ENERGY PERFORMANCE CERTIFICATES AND INVESTMENTS IN BUILDING
ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant, Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga
IEB Working Paper
2018/11
IEB Working Paper 2018/11
ENERGY PERFORMANCE CERTIFICATES AND INVESTMENTS IN
BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant, Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of
Barcelona (UB) which specializes in the field of applied economics. The IEB is a
foundation funded by the following institutions: Applus, Abertis, Ajuntament de
Barcelona, Diputació de Barcelona, Gas Natural, La Caixa and Universitat de
Barcelona.
Within the IEB framework, the Chair of Energy Sustainability promotes research into
the production, supply and use of the energy needed to maintain social welfare and
development, placing special emphasis on economic, environmental and social aspects.
There are three main research areas of interest within the program: energy
sustainability, competition and consumers, and energy firms. The energy sustainability
research area covers topics as energy efficiency, CO2 capture and storage, R+D in
energy, green certificate markets, smart grids and meters, green energy and biofuels.
The competition and consumers area is oriented to research on wholesale markets, retail
markets, regulation, competition and consumers. The research area on energy firms is
devoted to the analysis of business strategies, social and corporative responsibility, and
industrial organization. Disseminating research outputs to a broad audience is an
important objective of the program, whose results must be relevant both at national and
international level.
The Chair of Energy Sustainability of the University of Barcelona-IEB is funded by
the following enterprises ACS, CEPSA, CLH, Enagas, Endesa, FCC Energia, HC
Energia, Gas Natural Fenosa, and Repsol) through FUNSEAM (Foundation for Energy
and Environmental Sustainability).
Postal Address:
Chair in Energy Sustainability
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa
Universitat de Barcelona
C/John M Keynes, 1-11
(08034) Barcelona, Spain
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46
ieb@ub.edu
http://www.ieb.ub.edu
IEB Working Paper 2018/11
ENERGY PERFORMANCE CERTIFICATES AND INVESTMENTS IN
BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant, Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga
ABSTRACT: In the European Union, Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) provide
potential buyers or tenants with information on a property's energy performance. By
mitigating informational asymmetries on real estate markets, the conventional wisdom
is that they will reduce energy use, increase energy-efficiency investments, and improve
social welfare. We develop a dynamic model that partly contradicts these predictions.
Although EPCs always improve social welfare, their impact on energy use and
investments is ambiguous. This implies that, in a second-best world where energy
externalities are under-priced and/or homeowners have behavioral biases hindering
investments (myopia), EPCs can damage social welfare. This calls for using mandatory
energy labeling in contexts where additional instruments efficiently mitigate the other
imperfections.
JEL Codes: Q48, R31
Keywords: Energy labeling, energy efficiency, buildings
Pierre Fleckinger
MINES ParisTech and PSL University &
Paris School of Economics, Paris, France
Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga
MINES ParisTech and PSL University
Paris, France
Matthieu Glachant
MINES ParisTech and PSL University
60 Boulevard St Michel
75006 Paris, France
Tel.: + 33140519229
E-mail:
matthieu.glachant@mines-paristech.fr
1
Introduction
Improving energy efficiency is viewed as a major means to curb greenhouse gas emissions and, more generally, to limit the negative externalities generated by energy production, distribution, and use. This has led many countries to include ambitious energy efficiency objectives in their climate plans. As an il-lustration, the European Union set a binding target mandating a 20% reduction in energy use by 2020 relative to a business-as-usual scenario and current policy discussions focus on a 30% target for 2030.
Taxing energy taxation the primary policy strategy to reduce energy use, but it is usually combined with sector-specific policies. This is particularly true for buildings, which are responsible for a sizable share of total energy use (e.g. 40% in the EU). Many countries grant tax credits and subsidies to energy retrofits of existing buildings. Building codes include energy performance provisions for new buildings.
Another popular policy approach consists in providing potential buyers or tenants with information on the energy performance. In the European Union, so-called Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) give information on a prop-erty’s typical energy use and energy cost, an energy efficiency rating from A (most efficient) to G (least efficient), practical advice on improving such per-formance. Their publication is compulsory in all advertisements for the sale or rental of buildings since 2007. In other countries, energy labeling is usually voluntary (e.g. Energy Star, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design). The rationale for EPCs, and energy labeling more generally, is that buy-ers/tenants do not observe a dwelling’s or an office’s energy performance before moving in. In economic parlance, energy performance is an experience-good at-tribute. That is, a product characteristic which is difficult to observe in advance, but that will be revealed after the transaction. When considering a given prop-erty, a potential buyer or a tenant thus depends on the information provided by the seller/landlord who have clear incentives to manipulate this information by
overstating the performance.
By limiting these informational asymmetries, EPCs are primarily expected to improve the matching between properties with heterogeneous energy perfor-mance and households on the real estate market. In particular, households with high energy needs – and thus a high willingness to pay for energy performance – will be able to choose energy-efficient properties, while households with lower needs will opt for cheaper, but lesser efficient properties. EPCs also raise the incentives to invest in energy efficiency as the price of energy-efficient properties is higher than that of inefficient ones. These two mechanisms are expected to reduce energy use and to improve social welfare.
We develop a dynamic model which examines the impact of EPCs on the level energy use, investments, and social welfare and find results that partly contradict these arguments. The model describes how the building stock of a city evolves over time. It includes two main ingredients: First, homeowners1 can make investments to upgrade their dwelling’s energy performance. Second, a fraction of dwellings is sold on a competitive real estate market in each period. We use this framework to identify the equilibrium investment paths with and without energy certification, and the resulting impact on energy consumption.
