government, it is incapacitated by the following factors:
High rast of political campaigns which have to be recouped after
the election;
very lew pays of civil servants. By 1994, the monthly salary of a doctor was only $90, $45 for a police officer and $43 for a primary school teacher. The wage bill constituted only 1% of the GDP.
Lack of enforcement of auditing systems within the government and the parastatal sector;
manifest failure to implement the Standing Orders, partly because it is tco draconian and unrealistic;
inability to monitor assets and liabilities of key decision makers in the public service;
• an underresourced judicial system that is yet to recover from the blight of civil war.
The IGG is under-resourced for its wide- ranging responsibilities.
Even though the IGG statute of 2 of 1988 makes the office responsible directly to the President, it does not have enforce ment powers and is forced to depend on the inefficient arms of government (the police, judiciary etc) for the prosecution of its cases. Yet it is charged with the dual functions of anti-corruption and receiving and reacting to citizens' complaints against pubic officers.
A combined mission of donor agencies to Uganda in December 1995 noted the gains made by Ugandan government in respect of political stability and moves towards constitutional rule, tremendous improvements in the economic conditions of Uganda- low inflation, return of capital flight and a convertible currency- and progress in respect of civil service reforms especially the reduction of the civil service numbers to 169,000 from 320,000.
On the other hand, the mission also noted that corruption continues to be widespread in the country- existing both at the top and bottom segments
and for junior civil servants as a means of survival. Even though the country's political leader is perceived as incorruptible and has initiated substantive and determined measures to tackle corruption- the freedom given to IGG to investigate corruption and the incarceration of a number of civil servants and politicians on corruption charges, the population seems unconvinced of the determination of the leadership to effectively combat corruption'.
1.2.6. Ecuador
Ecuador had a population of 11 million in 1993. Its per capita income at that time was US$1,200. Corruption in Ecuador as in many developing countries had become systemic. But it is most virulent in the procurement activities. About 30% of project sums are spent on bribes.
What is most important however, is that Ecuador has developed a highly successful campaign against corrupt practices in its procurement processes with the assistance of Transparency International. All those bidding for a project are required to sign a pledge that they will not bribe. Moreover, whoever wins the project contract will make a full disclosure of all payment s to third parties in respect of the contract. The unsuccessful tenderers are given the right to sue if they can prove that corruption was a factor in the in the deal.
The civil society is actively in monitoring these processes.;
Many other countries are watching the Ecuadorian experiment with immense interest. First, because it targets an important area political and administrative corruption in LDCs-procurement. Second, because it under scores the international nature of unethical practices and the effort to seek international cooperation between government and the private sector, national and international companies and state and civil society actors in the programme of monitoring and policing anti-corruption. Finally, the programme has brought different civil society organisations together in a coalition named, 'Clean Hands Movement'.
1.2.7. Philippines
The Philippines , a chain of 1,700 islands in Asia had a population of 65 million in 1993. Its ruler from 1965 to 1986 was Ferdinand Marcos who came to power on the strength of a campaign to clean the country of corruption. In 1972, he declared martial law because he was dissatisfied with the progress that had been made in poverty alleviation and corruption eradication. Under the martial law he promised the emergence of a 'New Society'. In 1975, he dismissed 2,000 government officials* several of them high ranking- as a result of a performance audit.
One of the most notorious corrupt and inefficient government institutions was the Bureau of internal Revenue (BIR). It was responsible for collecting
two-fifths of the country's revenue and had a manpower size of 7000. But government's reverues from taxes had fallen from 42% in 1973 to 29% in 1975- because of various forms of corrupt practices ranging from embezzle ment, fraud, sinecures to extortion, use of speed money and underassessment of taxpayers to the benefit of tax officials. Even the investigation unit was also corrupted. President Marcos replaced the topmost official in this bureau with a person who was widely perceived as Mr. Clean, Justice Efren Plana Within a short time, Justice Plana had rid the BIR of most of the corrupt practices and elements. Among Ns most important strategies were the dismissal of several corrupt officials and the publication of their names and offenses in the media, collected a lot of information on corrupt officials and taxpayers who tempted them using military and security intelligence services. He also undertook reorientation seminars, and tried to introduce a new organisational culture in the BIR.
Plana made important changes in BIR. In 1980, he became deputy minister of finance and shortly afterwards a justice of the supreme court. He was able to stem the tide of corruption in the BIR and exterminated most of the internal and external forms of corrupt practices in the organisation. Tax collections surged and he created a new sense of professionalism in the
agency.
On the other hand, these gains could not be sustained. The same forms of corruption raised their heads in a more virulent form after his departure from the organisation. The BIR was crucial to the millions that Marcos stashed away before he was removed from power by popular uprising in 1986. According to the New York Times. the President installed his relatives in the BIR to help his family members evade taxes.
Corruption became a national problem in the Philippines and was rated as the most important problem confronting the country by most citizens. It ultimately led to a major national crisis and the removal of the President, who was forced to flee the country and died in exile, under disgraceful circum stances.
1.2.7. Nigeria
Nigeria is black Africa's most peopled country, with a population of some 105 million (1993). The country is blessed with rich mineral, agricultural and human resources. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the late 1960s brought windfall gains to the government revenues which enabled it to embark on a number of very ambitious projects-roads, education, health infrastructure and large power dams in the middle of the country. Even a decision was taken to relocate the capital form the port city of Lagos to the centre of the country in the virgin land of Abuja.
