NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE AND SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICES

The events at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl led to the development of the safety culture concept and gave a rise to practical implementation of this concept at nuclear facilities. Similarly, the events of 11 September 2001 demon-strated the significance of the terrorist act hazard and the need for an adequate consideration of this challenge.

There are good reasons to believe that safety culture in its broad sense comprises the security culture together with safety culture process as its integral parts; moreover, the security culture and the safety culture have the right to exist purely in the context of safety culture in the broad sense. Therefore, it does not seem justified speaking about the priority of the nuclear security culture over the safety culture or vice versa.

Conceptually, a security culture has been only defined with some delay due to the delay in understanding the reality and significance of the hazard of intruder actions with regard to the nuclear facility. Security culture is intrinsically similar to the process of safety culture. The main difference probably lies in the fact that different groups of specialists speak about these two ‘cultures’ at the specialized

workshops and forums. Since the ultimate demonstration of the safety culture of the individual consists in his or her deliberate and qualified implementation of the applicable instructions and rules of conduct, the forming of this deliberate perception shall be based on clear understanding of what might happen if these rules are violated. If there is no such understanding, and very often it is actually not reached in the field related to security, the operator will have to implement instructions for fear of being subjected to sanctions by the inspector if the latter finds any violations. There are neither clear and illustrative examples nor convincing arguments providing insight into the consequences of violating the nuclear security regime. This is partly due to the fact that such examples were not observed in practice. Nevertheless, it would be useful if possible scenarios were to be developed and demonstrated to the personnel of a nuclear facility.

Several examples of positive practices from the Russian experience should be noted:

— In order to establish a high grade security culture at the operator level, a certain hierarchy is required, according to which personal responsibility for the security should be imposed on the top manager. Energoatom, the Russian operator, uniting ten operating NPPs, holds annual meetings devoted to security (physical protection) issues. Traditionally, every NPP is represented at the meeting by its director, who makes a report and personally answers the questions of the meeting participants. The positive result of such arrangement of activities is evident.

— Regulatory documents on nuclear and radiation safety, i.e. federal rules and regulations, irrespective of their subject areas contain obligatory general provisions on physical protection, accounting and control. At the same time, there are specific detailed documents directly devoted to physical protection, accounting and control, which in their turn generally describe (in one way or another) the issues related to nuclear and radiation safety.

— The licensing procedure comprises obligatory consideration of issues pertaining to physical protection, accounting and control, although such issues are to be discussed by the special structural units and specialized experts. The licence validity terms and conditions comprise separate sections including the specific requirements for physical protection, accounting and control. Similarly, when applying for a licence for control of a nuclear facility, which is granted personally to the top managers, the latter must pass an examination on physical protection, accounting and control inasmuch as they are responsible for these issues.

— Refusal to give a licence due to insufficient knowledge of physical security (physical protection) has a highly significant effect on forming a serious attitude towards this issue. The operator’s understanding that the regulator imposes strict requirements and scrupulously supervises implementation promotes the development of a safety culture.

The company shall not only establish the organizational structure capable of efficiently controlling physical security functions, but it shall also inform personnel about their responsibility for assuring physical security, the existing hazards and the objective of all employees, i.e. assurance of physical security. In this case, responsibility of each employee for the physical security shall be documented, i.e. the job descriptions of every employee should contain specific provisions pertaining to the physical security taking into account the duties of a certain employee. Understanding that an internal violator constitutes the greatest hazard should also be reflected in the requirements for personnel. Every deviation by an employee from the established rules of work shall be treated as an unauthorized action and then registered and analysed to find elements of deliberate violation. The same refers to actions not covered by the rules, including insider information that was no part of an employee’s duties.

Explanatory work should be also aimed at demonstrating that any violation will inevitably be recorded and duly investigated.

If systematically and competently conducted, explanatory work among the process staff and the population of adjoining territories usually gives good results.

For example, during a terrorist attack simulation exercise at one of the facilities, some ‘terrorists’ and participating staff of special units appeared in the area where the facility was located. It seemed to them that they appeared secretly.

However, as the head of the facility security service stated later, he received various phone calls from the population of the adjoining populated area stating that some strangers were seen in the area where the facility was located.

In conclusion, we are open to a wide discussion of the issues related to interaction between and synergies between various aspects of safety and safety culture, since we are aware that developing a safety culture is a long term and complicated process. At the same time, as soon as a safety culture is developed and provided with the necessary support, it will become an effective guarantee that safety will be ensured in the long term, and the funds allocated to technology and other material facilities will be used as efficiently as possible.