We confirm that, in the absence of other market imperfections, the introduc-tion of EPCs improves social welfare in any case. However, the impact on the level of energy use and on the volume of energy efficiency investments is ambigu-ous. This has a very important policy implication. In a second-best world where energy externalities are under-priced and/or where consumers have behavioral biases that hinder investments (myopia), EPCs can damage social welfare. This calls for using EPCs in contexts where other imperfections are addressed by adequate instruments.
Literature on Building Energy Certification We contribute to the eco-nomic literature on energy labeling of buildings with the first theoretical study
1Although we cast the model in terms of residential homes, it equally applies to office
dealing with its impact on energy use, retrofit investments and social welfare. Almost all existing studies are empirical and concentrates on the impact on housing prices and rents (e.g., Brounen and Kok, 2011, Kok and Quigley, 2008, Fuerst and McAllister, 2011, Fuerst et al., 2015, Hyland et al., 2013, Jensen et al., 2016, Kok and Jennen, 2012). They commonly find a positive impact although some studies are not able to identify whether this signals the effects of energy performance per se or the sole effect of labeling. The policy implications of these results are however limited. The ultimate objectives of energy labeling is reducing energy use and improving social welfare. In theory, this can occur through two mechanisms: a better matching between heterogeneous households and dwellings and higher investment incentives. The existence of a price pre-mium is a necessary condition for this to occur, but is not sufficient to test for these goal achievements.
An exception is a paper by Comerford et al. [2016] who examine the impact on energy performance. Relying on UK data, they identify a threshold effect. After the introduction of the EPC, more homes have an energy rating just above the D grade and less homes have a rating just below (the color-coded letter grade of the EPC overlaid a pre-existing 0-100 point scale. It illustrates a situation already identified by Dranove and Jin [2010]: sellers might want to game the system when information is disclosed. Here, sellers seem to invest in a strategic way to reach the letter D. This leads to potential inefficiency issues: some sellers might over-invest to reach the letter D, some sellers might under-invest because their letter is already D or above.2.
Note that we only refer here to schemes which publicly disclose energy per-formance on real estate markets. There have been many studies on private signals providing home occupiers with informational feedbacks on their home energy consumption (for instance, see Jessoe and Rapson [2012]). The under-lying mechanisms are totally different since this information does not reduce informational asymmetries on real estate markets, but is expected to mitigate
2In this respect, Sallee and Slemrod [2012] develops an interesting evaluation of the size of
behavioral biases.
2
Model
2.1
Assumptions
We develop a dynamic model in discrete time, which describes the evolution of the building stock of a city. The stock include dwellings with energy performance θ. Each dwelling can either be energy-efficient (θ = 1) or inefficient (θ = 0). The dwellings are owned and occupied by a continuum of households with heterogeneous energy needs.3 More specifically, each household consumes a quantity of energy θ × e per period where e is distributed over [0, +∞) with cumulative F . F is continuous and the overall level of energy consumption is bounded: R+∞
0 e dF (e) < +∞.
Let qt denote the share of efficient dwellings. We assume that all dwellings are inefficient at the beginning of the game: q0 = 0. Any household can then invest in any period to upgrade its property if θ = 0. The cost is I and θ = 1 after investment, which is irreversible and which has an infinite lifetime (after investment, the energy performance is 1 over the entire time horizon). The share of efficient dwellings at time t is qt.
In each period, m households exogenously move out and sell their dwelling to the same number of households living outside the city who move in. Incoming and outgoing households are drawn from the same distribution. The exogene-ity of moving decisions captures the fact that most people decide to move in or out for professional or family reasons that are not related to home energy performance. The real estate market is competitive.
When there is certification, energy performance is perfectly observable be-fore the sale. Without certification, we assume that incoming households only observe it after moving in. The timing of events within each period t is as follows:
1. m households move out and m households move in.
2. Outgoing households sell their dwellings to incoming households. 3. Incoming households observe the energy performance of their home. 4. Each household living in an inefficient dwelling (θ = 0) decides whether
to invest I or not. 5. Payoffs are realized.
Last, we assume that all households form perfect expectations about future housing prices in all scenarios.
2.2
Social optimum
We can now identify the investment path and the allocation of households in the dwellings that implement the first best outcome. Under our assumptions, this optimum minimizes the discounted sum of investment and energy expenditures over the entire time horizon:
Social cost function is
C = ∞ X t=0 δt Z +∞ 0
Pt(θ = 0|e)(1 + α)e dF (e) + (qt+1− qt)I
Consider first the socially optimal matching rule in period t contingent on a given building stock with a share of energy efficient dwellings qt. In this context, perfect marching requires the allocation of households with the highest energy needs in the energy-efficient dwellings. Formally, let gt∗denote this socially op-timal allocation function e 7→ θ which maps each household type to a dwelling’s level of energy performance in period t. Perfect matching means that:
g∗t(e∗t) =1{e≥e∗
t} (1)
where e∗t is the limit type which binds the city capacity constraint: 1 − F (e∗t) = qt.
Turning next to the investment path, recall that the distribution of house-holds’ types e does not vary over time: incoming households are drawn from the same distribution as that of the initial population. As a result, an investment in a given dwelling should either be made in the first period or never, which in turn leads to a time-invariant threshold e∗t. Ignoring the time index, the value of e∗ is then obtained by considering that the investment decision in period 1 should be made as if the same household was staying forever. In this context, energy retrofit is socially optimal if the household e is such that the investment cost is lower than the net present value of the energy cost over the infinite time horizon: I ≤ ∞ X k=0 δke = e 1 − δ (2)
where δ denotes the household discount factor. This completes the characteri-zation of the social optimum.
