BACKGROUND
1.1. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is a major part of the national nuclear security regime for those States that have such material and facilities. IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) [1], provides recommendations for States on developing or enhancing, implementing and sustaining effective physical protection. IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 27‑G, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/
Revision 5) [2], provides guidance on how to implement those recommendations.
1.2. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [3] provides a framework for ensuring the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international transport. The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [4] entered into force on 8 May 2016 and extends the scope of the Convention [3] to cover nuclear material and nuclear facilities in domestic use, storage and transport used for peaceful purposes, as well as sabotage thereof. Reference [1] provides guidance to States Parties on meeting their obligations under the Convention [3] and its Amendment [4].
1.3. This publication updates the content of a handbook on the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities that was issued with restricted distribution.1 This publication includes information from the International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, prepared and delivered by Sandia National Laboratories.
OBJECTIVE
1.4. The objective of this publication is to provide comprehensive, detailed guidance for States, competent authorities and operators to assist them in implementing the recommendations in Ref. [1] and the guidance in Ref. [2] for an effective physical protection system (PPS) for nuclear material in use and
1 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Handbook on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities, IAEA‑TECDOC‑1276, IAEA, Vienna (2002).
storage and nuclear facilities. It provides further technical detail on how to design and evaluate a PPS, with respect to the selection and integration of appropriate, effective physical protection measures (including equipment). This publication is intended to serve as a general reference, pointing users to other complementary guidance on specific topics.
SCOPE
1.5. This publication applies to PPSs for nuclear material in use and storage and nuclear facilities against the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and against the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. This technical guidance does not address infrastructural aspects of a national nuclear security regime relating to physical protection, such as the legislative and regulatory framework or the institutions and organizations within the State responsible for implementing it.
Such aspects are addressed in IAEA Nuclear Security Series Nos 19, Establishing the Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme [5], and 29‑G, Developing Regulations and Associated Administrative Measures for Nuclear Security [6]. It also does not address in detail security measures complementary to PPSs, such as computer security measures or nuclear material accounting and control. Such aspects are addressed in other guidance such as IAEA Nuclear Security Series Nos: 17, Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities [7]; 25‑G, Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities [8]; and 32‑T, Establishing a System for Control of Nuclear Material for Nuclear Security Purposes at a Facility during Use, Storage and Movement [9].
1.6. The technical guidance in this publication is applicable to all stages in the lifetime of a nuclear facility, but focuses primarily on the design, equipment selection and operational steps of designing, implementing and sustaining a PPS. It addresses equipment and functions of a PPS to provide for prevention of, detection of and response to nuclear security events. It refers, where necessary, to other relevant guidance on specific topics. It also provides some general guidance on the evaluation of a PPS, pending development of detailed specific guidance.
1.7. Although intended for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, the concepts and guidance in this publication can also be applied to radioactive material and associated facilities and activities.
1.8. One of the purposes of nuclear material accounting and control measures is to prevent and protect against insiders who might attempt unauthorized removal or sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as discussed in Refs [8, 9]
and in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 8‑G (Rev. 1), Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats [10]. Nuclear material accounting and control comprises both administrative and technical control measures. Technical measures include technologies used for physical protection, such as video surveillance systems and radiation detection alarms. This publication describes the technologies but does not provide specific information on technologies solely used for nuclear material accounting and control, such as tamper indicating devices (see Ref. [9]
for more detailed guidance).
1.9. This publication does not include detailed guidance on the following:
(a) Response to a nuclear or radiological emergency that might result from a nuclear security event;
(b) Mitigation or minimization of the radiological consequences of sabotage at a nuclear facility (except to the extent that physical barriers are used to mitigate the consequences of an attack);
(c) Location and recovery of nuclear material out of regulatory control;
(d) Physical protection considerations in the siting of a nuclear facility.
1.10. In addition, this publication does not address security of material in transport, which is covered in IAEA Nuclear Security Series Nos 26‑G, Security of Nuclear Material in Transport [11], and 9‑G (Rev. 1), Security of Radioactive Material in Transport [12].
STRUCTURE
1.11. Section 2 of this publication provides guidance on key functions and protection measures that normally constitute a PPS. Section 3 describes the process of designing, developing and implementing a PPS. Section 4 provides detailed guidance on physical protection measures, including a range of technology, equipment and supporting procedures used for prevention, detection, delay and response. Section 5 addresses the PPS response, while Section 6 addresses PPS networks and support systems, and Section 7 addresses the introduction of new and emerging technology. Section 8 describes periodic equipment testing and the different types of testing, such as acceptance, operability and functional, maintenance and calibration tests. Section 9 explores PPS evaluation, Section 10 provides an overview of a PPS analysis and Section 11 provides guidance on management systems for nuclear security. The Appendix provides an example of a needs assessment and requirements analysis for adopting a new technology.