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CAUSA CAUSARUM

Chapter eme

Referring to the poet quoted by Aristotle in the Second Physics « St. Thomas says s "Vult enim poeta quod non

omne ultimum sit finis, sed id quod est ultimum et optimum, hoc est oujus causa fit," (l) The final cause, therefore,

implies not only the notion of ultimate but also that of •what is a greatest good. Hot every end can be a final cause, but only that end "which is a good, "Ultimum et optimum" -

such therefore is the definition of final cause.

A true understanding of final cause depends profound­ ly therefore upon a' correct notion of the good. Wherever a

true concept of the good is not present, a true concept of final causality must necessarily be absent. Indeed, it may ■well be conceived that the general rejection of the notion

of final causality by the positive sciences has been due in

some part at least to a gradual but profound misconception of the good.

In pursuing this theory we trill first examine the

doctrine of St. Thomas on the good and its role in final causality. We trill then attempt to show how this true notion

2

-of the good came to be lost gradually in the fifteenth and

sixteenth centuries, among certain schoolmen of that era. Lastly, we mil state the doctrine of John of St. Thomas concerning the good, a doctrine reaffirming the basic notions of St, Thomas, From this restatement of the true notion of the good, we mil see in contrast how far these scholastic teachers had strayed from the basic concepts,

In later chapters dealing with moderns who have had great influence in leading the thinking world away from

final causality, we will be careful to note their doctrine of the good as well as their false conceptions of final causality. We hope thereby to point out what connections may exist between these early Scholastic errors regarding

the good and the ultimate rejection of final causality. We think that comparison will evidence as well that, although

the Scholastic errors passed unnoticed by many whereas those of modern thinkers are obvious, these former were far more

profound in their deviation from the truth, and serve thereby to demonstrate the superficial character of many of the

moderns.

DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

The principal doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the good is to be found in the Summa Theologica, Prima Pars,

s

-Question Y, in the De Veritate, -Question I, Article I, and

Question 2X1, article 1 and in the treatise in Boethium de Hebdomadibus,

In these places he speaks of the good as a ■trans­ cendental convertible with being. It will be well to note that throughout this discussion we will confine ourselves to the transcendental good. The moral good is concerned with the responsible actions of creatures having an intellect and free will. The transcendental good is more extensive, is indeed coextensive with being. It is with this good that our problem of final causality is principally concerned. Many will admit final causality in human actions but at the same time deny it in the universe as a whole. Indeed, the first objection of those who admit a moral good and a purposeful action of human beings is that in claiming final causality for the universe of being we are committing the error of anthropomorphism, projecting unwarrentedly our own purpose­ ful action on the universe.

Turning first, therefore, to the doctrine of the good given by St. Thomas in the First Part of the Summa Theologica we read s

’’Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod sit aliquid appetibile » Unde Philosophus dicit, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt.” (

1

)

4

-"... cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt: hoc autem ha­ beat rationem finis $ manifestum est quod bonum ratio­ nem finis importat.” (l)

”... bonum dicitur diffusivum sui eo modo quo finis di­ citur movere

.11

(

2

)

”... Unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum; sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est (art.

1

et 3). Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secun­ dum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est per suam formam; forma autem prae supponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequun­ tur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, ne- cesse est quod et formam habeat, et ea quae praeexis­ tunt, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam, Fraeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commonsuratio prin­ cipiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam. Et hoc significatur per modum; unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. Ipsa autem forma singificatur per

speciem, quia per formam unumquodque in specie consti­ tuitur; et propter hoc dicitur quod numerus speciem praebet; quia definitiones significantes speciem sunt sicut numeri, secundum Philosophum. Sicut enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in de­ finitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta variat speciem. Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad fi­ nem, aut ad actionem aut ad aliquid hujusmodi; quia unumquodque inquantum est actu, agit et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc per­ tinet ad pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in perfecto esse, consistit etiam in * 1 2 3 modo., specie, et ordine." (g)

From these passages -me may conclude that the proper nature of the transcendental good includes the notions of

perfection, appetihility, and final causality. In reality

(1) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. V, a. 4, c

(

2

) ibidem, a. 4, ad

2

.

5

-good and being are identical and yet the terms are non

synonymous. Good is being in so far as it is perfect and therefore appetible, and hence a final cause.

Going now to the De Veritate me find that therein St. Thomas approaches the notion of the good through a treat­

ment of the general notion of property

1

of being. Thus, in

Question I we read s

"... secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum, exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit $ uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis ; sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos acci­ piuntur diversi modi essendi; et juxta hos modos acci­ piuntur diversa rerum genera;...Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens ; et hio modus dupliciter accipi potest; uno modo se­

cundum. quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud... Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo !/ modo, scilicet secundum ordine unius ad alterum; hoc

potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid;... Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia... In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum; ut in prin- oipio Ethic, dicitur: Bonum est quod omnia~appetunt. Convenientiam, vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum." (l)

Here ws see that good is a general mode of being, consequent upon every being, not in so far as it is considered

6

-in itself, but -in so far as it has order to another. We see further that this order is an order of convenientia, of proper proportion, not between any two beings whatever, but between any being and the intellectual appetite. Good, therefore, is a name expressive of the general mode of being which is the convenientia of every being to the appetite* Hence in this passage St* Thomas brings out once again that appetibility, order to appetite, is of the very nature of

good.

In Question XXI of the De Veritate, St* Thomas once again approaches the notion of good from the viewpoint of property of being. This time, however, he stresses rather the notion of its causality rather than of its simple relation

to appetite. He says

:

"...et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum. ... "verum. et bonum positive dicuntur j unde non possunt ad­

dere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio, secundum Philosophum in V Metaphye.

(text.

20

), dicitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri in quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur,... sicut patet in scientia et scibili;

.... relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam, est rationis tantum*.... et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfee- tivuzn et perfeotibile.

wOportet Igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfeotivi. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerares scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid aliud subsistit in specie illa : et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tan­ tum; et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perfi­ citur per rationem entis ; neo tamen ens est in eo se­ cundum esse naturale; et ideo hunc modum, perficiendi addit verum super ens...

se-••7 e*

eundum iràtionem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum naturas et per hunc modum est perfacti­ vum bonum; bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus li­ cit in VÏ Metaphya. (com*

8

), In quantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfect liram alterius et con­

servativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur

5

et inde est quod omnes recte defini­ entes bonum ponunt in ratione ejus aliquid quod perti­ neat ad habitudinem finis; undePhilosophuB dicit in I Ethic, (in princip.)’, quod bonum optime definiunt di­ centes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunto (Ï) "*

From this we see that to rightly define good we must consider it as perfective, not in any way whatsoever,

but as perfective according to all the being which it has in the nature of things, This is the perfectivity of reality, the perfectivity which has the nature of final cause, the per­

fectivity which all seek, which is,, therefore, referred to the appetite.

From all this doctrine of St, Thomas, therefore, we must clearly conclude that the notion of transcendental

good must include not only being as such, but being as , perfect,

and hence as perfective, not of the intellect, but of the appetite, Good, most essentially, therefore, is being as appetibile, as final cause.

