The Spanish Cannabis Social Clubs

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The political context: reaction to tightening the rules and the emergence of a supply lobby

However, after nearly thirty years of tightening the rules for coffee shops there are signs of a growing opposition against the restrictive trend in the coffee shop policy. This opposition comes from different sides. On the political level the municipalities are taking the lead. An increasing number of Dutch cities are in favour of a regulated supply of the coffee shops as a way to reduce the problems of public order and organised crime. At the moment of writing this study, the mayors of more than 26 Dutch cities support this view.⁵⁹ Different models are being considered, from the Spanish social club model to licensed growing of cannabis under control of local authorities. The mayors of these 26 cities are putting pressure on the Minister of Security and Justice who opposes regulated supply, referring to the provisions of the international conventions.

It is intriguing to see a new stakeholder appear on the scene. Besides the ‘cannabis movement’

coffee shop owners became an increasingly important stakeholder in the opposition against the restrictive coffee shop policy. This seems to be a sign of an emerging cannabis supply lobby. It shows that trade organisations openly lobbying for their interests are emerging even in the margins of the illicit drugs market where prohibition is replaced by condoning policies.

Overt lobbying of suppliers is for obvious reasons – a formal lobby of producers and sellers of illicit drugs cannot exist – only possible in a legal market. The lobbies of alcohol and tobacco producers and sellers, the lobby for gambling and the lobby in the field of psychopharmaceuticals are well-known examples. The cannabis market forms an interesting case here. The emerging lobby of coffee shop owners in the Netherlands underlines the impact of regulation policies. In the Netherlands, where the selling of cannabis is 'semi-legal', unions of coffee shop owners are emerging, acting as a lobby of suppliers. Groups of coffee shop owners, sometimes even formally organised as for instance the 'Bond Cannabis Detailisten' (BCD, the Union of Cannabis Retailers), have started to openly participate in the debate about coffee shop policy. They were actively and visibly involved in the opposition against the so-called ‘weed pass’. Their input was regularly covered by the media.

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associated with the opposition to the dictatorship, and smoking joints (“porros”) became a badge for most young leftist militants and even for many democrats (…)” (Gamella and Jiménez Rodrigo 2004 p627). As in the Netherlands the cannabis culture in Spain was also closely linked with a countermovement, an opposition against the established political system. Drug prohibition was one feature of this political system, which received much criticism.

Context and process: how a contradictory policy fuelled home cultivation

In 1982 the possession of small quantities for personal use was decriminalised in Spain (see 5.2.2). A meaningful step in a country where cannabis use became increasingly popular and widespread. From the 1970s on the cannabis use prevalence increased in the general population (15-64) and particularly among the young (15-34), although a slight decrease can be observed from 2011 onwards (Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad 2013; Gamella and Jiménez Rodrigo 2004).

The 1992 Public Security Law brought about a tightening of the policy regarding drug use and possession. An individual using or carrying an illicit drug in public places risked an administrative sanction (a fine). This led in the subsequent years to an enormous rise of proceedings against users, in the majority cannabis users. Gamella and Jiménez Rodrigo refer to over 50,000 cases per year and come to the following assumption:

“It is now legitimate to ask how someone can smoke cannabis without risking a fine. Privately growing one’s own marijuana would suffice. This might explain why home cultivation of marijuana has boomed in Spain during the last decade. Many youngsters and adults cultivate hemp plants. They often get their seeds, implements, and knowledge from an increasing number of “grow shops” and

“smart shops” that have been opened throughout the country. In the summer of 2002, a review of web pages and cannabis journals resulted in the identification of 197 such shops in over 40 Spanish cities. The average cultivator grows a few plants on his balcony or patio, but there are an increasing number of people who cultivate gardens and larger plots, and some who use advanced equipment and cultivate in closets using artificial lightning and even hydroponic techniques. The bulk of marijuana cultivation in Spain occurs out of sight, and growers are fairly discreet in their practice of this hobby.

Home cultivation is perceived to be an alternative to prohibition. The production of quality types of marijuana adapted to personal tastes is also a persistent motive. This method is also seen as an option to an illegal market that has increasingly been dominated by low quality hashish” (Gamella and Jiménez Rodrigo 2004, p643).

Context and process: from home cultivation to cannabis social clubs

These factors may indeed have contributed to the increasing popularity of home cultivation despite its still somewhat unclear legal status. There are reports of prosecution of larger scale cultivation, but growing for personal use has generally remained untouched. From individual growing for personal use it was just a small step to collective growing. Already in 1993 there were experiments with collective cultivation. To test the limits of the judicial response to collective home growing a group of cannabis activists, the Asociación Ramón Santos de Estudios Sobre el Cannabis (ARSEC) from Barcelona, asked the anti-drug public prosecutor in Catalonia if cooperative growing for personal use would be considered a crime. When the answer was negative they decided to grow, harvest and use cannabis and informed the media about this. This first attempt to get collective cannabis cultivation for personal use regulated or condoned failed. After having been acquitted initially by the provincial

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court the activists were found guilty in the final instance (Barriuso 2011, pp2). However, in other cases cooperative growing was condoned. A well-known example is the Kalamudia association, which started in 1998 to grow and harvest 600 cannabis plants for 200 people without the public prosecutor intervening. This went on for three consecutive years. More initiatives followed.

