Communications

For safety, Annex I of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] details the prior notification provisions by type of package. It further notes that there may be deviations (exceptions, additions, etc.) relative to:

(a) National regulations relating to safety;

(b) Carrier restrictions;

(c) National regulations relating to security, physical protection, liability, insurance, pre-shipment notification and/or routeing and import/export/

transit licensing.

Specifically, prior notification is required for Type B(U) and Type C packages containing radioactive material with an activity greater than 3000A₁ or 3000A₂, as appropriate, or 1000 TBq, whichever is the lower; Type B(M) packages; and shipments under special arrangement only.

Annex I of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] also notes that additional measures may need to be taken:

“to provide appropriate physical protection in the transport of nuclear material and to prevent acts without lawful authority that constitute the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which cause or are likely to cause, death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property”.

For shipments requiring only prudent management practice, carriers need to provide drivers of road conveyances with effective communication capabilities that are routinely tested before each shipment commences.

For basic transport security level shipments, operators need to cooperate with each other and with appropriate authorities to exchange information on applying security measures and responding to security incidents. In addition, crew members need to have the capability to communicate with their company or law enforcement personnel in order to request assistance. However, with all of these communications, sensitive information, including that related to transport operations, needs to be protected.

If the relevant domestic and international transport safety and security regulations with respect to pre-shipment notifications are complied with, the security provisions may either complement or be inconsistent with those for safety. There may be inconsistencies with respect to communications and the protection of sensitive information, including inconsistencies related to specific pre-shipment notification security and safety measures. In these cases, the operator will need to coordinate the pre-shipment notification information with the relevant competent authorities to resolve those inconsistencies and to ensure that the exchange of information on applying security measures and responding to security incidents is handled appropriately, that sensitive information is provided only to those who have a need to know, and that the crew members have the ability to effectively communicate with their company or law enforcement.

If a non-compliance with respect to excessive radiation levels or contamination is identified during the shipment, SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] requires that the non-compliance be reported to both the consignor and the relevant competent authorities. This notification “shall be made as soon as practicable and shall be immediate whenever an emergency exposure situation has developed or is developing” (see para. 309 of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1]).

5.17. WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS AND DOCUMENTATION

For safety, SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] specifies the detailed contents of transport documents (paras 546–553); information to be provided to carriers (paras 554–556); and requirements for notification of competent authorities of shipments (paras 557–560), on possession of information by the consignor (para. 561), and for retention of shipping documentation by carriers (para. 584–588).

For security, when applying prudent management practices, an operator would normally be expected to develop safety and security documentation and maintain records associated with the shipment of a consignment.

For shipments requiring basic transport security level measures, carriers need to provide appropriate crew members with written procedures on required security measures, which need to include information addressing how to respond to a security incident during transport.

If the relevant domestic and international transport safety regulations with respect to documentation are complied with, the security provisions for written instructions and shipment documentation may either complement or be inconsistent with those for safety. Where there are transport safety–security interface inconsistencies between specific written instruction and documentation requirements for safety and those for security, the consignor or carrier will need to coordinate the pre-shipment notification contents of planning documents with the relevant competent authorities to address those interface issues. In addition, consideration could be given to developing a series of separate documents, each of which may be provided only to those who need to know about the aspect of planning it addresses.

5.18. MARKING AND LABELLING OF PACKAGES, AND

PLACARDING OF VEHICLES AND FREIGHT CONTAINERS For safety, it is important that the packaging and freight containers be clearly labelled as hazardous, so as to reduce the likelihood of an error due to a lack of information about the contents. For safety purposes, SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1]

specifies that the following are required:

(a) Markings on packages to facilitate understanding by all involved in transport of the package of the contents of the package;

(b) Labelling of packages to facilitate radiological safety, communicating the dose rate outside the package and the specific contents of the package;

(c) Placarding of vehicles and freight containers to facilitate communication of potential hazards to emergency responders in the event of an accident.