EKROSEOÜS H0TIQHS OF SHE GOOD

v

We will not turn to investigate how this notion

8

-of the transcendental good suffered scans basic, yet subtle changes in the hands of some Scholastics of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It will be impossible at present to investigate all the writers of this epoch, but we will examine as many as time and the sources at hand permit.

DUBAHDDS

A member of the Order of Preachers, Durandus de Sancto Portiano published a commentary on the Books of Sentences in 1508. In commenting on the Second Book he set forth the proper nature of the good as follows :

"Dicendum ergo quod formalis ratio boni est ratio con­ venientis ita quod bonitas est formaliter ipsa conve­ nientia et contrahit entitatem ad partem subjectivam quae est relatio$ et ad tglem relationem quae est con­ venientia : et sio omnis bonitas est quaedam entitas qtiae est respeetiv&î sed non omnis entitas est quidditative bonitas s ita iquod non convertuntur essentialiter» bonum vero ratione concretionis importat id quod habet talem

convenientiam ut ejus subjectum : vel fundamentum et quia illud potest inveniri in quolibet generet saltem in generibus absolutis: ideo bonum dicitur converti cum ente non essentialiter sed denominative t formalis ta­ men ratio boni est respectiva scilicetratio conve­ nientiae . ” (

1

)

This short paragraph contains one of the most basic errors possible regarding the nature of the good. Unfortun- 1

9

-ately, moreover, this doctrine formed a basis for later errors, errors which may well have been the bridge leading

in part at least to the eventual rejection of final causality

by the moderns,

The most glaring blunder “which Durandus makes here

in Ms complete misconception of good as a property of being. Indeed, he depicts it as a property of being by holding it to pertain to being as an accident to its subject. Thus he distinguishes between the formal ratio of the good and the good

considered in the order of concretion. He says that the formal ratio of the good is a relation, the relation of convenientia.

Considered concretely good is the subject to which this relation

inheres *

In So far as good is said of this subject of the relation of convenientia, Durandus admits its convertibility with being, non essentialiter sed denominative. We will best understand what he means by this if we read the distinction

as he himself makes it in the form of a premise to his response. He says $

”...aliquid potest converti cum ente dupliciter uno modo essentialiter i alio modo denominative. Primo modo res convertitur cum ente: quia omnis entitas extra animam est essentialiter realitas et e converso. Secundo modo quando unum non est alterum, essentialiter et formaliter tamen unum non invenitur sine altero sicut ens creatum et relatio: quia dato quod non omnis essentia creata sit relatio $ nulla tamen essentia creata invenitur sine relatione et ideo convertuntur denominative.n (

1

) 1

10

-I

Thug > when Durandus says that good Is convertible with, being denominative » he means simply that wherever being is found there also is the relation of convenientia which is the good. This relation is evidently a real relation accord­ ing to his definition quoted above.

The question immediately arises as to how be would hold God to be good, as to whether he would posit a relation inhering In the Divine Essence* The answer is found in his response to an objection against his position. It reads as

follows $

"Ad quartam dicendum quod antecedens est falsum quia bonum in Deo dicit relationem vel respectum form&liter non quidem respectum ad intrat sed ad extra videlicet ad creaturas et cum dicitur quod Deus non refertur realiter ad creaturas, Dicendum est quod sicut dictum fuit primo libro dist. xxx. SI relatio accipiatur pro respectu per se consequente ad naturam rei. Sic Deus non refertur ad creaturas. Si autem accipiatur pro reali denominatione sumpta ex pluribus : sio Deus re­ fertur realiter ad creaturas cum dicitur creator vel bonums et quod subditur quod sequeretur quod Deus es­ set bonus ex habitudine ad creaturas: et sic bonitas ejus dependeret a creaturis dicendum quod falsum est. Aliud enim est Deum dici bonum in habitudine ad crea­

turas et bonitatem ejus dependere ad creaturas. Pri­ mum enim est verum: sed secundum est falsumi imo po­

tius bonitas creaturae dependet a Deo: et propter hoo Deus dicitur bonus in habitudine ad creaturam: quia tota creatura : et quicquid bonitatis et perfectionis est in ea dependet a Deo.” (l) (l)

11

According to this doctrine, therefore, God is good

only by a relation of reason « at any rate, His goodness

is

at most a real denomination, flowing from His relation to creatures, Were there no creatures God should not be able to be said good, Goodness requires plurality of being for

its very existence,

Ibis doctrine is so shockingly erroneous as almost to discourage a response. It will serve well to show to

what point an error on the nature of the good can lead. We will point out only briefly its gross error by indicating the doctrine of St, Thomas concerning the divine goodness.

This doctrine is found in the sixth question of the Prima Pars, There is the first article St. Thomas

•demonstrates that it belongs to God to be good. The teaching of this article is extremely profound. To be correctly under­ stood one must have grasped well what St, Thomas taught of the nature of the good itself in the preceding question. Since Durandus failed to do that as we shall see it is small wonder that he erred in this matter.

In this first article St. Thomas sets out to prove "quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit," (1) To do this he

» 12 —

shows that God is the object of every appetite in so far as He is "prima causa effectiva omnium." Thus St. Thomas proves

that God is good by referring to creatures, but he does not in any way state that God is good only in so far as He has respect to creatures * Nor does he mean in any way to say that the causality of God's goodness is efficient causality, as some seem later to interpreted him (1). His intent here

in this first article is merely to prove that God is good ; he does this by showing that God is appetible to creatures. All things, he says, seek their own perfection. This perfection however is a similitude of the agent. Hence the agent is ap­ petible and thus good. God, however is the first agent, the first efficient cause and is therefore certainly good.

Even in this first article, however, St. Thomas by the very profundity of Ms wording gives indication of how God is good in Himself, a doctrine which he asserts explicitly only in Article III. It will not be amiss to read the body of this first article,

"...bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est secundum, quod est appetibile; unumquodque autem appetit suam perfectionem; perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis, eum 1

omne agens agat sito simile j unde ipsum agens est appetit ile, et habet rationem boni} hoc enim est quod de ipso appetitur, ut ejus similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva omnium, ma­ nifestum est quod ei competit ratio boni et appetibi­ lis.” (

1

)

In the second article of this question St. Thomas is still speaking of the divine goodness in comparison to the created. There he proves that Sod is the highest good,

summum bonum} the use of the superlative here indicates that

a comparison is made, St, Thomas says that this adjective summum ”addit supra bonum non rem aliquam absolutam, sed re­ lationem tantum.” (2) This relation is a relation of reason

in respect to God, is real in creatures.

It is in the third article that St. Thomas speaks of the proper goodness of God. There he shows that God is good through His very essence and that it is proper to God alone to be good in this my# Since this article is the proper answer to Durandus* grave error we will quote it in

its entirety#

”... solus Dew est bonus per suam essentiam. Unum­ quodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfec­ tum. Perfectio autem alioujus rei triplex est. 1. 1 2

(1) St, Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. VI, a# 1, e.

