Community Benefit Sharing

Pilanesberg National Park in the former Bophuthatswana was one of the first efforts in South Africa to integrate community development with wildlife man-agement. In an attempt to compensate local people for the loss of residence, graz-ing land and access to wild resources caused by the fencgraz-ing of a large area of the National Park and to encourage them to support wildlife conservation, a range of benefit-sharing arrangements were put in place by the Park authorities through the formation of a community development organization.

is organization undertook activities aimed at the development of local enter-prises such as vegetable growing and clothing manufacture, the establishment of a community games reserve, local employment and the use of local contrac-tors and infrastructure development. Surveys carried out before and after these arrangements showed that there was a shift from the previously hostile reaction to the Park, to a situation in which there was about 90 per cent local community support for the Park and a willingness to work in the Park even on a voluntary basis (Davis, 1993).

5.4.1 Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire River Fisheries Co-management Programme, Malawi

Inland fisheries are an important economic activity for many rural dwellers in Malawi, where fish is the most important source of animal protein for the major-ity of the people. Artisanal fisheries are also much more important than commer-cial fisheries in the lakes of Malawi. International studies on artisanal fishery that

Source: van Rooyen, 2002

were conducted at the beginning of the 1990s found that fish stocks of the most economically important species, locally known as chambo, had collapsed. One of the key recommendations arising from these studies was adoption of partici-patory fisheries management accompanied by much greater involvement of the artisanal fisheries sector in management.

e Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (PFMP), a multi-donor funded project, was initiated in 1993. Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire River (Mangochi District) were selected as the pilot areas for testing the PFMP that would involve local level institutions in the management of the fishery. Local-level institutions, known as Beach Village Committees (BVCs), were formed and incorporated a range of actors such as village heads, gear owners, crew members and local villagers. e main task of the BVC was to open channels of communi-cation between the fishers and the Fisheries Department.

e ultimate aim of PFMP was to work towards self-regulation of the fishery.

e BVCs are involved in disseminating information about fishing regulations (mesh size, closed seasons and closed areas) to fishers. ey also provide com-munity inputs into the annual management meetings where fishing regulations are developed. In some instances, the role of BVCs has extended to enforcement of fisheries regulations. e BVCs are not legal entities and have, according to the law, no rights to confiscate illegal nets. is is one of the key problems that hamper the process of co-management in the area.

e primary motivation for entering into the arrangement was for the Fisheries Department to conserve fish stocks by involving fishing communities in manage-ment. For the fishing community, the motivation was to restore and strengthen the fisheries resource, which forms the basis of most livelihoods in Mangochi District (Mohamed, 2000).

5.4.2 The Richtersveld Contractual National Park, South Africa

e local communities of the Richtersveld, an area rich in mineral and plant resources, entered into a contractual agreement with the then National Parks Board in July 1991. is agreement was a milestone for implementation of new conservation policies and practices in South Africa. is biologically rich area, situated in the northwestern corner of South Africa, had long been earmarked as a potential conservation area. e mountain desert environment, with its associated natural endowments, is said to have the most biologically diverse representation of this particular biome. With substantial support from the wider conservation community, the National Parks Board (NPB), now known as the South African National Parks (SANP), entered into negotiations to establish a

contractual national park in the Richtersveld. In August 1991, the 162,445 hec-tares Richtersveld National Park (RNP) was proclaimed.

Livestock farming forms an important source of livelihood but the mountainous terrain and mining concessions in the mineral-rich area reduce the amount of land available for grazing. Communal use of the grazing lands is widespread in the Richtersveld. Vehement opposition from the Richtersveld communities to the establishment of the RNP in 1989 led to a court interdict on the eve of the signing of the agreement between the NPB and the local authority. e commu-nities were dissatisfied with the compensatory mechanisms and with many other conditions as set out in the agreement with the local authority. After lengthy negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in 1991. is agreement addressed community concerns and culminated in the signing of a contract between the NPB and the community of the Richtersveld. e contract agreement specified a number of conditions for the management of the park, such as establishment of a joint management committee, improvement of infrastructure in the area and the payment of lease fees to a community trust.

