceoftime,wecanalsoreferto Muscelli andStanghellini[10,11],whobuild onKimura’shypothesisandevokethe notionof

instantaneity.

Inthiscaseofthepresentarticle,thesetermsshouldnotbeunderstoodonlyaccordingtotheir habitualmeanings,thatis,thoseofbrevityorrapidity.Instead,thesetermsalsorefertothefact thatborderlinepatients’psychicexistenceischaracterizedbyanabsenceofmediation(inasmuch as,giventheculturalandlinguisticmilieuinwhicheachhumanbeingisbornanddevelops,and giventherelativelyuninterruptedcharacterofthehumanstreamofconsciousness,thismediation canbetrulysaidtobetotallyabsent).Borderlinepatientscanpresentdifficultiesinrepresenting

eventsforthemselves,inreflectinguponthem,or,inKimura’swords[8],intransformingthe eventsandemotionsexperiencedinthepresent–im-mediatelyandnoetically–intonoematic

or reflectivelyconsciouscontents.Thisiswhat leadsphenomenologiststosaythat borderline patients liveanahistorical(orcyclical)temporality,thattheyexperiencetimeasanimmediate presentinwhichpastandfutureareneverconsideredassuch[8].Indeed,ifexperiencescan’tbe represented,conceptualized,orreflectedupon,itbecomesdifficultforthepersontocreateher ownnarrativeidentity[9].Fortheborderlineperson,this“existentialframework”thatintegrates pastevents(or,rather,therepresentationsthatthepersonshouldhaveofpastevents)inorder todetermineprojectionsforthefuture(or,moreprecisely,representationsoffutureeventsthat

shouldbepresentintheformofhopes,motivations,intentions,projects,andotherpromises)is

1_See_also:_Englebert_J,_Follet_V._“Du_définitif_au_provisoire_._._.”:_{Psychopathologie}_et_tatouage._In:_Krtolica_I,_Feneuil

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deficient,whichmakestheattributionofpersonalmeaningtoeventslesseffectiveandwhichcan striptheseeventsoftheirexistentialsignificance.Theborderlinepatientis“caughtup”ineach newmomentasitarrives–or,asmaybethecase,inasinglepresentmomentwithouttemporal limits,withoutarticulation–,sincethefunctionsofthoughtandoflanguagethatallowoneto experience andassimilateeventsthrough higherlevel cognitions andelaborations seemtobe inefficientand,aboveall,overwhelmedbytheimpulsesofthemoment.

Justas“immediacy”shouldnotbereducedtoitscommonlyacceptedmeaning,thepresent orthepresenceinquestionshouldnotbesolelyunderstoodas“thenowthatpunctuatestheaxis oftime,norasavirtualpointthatcanberepresentedastheborderofthefutureandofthepast withoutbeingexperiencedassuch”([8],p.111).Instead,thesenotionsshouldbeunderstoodas atendencytobeabsorbedbytheimmediate,bythat which“pre-dates theverbal-discernment determination”([8],p.148),andwhichallowstheborderlinepatienttotearhimselfawayfrom afeeling ofemptiness;from adysphoricmood;or fromthe feelingsof urgency,anxiety,and irritabilitythataccompanythesestates.Thistendencyissimilartotheonethatprevailsduringa party,wheretheattractiontobreakingawayfromthedailyroutine(adailyroutinethat,forthe borderlinepatient,wouldamounttoafeelingofemptinessandadepressive mood)isstronger thananythingelse–andcarrieswithittheriskoflosingoneself.Thispropensityto“fillthevoidof existencethroughmomentsofecstasy,toactouttheprinciplesoflifeanddeath”([8],p.115)–in otherwords,concretely,toforgetoneselfinexplosionsofanger,inepisodesofsubstanceabuseand otheractsofself-harm–leadsKimuratorefertotheborderlinepatient’s“intrafestum”(literally, “duringthecelebration”)modeofexistence.Indeed,thisreferencetocelebration,toecstasy,to thissortof“chaoticimmediacy”([8],p.148)makessenseifweremindourselvesofelements that occur regularly ina borderline patient’sdaily life: addiction(alcohol, drugs,gambling); disorderedeating(particularlybingeeating);compulsivespending;sexualpromiscuity;and/or violence(directedtowardsoneselfortowardsothers).Asmentionedabove,Kimuragoessofar astodescribeanexperiencewhere“theprinciplesoflifeanddeathareneitherantagonisticnor mutuallyexclusive”([8],p.148).