Lemma 1 (Social optimum). In the first best optimum, investments are only made in period t = 1 and the share of efficient dwellings is q∗ = 1 − F (e∗) with e∗= I(1 − δ) for any t > 0. The energy-efficient dwellings should then be occupied by households with types higher than e∗: g∗
t(e∗t) =1{e≥e∗}).
3
Decentralized Equilibrium with an EPC
In this section, we examine the equilibrium investment path under perfect infor-mation on energy performance. From now on, let ut(e, θ) denote the expected lifetime surplus of a household of type e living in a dwelling with performance θ at the beginning of period t. In the case where the dwelling is efficient (θ = 1), this surplus is given by the recurrence relation:
ut(e, 1) = δ[mp1t+1+ (1 − m)ut+1(e, 1)]
That is, the energy expenditure is zero in period t while the household moves out in the next period with probability m, thereby selling the dwelling at price
p1
t+1, or stays with probability 1 − m and derives surplus ut+1(e, 1).
When θ = 0, the surplus depends on whether the homeowner invests or not. Denoting uI
t(e) and u∅t(e) the expected utility is:
ut(e, 0) = max{uIt(e), u ∅
t(e)} (3)
with:
uIt(e) = −I + δmp1t+1+ δ(1 − m)ut+1(e, 1) u∅t(e) = −e + δmp0t+1+ δ(1 − m) × ut+1(e, 0)
We now examine how incoming households are allocated in the different dwellings by the real estate market. To start with, perfect information implies a separating equilibrium with a price premium for the energy efficient dwellings: p0
t < p1t. The outcome of the sales is then given by p0t, p1t, and the allocation function gt: e 7→ θ which satisfies two conditions:
• Market clearing: R+∞
0 gt(e)dF (e) = qt. • Incentive compatibility: gt(e) = argmax
θ
ut(e, θ) − pθt.
From the incentive compatibility condition easily follows that the market perfectly matches the households with the dwellings. That is, there is a thresh-old type such that all househthresh-olds with lower types purchase inefficient dwellings whereas the highest types choose efficient ones. Hence gt= gt∗.
Lemma 2 (Perfect matching). Under perfect certification, all incoming house-holds with types such that e ≥ ˜etwhere ˜etis defined by F (˜et) = 1 − qtpurchases energy-efficient dwellings.
gt(e2) = 0. From the incentive compatibility, this would imply that
ut(e1, 1) − p1t ≥ ut(e1, 0) − p0t ut(e2, 1) − p1t < ut(e2, 0) − p0t
This is not possible because the function ut(e, 1) − p1t− ut(e, 0) + p0t is increasing with e. To see this, note first that p1
t and p0t do not vary with e because the market is competitive. This also holds true for ut(e, 1) which only depends on the price trajectory as shown by Eq.(??). Last, from Eq.(3) follows that ut(e, 0) is decreasing with e as u∅t(e) is decreasing. The market clearing condition directly gives the value of the threshold ˜e.
A direct implication is that the relative prices in equilibrium are those mak-ing the limit type ˜e indifferent between both dwelling types:
Corollary 1. In the market equilibrium, we have p1
t− p0t = ut(˜e, 1) − ut(˜e, 0). In order to predict the investment decisions in this market environment, we now compare uI
t with u∅t. It is intuitive that investors are the households with the highest energy needs.
Lemma 3. In period t, a household of type e living in an inefficient dwelling invests if e ≥ ˘e where ˘e is the unique solution of u∅t(e, 0) = uIt(e, 0).
Proof. uIt does not vary with e while u∅t is strictly decreasing with e. When e → ∞, we have u∅t → −∞, implying that uI
t > u∅t. Last, we show that uI
t(0) − u∅t(0) < 0 when e = 0 by contradiction. Assume that uIt(0) > u∅t(0) ≥ 0. This implies that have uI
t(0) = ut(0, 0) = −I + ut(0, 1), and thus ut(0, 1) − ut(0, 0) = I. We know that ut(e, 1) − ut(e, 0) is increasing with e, meaning that ut(0, 1) − ut(0, 0) < ut(˜e, 1) − ut(˜e, 0). Corollary 1 then implies that I < p1t− p0t, which is absurd.
Establishing that perfect certification implements the first best is then straight-forward as we just need to show that ˜e = ˘e = e∗.
Proposition 1. Perfect certification implements the first best optimum. Proof. uI
t(˘e) = u∅t(˘e) implies that −I + ˘e + δm(p1t+1− p0t+1) + [ut+1(˘e, 1) − ut+1(˘e, 0)] = 0. From Corollary 1 and ˜e = ˘e follows that this equation is equivalent to −I + ˘e + δ(ut+1(˘e, 1) − ut+1(˘e, 0)) = 0. Plugging ut+1(˘e, 1) = uIt+1+ I yields that ˘e = I(1 − δ) = e∗.
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Lemma 2 implies that investing households anticipate that, if they move out in a next period, their home will be purchased by the highest types. As incoming types are drawn from the same distribution, they invest as if they were going to stay forever in the dwelling, trading off the investment cost and the total discounted energy cost e/(1 − δ).
4
Equilibrium without EPC
The main difference with the certification case is that we now have a pooling equilibrium on the real estate market with p0
t = p1t. This greatly simplifies the analysis as the real estate market gives zero value to energy retrofit (p0
t = p1t) and incoming households are randomly assigned to the dwellings.