14

quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur#

2

« vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur ad

suam perfectam operationem necessaria, 3. vero per­ fectio alieujus est per hoc quod aliquid aliud attin­ git sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis con­ sistit in esse quod habet per suam formam substantia­ lem. Secunda ejus perfectio consistit in oaliditate, levitate, et siccitate, et hujusmodi. Tertia vero perfectio ejus est secundum quod in suo loco quies­ cit. Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato com­ petit secundum suam essentiam sed soli Deo, cujus

solius essentia est suum esse, et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur acci- dentallter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter; ut esse potentem, sapientem, et alia hujusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet (quaest. Ill, art.

8

), Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam perfectionem secun­ dum suam essentiam* Et ideo ipse solus est bonus per suam essentiam.” (

1

)

Thus, w® see how very properly Sod is said to be good in Himself, by pis very essence, since His essence is His very being, since, moreover, -whatever is attributed as accidental to creatures is attributed to God as being of

His essence, and since, lastly, God is ordained to no other

as an end but all others to Him, Durandus

1

serious mistake

in this matter, therefore » while is springs from a mistaken notion of the good itself, forms a most shocking misconcept­ ion of the very nature of God,

In the fourth and last article of this question

15

~

St. Thomas shows that all creatures are good by a certain

participation of the divine goodness* He says $

"A primp igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unum­ quodque potest dici bonum et ena, inquaatum partici­ pat ipsum per modum, cujusdam assimilât!onis; licet re­ mote et deficienter... (

1

)

Far, therefore, from God's being good in so far as creatures exist, the truth is that creatures are good only because God is so good by His very essence,

Just as it is difficult to believe that Durandus could have made this error regarding the goodness of God, so it is hard to conceive that he could have made the errors he did about the nature of the good i| he read the doctrine

given by St* Thomas in the De Veritate Question

1

X

1

« In

giving St. Thomas' doctrine of the good above, we quoted part of this,article# the part referring more directly to the good. The beginning of the article affords such a olear

and beautiful explanation of just how a transcendental prop­ erty of being is to be distinguished from being itself, that it is incredible that anyone could read it and still err.

St. Thomas begins by saying that something can be

16

added to smother In three ways. ' The first is when the

thing added is outside of the essence of that to which it is added, as when an accidental quality is added to a subs­ tance . In this way something can he added to a particular thing only, for as St* Thomas says

5

"nulla enim res naturae

est quae sit extra essentiam universalis, quamvis aliqua ree sit extra essentiam hujus entis." (l)

Thus, it is most evident that in this way nothing can be added to being as such. Nevertheless, this is the way according to which Durandus would seem to say the good formally considered appertains at least to created beings.

The second way given by St. Thomas in which some­

thing is said to be added to another is the way of contract­ ing or determining. An example of this is the way the notion "homo" adds something to that of "animal". Animal is not a

part to which mab is added, but animal is something which in itself is determined by man.

This is undoubtedly the way in which. Durandus thought he was adding good to being, for he speaks of being as contracted by the notion of good. Even in understanding

-

17

this way# however# he was wrong# for he seems to have conceived, contraction or determination as meaning a per­ pétuai presence of the accident, relation of convenience#

in the substance# being*

Had he understood it rightly# however# he would still have been wrong. Good does not contract being. Being contracted or determined in this way gives rise to the

division of the ten predicaments. But, as St. Thomas says

"bonum, dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens." (

1

)

The third and final way in which something is added to another, according to St* Thomas, is "secundum, ra­ tionem tantum"; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius

quod non est de ratione alterius; quod tamen nihil est in

rerum, natura, sed in ratione tantum; sive per illud contra­ hitur id cui dicitur addi, sive non." (

2

)

It is in this way in which good is said to be added to being. It does not contract being, however, for as St.

Thomas noted in the first question of the De Veritate it is

(1) St. Thomas, De Veritate,

Q,.

XXI, a. 1. e (

2

) ibidem.

18

a general mode following all 'being.

Durandus ’ further contention that the proper nature of the good is a relation of convenientia, convenien­ tia being taken as a proportion "between the natures of two beings as such, is an outgrowth of this basic misconception of good as a property of being. Good, as we have seen in. the doctrine of St. Thomas, is not a relation of convenientia, but the name good expresses a certain convenientia, a con­ venientia of the beings with the intellectual appetite.

As we have seen above, St. Thomas in the De Veri­

tate, Question I, describes the transcendental properties of being as general modes consequent on every being, Among

these general modes he makes a division between those which follow every being in se and those which follow each being in ordine ad aliud. It is among these latter that the good is to he found.

The group of general modes consequent on every being in ordine ad aliud is subdivided into those consequent upon every being according to its division from another being, and those following every "being "secundum conoenientiam unius entis ad aliud." In the first of these subdivisions, the aliud to which every being is ordered is any other being,

19

aliud denominates two very determined beings, intellect and will.

It is precisely this that Durandus failed to note. For him the aliud of convenientia ad aliud signifies any

being whatsoever. St. Thomas says this is impossible.

Indeed, immediately upon giving the division of those general modes which follow every being secundum convenientiam entis ad aliud, he says s "hoc quidem non potest esse nisi acci­

piatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum. omni ente. Hoc

autem est anima quae quodammodo est omnia..." (

1

)

Thus the aliud here Is the soul, and it is divided according to the two potencies of the soul, intellect and will. The convenientia of every being with the intellect is truths the convenientia with the will is good.

It is because Durandus has forgotten the intellect­ ual soul, therefore, that he has erred on the nature of the good. A system of beings which does not contain an intellect­ ual soul can have neither truth nor goodness. It is wierd, ^

therefore, to see men with an intellectual soul using that soul to try to explain the universe without the inclusion of

such a soul. Such men are not scientists or philosophers $ they are sophists*

Durandus’ first error does not ###m to h*** been the exclusion of the intellectual soul* It seems rather to have been an error as to the nature of the transcendental properties of being, an attempt to explain them -without reference to reason. Transcendental* as such can exist only for the intellectual soul and only through the Prime Intellect.

In the explanation of Ms doctrine Durandus divides convenientia into infer insec and extrinsic, the former imply­ ing sometimes the relation of formal or material cause, and the latter that of efficient cause. Hence the good, would

sometimes seem to have the ratio of formal material or ef­

ficient cause, (l)

In regard to final causality Durandus makes the following distinction $

"...aut intelllgltur d# ratione importata per hoc nomen finis et ad finem aut de ratione rei cui competit esse denominative fines» vel ad finem*”

(1) Durandus, II Sant* Diet. 84, Q, 1, Pol, C0HII A,

(2) ibidem, pol, ooni, I.

21

Thus he makes a distinction concerning final cause here similar to the one he makes regarding the good. He does not deny that good might have the ratio finis, but, on the

other hand, he does not list this ratio in his classification

of convenientia. He does say, however, that good cannot possibly be finis in so far as the thing to which It belongs

denominatively to be finis is connoted .