This experience gave rise to an initiative aimed at a formalisation and stabilisation of these groups, laying the foundation of the social clubs. A Federation of Cannabis Clubs, consisting at the start in 2003 of 21 clubs, developed guidelines for how to manage these cooperatives within the framework of existing legislation, by only facilitating use in private (Rosmarin and Eastwood 2012). One reason for developing these guidelines was to end the juridical uncertainty regarding cultivation. Spanish law enforcement had been inconsistent in its response to the emergence of cannabis clubs. This Federation of Cannabis Clubs is, like the Union of Cannabis Retailers in the Netherlands, a sign of an emerging cannabis supply lobby.

This was the formal starting point of what became known as Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs). The basic principle has remained unchanged: it is non-profit cannabis cultivation for personal use of the members of the club, which is in fact a group of producers. These social clubs are now officially registered associations. In 2011 their number was estimated anywhere between 100 and 300 (Barriuso 2011). Barriuso describes the working of the clubs as follows:

“The typical evolution of a cannabis social club starts with it being founded and recorded in the registry of associations. Next, the members who wish to approve a collective agreement on cultivation do so. The club rents or buys land, buildings, equipment and all that is necessary to cultivate and later distribute the harvest. The calculation of how much is cultivated is done on the basis of a prediction of each member’s consumption.

The care of the plants, according to the formula chosen in each club, is carried out by voluntary members, staff hired directly by the club, or professional cultivators (who are usually also members) who are paid for the land rental and the hours worked after producing the relevant invoices. The accounts are kept very thoroughly in case there is an investigation.

Distribution is done on the club’s premises, which are normally in commercial buildings or offices and only club members and accompanying adults can attend. It is distributed in small quantities, for more or less immediate consumption. Most CSC also have a consumption area for members, although they often allow small quantities to be taken away for consumption over the following few days, so members don’t have to attend on a daily basis. There is a maximum consumption limit, which is usually 2 or 3 gr/day, and this can only be exceeded in the case of users with medical needs that require higher doses.” (Barriuso 2011, p4).

Process: consolidation, commercialisation and control

While the coffee shops in the Netherlands through the years have changed from rather idealistic entrepreneurs into commercial business, most of the CSCs make no profit. However, in recent years one can observe a clear trend towards institutionalisation and commercialisation.

When commercialised the CSC model of course has business potential. “In some ways, they resemble large-scale illicit commercial cultivation, in the way that land, buildings and equipment can be purchased or rented to provide a space for cultivation. People are employed (or volunteer) to cultivate and maintain the cannabis as well as to harvest it. Cannabis is cultivated both indoors and outdoors. In addition to herbal cannabis, resin and other products (oil, creams, etc.) may be produced. Cannabis social clubs follow the allotment principle, whereby members pool resources

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and distribute the harvest among themselves and apply strict guidelines, for example prohibiting re-sale.” (EMCDDA 2012b p76)

There are signs that in some cases it is used as a stalking horse tactic to grow cannabis for profit. The cannabis market covered by the CSCs is of course a business area offering promising economic opportunities. Parallel with this ‘institutionalisation’ the judicial framework also evolved, resulting in the conclusion that possession of cannabis, including large quantities, is not a criminal offence if there is no clear intention of trafficking (Rosmarin and Eastwood 2012).

This trend towards commercialisation of CSC contributed to increasing control efforts of municipalities. It is their responsibility to regulate the commercial activities within their local authority boundary. Municipalities as San Sebastian in Basque country and Girona in Catalonia have developed clear rules in a legal framework defining, among others, the minimum age of members (18 years), the minimum distance between CSCs and between CSCs and schools and health services and a ban on any kind of publicity and promotion activities (Appendix 6).

Context: additional arguments / more good reasons

The intention to get around the restrictive provisions of the 1992 Public Security Law regarding use and possession in public places seemed to have been the catalyst of the cannabis social clubs. But there were two more arguments for developing social clubs which are worth mentioning. One is the quality aspect, as briefly mentioned earlier. This might have been an additional motive for choosing this cooperative way of producing cannabis. Members of a CSC have more direct control of the quality of the cannabis they are using: they are able ‘to control the origin, quality and composition of what they are consuming’.

And finally there is the argument of decriminalising cannabis supply. By cooperative home growing the production and distribution of cannabis is effectively decriminalised. Some authors refer here to a separation of the markets, separating the cooperative supply from the illegal market. This differs from the separation of the market intended by the Dutch coffee shop policy. While the intentions of the latter were to separate the soft drugs (cannabis) market from the hard drugs market, the social club model allows for a separation of cooperative production and distribution from the criminal market.