Foucauldian constructionism and discourse analysis

Important theoretical support is provided by the Foucauldian constructionism laying the ground for discourse analysis. Constructionism from this perspective

is taking the issue of the subject as an object of power, which is socially constructed. In the scientific inquiry, human beings are the objects of so-called 'dividing practices' whereby the subject is divided from others or within oneself along certain characteristics, for instance mad/sane, active/passive or sick/healthy. Such processes create subjects of power by the development of an ever-enlarging medical system of categorization whereby subjects are divided in medical labels. Moreover, these given characteristics work as a ground on which self-subjectification is built upon: human beings turn themselves into subjects along with the categories assigned to them (Foucault 1982). Similar trends can be found in other areas of life; in discourses to be found in social work as well as psychological interventions.

The objectification practices described by Foucault are maintained by power elements that in the post-modern era are based on control and surveillance rather than on punishment. People's lives, their conduct and morals are made an object of observation that is enabled by the subtle dynamics of scientific knowledge. Such trends can be seen in the system of knowledge surrounding for instance, medical and psychological intervention or even social work. In these areas instruments such as hierarchical observation (i.e. observation that requires the positioning of two unequal partners: the client and the professional) accompanying examination and normalizing judgments are normally used.

These processes as an apparatus of punishment are produced in a play of power that uses knowledge rather than coercion for the regulation of social conduct or in other words 'a mechanism that coerces by means of observation' (Foucault 1977: 171). Therefore, 'knowledge linked to power not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to make itself true' (Hall 2001: 76).

Discourses become forms of this power representing the 'regimes of truth' as described by Foucault:

'Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true' (Foucault 1980: 131).

Discourses then present a version of the world preferred by the speaker while superseding all others (Miller 2008). With the Foucauldian perspective we can only acquire information of things if they have a meaning, which makes discourse the only producer of knowledge implying that the objects of knowledge do not bring about knowledge by themselves (Hall 2001). Thus, meanings are constructed in discourses and outside these discourses meanings do not exist (Foucault 1972). Individual subjects personify the different forms of knowledge in the processes where they are produced in discourses. While I take this perspective of truth production as an important analytical presumption, I do not agree with the totalizing point-of-view that discourses are all-constitutive. Instead

of taking a position whereby structures take a complete agency-restricting role, I believe as Fairclough (1992) that resistance, struggle and negotiation are an inherent element in every power relation and that with the inclusion of practices in addition to discourses in the analysis, we are able to catch these instances.

This issue will be further scrutinized later on.

The notions of activation, marginalization and transition can be seen as constructed in discourses and tied to language serving as a base to our understanding. By this process, activation based measures can be legitimized as they apply to the more or less common understanding already constructed through these discourses. The research on clienthood is supposed to reveal the meanings that the figure of a welfare client entail and that bring about a certain regime of truth produced by the active labor market policies as well as the discourses around the subjects of intervention. These policies are a part of the 'institutional apparatus' (Foucault 1980) that use strategies of power relations supported by knowledge. Here, the technologies of such power involve institutional actors in the 'government of the self', whereby the subjects come to regulate themselves rather than being subjected to external control. The activation policies are then seen as capable of establishing subtle mechanisms through which the young people attach meanings to their clienthood. These meanings are uncovered to us by examining the discourses through which the individuals express themselves.

As Foucault rejects the binary structure of power relations where the dominators are opposed to the objects of domination, these relations are not necessarily repressive but can be empowering depending on the nature of the relationship, the players and the context. He assumes that the power relations do not exist without resistance, which becomes all the more effective due to the fact that they take place 'inside' the practice of power relations (Foucault 1980: 142). Hence, while individuals do not have access to the 'reality' outside discourses and are necessarily constrained by them, there exist strategies to resist, negotiate and use the dominant discourses for their benefit. In spite of this, Foucault seems to attach a weak conception to the agency of individuals or at least a limited conception of the subject, and his theoretical underpinnings have been accused of not being able to explore individuals' performances, strategies and practices (e.g. Macdonell 1986, Fairclough 1992).

It is precisely this insistence on structures that lies behind the criticism and that makes the view of power seem overwhelming. According to Fairclough (1992), Foucault's excessive emphasis on structures tends to neglect the analysis of practices and change. Instead, a more fruitful way of approaching structures might be to see them as an outcome of constantly renewed action or speech whereby they get not only reproduced but transformed. In practice, this means looking at the actual practices that take place in counseling sessions for instance (Fairclough 1992: 58-59.) While in this research, the role of analysis on interactions is rather marginal, it does have a focus on the implementation level of actual practices and the individual's accounts on the everyday realities and experiences as a starting point for describing structural premises. Whereas Foucault perhaps failed to include a thorough analysis of these strategies of struggle and resistance, the tools provided by other theoretical frameworks, such as critical discourse analysis will fill this gap.

5.1.2 Theoretical/analytical contribution of (critical) discourse analysis