According to the contractual agreement, a Management Plan Committee (known by its Afrikaans acronym, BPK) was set up to guide management of the Park. e Park also accommodated the seemingly competitive land uses of conservation, grazing and mining within its borders. Agreements were reached that existing mining operations could continue and that local stock farmers would be accom-modated within the Park. ere is also an increase in community-based tourism initiatives that can be traced to the existence of a national park in the area. ough the park has brought important benefits to the Richtersveld, critical questions have emerged as to whether the park is truly a co-management arrangement.

5.4.3 Water Resource Governance: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

As people realize that water is a finite resource, the move for co-operative manage-ment is growing worldwide. Southern African countries are beginning to establish management agreements and structures for shared water-bodies, the most nota-ble being the SADC Zambezi River Action Plan (ZACPLAN), which involves eight countries, and focuses on ways to guarantee the quantity and quality of water crossing borders. A number of other joint programmes exist, such as the Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission (OKAKOM) between Angola, Namibia and Botswana, and various Permanent Joint Technical Committees (PJTCs) between two or more countries. At a 1993 SADC/IUCN conference in Botswana, delegates recommended that ZACPLAN be broadened to take in all river basins in the SADC sub-region. e revised ZACPLAN is now the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems.

Water is the only natural resource in relative abundance in Lesotho. South Africa showed long-standing interest in utilizing water from the Lesotho Highlands to meet its growing industrial demand. A $US 5 billion joint venture between Lesotho and South Africa has been proposed, to build a network of dams and channels in the remote mountains of Lesotho to funnel rainwater to the indus-trial heartlands of South Africa. e dams will trap water that normally runs into the Orange River and out west into the Atlantic Ocean, and turn it north towards Johannesburg.

e prime objective is to turn Lesotho’s only abundant natural resource -water- into export revenues. In addition, on the way down, it will generate enough hydroelectricity to supply all Lesotho’s power needs and reduce its dependency.

However, the project is likely to cause environmental damage in terms of popula-tion dislocapopula-tion, grazing land flooding, and degradapopula-tion of the site by workers and tourists.

On October 24, 1986, an agreement between South Africa and Lesotho to proceed with the implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) was signed. e “Treaty on the LHWP between the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Government of the Republic of South Africa”

covers the rights and obligations of each party and lays down the quantities of water to be delivered, the cost-sharing provisions and the scope and calculation of payments for the water. e Treaty provides that South Africa will be respon-sible for all the costs of the LHWP related to the delivery of water, covering the cost of implementing, operating and maintaining the scheme. In addition, the country would provide loan guarantees if required by the lenders. us, Lesotho has virtually no financial obligation for the water-transfer component of the project. e Treaty also states that South Africa will pay Lesotho the equivalent of $US 60 million (at 1983 prices) a year in water royalties. e royalty would be a net benefit to Lesotho as the cost of exporting the water will be paid in full by South Africa.

5.4.4 Public Private Partnership in the Provision of Water and Sanitation in Queenstown, South Africa

In 1989, the old Queenstown Municipal Council began to experience financial problems, which affected its ability to deliver municipal services adequately. e Municipality entered into a concession contractual agreement in 1992 with Water Services South Africa (WSSA) in the operation, maintenance and manage-ment of water and sanitation systems over a period of 15 (later extended to 25) years (DBSA, 2000). At the time of signing, South Africa’s legislation prohibited private sector management of water billing and collection though it was foreseen that customer management responsibility might be taken over by the contractor

in the future (Palmer Development Group, 2000). In order to lease Municipal property, the Municipality published a notice of intention to engage the service of a private company in the provision of water and sanitation for public com-ment. As there was very little opposition to the intention of the Municipality, the Council went ahead with the contract in 1992.

5.4.5 The Dolphin Coast Concession in South Africa

e Dolphin Coast’s drive for private involvement in the delivery of public serv-ices predates the 1994 democratic elections. It was decided in November 1996 to seek private sector involvement in the delivery of water and sanitation services with a view to bringing in management efficiency and source for capital. In April 1997, 15 companies and consortia submitted technical and financial bids for implementing the water and sanitation concession contract and only 4 were adjudged for short-listing on the basis of a number of criteria used by the Adju-dication Committee.

In 1998, the preferred bidder was chosen. SAUR International won the R1 billion service concession contract to manage the Dolphin Coast’s water and sanitation systems over a period of 30 years. e company is expected to meet prescribed levels of service based on affordability and to take full responsibility for commer-cial risk by maintaining and developing infrastructure, providing services, billing consumers and assuming responsibility for tariff collection.