La restriction de l’information officielle

Au sujet de la protection de données, certains hommes politiques suggèrent qu’afin de lutter contre et de ne pas avantager les passeurs, il est nécessaire de ne diffuser aucune information officielle concernant la mise en place de stratégies sécuritaires en mer, puisque selon ces derniers, « people-smugglers use official information provided by governments, especially when that information is specific, to sell and promote their product and create perceptions amongst potential illegal entrants » (Morrison, House of Representatives, 13 November 2013 : 148). La divulgation d’informations spécifiques provoquerait, dans un premier temps, « [to] undermine [Australia’s] regional relationships necessary to deal with this problem [faisant référence ici aux requérants d’asile arrivant par voie maritime]; and, most of all, it would endanger [its] people » (Craig Kelly, House of Representatives, 20 November 2013 : 850). Et dans un deuxième temps, elle renforcerait le fait que les passeurs « dupe desperate people into embarking on that perilous and often fatal voyage on the high seas » (Nikolic, House of Representatives, 20 November 2013 : 854). Ainsi, le secret défense du gouvernement quant aux opérations en mer se justifie par le fait que ces efforts de dissuasion sont assimilables à une « guerre » contre les passeurs : « If we were at war we would not be giving out information that is of use to the enemy just because we might have an idle curiosity about it ourselves » (Abbott, House of Representatives, 24 February 2014 : 648).

A travers le nouveau projet de loi de l’Australian Border Force Act, mis en place par l’équipe spéciale militaire dans le cadre de l’opération frontières souveraines, le gouvernement rend le secret défense, ainsi que la sanction à deux ans d’emprisonnement pour la personne l’ayant rompu, conforme à la loi :

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24 Oaths or affirmations by Immigration and Border Protection workers

1) The Australian Border Force Commissioner may request the following persons to make and subscribe an oath or affirmation in accordance with the form prescribed by the rules for the purposes of this subsection:

a) a person who is covered by paragraph (a) of the definition of Immigration and Border

Protection worker in subsection 4(1) and who is in the Australian Border Force;

b) a person who is covered by paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of that definition and whose services are made available to, or who is performing services for, the Australian Border Force.

2) A person must make and subscribe the oath or affirmation before the Australian Border Force Commissioner or a person authorised by the Commissioner.

Compliance

3) An Immigration and Border Protection worker who has made and subscribed an oath or affirmation under this section must not engage in conduct that is inconsistent with the oath or affirmation.

Note: See subsection 13(4) and sections 15, 28 and 29 of the Public Service Act 1999 for the consequences of an APS employee in the Department not complying with subsection (3) of this section. *

41 Simplified outline of this Part

An entrusted person must not make a record of or disclose protected information unless the making of the record or disclosure is authorised by a provision of this Part, is in the course of the person’s employment or service as an entrusted person or is required or authorised by law or by an order or direction of a court or tribunal.

42 Secrecy

1) A person commits an offence if:

a) the person is, or has been, an entrusted person; and

b) the person makes a record of, or discloses, information; and c) the information is protected information.

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* 15 Breaches of the Code of Conduct¹⁴

Sanctions that may be imposed

1) An Agency Head may impose the following sanctions on an APS employee in the Agency who is found (under procedures established under subsection (3) of this section or subsection 41B(3) or 50A(2)) to have breached the Code of Conduct:

a) termination of employment; b) reduction in classification; c) re-assignment of duties; d) reduction in salary;

e) deductions from salary, by way of fine; f) a reprimand.

« There is a great advantage to have a high level of operational security which means you are not going to be transmitting frequently on what activities you are up to at that particular moment in time » (Morrison, House of Representatives, 19 November 2013 : 643). Cette marche à suivre, qui se justifie entre autres par « a sensible, prudent, compassionate but, above all, resolute and consistent approach to managing this problem [faisant référence ici aux requérants d’asile arrivant par voie maritime] » (Nikolic, House of Representatives, 20 November 2013 : 854), fait l’œuvre de diverses tensions entre hommes politiques, défenseurs des droits de l’homme, médias et population :

Here we have a minister of the Crown responsible for this particular area of policy refusing to answer questions regarding our nation's border security, regarding our nation's security policies, regarding our nation's immigration policy, regarding our nation's foreign affairs policy and regarding our nation's fiscal policy when it comes to relations with asylum seeker issues. This has affected the confidence of the Australian people in this parliament (Thistlethwaite, House of Representatives, 20 November 2013 : 848).

Face à cela, le gouvernement de centre-droite argumente qu’il cherche à tout prix d’éviter la méthode de gouvernance des partis de gauche – « we have seen the Greens and Labor become the best friends of the people smuggler » (Craig Kelly, House of Representatives, 20 November 2013 : 849) ; « the maritime operations of this government are different to those under the previous government » (Morrison, House of Representatives, 11 February 2014 : 40). Ainsi, il tient des propos dénonciateurs et accusateurs envers ses partis rivaux lors des discours parlementaires (5.2.4) qui, comme il sera compris par la suite, sont une stratégie contribuant au discours justificateur de ses actes.

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