When making an investment decision, the households just need to compare the investment cost with the savings in their own energy consumption in the current period and in future periods if they do not move. Household e will thus invest if: I ≤ e × ∞ X k=1 (δ(1 − m))k= e 1 − δ(1 − m) (4) This condition shows a partial internalization of the investment benefit by the investor. As the household may move out and sell its dwelling with per-period probability m, investing households discount the future at rate δ(1 − m), that is the conventional discount rate times the probability of staying in the next period. Hence, we have:
Lemma 4. In any period, a household of type e living in an inefficient dwelling invests if e ≥ ˆe where ˆe = I(1 − δ(1 − m)).
Although individual investment incentives are lower than the first best in a given period, they persist over time in contrast with the first best where all investments are made in the first period. The reason is that the randomized market allocation implies that high types inevitably move in inefficient dwellings in each period. Once installed, they cannot but invest to consume less energy. To be more precise, the process unfolds as follows:
• At t = 0, all households occupy inefficient dwellings.
• In period 1, the types higher than ˆe upgrades their home. As a result, the share of inefficient dwellings is F (ˆe) at the end of the period.
• At the beginning of period 2, m households randomly move out. A share mF (ˆe) of inefficient dwellings are thus (randomly) sold to incoming house-holds. Households moving in these inefficient dwellings invest if their type is higher than ˆe. The share of efficient dwellings thus increases up to (1 − m)(1 − F (ˆe).
The process goes on so that we have
Lemma 5. In period t, the share of efficient dwellings is qt = 1 − F (ˆe)[1 − m(1 − F (ˆe))]t−1. The overall level of energy investment flow is I
t = mI(1 − F (ˆe))F (ˆe)[1 − m(1 − F (ˆe))]t−1 and the overall level of energy consumption is Et= [1 − m(1 − F (ˆe))]tR
ˆ e
0e dF (e).
Proposition 2. Households never stop investing so that the share of efficient dwellings converges to 1 in the long run: qt → 1. The levels of per-period investments and energy use converge to zero: Et→ 0 and It→ 0
This dynamics is represented in Figure 1 which compares the evolution over time of qt with and without certification. Accounting for the dynamics of the building stock thus yields the counter-intuitive results that the absence of en-ergy certification leads to more enen-ergy efficiency investments and less enen-ergy
consumption in the long run. This trajectory however damages social welfare compared to energy certification which implements the first best optimum.
Figure 1: Example of energy-efficient dwellings stock qttrajectories
Until now, it has been assumed that EPCs are introduced at t = 0 (when q0= 0). From a policy perspective, it is more realistic to consider that certifi-cation is introduced in period τ > 0. We now investigate this case, introducing two additional assumptions. First, owners do not anticipate the introduction of certification in previous periods. Before τ > 0, their investment behavior is thus not influenced by future signals on the real estate market. Second, at the beginning of period τ , the share qτ of energy-efficient buildings and the alloca-tion correspond to those of the trajectory described in Lemma 5. Under these assumptions, it is straightforward that:
Proposition 3. In the case where the EPC is introduced at the beginning of period τ , all investments are immediately made. This leads to a (constant) share of efficient dwellings such 1 > qτ +1 > q∗. After τ , per-period energy consumption Et decreases towards a value Eτ∞ which verifies E∗> E∞τ > 0.
The proof and the intuition is straightforward. In period τ , there remains a share qτ of inefficient dwellings, which can be lower or higher than the first best. Suddenly, a price gap between efficient and inefficient dwellings appears on the real estate market. The households occupying inefficient dwellings whom types lies in between ˆe and e∗ thus decide to invest. At the end of the period, there however remains one inefficiency: there remain low types who live in efficient dwellings. This imperfect matching will progressively vanishes in the next periods when the low types will move out and sell their property to high types. Note that this result decisively hinges upon the assumption that moving decisions are exogenous. That is, we rule out cases where low types living in efficient dwellings would all move in inefficient dwellings in the city, thereby increasing their surplus by selling at a high price to high types.
5
EPC in a second best world
We have just seen that introducing EPCs may lead to higher energy consumption and lower cumulative investments. This implies that certification may reduce welfare in a second-best world where energy externalities are not sufficiently internalized or where households do not invest enough due to behavioral biases or other imperfections (”myopia).
5.1
Under-priced energy externalities
Assume now that energy expenditure e generates an externality αe which is not internalized with a tax or another policy instruments. Households thus use too much energy under EPCs. More precisely, cumulative energy cost, excluding the externality, is nowRe ∗ 0 edF (e) /(1−δ) while it should beRe ∗∗ 0 edF (e) /(1−δ) in the first best with a threshold e∗∗= I(1 − δ)/(1 + α) which is lower than e∗.
Under EPCs, cumulative energy use follows from Lemma 5: +∞ X t=0 δtEˆt= 1 1 − δ[1 − m(1 − F (ˆe))] Z ˆe 0 edF (e)
It is then clear that the difference with the EPC scenario is ambiguous. In particular, it depends on the cumulative F . If most households lie in between e∗and ˆe (the population has intermediary energy needs), they will not invest in the absence of EPCs), leading to a higher energy use4. This is just the opposite if most of the households have high energy so that e > ˆe. Their propensity to invest is identical in the first period, but a fraction of incoming households continue to invest in the next periods without EPCs because they move in an inefficient dwellings.
Depending on the size of the externality, this can lead to a higher social cost with EPCs. Formally, the social cost function is
C = ∞ X t=0 δt Z +∞ 0
Pt(θ = 0|e)(1 + α)e dF (e) + (qt+1− qt)I
And straightfoward calculation yields that EPCs improve welfare iff:
(1 + α) Reˆ 0e dF (e) 1 − δ(1 − m(1 − F (ˆe))) − Re∗ 0 e dF (e) (1 − δ)) ! + I 1 − δ(1 − m) 1 − δ(1 − m(1 − F (ˆe)))(1 − F (ˆe)) − (1 − F (e ∗))> 0
The sign of this (cumbersome) welfare difference is ambiguous. If α is very small, the EPC scenario converges to the first best. If α is large, EPCs may damage welfare if qt quickly converge towards 1. And we have seen that this depends on the distribution F (among other factors). We collect these insights in a new proposition.