For security, labelling and placarding might provide a potential adversary with information that could assist the adversary in a performing a malicious act.

Removal of labels, placards or both for security purposes reduces the ability to communicate radiological protection and emergency response information to operational personnel, freight handlers and emergency response personnel.

Where a possible inconsistency exists between safety and security measures involving placarding and/or labelling, para. 2.62 of Ref. [4] states:

“if a State were to determine, based on an analysis of the threat, to remove (on an exceptional basis) any markings, placarding or labelling placed externally on the package or the vehicle with information on the hazards of the material, compensatory measures should be applied such as escorting personnel who can provide information on the nature and hazards of the material to emergency responders. Solutions to potential conflicts such as these should be assessed and approved by the regulatory bodies responsible for transport safety and security.”

Where it is determined that there is an inconsistency when satisfying safety hazard communication through the use of markings, labelling or placarding, then compensatory measures approved by competent authorities will need to be applied through alternative communications methods which ensure that in the event of an accident or emergency, lifesaving emergency response actions can take place.

5.19. IDENTIFICATION OF CONSIGNEES AND AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS

There are no apparent inconsistencies with the transport safety–security interface relative to the identification and authorization of consignees. Establishing identification and authorization requirements for consignees for security purposes can, in fact, enhance safety during transport.

For safety, with respect to the consignee, para. 546 of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1]

requires that (italics omitted) “The consignor shall include in the transport documents with each consignment the identification of the consignor and consignee, including their names and addresses…”.

SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] also specifies the following (italics omitted):

“583. Where a consignment is undeliverable, it shall be placed in a safe location and the appropriate competent authority shall be informed as soon as possible and a request made for instructions on further action.”

…….

“585. The information applicable to the consignment shall accompany the consignment to its final destination. This information may be on the

transport document or may be on another document. This information shall be given to the consignee when the consignment is delivered.”

For shipments requiring prudent management security practices, the consignor needs to know the consignee as would be the case for shipments of any valuable commodities.

For shipments requiring basic transport security level measures, consignors needs to ensure that consignees are properly identified, authorized and prepared to receive the consignments.

5.20. SURVEILLANCE

Reference [4] does not specify surveillance of shipments that require prudent management practices or the basic or enhanced security levels. However, if additional security measures are determined to be necessary by a competent authority owing to changes in threat levels or other factors, then para. 5.65 of Ref. [4] indicates that surveillance is an additional measure that might be considered. An inconsistency between safety and security if surveillance is required is unlikely to occur.

6. PROCESS FOR ADDRESSING TRANSPORT SAFETY–SECURITY INTERFACE ISSUES

Operators need to ensure that all transport safety requirements and national security requirements are satisfied and the associated transport safety–security interfaces are appropriately addressed.

For safety, consignors are required to provide transport documents (see paras 545–553 of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1]). These can serve as a basis for managing their operations consistently with the application of a management system (see para. 306 of SSR-6 (Rev. 1)) for transport (e.g. TS-G-1.4 [14]).

Similarly, for security, the relevant IAEA recommendation and guidance publications, and the requirements that emanate from the UN Model Regulations [2] and relevant modal regulations as established in State regulations specify similar actions.

This section describes a process to be followed by the operators submitting these transport documents and working with the safety and security authorities to address interface issues between safety requirements and national security

requirements. The operators must comply with all national safety and security requirements. Any non-compliance with safety or security requirements will involve compensatory measures which must be approved by the national safety and security competent authorities. For safety, the compensatory measures may include the requirement to ship under a special arrangement approval, which must be accomplished before the shipment begins.

Figure 1 applies to operators resolving such non-compliances, and to the safety and security competent authorities in providing resolution to such situations. This decision chart illustrates a logical process that operators, working with safety and security competent authorities, can follow to identify and resolve, for each of the 20 transport tasks outlined in Section 5, possible issues with the transport safety–security interface for normal commercial shipments of radioactive material where additional security measures (Ref. [4]) are being considered.

