The comprehensive safeguards agreement

— Basic undertaking: to ensure compliance with the NPT, the safeguards agreement and any regional non-proliferation agreements in respect of all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the State’s territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere. The IAEA, under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, has the right to apply safeguards.

— Application of safeguards: gives the IAEA the right to apply safeguards under the safeguards agreement.

— Co-operation: commits all agencies of the government to full co-operation with the IAEA in implementing safeguards.

— State system of accounting and control (SSAC): mandates the establishment and maintenance of a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards, including: a measurement system; a system for the evaluation of instrument accuracy; procedures for reviewing measurement differences; procedures for carrying out physical inventories; a system for the evaluation of unmeasured inventories;

records and reports systems for all material balance areas; and a system for reporting to the IAEA.

— Provision of information to the IAEA: mandates the prompt provision of all necessary information by all agencies and operators to the IAEA so as to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards.

— IAEA inspectors: mandates co-operation with IAEA inspectors so that they may effectively discharge their functions.

— Privileges and immunities: confirms that the IAEA (including its property, funds and assets), its inspectors and officials will be extended the privileges and immunities set out in IAEA document INFCIRC/9/Rev.2 [41].

— Transfer of nuclear material out of the State: requires notification to the IAEA of transfers; if above specified quantities, the notification must be made in advance of the transfer.

— Non-nuclear uses: recognizes the need for prior IAEA agreement to exempt nuclear material from safeguards, or terminate safeguards on it, for non-nuclear uses.

— Non-peaceful activities: sets forth the procedures to be applied in the event that a State exercises its discretion to use safeguarded material for non-explosive, non-peaceful nuclear activities, including notification to the IAEA, provision of an assurance that the activity does not conflict with the State’s peaceful use commitments, provision of an assurance that no nuclear explosive device(s) will be made, provision of information concerning the activity, provision of information on the quantity and composition of the material.

— Finance: contains a commitment to fully reimburse the IAEA for its expenses.

— Third party liability: provides that any third party liability protection applying to nationals of the State will apply also to the IAEA and its officials.

— International responsibility: provides that damage claims against the IAEA, other than claims for damage arising out of a nuclear incident, will be settled in accordance with international law.

— Dispute settlement: mandates consultations on questions of the interpretation or application of the safeguards agreement.

— Amendment: mandates consultations between the IAEA and the State, at the request of either, regarding proposed amendments to the safeguards agreement.

— Starting point of safeguards: provides for notification to the IAEA of exports or imports of nuclear material that is not of a composition or purity sufficient to trigger inspections.

— Exemptions: authorizes the State to request the IAEA to exempt nuclear material from safeguards for specified uses or within certain quantity limitations.

— Termination: authorizes the State to request the IAEA to terminate safeguards on nuclear material in certain circumstances.

— Subsidiary arrangements: authorizes the State to agree with the IAEA on subsidiary arrangements that detail the measures necessary for the IAEA to fulfil its responsibilities.

— Design information: mandates the State to provide information on the design of nuclear facilities to the IAEA.

— Nuclear material outside nuclear facilities: mandates the State to provide the IAEA with information (and details of any changes in the information) on nuclear material outside nuclear facilities, including its location, the user’s name, and the procedures for accountancy and control.

— Records system: mandates the State to maintain a material accountancy and operating records system.

— Reports: mandates the regulatory body to provide reports to the IAEA as foreseen in the safeguards agreement, including: material accountancy reports; inventory change reports; and special reports, in the event of any unusual incident leading to a loss of safeguarded nuclear material.

— Inspections: confirms the legal right of IAEA inspectors to have access to necessary locations; provides for facilitating the performance of inspectors’ tasks; provides for the prompt issuance of visas for inspectors;

and provides for the rendering of services needed by inspectors.

— Transfers: mandates the State to provide notice to the IAEA of transfers out of the State and to confirm completed transfers.

As mentioned above, legislation should ensure compliance with the NPT, the safeguards agreement and any regional non-proliferation agreements in respect of all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the State’s territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere. To this end, all agencies of the government are required to co-operate fully with the IAEA, in particular to provide promptly all necessary information to the IAEA so as to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards.

The State’s nuclear regulatory system should normally consist of:

(a) A regulatory body designated in the State’s domestic legislation for the purposes of implementing and applying the safeguards agreements concluded.

There should also be corresponding provisions of:

(b) Licensing;

(c) Inspection and assessment;

(d) Enforcement.

The comprehensive safeguards agreement requires a State to establish and maintain a system of accounting for, and control of, all nuclear material subject to safeguards, including:

(1) A measurement system;

(2) A system for the evaluation of accuracy;

(3) Procedures for reviewing measurement differences;

(4) Procedures for carrying out physical inventories;

(5) A system for the evaluation of unmeasured inventories;

(6) A records and reports system for all material balance areas;

(7) A system of reporting to the IAEA.

The regulatory body mentioned in (a) above should liaise with the IAEA on an ongoing basis as regards, inter alia:

(1) The furnishing and updating of information regarding the design of nuclear installations;

(2) The furnishing of reports required by safeguards agreements and subsidiary arrangements;

(3) The submission of requests for exemption from or termination of safeguards relating to nuclear material;

(4) The notification of exports and imports of nuclear material;

(5) The provision of facilities and support to the IAEA inspectors;

(6) The accompaniment of IAEA inspectors during their inspections and visits.

The State’s licensing provisions mentioned in (b) above should provide, inter alia:

(1) That specific nuclear activities require a licence or authorization by the regulatory authority (e.g. the possession and/or use of source or fissionable material);

(2) For prescribed reports at prescribed times and/or intervals (including material accountancy reports and special reports in the event of any unusual incident leading to a loss of nuclear material);

(3) For the subsequent reporting of inventory changes (including exports, imports and production);

(4) For the provision of design information on any nuclear installation;

(5) For the keeping of records (including an accountancy and operating records record system);

(6) For the performance of prescribed measurements of nuclear material;

(7) For prior notice of transfers out of the State and the confirmation of completed transfers and of prior notice of the import or export of nuclear material;

(8) For co-operation with inspectors (in particular with IAEA inspectors).

The State’s inspection and assessment provisions mentioned in (c) above should include the right of inspectors (in particular IAEA inspectors) to have access to any locations necessary to verify, inter alia:

(1) The consistency of the reports with the records;

(2) Changes in the situation;

(3) The location, quantity and composition of nuclear material subject to safeguards;

(4) Information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for and shipper–receiver differences;

(5) Information in special reports.

The State’s enforcement provisions mentioned in (d) above should be established, inter alia, to:

(1) Provide the regulatory body with powers to enforce compliance with the requirements laid down by the legal frameworks governing the safeguards;

(2) Provide for the rights and obligations of individuals and organizations (e.g. cases in which a court warrant may be required to ensure compliance, for example search or seizure measures);

(3) Provide for detailed procedures for determining and exercising enforcement actions (e.g. powers to seize and detain, and to bar or restrict access);

(4) Establish offences and penalties for violations of the requirements (e.g.

failures to report, refusals to provide information, obstructions of inspections, evasions of inspections or collections of samples and giving false or misleading information).

In addition, legislation should provide that the IAEA (including its property, funds and assets), its inspectors and officials performing functions under the safeguards agreements will be extended the privileges and immunities set out in IAEA document INFCIRC/9/Rev.2 [41].