Prosperity from oil also led to heightened forms of corrupt practices among the various government officials-first by civilian politicians but later in a more virulent form by military and civil officials, in close collaboration with foreign contractors of various shades and colour.
Military rulers justified their forcible entry into power by the corrupt practices of officials but they themselves were often overthrown by their colleagues on the charges of corruption and mismanagement of public resources. Unfortunately, each successive regime had out-performed the other.
But this was not for want of a battery of measures designed to stem the tide of corruption.
Three major types of measures have been used to tackle unethical practices by Nigerian governments. The first are media campaigns; since most media houses were owned and controlled by the governments this was relatively easy. Under the Buhari/ Idiagbon regime, a "War Against Indiscipline"
, otherwise known as WAI was launched. The Shagari regime followed this up with an ethical revolution and every govemment since that time has launched its own 'war' against indiscipline with lots of fanfare and cost but little tangible results on the conduct of public officials. Secondly, specialised bodies are created to investigate and prosecute corrupt practices: these include special tribunals with wide powers established by military decrees and manned mainly by military officers.
In addition, specialised civilian institutions have also been created, the most important being the Public Complaints Commission (PCC) in and the Corrupt Practices Bureau (both 1975), the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal in 1979. The Code of Conduct itself is very elaborate and prohibits all public officers (from the President down to the most menial of civil servant in the federal, state or local govemment or their agencies) from conflict of interest situations - they are forbidden from taking on part-time jobs, live above their incomes, be members of secret societies, operate foreign accounts, or take gifts or loans other than from banks or registered financial institutions. They are also not permitted to take only one job after retirement from the public service.
Most importantly, all public servants are expected to declare their assets (and those of their immediate families) immediately after taking office and at the end of every four years, at the end of every administration. In 1968, a major reform of the civil service incorporating new measures for improving accountability in the civil services was undertaken. Audit alarm committees were set up with powers to stop any voucher in a department or ministry.
Most of these measures have not had any impact whatsoever on unethical practices either on political office holders or civil servants. Several of these emergency structures are usually not properly resourced or not resourced
at all. For instance, the PCC was underfunded and practically all its staff were
seconded from government. The agency has therefore been more successful with minor administrative and routine issues rather than important cases. The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal legislations were never passed by the
parliament throughout the second republic and up till today has no adequate personnel, financial or police powers to compel compliance. The Audit AlarmCommittees were helpless in a situation in which those to raise the alarms- the Chief Executive of the Ministries, the Minister who also had the powers to hire and fire any staff in his department or Ministry- were often the people
implicated in major corruption scandals.On the other hand, Nigeria's military rulers seem adept at destroying
the very institutions -independent judiciary, legislatures, active media and civil
society structures etc- that could make them accountable while putting in placestructures that give a semblance of combatting corruption but is incapable of
detecting or penalising corrupt political leaders. As a result, the Nigerian civil service remains demoralised by poor pay, institutionalised corruption from the top leadership, opaque procedures and absolute lack of accountability in government. A recent World Bank report notes that the country's public sector lacks transparency, accountability and pervasive mismanagement which robs the economy of resources, adds to the cost of doing business and underminesconfidence in the public sector.10
The above cases have been very selective and cover only specified periods in each country. It has not been possible to cover all the possible cases that could be of interest. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned cases have been carefully selected to highlight important lessons for Ethiopia's efforts to design its own programme of enhancing ethics in its civil service. We turn to the lessons of these reviews next.
1.3. Lessons for the Ethiopian Civil Service
No two countries' experiences can be exactly the same in view of differences in national cultures, norms, social composition and levels of economic and social development. However, the field of administrative reform is one in which many useful lessons can be learnt across national boundaries and cultures.
From the review of different approaches and mechanisms for enhancing the ethical conduct of civil servants, seven major lessons deserve to be highlighted:
10 See World Bank 1995, p. 150.
1.3.1. Political Leadership's Commitment and Example Is Most Critical
By giving their support to a reform programme, the political leadership increases the visibility and importance of a reform programme for improving the ethical conduct of civil servants. It is however, even more important that political leaders lead by example as any rumours of ill-gotten gains or other unethical practices on their part will only reinforce the public's cynicism about such reform efforts.
1.3.2. Ethical Issues are best tackled as part of a programme of civil service reform rather than singly or as part of vendetta against past administrations
This is the case because improving the ethical conduct of civil servants is a long-term project which requires a number of interrelated activities over a period of time and cannot be tackled only by new legislations, penal systems or some other adhoc, dramatic activity. Focus on individual cases while symbolic could lead to scape-goating and divert attention from the systemic issues.
1.3.3. In order to enhance the effectiveness of civil service organs, it Is usually necessary to Improve the capacity of key internal and external accountability mechanisms.
internal accountability institutions include civil service rules and procedures, formal and informal training, inspectorates etc. The external institutions include the judiciary, the legislature, specialised, independent commissions - which are all outside the civil service proper and even some of the organs are outside of the public sector as whole- such as the media and pressure group activities of political parties and civil society organisations. As much as possible these two sets of mechanisms must mutually reinforce one another to be effective.
1.3.4 The drive for an ethical civil service Is an excellent window of opportunity for undertaking the revrtallsation of the civil service as a whole
The drive for a cleaner and more responsible civil service could provide the necessary impetus and enthusiasm on the part of the public and even the civil servants themselves for an incremental reform of the civil service as a whole. Indeed, successful anti-corruption institutions have served as very successful rallying points for the overall reform of the civil service in Hongkong and Singapore.
1.3.5. Each country must select the most appropriate
mechanisms to Its circumstances. A menu of options