The identification of a potential interface issue will depend on the specifics of the consignment being planned. Here, all parties need to consider many factors, including the following:

(a) The chemical and physical forms of the radioactive contents in a package;

Operator identifies safety/

security requirements/

measures for each transport task

Operator develops proposed alternate resolutions for each transport task having an interface

non-compliance

Operators implement measures, notify competent authorities of any difficulties in implementation, await

competent authority’s direction on agreed measures

as needed to completely resolve difficulties

Safety and security competent authorities coordinate on and develop

resolutions to all interface conflicts, communicate resolutions to operator Operator communicates proposed alternative transport safety/security interfaces with both safety and security competent authorities and

requests joint approval

resolutions to Do any of the interface conflicts still result in operator

non-compliance with safety

FIG. 1. Process for operators and safety and security competent authorities to follow in addressing transport safety–security interface issues.

(b) The details of the package design that have been established to satisfy the safety requirements specified in relevant transport safety regulations;

(c) The type(s) of conveyance, mode(s) of transport and routes to be used.

The implementation of prudent management practices for security as detailed in Ref. [4] can enable compliance with all the transport regulatory requirements specified in SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] to be achieved. The implementation of additional security measures may introduce scenarios in which the transport safety requirements cannot be met, and in these situations this lack of compliance will require discussion between the competent authorities for safety and security to identify and agree on the compensatory safety measures needed.

If additional security measures are deemed necessary by the transport security competent authority, advice and agreement involving other competent authorities for safety and security will need to be sought (see Fig. 1). The operators should be informed of the additional security measures and the compensatory safety measures determined necessary by both the security and safety competent authorities.

If additional, compensating safety measures are deemed necessary by the transport safety competent authority, advice and agreement by other involved competent authorities will need to be sought. The operators should be informed of the agreed compensatory safety measures as determined necessary by both the security and safety competent authorities.

As shown in Fig. 1, the operator should assess if any additional security measures compromise compliance with the safety regulatory requirements (including any notified compensatory safety measures), or whether any safety requirements compromise compliance with national security requirements.

If compliance with safety requirements or national security requirements is compromised, then the operator should follow the approach shown in Fig. 1, preparing proposed compensatory measures, communicating those to the safety and security competent authorities and awaiting notification of agreed measures from both competent authorities before the shipment commences.

For safety, this is advised because any resulting non-compliance with the transport safety requirements would be illegal unless the compensatory measures have been approved by safety competent authorities, a special arrangement approval has been issued to the operator, and any changes to national emergency response arrangements have been implemented. Similarly, for security this is advised to ensure compliance with national security requirements set by the State.

Therefore, the resolution process will need to be focused on the design of the transport system, considering the changes in the details of the interface between safety and security. The topically related example questions provided

in Appendix I can be used with the decision chart in Fig. 1 to further facilitate addressing such issues.

Appendix I

EXAMPLE TRANSPORT TASK QUESTIONS FOR ADDRESSING TRANSPORT SAFETY–TRANSPORT SECURITY INTERFACE ISSUES

Section 5 discussed 20 safety–security interface tasks that will need to be considered when addressing potential interface issues. As applicable, it considered, for security, both normal commercial shipments of radioactive material requiring only prudent management practices and those requiring both prudent management practices and basic transport security level measures.

For shipments that require only prudent management practices, the safety–security interface will probably not introduce interface issues.

However, for shipments requiring both prudent management practices and basic transport security level measures, a consignor may consider applying the security measures set forth in Ref. [4], following consultation with and approval by relevant safety and security competent authorities if the adoption of such measures would result in a non-compliance with safety requirements. For basic transport security level shipments, para. 5.9 of Ref. [4] states:

“At the basic transport security level, the regulatory body should require that shippers, carriers, receivers and others engaged in the transport of radioactive material implement security systems or other arrangements to deter, detect, delay and respond to malicious acts affecting the conveyance or its cargo, using a graded approach. These arrangements should be operational and effective at all times and include training and regular briefings to assist personnel in maintaining awareness and vigilance.”