Proposition 4. In the case where energy consumption generates an externality of size α per unit, introducing EPCs may damage social welfare. This ultimately depends on the sets of parameters m, δ, I, α and on the distribution of energy needs F .
4Formally, F (ˆe) → 1, implying that the first multiplicative tends to be equal across
5.2
Owner myopia
The empirical literature on residential energy efficiency provide evidence that energy users may under-estimate future private energy savings when making in-vestment decisions (for a general discussion, see Gillingham and Palmer [2014]). This leads to decisions that are not privately optimal and justifies the existence of policies that promote investments (e.g., subsidies, tax credits).
In line with these arguments, assume now that the owners discount future costs with a private discount factor µ which is higher than the social discount rate δ. Again, one can expect that the absence of EPCs, which increases in-vestments in the long run, may be more efficient. By analogy with the previous case, we can easily show that EPCs improve welfare iff:
Reˆµ 0 e dF (e) 1 − δ(1 − m(1 − F ( ˆeµ))) − Re∗µ 0 e dF (e) (1 − δ)) ! + I 1 − δ(1 − m) 1 − δ(1 − m(1 − F ( ˆeµ))) (1 − F ( ˆeµ)) − (1 − F (e∗µ)) > 0
with e∗µ= I(1 − µ) and ˆeµ= I(1 − µ(1 − m)). This difference is again ambiguous and we have a proposition which is similar to the previous one.
Proposition 5. In the case where owners discount too much the future, intro-ducing EPCs may damage social welfare. This ultimately depends on the sets of parameters m, δ, I, α and on the distribution of energy needs F .
6
Conclusions
We have developed a dynamic model featuring a building stock with endogenous energy characteristics. The model includes three main ingredients. First, in the absence of EPCs, potential buyers do not observe energy performance before moving in their new home (experience good). Second, each homeowner can invest in order to increase his/her dwelling’s energy performance. Third, an exogenous fraction of dwellings is sold in each period.
If asymmetric information on quality is the only market failure, we show that EPCs implement the social optimum. Less intuitively, the impact on the volume of investments and on the level of energy use is ambiguous. In the short run, that is, holding fixed the energy characteristics of the building stock, EPCs decrease energy use by improving the matching between buyers with hetero-geneous energy needs and dwellings with heterohetero-geneous energy performance. In the long run, EPCs can however either decrease of increase investments in energy efficiency, and thus energy use. Two countervailing factors drive this outcome. On the one hand, EPCs create on the real estate market a wedge between the price of efficient dwellings and inefficient dwellings. Homeowners are thus more prone to retrofit their homes because they anticipate a possible resale in the future. On the other hand, EPCs give potential buyers with two instruments to reduce energy use: purchasing an inefficient dwelling and invest or purchasing a dwelling which is already efficient. In contrast, investing is their unique instrument if they do not observe energy performance. In the long run, this increases investments as the random allocation of newcomers inevitably leads to the installation of a fraction of households with high energy needs in inefficient properties.
These results have important policy implications. In a second-best world where energy externalities are under-priced – leading to a too high energy use – and/or where consumers show behavioral biases that hinder investments (my-opia), EPCs can thus damage social welfare. It is however extremely difficult to identify the contexts in which this could occur, in particular, because household heterogeneity – captured by the shape of the distribution of e in our setting – strongly influences the equilibrium path. This thus calls for using EPCs in contexts where other imperfections are properly addressed by other instruments. While the empirical literature on EPCs and energy labeling is well developed as mentioned in introduction, it yields nearly no useful inputs for our conclusions as it does not deal with the impacts on energy use and investments.
directions. First, we want to generalize the results to the rental case. While the above mechanisms would still operate, the investment incentives are clearly lower without EPCs as the owner derives zero benefit from energy savings. Second, we want to calibrate the theoretical model with realistic figures in order to derive more clear-cut results on the impact of EPCs. Third, we also plan to explore the impacts of voluntary labeling.
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7
Appendix
7.1
Extension: rental case with landlords and tenants
We now consider the case where households rent their dwellings.
7.1.1 Model
Compared to the previous sections, we now distinguish two categories of agents: landlords and tenants (we still consider a continuum of agents in both cate-gories). Landlords play an infinite-horizon game. At each period, they offer their dwelling for rent. Landlords are profit-maximizers and can weatherize their dwelling for a cost I. Tenants have a type e distributed according to the cumulative distributive function F as in the previous sections. At each period, a tenant has an exogenous probability m of moving out of the city and m incoming tenants move in.
At each period occurs the following sequence:
1. m tenants inside the city exogeneously decide to move out. Landlords who own empty energy-inefficient dwellings can choose to weatherize their dwelling for a cost I.
2. m tenants outside the city decide to move in. Incoming tenants pick up their new dwelling in a competitive equilibrium setting. Energy-efficient dwellings of type ¯θ rent at ¯pt and energy-inefficient dwellings of type θ rent at p
t.
3. Incoming tenants learn the energy performance of their new dwellings if not previously known. Tenants who live in energy-inefficient dwellings can weatherize their dwelling for a cost I.
4. Tenants of type e who live in an energy-efficient dwelling receive a payoff e. Tenants who live in an energy-inefficient dwelling receive zero payoff.
Similar results for such a setting.
IEB Working Papers
2013
2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age
matter?"
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas?
The answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants"
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans,
the Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities"
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated?
Costs and benefits of being a capital/central municipality"
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from
Catalonia"
2013/8, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Banking towards development: evidence from the Spanish
banking expansion plan"
2013/9, Asensio, J.; Gómez-Lobo, A.; Matas, A.: "How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption?
Evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain"
2013/10, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions"
2013/11, Segarra, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel, M.: "Financial constraints and the failure of innovation
projects"
2013/12, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.: "The mathematics skills of school children: How does England compare to the high
performing East Asian jurisdictions?"
2013/13, González-Val, R.; Tirado-Fabregat, D.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Market potential and city growth:
Spain 1860-1960"
2013/14, Lundqvist, H.: "Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office"
2013/15, Ahlfeldt, G.M.; Maennig, W.: "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: a spatial analysis of airport effects"
2013/16, Lampón, J.F.; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Factors behind international relocation and changes in production
geography in the European automobile components industry"
2013/17, Guío, J.M.; Choi, A.: "Evolution of the school failure risk during the 2000 decade in Spain: analysis of
Pisa results with a two-level logistic mode"
2013/18, Dahlby, B.; Rodden, J.: "A political economy model of the vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal
imbalances in a federation"
2013/19, Acacia, F.; Cubel, M.: "Strategic voting and happiness"
2013/20, Hellerstein, J.K.; Kutzbach, M.J.; Neumark, D.: "Do labor market networks have an important spatial
dimension?"
2013/21, Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand constraints to
innovation"
2013/22, Lin, J.: "Regional resilience"
2013/23, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: "R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation in
the energy industry"
2013/24, Huisman, R.; Stradnic, V.; Westgaard, S.: "Renewable energy and electricity prices: indirect empirical
evidence from hydro power"
2013/25, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 2013/26, Lambertini, L.; Mantovani, A.: "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly:
pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion"
2013/27, Feld, L.P.; Kalb, A.; Moessinger, M.D.; Osterloh, S.: "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules
and no-bailout clauses – the Swiss experience"
2013/28, Hilber, C.A.L.; Vermeulen, W.: "The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England" 2013/29, Revelli, F.: "Tax limits and local democracy"
2013/30, Wang, R.; Wang, W.: "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization"
2013/31, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective"
2013/32, Saarimaa, T.; Tukiainen, J.: "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary
reforms"
2013/33, Agasisti, T.; Murtinu, S.: "Are we wasting public money? No! The effects of grants on Italian university
students’ performances"
2013/34, Flacher, D.; Harari-Kermadec, H.; Moulin, L.: "Financing higher education: a contributory scheme" 2013/35, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: "Sending the pork home: birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities"
IEB Working Papers
2014
2014/1, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "When police patrols matter. The effect of police proximity on citizens’
crime risk perception"
2014/2, Garcia-López, M.A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do land use policies follow road
construction?"
2014/3, Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: "Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle" 2014/4, Cuberes, D.; González-Val, R.: "The effect of the Spanish Reconquest on Iberian Cities"
2014/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, E.: "Tax professionals' view of the Spanish tax system: efficiency,
equity and tax planning"
2014/6, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Difference-form group contests"
2014/7, Del Rey, E.; Racionero, M.: "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: sharing versus
risk-pooling"
2014/8, Torregrosa Hetland, S.: "A fiscal revolution? Progressivity in the Spanish tax system, 1960-1990" 2014/9, Piolatto, A.: "Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion"
2014/10, Costa, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Segarra, A.: "Energy efficiency determinants: an empirical analysis of
Spanish innovative firms"
2014/11, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Reviving demand-pull perspectives: the effect of
demand uncertainty and stagnancy on R&D strategy"
2014/12, Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Barriers to non-formal professional training in Spain in periods of economic
growth and crisis. An analysis with special attention to the effect of the previous human capital of workers"
2014/13, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty" 2014/14, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: "Media competition and electoral politics"
2014/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Regulatory environment and firm performance in EU
telecommunications services"
2014/16, Lopez-Rodriguez, J.; Martinez, D.: "Beyond the R&D effects on innovation: the contribution of
non-R&D activities to TFP growth in the EU"
2014/17, González-Val, R.: "Cross-sectional growth in US cities from 1990 to 2000"
2014/18, Vona, F.; Nicolli, F.: "Energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in OECD countries" 2014/19, Curto-Grau, M.: "Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies"
2014/20, Duro, J.A.; Teixidó-Figueras, J.; Padilla, E.: "The causal factors of international inequality in co2
emissions per capita: a regression-based inequality decomposition analysis"
2014/21, Fleten, S.E.; Huisman, R.; Kilic, M.; Pennings, E.; Westgaard, S.: "Electricity futures prices: time
varying sensitivity to fundamentals"
2014/22, Afcha, S.; García-Quevedo, J,: "The impact of R&D subsidies on R&D employment composition" 2014/23, Mir-Artigues, P.; del Río, P.: "Combining tariffs, investment subsidies and soft loans in a renewable
electricity deployment policy"
2014/24, Romero-Jordán, D.; del Río, P.; Peñasco, C.: "Household electricity demand in Spanish regions. Public
policy implications"
2014/25, Salinas, P.: "The effect of decentralization on educational outcomes: real autonomy matters!"
2014/26, Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Does corruption erode trust in government? Evidence from a recent
surge of local scandals in Spain"
2014/27, Costas-Pérez, E.: "Political corruption and voter turnout: mobilization or disaffection?"
