ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS

A principal focus of Member States’ security concerns has related both to unknowing mistreatment and mishandling, and to malevolent use of radioactive material, including nuclear material and sealed radioactive sources.

Some of these concerns actually predate the events of 11 September 2001, which provided a new dimension to potential terror acts. For example:

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— Loss of control of sources that has led to:

• inadvertent exposure of people;

• the meltdown of irradiator sources at foundries, contaminating significant quantities of metal products;

— Use or planned use, and the availability of, radioactive material for terrorist purposes.

These concerns have resulted in a number of initiatives by the IAEA and by some Member States to define appropriate levels of accountability and security for radioactive sources. A series of IAEA sponsored meetings have resulted in a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [4], which is currently under revision, supporting documents such as the Categorization of Radioactive Sources [5] and the Security of Radioactive Sources [6]. In addition, an international conference was convened in March 2003 to focus attention on the scope of the problem with source security and on possible methods to improve their control.

Nuclear material is a subclass of radioactive material. It was subject to initiatives to assure their security prior to 11 September 2001. Since nuclear material is required to produce or build nuclear weapons, every aspect of its production, use, storage and transport has been subjected to intense concern and effort to institutionalize controls to prevent significant quantities from being diverted, and from falling into the hands of rogue States and terrorist groups. A primary vehicle for maintaining control of nuclear material is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [7], to which eighty-eight Member States are party, and forty-five are signatories. The companion document The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities [8] provides guidelines on suitable means for establishing security for nuclear material including during transport.

Subsequent to 11 September 2001, added attention has been paid to security for all radioactive material, not just radioactive sources and nuclear material. This attention is a result, in part, of the realization that, in the view of those with malevolent intent, suicide in performing a terrorist act is sometimes acceptable and, perhaps, in some cases may even be desirable. Thus, the hazardous and sometimes lethal radiation field for some radioactive material, previously thought to provide self-protection for the diversion of the material, may no longer be considered a protecting factor. As a result, it is clear that the psychological and possibly immense socioeconomic cost and the potential for physical harm to exposed humans from an optimally successful terror-based use of radioactive material must be limited through the application of enhanced security measures, including for transport.

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To meet this need, the IAEA, in response to a Board of Governors Resolution in 2002 [3], embarked on a programme to develop a set of recommended security requirements for radioactive material in transport as part of an overall enhanced security initiative to be funded, in part, from extra-budgetary contributions. The aforementioned draft guidelines for security in the transport of radioactive material are one of the results of that effort.

For the purposes of this paper:

— Safety relates to the protection of humankind and the environment from the potential consequences of accidents, while

— Security relates to the protection of humankind and the environment from the potential consequence of malicious, purposeful and unlawful acts of an individual or group.

It is noteworthy that the Agency’s Transport Regulations, TS-R-1 [2], clearly address issues associated with safety and make clear that security requirements, if applied, should not interfere with requirements to assure safety (e.g. see para. 108 of TS-R-1). Indeed, the IAEA’s founding statute [1]

authorizes it to perform certain functions, including, in Article III.A.6,

“…establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of health and minimi-zation of danger to life and property…”

Security guidelines, such as those in The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/225 [8], the Security of Radioactive Sources, TECDOC-1355 [6], and the anticipated guidelines for security in the transport of radioactive material, all are directed towards protecting health and minimizing danger to life and property. Thus, security may be considered a subset of safety.

Efforts relating to security in the transport of radioactive material build on the IAEA’s statutory provision of “establishing standards of safety” so that activities involving radioactive material will be in compliance with the require-ments of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources [9], which specifies that:

“The transport of radioactive sources shall be subject to the requirements of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material and any applicable international convention.” (para. 2.9)

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and

“Sources shall be kept secure so as to prevent theft or damage and to prevent any authorized legal person from carrying out any of the actions specified in the General Obligations for Practices of the Standards (see paras 2.7–2.9), by ensuring that: (a) control of a source not be relinquished without compliance with all relevant requirements specified in the registration of licence and without immediate communication to the Regulatory Authority, and when applicable to the relevant Sponsoring Organization, of information regarding any decon-trolled, lost, stolen or missing source; (b) a source not be transferred unless the receiver possesses a valid authorization; and (c) a periodic inventory of movable sources be conducted at appropriate intervals to confirm that they are in their assigned locations and are secure.” (para. 2.34)

The results of the efforts to provide recommended guidelines for security in the transport of radioactive material are expected to be initially published as a technical document (TECDOC) with the notation that it is provided as

“Interim guidance for comments”. The TECDOC may very well be a precursor for a future safety guide within the IAEA’s corpus of Safety Standards.