"... nullo igitur modo formalis ratio boni est esse fi­ nem, vel ad finem, si sic accipiantur." (

1

)

As we know, the distinction regarding the finis which Durandus makes is incorrect. Good has the ratio finis, as St. Thomas says, and good is convertible with being, and with res. Hence Durandus is actually guilty here of denying the ratio finis to the good, although in the confusion of his doctrine one might better say he is guilty at most of having a very vague conception of the relation of good and end. Since he does not list the relation of final causality

among his relations of extrinsic convenientia, one may well assume that he does not mean to include the ratio finis in the formal ratio of the good even as a type of good.

Durandus does attribute a motion to the good,

22

though it is difficult to see in what my it is a motion. He says the motion of the good consists in its apprehension hy the practical intellect. It will he best if we read Ms

own words in this matter :

”Ad quintum, dicendum quod solus respectus non movet sed absolutum cum respectu movet tam intellectum practicum quam voluntatem. Simplex enim quidditas licet possit movere intellectum ad actum simplicem qui est indivisi­ bilium intelligentia: tamen non potest movere ad actum componentem nisi accepta in habitudine ad alterum quia actus intelligendi componens fertur in duo propter con­ venientiam unius ad alterum: et sic intellectus practi­ ces movetur a bono inquantum apprehendit aliquam natu­ ram absolutam sub ratione convenientis ad alterum.*(

1

)

Although Durandus speaks here of a motion of the will, Ms words would seem to imply that the prime motion of

the good is a motion of the practical intellect, the motion of the will being consequent upon this. Actually the motion

of the good is a movement of the will, a movement of attract­ ion; a necessary condition for such a movement, however, is the presentation of the good to the will by the intellect. This apprehension of the good by the intellect is not due to a motion of the good, but is rather due to the motion of the intellect.

Durandus

1

idea of the motion of the good is

23

fundamentally a rationalization from his concept of the essence of the good. It will he interesting to note how

a variation of this idea recurs in the doctrine of Vasques when he says that finis has the formal ratio of finalizing

when it bespeaks an objective concepts in other words, final c&tiie moves bjr being known and not merely through being known. This doctrine of Vasques is merely one evidence of how much his thought was influenced by the teaching of Durandus? there are many more as we shall soon see.

To summarize the errors of Durandus ' doctrine of the good, then, we may say that he has erred in considering

good as a contraction of being, in staking it an accidental relation in so far as it refers to creatures, an extrinsic (?) denomination as it refers to Sod, in speaking of it as a

convenientia of a being not to the appetite but to another being, and in ignoring, to say the least, its ratio of final

cause.

LATER SOHQOLMEST

We will consider now the doctrine of son® of the later schoolmen. Time will limit us at present to only two of their number, two* however, whose names rank among the

- 24

foremlst isa scholarship, Vasques and. Suarez, We Mil

endeavour to point out not only the errors of their doctrine of the good and final cause, hut also in -what My these errors

seem to have been motivated by "the teaching of Durandus »

VASQUEZ SÜAEEZ

In his Metaphysics, published in 1614, Francis

Suarez,

8

.J. discusses at great length the notion Of the

transcendental good, His discussion is found in Disputatio X.

The tract begins -with a list of various opinions aS to the proper nature of the transcendental good. Second among these opinions Suarez lists that claiming good to be a real relation of convenientia. This opinion, he says, is attributed to Durandus, but is not the mind of that school­ man, Suarez claims rather :

*Sed cum Durandus in aliis etiam rebus neget proprias relationes reales, alia est in praesenti mens ejus, , ut infra videbimus*® (

1

)

Although Durandus’ own words as quoted above and the entire nature of Ms treatment of the transcendental good

seem to belie this claim of Suarez, still we will not argue

(1) Suarez, Me taphys io or urn Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect. 1,

no. G.

25

-the point here since in -the confused state of mind in "which Durandus seems to have conceived things anything is possible.

It is strong indication, however » of how much influence Durandus had on Suarez ’ thinking that Suarez later should claim that his own position regarding the transcendental good is in reality what Durandus meant*

The fourth opinion regarding the transcendental good quoted by Suarez is that attributed to a certain Hervaeus in his Quodlibetaleg. Two Servaei lived in the fourteenth century, both of whom wrote concerning Thomistie doctrine. In the absence of the proper text we will give the opinion as set forth by Suarez t

K ». «bonitatem nihil aliud dicer© quam intrinsecam rei perfectionem quae absoluta est in absolutis, et rela­ tiva in relativis. Unde fieri videtur consequens, bonum nihil aliud esse, quam ipsum ens, quatenus in se aliquid perfectionis habet. Haec opinio tribuitur Hervaeo quodlib* 5, qu. 2, ibi tamen magis sentit bo­ nitatem dicer^T entitatem quatenus est perfeetiva al­ terius, seu quatenus ad alterius perfectionem ordina­ tur, quam ut in se habet perfectionem aliquam, de que sensu infra dicam.” (

1

)

Suarez accepts this opinion as true, but says it is necessary to add something to it. With this addition he forms his own conclusion which he says is the one Durandus

(1) Suarez, Metaphysieorum Disputationum, Disp. I, Sect. 1,

no. 9.

- ₂₆

also intended. Let us read it $

"Dicendum ergo est bonum supra ens solum posse addere rationem convenientiae, quae non est proprium relatio, sed solum cono tat in alio talem naturam habentem na­ turalem inclinationem, capacitatem, vel coniunctionem cum tali perfectione: unde bonitas dicit ipsam perfec­ tionem rei, oozmotando praedictam convenientiam seu denotationem consurgentem ex coexistent ia plurium." (l)

One will certainly see Durandus mirrored here. Suarez, however, did not make the basic error regarding the nature of a property of being which we found in Durandus. Indeed, Suarez never speaks of good as a contraction of being, but he speaks of the two as distinct only by reason. He

strongly maintains their coextension, moreover, saying there can never be good where there is not being, It will not be amiss to read seme of his texts on this point $

"ut sio (i,e. according to Ms opinion) nonnulla dis­ tinctio rationis fundata in rebus inter bonum et ens, ut sic possit bonum attribui enti tamquam proprietas, en non esse synonimum cum illo, quia formal iter aliud est esse seu habere entitatem: aliud vero ratione en­ ti tat is habere semper aliquam convenientiam, quam ra­ tio boni declarat." (

2

)

"Dicendum tamen censeo, bonum proprie dictum semper sup­ ponere vel includere ens, seu fundari in ente, ideoque non posse bonum, sub quacunque praedictarum rationum,

(l) Suarez, Metaphysicorum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect, 1, no

12

,

27

latius patere» quam ens,” (l)

“Sequitur dqinde "bonum sub eadem ratione sumptum esse aliquo modo passionem, seu proprietatem entis, quia et cum illo convertitur, et secundum rationem illud supponit, et ab eo aliquo modo distinguitur secundum formalem rationem a nobis conceptam et significatam. Et ideo dixi, esse aliquo modo passionem, quia non est passio in eo rigore, in quo passio requirit dis­ tinctionem aliquam ex natura rei a suo subjecto, sed solum, ut dicitur de quolibet attributo secundum ra­ tionem , distincto ab eo cui attribuitur, ut superius declaratum est, tranotando de passionibus. “ (

8

)

“Cum bonum nomen sit connotativum seu denominativum hic non inquirimus, quid illud sit, quod bonum deno­ minatur: nam certum est, illud, in communi loquendo, esse ens quod natura seu ratione bonum antecedit, ut in superioribus dictum est, et ex sequentibus magis constabit, sed inquirimus quaenam. sit illa forma seu ratio a qua res bona denominatur. “ (5)

This last text, one with which Suarez opens Ms tract, when taken alone, is reminiscent of Durandus f convertibility non essentialiter sed denominative between

good and "being. Understood, however, in the light of Suarez’ whole doctrine we will see that while he maintained the correct

conception of a property of being, he was forced to a vague acceptance of denominative convertibility.