From anotherdisciplinarystandpoint,Duvignaud’s studyLedon durien [15]allowsusto linkananthropologicalunderstandingoffestivitytotheborderlineperson’sambivalentandoften destructiverelationaldynamic.Theparty–which,contrarytotheborderlineexperience,is tem-porarilycircumscribed– canbeunderstoodas aparadoxicalrelational actbuilt uponinutility andnothingness.Duvignaud’sposition–thatthe“gratuitous”natureofthepartyisessentialto society’sfunctioning–isentirelyreasonable;however,anexistencethatisexclusivelyfoundedon thisdimensionwillinevitablyposeaproblemintermsofthesubject’sidentityandrelationships. Whiletheborderlinepatientstrivestocreateapermanent“partyworld”,thisdoesnotmean thatshelivesinastateofabsolutebliss.Instead,theimmediatepresentofsuchpatientsalternates betweendysphoricmoodsandmomentsofangerorshame(oftenmotivatedbythesenseofurgency

provokedbydysphoria).StanghelliniandRosfort[12]evokea“dysphoria-angercomplex”in whichthedysphoricmoodisconceivedofasacentrifugalforcethat“fragmentstheborderline person’s representations of herselfand others, thus contributingto her painful experience of incoherence andinner emptiness,her threatening feeling of uncertainty andinauthenticity in interpersonalrelationships,andherexcruciatingsenseofinsignificance,futility,andtheinanity oflife”([12],p.262),andinwhichangerisacentripetalforcethat“restoresthecohesionof theself,determinesaclear-cut,unambiguousimageoftheother,anddissipatesalldoubtsand sentimentsofabsurdityatthecostofacute,thoughtransitory,persecutorydelusions”([12],p. 262). Theborderline subject mustsomehow get throughlife withoutthe feltconsistency that comesfrom thedirectandimplicitexperienceof anintegratedpastandofatrulyanticipated

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future.Hemustdowithoutthe“force”thatwouldallowhimtostaythecourseandtoforgean identitythanksto“second-ordervolitions”[12,16],thatis,englobing,overarching,anddurable volitionsthat allowapersontoseizethoseopportunitiesforautonomyandself-determination that are available toeveryhumanbeing – instead of beingguidedby his impulsesand other spontaneousoutbursts(whichare,insubstance,the“first-orderdesires”mentionedbyFrankfurt

[12,16]).

3. Postmodernityandthefragmentationoftheself

Themodificationstothewayinwhichconsistency,commitment,andresponsibilityare expe-rienced (both implicitly and explicitly) suggest profound existential difficulties, bothfor the borderlinepatientaswellas,morebroadly,withinourpostmodernsociety.Theprocessofforging anidentityisparticularlydifficult,andsubjects’capacitiesforreflexivity2andself-determination arecompromised.Inthisarticle,ourprimaryfocusisonthetemporaldimensionofthe postmod-ernexperience,whichFuchsdiscernsinthe“accelerationofmomentaryevents,(the)mobility ofworklife,(the)futilityofcommunication”([9],p.385).Theaccelerationoftime(andofthe paceoflife)–whichcompelsthepostmodernsubjecttoexperienceeverythingthatthislifehas tooffer–bringsaboutafeelingthatMuscelliandStanghellinicallfragmentation[10].Dailylife inpostmodernityischaracterizedbythepropensitytosatisfyanimmediatedesireattheexpense ofbuildingforthefuture;theincreasingbrevityandinstantaneousnessofevents;ever-increasing mobility;andtheubiquitousandimpersonalcharacterofcommunication.Inthecontextofglobal capitalism fueledbytechnologicaladvances,thephenomenaoftotalized commodificationand hyper-consumptionencroachupontheOther;onourinterpersonalrelationships;and,ultimately, onourlives[19].Thisallowsustosuggestalinkbetweentheincreasingprevalenceofborderline personalitydisorderandoursociety’sevolution.

FollowingFuchs,we canspeakof atemporalfragmentationoftheself,ofafragmentation ofidentity,andofafragmentationofthenarrativeidentity[9].Thistemporaryfragmentationof theselfcallstomindaparticularformofintolerancefortheambiguityanduncertaintythatare part ofanylong-terminterpersonalrelationship, and,especially,arejectionof thedimensions of commitment, responsibility,andguilt that theserelationships tendtoproduce.Rather than consentingtoaminimumoftherepressionthatpersonalgrowthrequires,ratherthaneliminating (voluntarilybutalsoinvoluntarily)certainundesirablecompulsionswhilefosteringothersinorder toliveaccordingtoacodethatcoulddefinehervaluesandheridentity,theborderlinepatienthas atendencytonotchoose;sheadapts,instead,bycleavingheridentity.Insodoing,shedeprives thisidentityofitsnormaltemporaldimension,byeliminatingpastandfutureinordertoavoid objectpermanence,bonds, commitment, responsibility,andguilt –all ofwhichparticipate in anchoring subjectsinthe long-term,atleast if werefer tothe dominant socialandrelational systemthatprecededthegradualadventofpostmodernity.Insum,wecansuggestthatthistype ofpatientadoptsaresolutely“postmodern”lifestyle,inwhichthesubjectisunmooredfromthe usualcoordinatesoftimeandspace(aswewillseelateron).

