• Aucun résultat trouvé

The loss of transparency is both a bug and a feature from the security viewpoint. To the extent that it prevents the end-to-end deployment of IPSEC, it damages security and creates vulnerabilities.

For example, if a standard NAT box is in the path, then the best that can be done is to decrypt and re-encrypt IP traffic in the NAT. The traffic will therefore be momentarily in clear text and potentially vulnerable. Furthermore, the NAT will possess many keys and will be a prime target of attack. In environments where this is unacceptable,

encryption must be applied above the network layer instead, of course with no usage whatever of IP addresses in data that is

cryptographically protected. See section 4 for further discussion.

In certain scenarios, i.e. 5.1 (full IPv6) and 5.2.1.2 (RSIP), to-end IPSEC would become possible, especially using the "distributed firewalls" model advocated in [Bellovin].

The loss of transparency at the Intranet/Internet boundary may be considered a security feature, since it provides a well defined point at which to apply restrictions. This form of security is subject to the "crunchy outside, soft inside" risk, whereby any successful penetration of the boundary exposes the entire Intranet to trivial attack. The lack of end-to-end security applied within the Intranet also ignores insider threats.

It should be noted that security applied above the transport level, such as SSL, SSH, PGP or S/MIME, is not affected by network layer transparency issues.

Acknowledgements

This document and the related issues have been discussed extensively by the IAB. Special thanks to Steve Deering for a detailed review and to Noel Chiappa. Useful comments or ideas were also received from Rob Austein, John Bartas, Jim Bound, Scott Bradner, Vint Cerf, Spencer Dawkins, Anoop Ghanwani, Erik Guttmann, Eric A. Hall, Graham Klyne, Dan Kohn, Gabriel Montenegro, Thomas Narten, Erik Nordmark, Vern Paxson, Michael Quinlan, Eric Rosen, Daniel Senie, Henning

Schulzrinne, Bill Sommerfeld, and George Tsirtsis.

References

[Bellovin] Distributed Firewalls, S. Bellovin, available at http://www.research.att.com/˜smb/papers/distfw.pdf or http://www.research.att.com/˜smb/papers/distfw.ps (work in progress).

[Berners-Lee] Weaving the Web, T. Berners-Lee, M. Fischetti, HarperCollins, 1999, p 208.

[Saltzer] End-To-End Arguments in System Design, J.H. Saltzer, D.P.Reed, D.D.Clark, ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4, November 1984, pp 277-288.

[IEN 48] Cerf, V., "The Catenet Model for Internetworking,"

Information Processing Techniques Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, IEN 48, July 1978.

[CATENET] Pouzin, L., "A Proposal for Interconnecting Packet Switching Networks," Proceedings of EUROCOMP, Brunel University, May 1974, pp. 1023-36.

[STD 7] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793, September 1981.

[RFC 1546] Partridge, C., Mendez, T. and W. Milliken, "Host Anycasting Service", RFC 1546, November 1993.

[RFC 1597] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D. and G. de Groot, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", RFC 1597, March 1994.

[RFC 1633] Braden, R., Clark, D. and S. Shenker, "Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: an Overview", RFC 1633, June 1994.

[RFC 1889] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R. and V.

Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", RFC 1889, January 1996.

[BCP 5] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G. and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

[RFC 1928] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R., Koblas, D.

and L. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, March 1996.

[RFC 1958] Carpenter, B., "Architectural Principles of the Internet", RFC 1958, June 1996.

[RFC 2018] Mathis, M., Mahdavi, J., Floyd, S. and A. Romanow, "TCP Selective Acknowledgement Options", RFC 2018, October 1996.

[RFC 2052] Gulbrandsen, A. and P. Vixie, "A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2052, October 1996.

[RFC 2101] Carpenter, B., Crowcroft, J. and Y. Rekhter, "IPv4 Address Behaviour Today", RFC 2101, February 1997.

[RFC 2210] Wroclawski, J., "The Use of RSVP with IETF Integrated Services", RFC 2210, September 1997.

[RFC 2309] Braden, B., Clark, D., Crowcroft, J., Davie, B., Deering, S., Estrin, D., Floyd, S., Jacobson, V., Minshall, G., Partridge, C., Peterson, L.,

Ramakrishnan, K., Shenker, S., Wroclawski, J. and L.

Zhang, "Recommendations on Queue Management and

Congestion Avoidance in the Internet", RFC 2309, April 1998.

[RFC 2326] Schulzrinne, H., Rao, A. and R. Lanphier, "Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)", RFC 2326, April 1998.

[RFC 2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

[RFC 2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.

and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated Service", RFC 2475, December 1998.

[RFC 2581] Allman, M., Paxson, V. and W. Stevens, "TCP Congestion Control", RFC 2581, April 1999.

[NAT-ARCH] Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT", Work in Progress.

[NAT-PROT] Holdrege, M. and P. Srisuresh, "Protocol Complications with the IP Network Address Translator (NAT)", Work in Progress.

[SECMECH] Bellovin, S., "Security Mechanisms for the Internet", Work in Progress.

[RSIP] Lo, J., Borella, M. and D. Grabelsky, "Realm Specific IP: A Framework", Work in Progress.

[HIP] Moskowitz, R., "The Host Identity Payload", Work in Progress.

Author’s Address Brian E. Carpenter IBM

c/o iCAIR Suite 150

1890 Maple Avenue Evanston, IL 60201 USA

EMail: brian@icair.org

Full Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.

This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of

developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be

followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English.

The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.

Documents relatifs