Although Suarez did not follow Durandus in this basic

error regarding the properties of being, he did follow him in * 8

(1) Suarez, Metaphysicorum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect. 5, no.

1

.

(

8

) ibidem, Sect. 5, no. 5.

28

-holding the ratio formalis of the good to he convenientia not to the appetite hut to being, for him the aliud of St,

Thomas is another being, not always really distinct as Du­ randus required, hut distinct at least by reason. This is indeed the basic error of Suarez* doctrine, and once again it springs from an omission of the notion of intellectual soul in the system, though Suarez* omission was not so complete as was Durandus *,

In his discussion, Suarez seems'often to teeter dangerously on the precipice of Durandus* error of denominat­ ive convertibility. In so far as he saves himself he does so only by holding tight to his correct notion of property of being and by a logical vagueness. His most complete fall comes in his answer to an objection to Ms conclusion as to the proper nature of the good.

This objection may be stated briefly as follows $ good is divided into bonum alteri and bonum in se. The former is only good secundum quid. The ratio formalis of the good

as Suarez gives it applies, however, only to the bonum alteri.

Suarez gives two answers to this difficulty. In the first he falls into Durandus * error, but he pulls him­

self out again in the second. In his first answer he maintains his definition $

- 29

"...describere bonitatem» qua© est passio entis

%

bonum autem solum esse passionem entis prout dicit convenientiam, ad alteram» seu prout est bonum alteris hoc enim modo distinguitur bonum aliquo modo ab ente, et convenit omni enti, etiam perfectissimoi • ».

"Bonum autem absolute sumptum, scilicet, prout est bo­

num in se, non videtur pertinere ad passionem entis, sed potius ad essentiam, seu entitatem ejus ut supra argumentabar, quia bonum hoc modo idem est, quod per­ fectum, ut D. Thom, saepe dicit I Part. q. 5 perfec­ tum autem includitur in essentiali conceptu entis realis, quia non potest concipi ens cum entitate quin concipiatur cum perfectione essentiali." (

1

)

Suarez here seems to echo Durandus} very •words, distinguishing between bonum in its formal ratio and bonum ratione concretionis. He follows Durandus too in denying the formal ratio of the good to include the perfect (2). In

this matter it will be interesting to note the distinctions of the perfect which Suarez makes. They will form interest­

ing comparison with that most illuminating distinction which we will find in John of St, Thomas. Suarez divides the perfect as follows :

"... dicit enim Aris t. 5 Metaph. c.

6

’perfectum dici, extra quod non esse ullam partem accipere seu oui nihil deest’.... Hoc ergo sensu perfectum dicitur, non quod-cunque bonum, sed illud quod omni ex parte consummatum est, quod est simpliciter bonum."

(1) Suarez, Disp» X, Sect. 1, no. 14#

so

"Alio tamen modo potest perfectum, dici, quidquid sub aliqua ratione entis, habet perfectionem simpliciter necessariam et essentialem.... Atque hoc modo bonum et perfectum convertuntur, imo sunt omnjno idem, prout bonum dicit id quod in se bonum est, seu quod habet bonitatem, i,e. perfectionem sibi debitam; hoc autem nihil aliud est quam habere essentiam vel en­

ti tatam sibi debitam, igitur bonum sub hac ratione

nihil aliud essentialiter ac formaliter dicit quam ens

;11

"Imo etiam esse perfectum priori modo, seu bonum sim­ pliciter, nihil aliud est quam esse ens habens totam entitatem, quae ad complementum requiritur." (

1

)

This doctrine can be interpreted in keeping with the teaching of St. Thomas, but unless the proper distinctions

are made it is prima facie far from that doctrine. One cannot

divorce the notion of perfect from the formal ratio of the good, nor can one say that under this ratio of perfect the good essentially and, formally signifies only being, is

synonymous with being. We shall find the proper distinction to answer this difficulty in the treatise on the transcendental good given by John of St. Thomas. We will defer its solution till we come to see this doctrine.

One will not fail however to see the hand of Durandus in this doctrine of Suarez as it is Written here.

Indeed, Suarez does everything here but say that good and 1

— SI —

being are convertible non essentialiter sed denominative. He says that good under the notion of perfect is being

essentially and formally. This notion of perfect* however* he does not hold to be the formal ratio of good, Hence in so far as perfect and good are convertible here (unless the

matter is interpreted in the true sense of St. Thomas and John of St. Thomas) the only implication possible is that

the convertibility is one of denomination only.

In his second response Suarez seems to extract himself from this difficulty. A careful analysis* however, will reveal that even here he does not quite evade the notion of denominative convertibility between good and being. He

says $

"Verumtaaen propter usum vocum potest adhiberi alia res­ ponsio. Nam, licet prior in hoc habeat verum, quod bonum sub ea ratione in re non differt ab ente, nihil­

ominus possunt ratione distingui, quod satis est ut bonum assignetur ut proprietas entis, ad modum aliorum transcendentium. Est itaque quoad impositionem vel significationem nominis advertendum ens solum dici ab esse aut entit&te ut supra exposuimus, perfectum autem clarius exprimere entis perfectionem; in quo negatio­ nem includit, vel saltem sine illa non potest a nobis ejus significatum explicari, scilicet quod nihil ei desit secundum eam rationem secundum, quam perfectum dicitur. Bonum vero dicere convenientiam aliquam, ra­ tione cujus habet res, quod appetibilis sit; nam bo­ num per ordinem aliquem aut appetitum , dictum est ut D. Thomas docuit,#., ex illo Arist. I Ethie. Bonum est, quod omnia appetunt, et statim magis explicabitur.

Unde necesse est res illas quae absolute et secundum se dicuntur bonae, sic denominari; quia habent perfec­ tionem sibi convenientem et appetibilem; et ita etiam

— 52 «

sit ut bonum, hoc modo, de formali significet perfec­ tionem existentem in tali re connotando in eadem re capacitatem, inclinationem seu naturalem, connexionem cm tali perfectione

.11

(l)

tiras, for Suarez, the goodness of a being in itself

consists in the perfection it has according as that perfection bespeaks a convenientia with the being. Suarez goes on to

say that sometimes this perfection is distinguished from the being as accidently inhering in it. In this case it is easily discerned how the being is good through the goodness of this perfection. Suarez finds the case more difficult however, where the perfections are not really distinct from the being as accident from substance* Let us read his words again in these matters : .