2_In_the_context_of_this_article,_the_concept_of_reflexivity_is_borrowed_from_the_works_of_the_American_{phenomenologist}

LouisSass[17,18].Reflexivity,here,referstothatwhichallowsforaconsciousnessoftheselfthroughaturningback ontheself.Itisimportanttounderstandthatthereflexiveactisnotexclusivelyvolitionalorintellectual,andthatiscan thus,paradoxically,beassociatedwithautomaticorpre-reflectiveprocesses.Theactofthinking,ofreﬂecting–about oneself,aboutone’sexperience,abouttheworld–formsthebaseofone’snarrativeidentity,andisthusincludedinthis conceptionofreflexivity,butthelattercannotbereducedtoasimple“actofthinking.”

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Itisdifficultfortheborderlinepatienttodistancehimselffromhisexperiences;heisincapable of mediatingtheminasatisfactorymanner.The borderline patienthasatendencytoidentify witheach momentas ithappens; sheiscompletely immerged ineach instant.The borderline relationshiptospaceismarkedbyubiquity[13],inthesensethat“thenow-experienceandthe personareone”([12],p.273).Thereisnothingseparatingthepresentmomentandtheself;present momentandselfare“fused”together,andthepersonis“onlywhattheyareexperiencingatthe moment”([9],p.381).Thesafetymarginthattypicallyseparatesusfromeventsismissing[12].In consequence,manyeventstakeonanexaggeratedimportanceforthepatient.Aperfectexample canbefoundinborderlinepatients’characteristicinterpersonalinstability,dueinparttothemany “anodyne”eventsthatareinterpretedasveritablebetrayals.Borderlinepatientshavedifficulty indistancingthemselvesfromtheirimmediateexperiencesandinadoptingametapositionthat couldhelpthemobserveandanalyzewhatisatstakeinsituationsinwhichtheyfeelthemselves entangled,ifnotoutrighttrapped.

ForMeares[12,20],thefacttheborderlinepatientsexperiencesuchrapidmoodswingsisjust oneoftheelementsthatcorroboratestheideathattheyliveinakindofpermanentpresent;thatthey areconstantlyabsorbedbythethingitself,theimmediatemoment,theinstantaneousemotion–and thatsecond-ordervolitionsdon’tsufficientlymoderatetheseimmediateexperiencesandmotions. Mearesalsoobservesthatinterviewswithborderlinepatientsoftenconsistofa“catalogofrecent events”rarelyaccompaniedbytakingastepbacktoputthingsinperspective,asifthesepatients wereincessantlycaughtupintheinternalandexternalstimulithattheyareunabletoignore.

Inhiswork,Mearesreferstoa“traumatic(memory)system”:insteadofrememberingevents

asmemories,borderlinepatientsseemtorelivememoriesasiftheywereonceagainhappening inthepresent. Thisphenomenon couldalso potentiallyexplaintheperceptual distortionsand otherpseudo-psychoticsymptomsthatoccasionallyoccur.Heattributesthepathogenesisofthis “traumaticsystem”toaninvalidatingenvironment,and,moreprecisely,toalackofrecognition ininterpersonalrelationshipsthatresultsinalackofintimacy–inthesenseofthefeelingofbeing someone,ofbeingoneself,basedonasharedintimateexperiencewithsomeoneelse.Duringthe constructionofthesubject’sidentity,Mearesargues,thiscomplexhindersthedevelopmentofan adequate“internallistener”.Whenallgoeswell,thisinteriorpartnerindialogue,thisinteriorized andsecureinterlocutor,givesaconcreteformtowhatKimuracallsaïda, byallowingfor the emergenceofthefeelingofhavinganidentity.Andthisthankstothefactthattheinternallistener representsbothafigureofalteritythatimpliesthatthereisanothertotalkto(theself,asadistinct entity,andthusendowedwithanidentity),andafigureofthefundamentalintersubjectivityand collectivitythatgivesrisetotheveryconceptofindividuality.