Finally, a competent authority may require a consignor to apply additional security measures owing to an arising threat or risk in the State or States where normal commercial shipments of radioactive material are to occur. The relevant competent authorities will specify the basis for determining the necessary level of security and the appropriate security measures for a given shipment. If these measures lead to a non-compliance with safety requirements, this will need to be accompanied by any required compensatory safety measures that are to be applied, as prescribed by the safety competent authority.

To assist operators in fulfilling these requirements, subsections I.1–I.20 elaborate upon the 20 tasks discussed in Section 5, providing a brief summary of potential interface issues, and then lists in the left column one or more typical questions that can be used in an action list to facilitate demonstration of compliance with relevant safety requirements/security recommendations prior

to undertaking a shipment. This table could also assist operators in identifying safety–security interface issues and addressing those issues with their relevant competent authorities.

Operators and competent authorities may explore these typical questions for each of the tasks listed in subsections I.1–1.20, responding to each question in the three blank columns in the table (i.e. providing answers for safety, security and the interface), thereby helping them to better understand the safety–security interface. Specifically, application of this table could be useful to the operators when preparing to undertake normal commercial shipments of radioactive material. For example, for these shipments, providing answers to the questions in the subsections that follow could facilitate the preparation of necessary transport documents by operators, incorporating safety–security interface information associated with the shipments while concurrently providing a basis for demonstrating compliance with safety requirements and security measures to competent authority inspectors.

In utilizing this tool, prior to preparing its shipment, the consignor needs to determine whether only prudent management practices are to be followed for transport security, or whether both prudent management practices and basic transport security level measures are to be followed; Table 23 in Appendix II can further assist the user in this process. The consignor also needs to determine whether the contents of the shipment pose other dangers and, if so, will need to determine what additional security measures if any need to be applied owing to those subsidiary hazards.

I.1. GENERAL INTERFACE BETWEEN SAFETY AND SECURITY Compliance with all relevant dangerous goods transport regulations is necessary to ensure that transport security measures are implemented so as to not detract from safety. Thus, the provisions set forth in all relevant transport safety and security regulatory documents need to be implemented so as to provide a high level of safety and security, while any interface issues between safety and security are resolved by the relevant competent authorities working closely with the consignor and carriers.

Both transport safety regulations and transport security recommendations and guidance specify that radioactive materials shall be shipped where security provisions recognize and accommodate safety provisions, and safety provisions recognize and accommodate security provisions.

The general interfaces between transport safety and security are structured with a view to ensuring one does not detract from the other. Complying with all relevant dangerous goods transport regulations can provide a high level of safety,

while any interface issues introduced by security will need to be addressed.

Table 2 contains example questions to assist stakeholders in addressing issues with the general interface between safety and security.

I.2. REGULATIONS AND COMPLIANCE

For a given normal commercial shipment of radioactive material, relevant domestic and international transport safety and security regulations apply. Safety and security regulations may emanate from different competent authorities that are governed by different legal and regulatory regimes, making it difficult for operators to develop an understanding of how to fully comply with both sides of the regulatory framework.

For transport safety, all relevant requirements imposed by regulations must be satisfied. Similarly, for transport security, all relevant security measures imposed by relevant regulations must be satisfied. If a failure to comply with requirements is identified, this will need to be communicated to the relevant safety and security competent authorities.

For international shipments it is possible that consignors and carrier(s) may operate under regulatory regimes based upon different editions of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] for safety, and national requirements for security that meet the IAEA security recommendations in part or in full. Possible interface issues in the international transport safety–security interface for a shipment will need to

For international shipments it is possible that consignors and carrier(s) may operate under regulatory regimes based upon different editions of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [1] for safety, and national requirements for security that meet the IAEA security recommendations in part or in full. Possible interface issues in the international transport safety–security interface for a shipment will need to