"Quod clarius patet, quando talis perfectio est dis­

tincta ab ipsa re, quae ab illa bona denominatur; nam

quando homo dicitur bonus ratione virtutis, de formali

significatur virtus, non utcunque sed ut bonitas quae­ dam, in quo importatur, non tantum perfectio virtutis, sed etiam convenientia, quam habet cum humana natura connotando ex parte ipsius naturae capacitatem vel pro­ pensionem ad talem perfectionem. In his vero rebus in quibus non est distinctio inter perfectionem, et rem, quae perfecta dicitur, difficilius videtur explicari haec convenientia, vel connotatiot dicendum, est tamen, quamvis in re non sit distinctio, a nobis tamen conci­ pi ac significari ad modum distinctorum, id est per mo­ dum formae denominantis et rei denominatae, et ideo significari illam formam ut perfectionem aceomodatam ei in quo' existit, in quo computatur naturalis connexio

— 33 —

ejus cw tali forma, et ita distingui tale bonum ab ente, saltem ratione.” (

1

)

In this latter instance the distinction between good and being is one of reason only therefore. One may well ask whether Suarez intended only a distinction of reason rati opinantis or a distinction implying a fundamen­ tum in re. That he intended it as a distinction of reason

ratiocinatae is clearly stated in his commentary on the Prima Pars of St. Thomas* Summa Theologica, There in discussing the goodness of God he says that a thing can be

said good in three ways

%

"Primo igitur dicitur res bona quia in suo esse perfec­ ta est, i,e. quia habet omnia, quae ad complementum sui esse requiruntur." (

2

)

"Secundo modo dicitur aliquid ens bonum, quia conveniens est alicui, ac proinde ei est appetibile. Hoc autem ip­ sum intelligi potest duobus modus. Primo quatemus unum­ quodque habet perfectionem sibi convenientem et amabi­ lem, quae convenientia si per modum relationis conside­ retur, dolum est per considerationem nostram: tamen ut in re habet virtual# fundamentum, solet vocari So­ nitas transeendentalis, juxta probabilem opiniornem, de qua disput. 10 Metaphysica©...Alio vero modo di­ citur una res bona respectu alterius, quia est Illi conveniens." (&)

(1) Suarez, Metaphysics, Disp. X, Sect, 1, no, 17.

(2) Suarez, in I Pars, Lib. I, Tr, I, cap.

8

.

M

"Tertio modo denominantur peculiariter res intellec­ tuales bonae bonitate morali, vel actuali, quia ope­ ra bona moralia exercent, vel habitu et aptitudine retinent, quatenus sunt dispositae et propensae ad illud bonum, exercendum., * .hanc tertiam bonitatem non esse 'illam quae transcendental!» sit.” (

1

)

From the first division of the second mode in "which

Suarez says things are said good we may well conclude that Suarez was thinking of a distinction of reason ratiocinatae

in his passage in the Metaphysics quoted on page twenty»gig.

Indeed this mode of good and that last mode of the passage in the Metaphysics both refer to a simple being and are un­ doubtedly to be understood in the same way.

That the distinction is one of reason ratiocinatae is evident since Suarez posits a virtual fundament in re. It

is a virtual fundament in re which underlies a distinctio ra­ tionis ratiocinatae. * 1

Further and conclusive evidence that he could only have meant a distinction rationis ratiocinatae is afforded by the fact that he did not admit of such a thing as a dis­ tinction rationis ratiooinantis. We can find this doctrine

in his Metaphysical Disputes Disp. 7. John of St, Thomas

36

-SUDOS up Ms doctrine as follows

;

“Sed quidam explodunt distinctionem rationis ratio­ cinant! set solum admittunt illam, quae habet funda­ mentum aliquod in re# distinctionem, vero rationis ra­

tiocinant is utpote fictam solum ease repetitionem ejusdem conceptus sine resultantia alicujus distinc­ tionis in conceptu objective. Videatur Suarez in Met&ph, disp. 7. sect. 1, Vasques, I p. diet, 117»

cap* 6.n (1)

In the above commentary wherein he makes the three divisions of the good Suarez is discussing in what says God

is said good. He applies especially to God this mode wherein a being is said good in so far as it has the perfection con­ venient to itself, a convenientia which we discern by our

reason basing it on a virtual fundamentum in re. Just after describing it he says a

“Hoe ergo modo, per s© notum, et evident is s imum est, Deum esse summe bonum, habet enim perfectionem sibi maxime convenientem, et amabilem a se, unde se neces­

sario amat, ut postea videbimus. “ (

2

)

thus Suarez did, not fall into the error which Durandus made in saying God is good only in relation to His

creatures, because goodness requires a plurality of being. Suarez held that God is good in Himself, though he too required a plurality for the formal notion of goodness. We

(1) John of St. Thomas, Curs. Phil., T. I, II P, Q, II, a.

HI, 2MM1.

— 36 —

may have remarked this in the last phrase of his definition given above*

"unde bonitas dicit ipsam perfectionem rei, coxmotando praedictam convenientiam seu denominationem consur­ gentem ex coexistent!» plurium." (

1

)

Here again he seems to have morrored Durandus ’ words, though he has certainly changed their import. Du­ randus ’ plurality was of real beings only) Suarez makes his plurality either real, or one of reason. Thus he is able to

save the goodness of God in Himself.

Suarez also held God to be good in so far as He is conveniens to creatures. He does not posit this as being so evident as his first conclusion as to God’s goodness in se, but he does hold it. In discussing this point he again mirrors the errors of Durandus, saying that good in its formal ratio of convenientia may be considered as the form or some part of another, or as its efficient cause. H© concludes that God id conveniens to creatures in so far as He is their * end, their object, their friend, and through His great power

as efficient cause « Thus he does not place the causality of the good in final causality alone but leaves it roam

37

through several genera of cause. Indeed, what he has to say of God’s causality as end in a later tract will manifest

that his conception of final causality tended confusedly to identify it with efficient causality, (l)

We will do well to read Suarez’ final conclusion as to the transcendental goodness of God. He says :

"Bonitas ergo trans cendentalis in Deo est vel prima, vel secunda, quae a nobis explicatae sunt, vel utramque simul juxta varios modos explicandi bonitatem trans- cententalem, de quibus in disp. 10 Metaphysicae dixi­ mus. Praecipue vero solet denominari Deus bonus ex plenitudine omnis perfectionis, et quatenus ex plenitu­

dine ejus propensus est ad se diffundendum, et com­ municandum aliis, quibus bonus esse potest. Quomodo videtur de bonitate Del praecipue agere Dionys. cap, 4 de Divi. ndaa. Sic autem clarum est bonitatem nihil addere essentiae Dei secundum rem, sed solum secundum quondam comatationem, et habitudinem rationis nostro modo concipiendi, non quod relationrationis sit boni­ tas, sed fundamentum ejus, ut dicto loco declara-

vi." (2)

We may wonder exactly to which division Suarez refers by prima and secunda, whether it is to his first two modes in which a thing is said good as given in the quo­

tation on page 33, or to Me two divisions of the second mode. According to the phrase which follows

"juxta varios modes explicandi bonitatem transcendentalem",

and in the light of his last sentence of this quotation, we (l)

(l) Of. below, page

38

conclude that he would Interpret his first mode in the

light of Ms first division of the second, that thus Ms first mode is not formally transcendental good, but is presupposed to it.