4. (Dis)embodiedandemotionaltemporality

Throughoutthisarticle,we havenoticedjusthowcentraltheoscillationsandintensitiesof emotionalexperiencesaretotheborderlineexperience.Itwouldseemuseful,then,toclarifythe phenomenologicaldefinitionofanemotion.Inphenomenology,emotionsare,firstly,conceived ofas “kinetic,dynamic forcesthatdriveusinourongoinginteractionswiththeenvironment” ([12],p.261).Onecouldevensuggest,asSartredoes[21],thatanemotionisaconditionsine quanonoftheinteractionsbetweenanindividualandhisenvironment.

The Latinroots of the word“emotion” (e-motio, e-movere) underscorethe importance of movement. Likewise, emotionalexperiences are tendencies to action;they motivate andcan bringabouttheproductionofmovement.Theyaretheorganizersofourbeing-in-the-world;of ourrelationshiptotime,tospace,totheself, andtoothers–inthat theysituatethepersonin

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the world,and“allow himtoperceivethe thingsthat surroundhim asdisclosingcertain(and notother)possibilities”([12],p.262).Emotionalexperiencesarealsounderstoodas“embodied intentionality” ([12],p. 262),sincetheyformthe basisof ourattention andcontributetoour feelingofbeinginvolvedintheworld,toourrepresentationsofthings,tothemeaningwefind inthem,andtoourpre-reflectiveunderstandingofothers’behavior.Forallofthesereasons(and becauseofthebodilysensationsthattheyproduce),emotionsareunderstoodasfundamentally

corporeal[22,23].

However,thefragmentationoftimeandofidentitythatwehaveexploredinthisarticlecanalso befoundintherelationshiptothebody.Borderlinepatientsoftenexperienceterribledifficultiesin feelinglikeaperson–thisisafrequentreasonforseekingtherapy–,andmanyalsoreportafeeling ofdistancefromtheirownbody,asifthebodywas“lyingsomewherebetweenselfandnon-self” ([12],p.271),somewherebetweenselfandother.Borderlinepatientscanstruggletocontroltheir emotions;inthesameway,theyoftenspeakoftheirbodyasbeingoutoftheircontrol.Allofthe logicalpremisesthatfoundourjudgment(thejudgmentthatmediatesourdailyexperience),such astheprinciplesofidentity,ofnon-contradiction,oroftheexcludedthird,canbereducedtothe principleofindividuation:eachperson“hasonlyonebodilylifetolive”([8],p.147),andeach personisuniqueandself-contained.Theabsence ofmediation–thismissing“psychicforce”

[9,12]thatleadstoa“chronicfeelingofemptiness”–isintimatelylinkedtothefeelingthatone’s identityisvagueatbestandtothewaythatanindividualexperiencesherownbody.Here,wecan thinkofborderlinepatients’frequent,spectacularactsofself-harmthatregularlybringthebodily

dimensionintoplay. Manyauthorshavepointedoutthatwhentheseactsarenotsuicidal(e.g. cuttingandself-inflictedburns),theyresembleemotionalregulationstrategiesthataffordacertain relief,anexperienceof“discharge”[24].Theregulationofemotionsthroughthebodilymedium

cantakedifferentforms,accordingtowhattheyrepresentforeachindividual[24]:givingphysical formtopsychicpain[25];punishingoneselforregulatingone’sdysphoria;communicatingwith one’sentourage;rememberingcertaineventsbyleavingatrace(ascar);orfeelingmoreactive

(inthesenseofbeingtheagentof one’sexperiences,insteadofexperiencingthempassively). In general,theseactions on andby the bodyseem particularlyrelevant to ourreflections on immediacy.Wecan,forexample,imaginethat thebodilymedium“replaces”aninsufficiently mediatingreflectivecapacity.Wecouldalsopositaphenomenonof hypo-reflexivity– which, from apsychopathological pointof view, couldbeopposedtoschizophrenichyper-reflexivity

[17,18,26,27].Lastly,wecouldnotethatifsomepatientsclaimnottoexperienceanyphysical painduring theseacts,othersseemdrawntothem preciselyfor thisreason.Wecanthinkof physical painas asubstitute for apsychicpainthat cannotbe mediated[25].The borderline patient’sfrequentattractiontotattooscanalsobeinterpretedinlightofthesehypotheses3[14]. Bringing thebodyinto playis aparadoxicalremedy,ameansofovercoming thedistressthat characterizesaparticularformofrelationshipbetweenthebodyandtheself.