2014/28, Cubel, M.; Nuevo-Chiquero, A.; Sanchez-Pages, S.; Vidal-Fernandez, M.: "Do personality traits affect
productivity? Evidence from the LAB"
2014/29, Teresa Costa, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Retail price effects of feed-in tariff regulation"
2014/30, Kilic, M.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The stabilizing effect of hydro reservoir levels on intraday power prices
under wind forecast errors"
2014/31, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.: "The diffusion of patented oil and gas technology with
environmental uses: a forward patent citation analysis"
2014/32, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "Public-private sector wage differentials by type of contract:
evidence from Spain"
2014/33, Backus, P.; Esteller-Moré, A.: "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?" 2014/34, Huisman, R.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Costs of power supply flexibility: the indirect impact of a Spanish
policy change"
IEB Working Papers
2015
2015/1, Foremny, D.; Freier, R.; Moessinger, M-D.; Yeter, M.: "Overlapping political budget cycles in the
legislative and the executive"
2015/2, Colombo, L.; Galmarini, U.: "Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption" 2015/3, Pellegrino, G.: "Barriers to innovation: Can firm age help lower them?"
2015/4, Hémet, C.: "Diversity and employment prospects: neighbors matter!"
2015/5, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions" 2015/6, Choi, A.; Jerrim, J.: "The use (and misuse) of Pisa in guiding policy reform: the case of Spain"
2015/7, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between
sub-central administrations"
2015/8, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Analysing the sensitivity of electricity system operational costs
to deviations in supply and demand"
2015/9, Salvadori, L.: "Does tax enforcement counteract the negative effects of terrorism? A case study of the
Basque Country"
2015/10, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "How time shapes crime: the temporal impacts of football matches on
crime"
2015/11, Piolatto, A.: "Online booking and information: competition and welfare consequences of review
aggregators"
2015/12, Boffa, F.; Pingali, V.; Sala, F.: "Strategic investment in merchant transmission: the impact of capacity
utilization rules"
2015/13, Slemrod, J.: "Tax administration and tax systems"
2015/14, Arqué-Castells, P.; Cartaxo, R.M.; García-Quevedo, J.; Mira Godinho, M.: "How inventor royalty
shares affect patenting and income in Portugal and Spain"
2015/15, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "Measuring the negative externalities of a private leisure activity:
hooligans and pickpockets around the stadium"
2015/16, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Costa-Campi, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Unexpected consequences of
liberalisation: metering, losses, load profiles and cost settlement in Spain’s electricity system"
2015/17, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Impacts of intermittent renewable generation on electricity
system costs"
2015/18, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Paniagua, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Are energy market integrations a green light for
FDI?"
2015/19, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sánchez-Vidal, M.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Big plant closures and agglomeration
economies"
2015/20, Garcia-López, M.A.; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "How does transportation shape
intrametropolitan growth? An answer from the regional express rail"
2015/21, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Fiscal equalization under political pressures"
2015/22, Escardíbul, J.O.; Afcha, S.: "Determinants of doctorate holders’ job satisfaction. An analysis by
employment sector and type of satisfaction in Spain"
2015/23, Aidt, T.; Asatryan, Z.; Badalyan, L.; Heinemann, F.: "Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as
usual?"
2015/24, Albæk, K.: "A test of the ‘lose it or use it’ hypothesis in labour markets around the world" 2015/25, Angelucci, C.; Russo, A.: "Petty corruption and citizen feedback"
2015/26, Moriconi, S.; Picard, P.M.; Zanaj, S.: "Commodity taxation and regulatory competition"
2015/27, Brekke, K.R.; Garcia Pires, A.J.; Schindler, D.; Schjelderup, G.: "Capital taxation and imperfect
competition: ACE vs. CBIT"
2015/28, Redonda, A.: "Market structure, the functional form of demand and the sensitivity of the vertical reaction
function"
2015/29, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "An analysis of wage differentials between full-and part-time
workers in Spain"
2015/30, Garcia-López, M.A.; Pasidis, I.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Express delivery to the suburbs the effects of
transportation in Europe’s heterogeneous cities"
2015/31, Torregrosa, S.: "Bypassing progressive taxation: fraud and base erosion in the Spanish income tax
(1970-2001)"
2015/32, Choi, H.; Choi, A.: "When one door closes: the impact of the hagwon curfew on the consumption of
IEB Working Papers
2015/35, Calero, J.; Choi, A.: "The distribution of skills among the European adult population and unemployment: a
comparative approach"
2015/36, Mediavilla, M.; Zancajo, A.: "Is there real freedom of school choice? An analysis from Chile"
2015/37, Daniele, G.: "Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’
ability"
2015/38, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Regional unemployment, marriage, and divorce"
2015/39, Foremny, D.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "‘Hold that ghost’: using notches to identify manipulation
of population-based grants"
2015/40, Mancebón, M.J.; Ximénez-de-Embún, D.P.; Mediavilla, M.; Gómez-Sancho, J.M.: "Does educational
management model matter? New evidence for Spain by a quasiexperimental approach"
2015/41, Daniele, G.; Geys, B.: "Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government
dissolutions on electoral outcomes in Southern Italian municipalities"
2015/42, Ooghe, E.: "Wage policies, employment, and redistributive efficiency"
2016
2016/1, Galletta, S.: "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment
in Italy"
2016/2, Flatley, L.; Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Trujillo-Baute, E.; Waterson, M.: "Analysing the potential
economic value of energy storage"
2016/3, Calero, J.; Murillo Huertas, I.P.; Raymond Bara, J.L.: "Education, age and skills: an analysis using the
PIAAC survey"
2016/4, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Daví-Arderius, D.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The economic impact of electricity losses" 2016/5, Falck, O.; Heimisch, A.; Wiederhold, S.: "Returns to ICT skills"
2016/6, Halmenschlager, C.; Mantovani, A.: "On the private and social desirability of mixed bundling in
complementary markets with cost savings"
2016/7, Choi, A.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: "Double toil and trouble: grade retention and academic
performance"
2016/8, González-Val, R.: "Historical urban growth in Europe (1300–1800)"
2016/9, Guio, J.; Choi, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Labor markets, academic performance and the risk of school dropout:
evidence for Spain"
2016/10, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.; Tamagni, F.: "Innovation strategies and firm growth"
2016/11, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Local labor market effects of public employment" 2016/12, Sanchez-Vidal, M.: "Small shops for sale! The effects of big-box openings on grocery stores"
2016/13, Costa-Campi, M.T.;García-Quevedo, J.;Martínez-Ros, E.: "What are the determinants of investment
in environmental R&D?"