This position is supported by three conclusions

with which Suarez resolves Ms treatment of the transcendental good in the Metaphysics, These three we will find to be quite parallel with the first mode and with the two divisions of the second mode named in the Commentary above. The con­ clusions in the Metaphysics are $

"Dicendum

tamen censeo bonum proprie dictum semper supponere vel includere ens, seu fundari in ente, ideoque non posse bonum, sub quacunque praedictarum rationum, latius patere, quam ens." (l)

"Omne verum ens in se bonum est, seu bonitatem aliquam habet sibi convenientem: atque Ita sit ut bonum abso­ lute dictum cum ente convertatur * (

2

}'

"Omne ens etiam est bonum respectu alioujus, id est, alicui conveniens, quo circa etiam bonum, sub ratione conveniens sumptum, cum ente convertitur, et est at­ tributum seu passio ejus." (3)

(1) Suarez, Metaphysicarum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect.

HI, no. 3,

(

2

) ibidem, no 4.

89

-We will note that only the last of these is said to be an attribute or property of being. Suarez intends,

however, that the second denote a property of being also

provided it be understood correctly. For that he makes a division of the perfection of a thing according as that

perfection in an accident to the thing or is its very essence, We saw this same division earlier (1) when Suarez gave the

second answer to his difficulty as to how a thing may-be said good in se. Here he makes it clear that he considers only the convenientia of the essential or intrinsic perfection of a thing in se as transcendental bonum, in se, a property of

being. He says :

"Potest autem haec perfectio in creaturis esse, vel es­ sentialis seu intrinseca (sub qua ipsum esse comprehen­ do) (%) vel accidentalis. Prior est inseparabilis ab unoquoque ente si in suo actuali esse conservetur: Posterior vero saepe potest separari. Denominatio %1- tur boni, quae omni ente necessario convenit: illa est quae a perfectione intrinseca, et essentiali desumitur, prout vero sumi potest a perfectione accidentali (sub hac ratione includendo quicquid ex natura rei distin­ guitur ab essentia rei, et entitati actuali) sio non est ne cesse, omne ens creatum esse bonum, id est, affectum omni perfectione sibi possibili aut debita. Atque ita

(jj (0 >

jp-cU?

Jr-(l)^We may wonder whether Suarez means existence or being by the word "esse" here, Should he have meant being he would have been distinguishing being against itself, and then his relation could only have been identity and not convenientia. We must understand the term, there­

fore, as existence, because he meant to consider perfection of a thing as convenient to itself. Moreover as we saw- above Suarez admitted of no distinction of reason ratio- cinantis and hence we should not logically expect one here.

40

sit, bonura priori ratione sumptum converti eum ente: ostenàimus eaaim oiaae eELS esse bonum, nihilque esse vere bomm, nisi quod vere est. Sequitur deinde bo­ num sub eadem ratione sumptum esse aliquo modo passio­ nem, seu proprietatem entis, quia et cum illo conver­ titur, et secundum rationem illud supponit, et ab eo aliquo modo distinguitur secundum formalem rationem a nobis conceptam et significatam. Et ideo dixi esse aliquo modo passionem, quia non est passio in eo ri­ gore, in quo passio requirit distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei a suo subjecto, sed solum ut dicitur de quo­ libet attributo secundum rationem distincto ab eo cui attribuitur, ut superius declaratum est, tractando da passionibus *" (

1

)

By these words Suarez does not rule out accidental

perfection as a transcendental good

3

he does, however, remove

it from the ratio of bonum in se, considered as a transcendental good. For him accidental perfection is to be considered as something distinct from the thing in itself, and, therefore, as bonum alteri. This is clearly indicated in the passage from, his second response to the objection against Ms doctrine,

quoted above on page twenty-six; He says there :

"Quod clarius patet, quando talis perfectio est distinc­ ta ab ipsa re, quae ab illa bona denominaturi nam quan­ do homo dicitur bonus ratione virtutis, de formali si­ gnificatur virtus, non utcunque sed ut bonitas quaedam, in quo importatur, non tantum perfectio virtutis, sed etiam convenientia, quam habet cum humana natura conno- tando ex parte ipsius naturae capacitatem vel propen­ sionem ad talem perfectionem.n (

2

)

(1) Suarez, Metaphysioorum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect. Ill, no, 5.

41

Undoubtedly, therefore, Suarez considers accidental perfection as a passio entier a transcendental good in so far as it is conveniens alteri. Hence, in so far as it is a good it is so according to the second division of his second mode in the Commentary or to the ttird conclusion in the Meta­ physical Disputes»

This Snaresian doctrine is more than slightly startling in its ramifications. It manifests first of all,

as its basis, a complete misconception of thalnotion of in­ dividuality, and it postulates in its logical consequences

an annihilating overthrow of the whole doctrine of the distinction of bonam simpliciter and bonum secundum quid.

Indeed, this doctrine of simpliciter and secundum quid as applied to being and to good is Incomprehensible without a correct notion of what is an individual. As we

shall see when we read it, St, Thomas’ whole treatment of this

important point presupposes a correct notion of individuation.

It will not be amiss, therefore* to enter briefly into the Thomistic idea of the individual and to point out how Suarez is opposed to it.

An individual is defined by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica as follows $ ”Individuum autem est quod est in se

42

indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum," (l) As the

principle of individuation, he assigns in many places materia signata quantitate, One reference especially clear is found,

in Ms Opusculum In Boethium De Trinitate, There he says :

"Illa quae differunt numero in genere substantiae non solum differunt accidentibus, sed etiam forma et materia. Séd si quaeratur, quare haec forma differt

ab illa, non est alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia

materia signata. Neo invenitur alia ratio, quare haec materia sit divisa ab illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subjecta dimensioni intelligitur esse principium hujus diversitatis." (

2

)

We -will note above that St, Thomas refers to the difference of individuals as being by accidents. John of St. Thomas makes this illusion more explicit -when he says $

"Unde obiter intelligitur, quam vera sit sententia D. Thome, quod principium individu&tionis est materia signata quantitate et accidentibus, non quia accidentia formali ter "constituant individua tionem, sed quia a materia ut a principle per se dependet individuatio, ab accidentibus autem ut a conditionibus designationis, alias frustra individuum definiretur per collectionem proprietatum, etc." (5)

(1) St. Thomas, (2) St. Thomas, (S) John of St*

429b7.