5. Conclusion:instantaneityandimmediacy

Inthisway,thetwomaindefinitionsoftheword“immediacy”revealtheircontinuity. Imme-diacy–inthesenseofanabsenceofmediation,inthesenseofafailuretobehaveinaccordance withsecond-ordervolitionsthatallowfor theevaluationandselectionof different“first-order

3_Englebert_J,_Follet_V._“Du_définitif_au_provisoire_._._.”:_{Psychopathologie}_et_tatouage._In:_Krtolica_I,_Feneuil_A_(Eds.), L’expériencedel’éternité.Paris:Hermann;2018.Inpress.

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desires”–binds theborderlinepersontothepresentmoment,totheimmediate,followingthe secondacceptationoftheword.Theborderlinepatientpursuesasuccessionofdesiresandseems tocompletelyandunquestioningly adaptto“eachnow”inaquasi-randomway.Ifimmediacy does,indeed,refertosomethingdirect,itwouldbemoreprecisetosaythatthisnotionreflectsa kindofsuccessionwithoutlinks,withoutarticulation.Theimmediatefollowsorprecedeswithout apause.Thereisscarcelyanyroomformediationinthiswayofrelatingtotime,noristherea placeforanintermediary–whetherintheformofasubject-agentofmediationorofthesocial environment,the latter being unabletotake onthe role of moderator,of intermediary in the personalexperienceoftime.

Becauseofthisdeficitofmediation,theborderlinesubjectpossessesacertainflexibility.This subject,whomcertainauthorsconsidertobethestandard-bearer(fromapsychopathologicalpoint ofview)ofpostmodernity’sarchetypal“(normally)flexiblepersonality”[9],presentsapathology thatcouldthusbeconsideredahyper-ﬂexiblesyndrome,viewedthroughthelensofcontemporary socialtendencies,whereanexcessofmediationmightinduceexistentialconsequencesunlikely tohelpsubjectsbetteradapt ortocontributetotheirwell-being.Indeed,thisflexibility,rather thanmediation,isperhapsaresponsetothepostmodernsocietalevolutiondescribedabove.And here,thehypothesisofanambienthyper-adaptationpresentinborderlinepatientsisperhapsless absurdthanitmightseematfirstglance.

Instantaneity,asa“transcendentalmatrixofthepostmodernhumancondition”([11],p.245), seemstohaveinvadedtheborderlinesubject’smodeofexistence.Thisdevotiontothe instan-taneousrepresentsthetriumph of thefragmentandof rawemotion,as wellas theerasureof long-lastingsocialrelationships,thatonecanobserveinnumerousphenomena,suchasonsocial media.Baumanreferstoourcontemporarysocietyasa“liquid”one[28,29],thereby differen-tiatingitfrommodern,“solid”societies.Today,emotionalandsocialphenomenaseemlessapt toallowthesubjecttoforgeastableandwell-definedidentityforherself(whetherimplicitlyor explicitly)–identityinthesenseofthepossibilityofexperiencingasubjectivityturned simulta-neouslytowardsapastmadeupofgenuinelyelaboratedpsychicexperiencesandtowardsafuture madeupofrealprojects.Thehumanmindcannotmatchthepaceofinstantaneousdailylife– whichhasflourishedthankstoincessanttechnologicalevolution–withoutfallingintoemptiness andexistentialsuffering.Logically,then,theborderlinepersonwouldbethe“hyperbole”ofan era characterizedbyfragmentation[10,11]– anoffspring,or the shrapnel,of postmodernity4

[13,14]–and,inthissense,perfectlyadaptedtothisregime.

Asafinalobservation,wemightremarkthattheconceptsofimmediacyandinstantaneousness

dealwiththesamephenomenonbutconsiderdifferentaspectsofit.Thefocusonthemedium

revealsa relational logic(the relationof the borderline individual totimeandtoothers) and suggestsamore“spatial”problematizationoflivedtime(theplaceofthesubjectsandofothers inthe process).Focusingonthe dimension of theinstantintroduces, instead,anarrativeand intrapsychicproblematicinthesubject’srelationshipstopast,present,andfuture,andallowsfor thedevelopmentofamore“temporal”argumentconcerninganintimatelivedexperienceoftime.

Disclosureofinterest

Theauthorsdeclarethattheyhavenocompetinginterest.

4 _Englebert_J,_Follet_V._“Du_définitif_au_provisoire_._._.”:_{Psychopathologie}_et_tatouage._In:_Krtolica_I,_Feneuil_A_(Eds.), L’expériencedel’éternité.Paris:Hermann;2018.Inpress.

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