2016/14, García-López, M.A; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Next train to the polycentric city: The effect of
railroads on subcenter formation"
2016/15, Matas, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Dominguez, A.: "Changes in fuel economy: An analysis of the Spanish car
market"
2016/16, Leme, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "The effect of a specialized versus a general upper secondary school
curriculum on students’ performance and inequality. A difference-in-differences cross country comparison"
2016/17, Scandurra, R.I.; Calero, J.: “Modelling adult skills in OECD countries”
2016/18, Fernández-Gutiérrez, M.; Calero, J.: “Leisure and education: insights from a time-use analysis”
2016/19, Del Rio, P.; Mir-Artigues, P.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “Analysing the impact of renewable energy regulation
on retail electricity prices”
2016/20, Taltavull de la Paz, P.; Juárez, F.; Monllor, P.: “Fuel Poverty: Evidence from housing perspective” 2016/21, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: “Switch towards tax centralization in Italy: A wake
up for the local political budget cycle”
2016/22, Ferraresi, M.; Migali, G.; Nordi, F.; Rizzo, L.: “Spatial interaction in local expenditures among Italian
municipalities: evidence from Italy 2001-2011”
2016/23, Daví-Arderius, D.; Sanin, M.E.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “CO2 content of electricity losses”
2016/24, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Banking the unbanked: Evidence from the Spanish banking
expansion plan“
2016/25 Choi, Á.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: “The evolution of educational inequalities in Spain:
Dynamic evidence from repeated cross-sections”
IEB Working Papers
2016/30, Di Cosmo, V.; Malaguzzi Valeri, L.: “Wind, storage, interconnection and the cost of electricity”
2017
2017/1, González Pampillón, N.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Can urban renewal policies reverse
neighborhood ethnic dynamics?”
2017/2, Gómez San Román, T.: “Integration of DERs on power systems: challenges and opportunities” 2017/3, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.: “Innovation persistence and employment dynamics”
2017/4, Curto‐Grau, M.; Solé‐Ollé, A.; Sorribas‐Navarro, P.: “Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?” 2017/5, Solé‐Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Housing booms and busts and local fiscal policy”
2017/6, Esteller, A.; Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: “Taxing high-income earners: Tax avoidance and mobility” 2017/7, Combes, P.P.; Duranton, G.; Gobillon, L.: “The production function for housing: Evidence from France” 2017/8, Nepal, R.; Cram, L.; Jamasb, T.; Sen, A.: “Small systems, big targets: power sector reforms and renewable
energy development in small electricity systems”
2017/9, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: “Distributive politics inside the city? The political economy of Spain’s plan E” 2017/10, Neisser, C.: “The elasticity of taxable income: A meta-regression analysis”
2017/11, Baker, E.; Bosetti, V.; Salo, A.: “Finding common ground when experts disagree: robust portfolio decision
analysis”
2017/12, Murillo, I.P; Raymond, J.L; Calero, J.: “Efficiency in the transformation of schooling into competences:
A cross-country analysis using PIAAC data”
2017/13, Ferrer-Esteban, G.; Mediavilla, M.: “The more educated, the more engaged? An analysis of social capital
and education”
2017/14, Sanchis-Guarner, R.: “Decomposing the impact of immigration on house prices”
2017/15, Schwab, T.; Todtenhaupt, M.: “Spillover from the haven: Cross-border externalities of patent box regimes
within multinational firms”
2017/16, Chacón, M.; Jensen, J.: “The institutional determinants of Southern secession” 2017/17, Gancia, G.; Ponzetto, G.A.M.; Ventura, J.: “Globalization and political structure” 2017/18, González-Val, R.: “City size distribution and space”
2017/19, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Pellegrino, G.: “What firms don’t know can hurt them: Overcoming
a lack of information on technology”
2017/20, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Why do manufacturing industries invest in energy R&D?” 2017/21, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “Electricity regulation and economic
growth”
2018
2018/1, Boadway, R.; Pestieau, P.: “The tenuous case for an annual wealth tax”
2018/2, Garcia-López, M.À.: “All roads lead to Rome ... and to sprawl? Evidence from European cities” 2018/3, Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.; Geys, B.: “Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians’ responses to a political
scandal”
2018/4, Cavalcanti, F.; Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.: “Popularity shocks and political selection”
2018/5, Naval, J.; Silva, J. I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Employment effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition” 2018/6, Agrawal, D. R.; Foremny, D.: “Relocation of the rich: migration in response to top tax rate changes from
spanish reforms”
2018/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Kesidou, E.; Martínez-Ros, E.: “Inter-industry differences in organisational
eco-innovation: a panel data study”
2018/8, Aastveit, K. A.; Anundsen, A. K.: “Asymmetric effects of monetary policy in regional housing markets” 2018/9, Curci, F.; Masera, F.: “Flight from urban blight: lead poisoning, crime and suburbanization”