Summa Theologica, I, Q, XXIX, a. 4, o. Opuse. 70, in Boeth, de Trin, 4, 2 ad 4. Thomas, Cursus PMI., T. I, II P. Q. IX,

43

The definition to which John of St. Thomas refers in this last line is the famous definition of the individual

given "by Porphyrins :

“Individua ex eo dicuntur, quod ex proprietatibus con­ sistit unumquodque eorum, quarum collectio numquam in alio eadem.erit.”

Thus accidents are indeed included within the in­ dividual and serve as conditions from which the individual may

be designated.

Suarez*opinion is completely at variance with all this. He holds that everything is individuated by itself,

by its own being. Thus, he would seem to separate accidents

from the composite as other individual, though accidental, entities, stuck, as it were, upon this compositum. Hot only does he thereby destroy the principle of individuation but he also renders impossible the designation of any individual, since the accidents are the means for this.

Suarez * doctrine of the principle of individuation

is found in his Metaphysical Disputes, Dispute V. Neither

time nor the scope of'this paper permit a thorough investigation of this tract. We shall have to content ourselves therefore with a passage or two quoted therefrom to illustrate our point,

44

-of St, Thomas. Suarez' notion -of individuation is indicat­ ed in the following $

”.,.dicendum, est res omnes, quae sunt actualia entia, . seu quae existant, veil existera possunt immediate, esse singulares ac individuas. Dico immediate ut ex­ cludam communes rationes entium, quae ut sio non pos­ sunt immediate existera, neque habere actualem enti- tatem, nisi in entitatibus singularibus et individuis, quibus sublatis Impossibile est, aliquid reale manere, sicut de primis substantiis dixit Aristoteles in Prae­ dicamentis, cap. de substantia...,,Omnis ergo entitas hoc ipso quod est una entitas in rerum natura necessa­ rio est una praedicto modo, atque adeo singularis et individua.” (

1

)

Tfife may glimpse something of his notion of the in­ dividuation of accidents from the following :

“Diximus enim dupliciter posse nos loqui, de principio

individuationisj primo in ordine ad esse, et ad pro­

priam rei constitutionem secundum se. Secundo in or­ dine ad productionem quatenus determinatur agens ad distinctum individuum producendum, vel ad efficiendum unum potius, quam aliud, et consequenter in ordine ad nostram cognitionem, quatenus sensibiliter (ut sio di­ cam) distinguere possumus unum ab alio. Priori igitur consideratione (quae maxime a priori est et maxime pro­ pria hujus scientiae) vera est posterior sententia do­ cens accidentia non subjecto, sed ex propriis entita­ tibus habere suam individuationem et numerioam distinc­ tionem. .... Posteriori autem consideratione (quaemagis est physica et a posteriori) dioi possunt accidentia accipere individuationem ex subjecto, tamquam ex radice, seu occasione potius multiplicationis, et distinctio­ nis eorum. Hoc tamen non de subjecto nude sumpto, sed adhibitis aliis circumstantiis, vel conditionibus ad actionem necessariis intelligendum est, ut in eolutio- 1

(1) Suarez, Metaphysieorum Disputationum, Disp. V, Sect. I, no. 4.

46

nibus argumentorum commodius explicabitur. " (l)

Thus for Suarez accidents do not serve as conditions for designating the individual being, but rather the substance

seems to serve as a means for our distinguishing the accidents,

John of St* Thomas* summary of Suarez* doctrine is brief and concerns itself only with his idea of the individual. He says ;

"Prima (sententia) affirmat unumquodque individuari seipso et ex propria entitate, et sicut seipsa habet unitatem formalem, et omnis unitas est passio entis, ideo ipsam entitatem ponit pro principium individuatio- nis. Ita tenet P. Suarez, Metaph. sect. 4." (2)

The consequence of this opinion is, as we have said,

the utter overthrow of St. Thomas * distinction between bonum

simpliciter and secundum quid. This distinction affords a

definite contrast between being and its transcendental property, good, the one being said simpliciter or secundum quid inversely to the other. St, Thomas * doctrine is found in his reply to

the first objection of Article I, Question V, in the Prima Pars.

Unmistakably clear it paints a valuable metaphysical picture.

(1) Suarez, Metaphysieorum Disputationum, Disp. V, Sect. VII,

no. 4,

(2) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Phil., T. II, Phil. Nat. Ill P. IX, art. Ill, 771 a 11.

46

"... Licet bonum, et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt secundum, rationem, non eodem modo di­ citur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum simpliciter. Warn, cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque. Un­ de per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur ali­ quid esse secundum quid; sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid; non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter; cum adveniat rei jam praeexis­ tenti In actu, Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile; et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bo­ num simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfec­ tionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfec­ tionem inquantum est actu; non tamen dicitur perfectum

simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum, primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid; id est, inquantum est ens. Secundum vero ultimum ac­ tum dicitur aliquid ens secundum, quid et bonum simpli­

citer. Sic ergo quod dicit Boetius quod in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, et aliud quod sunt; referendum est ad esse bonum simpliciter, et ad esse simpliciter: quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter; et tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum: et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens,"

This whole doctrine rests upon a correct and common sense notion of the individual and a true idea of the good. Since Suarez had neither of these, it is small wonder that we find Mm utterly destroying the whole signification of the

distinction with the one word "equivocal” when he comes to

speak of it, % find his treatment of it immediately following

his division of the perfect which, as we saw above, (

1

) he made

47

-in the course of hie first response to the difficulty to his notion of the good, There, we nay remember, he divided the perfect into that which is perfect simpliciter, i»e. lacks nothing to its complement, and that "which is perfect only essentially, i«e* has only necessary and essential perfection. He says explicitly in this passage that the good in so far as it signifies the perfect in this second sense “nihil aliud

essentialiter ac foraaliter dicit quam ens.“ He concludes

also that only bonum simpliciter Is to be said perfect in the first sense. In this sense as well he seems to have conceived the good as formally identical with being for in the last sentence he says : “Imo etiam esse perfectum, priori modo, seu

bonum simpliciter, nihil aliud est quam esse ens habens totam entitatem, quae ad complementum, requiritur.” From this he

proceeds to the distinction of bonum simpliciter and bonum secundum quid. Let us read what he has to say ;

“Et hoc mode intelligendus est D, Th. cum dicere solet (ut videre licet I p» qu« 5, art, 1, ad 1) aliter inter se comparari in creaturis ens simpliciter et secundum quid, quam bonum simpliciter et secundum quid; nam res habet quod sit ens simpliciter per esse substantiale, secundum quid vero per esse accidentalei habet autem quod sit bona secundum quid per esse substantiale, sim­ pliciter autem per esse accidentale « Hoc autem ultimum intelligendum est non praecise de esse accidentali, sed ut conjuncto esse substantialis non esset enim bonus homo per accidentales virtutes nisi supponeretur homo et consequenter substantialiter et naturaliter bonus. Unde in illis vocibus secundum quid et simpliciter, videtur esse aequivocatio: nam. cum dicuntur de ente; videntur dici de substantia et accidente praecise com-